UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) DEE MONBO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 24-cv-02547 (APM) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) OF NAVY et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

Pro se Plaintiff Dee Monbo protests her three-year debarment as a federal contractor by the

Navy in 2023. Plaintiff advances no less than 14 claims. Counts One through Four allege

violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failing to provide proper notice of the

debarment consistent with applicable regulations. Third Am. APA Compl., ECF No. 29

[hereinafter Compl.], at 22–23. Counts Five and Six assert violations of the APA for failing to

provide proper notice of suspension consistent with applicable regulations. Id. at 24. Counts

Seven and Eight advance tort claims of interference with prospective economic advantage and

defamation per se, respectively. Id. at 25–26. Counts Nine and Ten assert that the APA bars the

Navy’s attempt to collect $15,400 from Plaintiff’s company, Monbo Group International (MGI),

due to a purportedly preclusive ruling from the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals

(the “Board”). Id. at 27–29. Counts Eleven and Twelve are styled as APA claims but allege

violations of the First and Fifth Amendments, respectively, based upon Defendants’ purported false

statements about MGI’s unpaid debt to the Navy. Id. at 29–31. Count Thirteen seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Navy to comply with the Board’s ruling. Id. at 31–32. And Count

Fourteen asks for injunctive relief that would bar Defendants from debarring or suspending

Plaintiff in the future. Id. at 32–33.

Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion

centers entirely on the contention that applicable regulations required the Navy to provide her

notice of potential debarment by certified mail, but she received notice only by email at

[email protected]. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.].

Defendants cross-move as to all counts. Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.],

ECF No. 46, Defs.’ Combined Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. & in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No.

46-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem.]. Plaintiff also has filed a host of motions to supplement the

administrative record and for judicial notice, ECF Nos. 34, 56, 58, 61, 66, which Defendants

oppose, ECF Nos. 39, 68. For the reasons explained below, the court grants Defendants’ motion

in full and denies Plaintiffs’ motions.

II.

A.

The court begins with Counts One through Four. Plaintiff asserts violations of the APA

based on the Navy’s failure to comply with regulations that, at the time, required proposed

debarment and final debarment notices be delivered by “certified mail, return receipt requested.”

Pl.’s Mot. at 4, 6–9 (citing

(c), (e)(1) (2023)). There is no dispute that the Navy

sent her notices via email to [email protected], instead of by certified mail. AR-001–

004.1 But that service choice was not fatal. As Defendants explain, at the relevant time, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment authorized debarring officials to deviate

1 Citations to the Administrative Record, ECF No. 70, use the format “AR-” followed by the last three digits of the Bates number.

2 from the certified-mail requirement and “to provide [suspension and debarment] notices and

decisions to contractors electronically via-email and/or secure file exchange service.” Defs.’ Mem.

at 12 (citing Under Sec’y Def., Class Deviation 2020-O0014—Flexibilities for Electronic Delivery

of Information Related to Suspension and Debarments (Apr. 4, 2020),

https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000802-20-DPC.pdf). The Navy’s

transmission of Plaintiff’s proposed notice of debarment and the debarment decision by email

therefore did not violate the APA.

In her reply brief, Plaintiff appears to concede that notice by email was permissible, but

nevertheless contends that the Navy sent the notices to the wrong email address. She argues that

regulations required delivery to the “email address in the contractor’s [Sam.gov] registration,”

which for her is [email protected]. Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. & Opp’n to Defs.’

Mot., ECF No. 63, at 5, 10 (citing

(c)(1) (2025)). But that regulatory

specification did not come into effect until January 17, 2025. Therefore, it is not relevant to

whether the Navy violated the APA in 2023. Accordingly, the court grants Defendants summary

judgment as to Counts One through Four.2

B.

The APA claims in Counts Five and Six are not cognizable. The asserted violations center

on the failure to proper serve suspension notices. Compl. at 24 (citing

(c),

2 To the extent that Plaintiff’s first cause of action challenges the debarment as arbitrary and capricious, Plaintiff has made little effort to make such showing. See Pl.’s Mot. at 10. She contends that, in debarring her, the Navy failed to consider that MGI “submitted the lowest and winning bid price in the amount of $256,000.00 to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) when they decided to debar Plaintiff from government contracting and cut off Plaintiff’s livelihood, at issue.”

But Plaintiff nowhere explains why that fact matters to the debarment determination. Defendants “determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Monbo Group International caused a fraudulent past performance questionnaire to be submitted to another Federal Agency and failed to respond to the Navy’s demand to recover the overpayment.” Defs.’ Mem. at 13 (citing AR-021–027, -200–202). That decision was not arbitrary and capricious.

3 (e)(1) (2023)). The Navy did not suspend Plaintiff; it debarred her. She therefore fails to state

APA claims in Counts Five and Six.

C.

Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Seven, Eight, Eleven, and Twelve are foreclosed either for

naming improper defendants or by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their

“official capacities,” which is tantamount to a suit against the Navy. See Kentucky v. Graham,

, 165–66 (1985). But tort claims are not cognizable against federal agencies, only the

United States.

(a). So, Plaintiff has named the wrong defendant.

But even if the court were to construe her claims as against the United States, the United

States has not waived its sovereign immunity as to the common law torts of tortious interference

with prospective economic advantage, see Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States,

,

1153–55 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and defamation, see Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The same is true for constitutional torts. See FDIC

v. Meyer,

(1994). Summary judgment therefore is entered in favor of

Defendants as to Counts Seven, Eight, Eleven, and Twelve.

D.

Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Nine, Ten, and Thirteen are essentially contract claims over

which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Styled as APA and mandamus claims, Plaintiff

challenges the Navy’s effort to collect $15,400 in overpayments made to MGI under its contract

with the Navy. Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the collection effort—MGI is the property

party—and such claims belong in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See Am. Airways Charters,

Inc. v. Regan,

, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[N]o shareholder—not even a sole

shareholder—has standing to bring suit in his individual capacity on a claim that belongs to the

4 corporation.”); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that

it is a “well-accepted proposition that a plaintiff may not avoid [contract remedies] merely by

alleging violations of regulatory or statutory provisions rather than breach of contract”). Summary

judgment is therefore granted to Defendants as to those counts.

E.

Finally, the court denies Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in Count Fourteen, as she

has not established the merits of any claim.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 46, is

granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 41, is denied. Additionally, the

court denies Plaintiff’s various motions to supplement the administrative record as she has offered

only a boilerplate reason for doing so, ECF Nos. 34, 56, 58, 61, as well as her motion for judicial

notice, ECF No. 66, because the facts she identifies are merely record facts that are not judicially

noticeable.

A final, appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: September 26, 2025 Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge

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