UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALI ALSARAJ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 24 - 3399 (LLA) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Ali Alsaraj, a U.S. citizen residing in the United States, and his parents, foreign

nationals Buraq Al Siraj and Sameerah Kaba, seek to compel Defendants—the U.S. Secretary of

State, the U.S. Embassy in Oman, various State Department officials, and Kash Patel in his official

capacity as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)—to adjudicate

Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s immigrant visa applications. ECF No. 1. 1 Plaintiffs claim that their

visa applications have been unreasonably delayed in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”),

et seq., and the Mandamus Act,

. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29-30.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 40. For the reasons explained below, the court will

grant the motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of FBI Director Patel but otherwise deny it.

1 Plaintiffs named several government officials in their official capacities as Defendants, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-21, and their successors are “automatically substituted” as parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court draws the following facts, accepted as true, from Plaintiffs’ complaint. Wright

v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). It further takes judicial

notice of “information posted on official public websites of government agencies.” Arab v.

Blinken,

, 63 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022).

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that a U.S. citizen or lawful

permanent resident may petition for a qualifying relative to receive permanent residency in the

United States.

. There are several steps to the process. First, the sponsor must

file a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”). Id.; see

(f) (2025); USCIS, I-130 Petition for Alien Relative. 2 If the

USCIS approves the petition, it transfers the case to the U.S. State Department’s National Visa

Center (“NVC”).

(f)(3). The foreign national must then submit a DS-260

Immigrant Visa Application to the NVC and await an interview with a consular officer.

, 42.62, 42.67. At the conclusion of the interview, “the consular officer must [either] issue

the visa [or] refuse the visa.”

§ 42.81(a). If the consular officer determines that he does not

have sufficient information to establish visa eligibility, he may “refuse” the visa pending further

administrative processing pursuant to Section 221(g) of the INA, which typically consists of

additional information-gathering. U.S. Dep’t of State, Administrative Processing Information; 3

see

(g); Giliana v. Blinken,

, 18 (D.D.C. 2022).

In August 2021, Mr. Alsaraj filed I-130 petitions on behalf of his father, Mr. Al Siraj, and

his mother, Ms. Kaba. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2; see

(Ex. A). The USCIS approved

2 Available at https://perma.cc/DR4Z-5PNR. 3 Available at https://perma.cc/RH7T-J7US.

2 Mr. Al Siraj’s petition in June 2022,

, and Mr. Al Siraj was interviewed at the U.S. Embassy

in Oman in February 2023,

. After the interview, the Embassy informed Mr. Alsaraj that

Mr. Al Siraj’s visa application “was being held for administrative processing and that the Embassy

would contact him when the administrative processing was completed.”

; see

(Ex. D).

The USCIS approved Ms. Kaba’s petition in January 2023,

, and Ms. Kaba was

interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Oman in May 2023,

. After the interview, the Embassy

informed Mr. Alsaraj that Ms. Kaba’s visa application “was being held for administrative

processing and that the Embassy would contact her when the administrative processing was

completed.”

; see

(Ex. E).

Plaintiffs “have been told that there is no foreseeable date at which time the administrative

processing will be completed.”

. The delay in the adjudication of Mr. Al Siraj’s and

Ms. Kaba’s visa applications has “deprived [Mr. Al Siraj and Ms. Kaba] of the substantial benefits

of being able to join [Mr.] Als[a]raj in the safety of the United States,” including being able to live

and work in the United States.

. The family has also had to withstand being separated “for

a very long time.”

In December 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to compel Defendants to adjudicate

Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa applications. ECF No. 1. Defendants have moved to dismiss

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 40. The matter is fully

briefed. See ECF Nos. 40 to 42.

3 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action

unless the plaintiffs can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses

subject-matter jurisdiction. Green v. Stuyvesant,

(D.D.C. 2007). In

reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court “is not limited to the allegations set

forth in the complaint” and “‘may consider materials outside the pleadings.’” Morrow v. United

States,

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food &

Drug Admin.,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)). Additionally, when reviewing such a

motion, the court is required to “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint

and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

,

1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

In

evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will accept the factual allegations in

the plaintiffs’ complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Erickson v.

4 Pardus,

(2007); see also Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

. Nor will “‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice. Iqbal,

(alteration

in original) (quoting Twombly,

).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the

facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.

Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Hurd v. District of

Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2017)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise three arguments in their motion to dismiss: (1) that FBI Director Patel

must be dismissed because he cannot provide the relief requested, ECF No. 40, at 4-5; (2) that the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars consideration of Plaintiffs’ claim, id. at 9-13; and

(3) that Plaintiffs fail to identify a discrete agency action that Defendants were obligated to, but

did not, take, id. at 5-9. 4 The court considers each argument in turn.

4 In a departure from similar cases, Defendants do not argue for dismissal based on the factors set forth in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”), the very analysis required to evaluate a claim of unreasonable delay. ECF No. 40, at 1. Instead, in a footnote, Defendants claim that they will move for judgment on the pleadings based on the TRAC factors if the court denies their motion to dismiss.

at 1 n.1. While allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants’ approach strikes the court as an exercise in gamesmanship that increases litigation costs for the parties and taxes limited judicial resources. The court encourages Defendants to litigate more efficiently in the future.

5 A. FBI Director Patel

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to proceeding against FBI Director Patel

because he neither caused Plaintiffs’ injuries nor can provide them with their requested relief. ECF

No. 40, at 4-5. Plaintiffs respond that Director Patel is a proper defendant because the FBI

conducts background checks of visa applicants and thus may be a source of the delay in the

adjudication of Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa applications. ECF No. 41, at 6-7. The court

agrees with Defendants that Director Patel must be dismissed.

“[T]o establish standing as to each defendant, [a p]laintiff must show that his injuries are

‘causal[ly] connect[ed]’ to each defendant’s conduct and ‘likely’ can be ‘redressed by a favorable

decision.’” Zakeri v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-3162,

, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2024)

(third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992)). Plaintiffs allege that Director Patel “is responsible for overseeing the background checks

involved with immigration matters,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 21, and they posit that delays in those

background checks “may be the reason that administrative processing is still causing delay

regarding the adjudication of their immigrant visa applications,” ECF No. 41, at 6. The trouble

for Plaintiffs is that nowhere in their complaint do they allege any facts suggesting that the delay

in the adjudication of Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa applications is attributable to the FBI.

See generally ECF No. 1. “The ‘sheer possibility’ that the FBI played some role in the disputed

delay is insufficient to allege standing.” Nusrat v. Blinken, No. 21-CV-2801,

,

at *4 (D.D.C. Sep. 8, 2022) (quoting Iqbal,

); see Ba Tis v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

No. 24-CV-219,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2025) (dismissing claims where the

plaintiff failed to allege that the Secretary of Homeland Security and FBI Director had a role in

adjudicating his visa). At most, Plaintiffs allege that Director Patel has “responsibilities that

6 intersect with the adjudication of a visa application.” Ba Tis,

, at *4. Even after

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, their bare speculation that Director Patel

“may” be a reason for the delay in adjudicating Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa applications is

insufficient to suggest that he is either causally connected to or capable of redressing their alleged

injury. See ECF No. 41, at 6. The court will accordingly grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Director Patel from the case.

B. Consular Nonreviewability

Defendants next argue that the court must dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability. ECF No. 40, at 9-13. 5 In the context of visa adjudications,

“[c]onsular nonreviewability shields a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from

judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir. 2021); see Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 (2024).

However, “a long line of decisions from this Court have held that the consular nonreviewability

doctrine applies only to final decisions and thus does not bar judicial review of a consular officer’s

delay when a visa application has been provisionally refused pending a final decision.”

Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

, 11 (D.D.C. 2022) (collecting

cases).

In response to this longstanding precedent, Defendants point to the D.C. Circuit’s decision

in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024), arguing

that while there may have previously been “some debate . . . as to whether the doctrine applie[s]

5 It is well established that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not jurisdictional. See Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 n.4 (2024).

7 in cases seeking to compel action on visa applications in post-refusal administrative processes,

Karimova necessitates an end to that debate.” ECF No. 40, at 11. In Defendants’ view, Karimova

conclusively establishes that where a visa application has been refused under Section 221(g) and

placed in administrative processing, a final decision has been rendered on the application. ECF

No. 42, at 9-10; see Karimova,

, at *2-3, *6. The court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the court notes—contrary to Defendants’ assertion, ECF No. 40, at 6

n.2; ECF No. 42, at 1-4—that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Karimova does not bind it. The

D.C. Circuit has twice declined to publish Karimova. See Karimova,

, at *6;

Order, Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 10, 2024), Doc. No. 2074062, at 1. Under

the D.C. Circuit’s rules, “[w]hile unpublished dispositions may be cited[,] . . . a panel’s decision

to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that

disposition.” D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2) (emphases added). 6 This court takes the D.C. Circuit at its

word and considers, but does not find itself bound by, Karimova.

Having considered Karimova, the court is not inclined to follow it. In Karimova, the

plaintiff was in a position substantially similar to that of Mr. Al Siraj and Ms. Kaba: she had

applied for a visa, interviewed at an embassy, and had her application “officially ‘refused’” under

6 Defendants cite D.C. Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B) for the proposition that unpublished opinions “may be cited as precedent,” ECF No. 42, at 3 (quoting D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B)), which is true as far as it goes. But as the D.C. Circuit has explained—in a published opinion that is binding on this court—“[w]hile [unpublished] dispositions have some precedential value, they are ‘obviously . . . not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.’” In re Grant,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan,

(1974)). Accordingly, these decisions “may be considered persuasive authority, but they do not constrain a panel of the [C]ourt from reaching a contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full consideration of the issue.”

Other than their say-so, ECF No. 42, at 1-4, Defendants have pointed to no authority suggesting that this court should take a different approach.

8 Section 221(g) for further administrative processing.

, at *2 (quoted sources

omitted). The D.C. Circuit, relying on various regulations and the Department of State’s Foreign

Affairs Manual (“FAM”), reasoned that placing an application in administrative processing must

be a “final” decision because a relevant regulation instructed that a consular officer “must issue”

or “refuse” a visa following an interview,

(emphasis in Karimova) (quoting

(a)), and because the FAM directed that, after an interview, “[c]onsular officers ‘cannot

temporarily refuse, suspend, or hold the visa for future action,’”

(quoting 9 FAM § 504.1-3(g)).

Drawing on these sources, the D.C. Circuit characterized Ms. Karimova as requesting “yet another

‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application,” as opposed to a final decision in the first

instance. Id. at *6.

This interpretation places too much emphasis on the current language in the FAM—which

does not carry the force of law, see Aramnahad v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-1817,

,

at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2025)—and too little emphasis on the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint

and the realities of the visa-adjudication process, see Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 16

(“Although the State Department may ‘choose[] to characterize a section 221(g) notification as a

“refusal,”’ that magic word is not a get-out-of-review-free-card . . . [and] the Court must examine

[a plaintiff’s] allegations to determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges that the consular

officer’s ‘refusal’ was in fact an ‘interim decision [that] is not sufficiently final to warrant the

application of the [consular nonreviewability] doctrine.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Vulupala v.

Barr,

, 98 (D.D.C. 2020))). It is impossible to square Defendants’ assertion

that placement in “administrative processing” was a final disposition of Mr. Al Siraj’s and

Ms. Kaba’s visa applications with the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs allege that,

after Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s interviews, they were informed that their visa applications had

9 been placed in “administrative processing” and that they would be contacted once that processing

was complete. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7-8. In their brief in opposition, Plaintiffs further maintain that, after

their interviews, Mr. Al Siraj and Ms. Kaba were directed to provide additional information to

supplement their applications, which they did. ECF No. 41, at 5; see ECF No. 1, at 24-25 (Ex. D),

27-28 (Ex. E). Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in

Plaintiffs’ favor—as this court must, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678—Plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged that they have not received final decisions on Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa

applications, see Aramnahad,

, at *8; cf. Ibrahim v. Spera, No. 23-CV-3563,

, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Sep. 6, 2024) (noting “that it is extremely difficult to square

[Karimova’s] analysis, which is based largely on agency regulations, with the communications

that visa applicants actually receive from various consulates”).

Plaintiffs do not challenge final decisions denying Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa

applications, nor do they contend that this court should order the State Department to grant the

applications. See generally ECF No. 1. Rather, Plaintiffs request only that Defendants “either

grant or deny [Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s] pending immigrant visa applications.”

.

Several courts in this district have found, even after Karimova, that “the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability does not bar challenges to timing as opposed to substance.” de Belinay v.

Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-240,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2025) (quoting Shabestary v.

Sanders, No. 24-CV-362,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024)); see, e.g.,

Tolymbekova v. Rubio, No. 25-CV-295,

, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Sep. 5, 2025);

Mehrpooya v. Allen, No. 24-CV-2340,

, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Sep. 4, 2025); Thein v.

Trump, No. 25-CV-2369,

, at *7-10 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); Shushkov v.

Rubio, No. 24-CV-2265,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2025); Hojjatoleslami v.

10 Rubio, No. 24-CV-2871,

, at *3 (D.D.C. July 30, 2025); Diabin v. Rubio,

No. 24-CV-3374,

, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025); Aramnahad,

,

at *10; Mahmoodi v. Altman-Winans, No. 24-CV-2010,

, at *4-6

(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025); Baygan v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-2840,

, at *4-5

(D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024). But see Rezvani v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-3381,

, at *2

(D.D.C. May 5, 2025) (noting that “the consular non-reviewability doctrine would likely apply”

but dismissing suit for failure to sufficiently allege a non-discretionary duty).

This court follows the majority view and determines that Plaintiffs’ action is properly

understood as an attempt to compel two adjudications that have been unreasonably delayed, rather

than one aimed at changing any final decisions that have already been rendered. Accordingly, the

case is not barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

C. Non-Discretionary Duty

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that a “government agency or

official” violated a “clear, non-discretionary duty”—a threshold requirement for a mandamus

claim and a merits question for a claim of unreasonable delay under the APA. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.

Burwell,

(D.C. Cir. 2016); see ECF No. 40, at 5. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs cannot identify “a clear, non-discretionary duty requiring a consular officer to take any

action on the Visa Application[s].” ECF No. 40, at 5. As support for this proposition, Defendants

again point to Karimova, which they argue is “dispositive” of the claims presented. Id. at 6, 9.

In Karimova, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiff had “not identified an adequate legal

basis” for her action seeking to “compel[] the consular officer overseeing her visa application to

make yet another ‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application.”

,

at *6. The Court characterized the plaintiff as “argu[ing] that Section 555(b) [of the APA]—and

11 only Section 555(b)—‘places a clear, non-discretionary duty’ on her consular officer to

re-adjudicate her already-refused application.”

. The Court easily determined that

“Section 555(b) does no such thing” and instead “simply expresses ‘a congressional view that

agencies should act within reasonable time frames.’”

(quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr.

v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”)).

The problem for Defendants is that this rationale is wholly inapplicable given this court’s

understanding of the visa process. See supra Part III.B. It may be true that Section 555(b) does

not create a duty to re-adjudicate a final decision where one has already been made, but, as this

court sees it, that is not what Plaintiffs are seeking. Instead, they are seeking an initial, final

determination on their visa applications. In this way, any discussion of how Section 555(b) applies

to requests to re-adjudicate final visa decisions means very little for a plaintiff who seeks an initial

final decision and wishes for it to be made “within [a] reasonable time frame[]” as Section 555(b)

requires. TRAC,

.

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that the APA and

(a) impose a

nondiscretionary duty on Defendants to adjudicate Mr. Al Siraj’s and Ms. Kaba’s visa

applications. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 39. 7 Several courts in this district have concluded “that both the

APA and State Department regulations create a clear duty to adjudicate visa applications within a

reasonable time.” Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-CV-1187,

, at *5

(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024); see, e.g., Tolymbekova,

, at *5-6; Mehrpooya,

, at *7-8; Thein,

, at *11; Shushkov,

, at *5-6;

Diabin,

, at *3-4; Aramnahad,

, at *8-10; Kahbasi v. Blinken,

7 Plaintiffs also rely on the FAM, see ECF No. 1 ¶ 34; ECF No. 41, at 10, but, as the court has explained, see supra at 9, the FAM does not have the force of law.

12 No. 23-CV-1667,

, at *5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2024); Ameer v. Schofer,

No. 23-CV-3066,

, at *4 (D.D.C. June 4, 2024); Vulupala, 438 F. Supp. 3d

at 100. But see, e.g., Ghasaban v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-2946,

, at *2-4

(D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2025); Sabeti v. Blinken, No. 24-CV-2627,

, at *2-3

(D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2025); Pour v. Rubio, No. 25-CV-573,

, at *4-7

(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025); Seifan v. Sweeney, No. 25-CV-261,

, at *4-5

(D.D.C. July 31, 2025); Javaid v. Armstrong, No. 24-CV-2716,

, at *2-3

(D.D.C. July 29, 2025); Pasiukevich v. Lawton, No. 24-CV-3349,

, at *3-4

(D.D.C. July 17, 2025).

This court continues to adhere to the view that consular officials have a nondiscretionary

duty to fully adjudicate visa applications. Issuing a final decision on a visa application is clearly

a discrete agency action, and it is required by both the APA and federal regulations. See Khazaei

v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-1419,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2023); see also Mashpee

Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that

the APA “imposes a general but nondiscretionary duty upon an administrative agency to pass upon

a matter presented to it ‘within a reasonable time,’

(b), and authorizes a reviewing

court to ‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,’

§ 706(1)”).

But even if the court read Karimova with the D.C. Circuit’s understanding that

Section 221(g) refusals are final, it would still deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss. That is

because—even taking the argument on the D.C. Circuit’s own terms—Karimova did not hold that

no source of law creates a nondiscretionary duty to re-adjudicate a visa application, just that

“Section 555(b)—and only Section 555(b) . . . does no such thing.”

, at *3.

13 Plaintiffs here do not center their argument on Section 555(b), but on the APA more generally and

(a). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 39. At this early stage of litigation, that is sufficient.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 40, is GRANTED insofar as FBI Director Kash Patel is dismissed from the suit and

DENIED in all other respects. It is further ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs’

Complaint, ECF No. 1, on or before October 9, 2025. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: September 25, 2025

14