UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NEXTERA ENERGY GLOBAL HOLDINGS B.V., et al.,

Petitioners, Civil Action No. 19-cv-1618 v.

KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioners NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings

B.V. (collectively, “NextEra”) move for summary judgment to confirm their €290.6 million

arbitration award and $3.5 million annulment decision, plus interest and fees, against Respondent

Kingdom of Spain (“Spain”). For the reasons below, the court will GRANT NextEra’s motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Framework

The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) is a multinational treaty that “establishes a legal

framework” to “promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on complementarities

and mutual benefits.” ECT art. 2, Dec. 1994, ECF No. 1-6 (“ECT”). The United States, the

Netherlands, and Spain are signatories to that treaty. ECF No. 1-7.

When disputes between signatories relating to an energy investment arise, “each

Contracting Party . . . gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international

arbitration.” ECT art. 26(3)(a). Where “the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting

Party . . . to the dispute are both parties to the” Convention on the Settlement of Investment

Page 1 of 8 Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”), arbitration is

mandatory. Id. art. 26(4)(a)(i). The United States, the Netherlands, and Spain are also contracting

parties to the ICSID Convention. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 3, ECF No. 96-4 (“SOF”). NextEra is

a Dutch company. Id. ¶ 1.

The ICSID Convention oversees the “conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes

between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States,” Int’l Centre for Settlement

of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules § 1, art. 1(2), ECF No. 1-5

(“ICSID Convention”), including through adjudication by arbitration tribunals, id. § 2. When

arbitration is appropriate, signatories to the ICSID Convention consent to “arbitration to the

exclusion of any other remedy,” id. art. 26, and agree that “award[s] shall be binding on the parties

and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in th[e]

Convention,” id. art. 53(1). Parties to the Convention “may enforce” an ICSID arbitration award

“in or through federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a

final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.” Id. art. 54(1).

In the United States, the obligation to enforce ICSID awards is codified at 22 U.S.C.

§ 1650a, which provides that “pecuniary obligations imposed by [an ICSID] award shall be

enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of

a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” “Confirmation is the process by which

an arbitration award is converted to a legal judgment.” LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova,

(D.C. Cir. 2021). Only once an award is confirmed can the prevailing party

seek to execute on the resulting judgment “by, for example, attaching [the sovereign’s] commercial

assets in the United States.”

Page 2 of 8 B. Factual Background

In 2007, after Spain enacted legislation that attracted investments in renewable energy

production through various financial incentives, NextEra invested €750 million in solar power

projects in Spain. Annex A, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability, And Quantum Principles ¶¶ 93,

97, 116, ECF No. 1-4 (“Award I”). Spain later repealed that legislation, eliminating the financial

incentives that had led NextEra to invest in the Spanish solar energy projects. Id. ¶¶ 599, 678–82.

Because these investments were protected under the ECT, ECT art. 26(4), NextEra requested

arbitration by an ICSID tribunal. Award I ¶ 6. Spain objected, raising jurisdictional and merits

concerns. Award, ¶¶ 5–12, 24–28, ECF No. 1-4 (“Award II”).

On May 31, 2019, the ICSID tribunal issued its final award in NextEra’s favor, finding that

Spain had breached its duty under the ECT and ordering Spain to pay €290.6 million in damages

plus interest and costs. Id. ¶¶ 37(2)–(6). Although Spain attempted to annul the award, the ICSID

tribunal denied that request on March 18, 2022. Annulment Dec. ¶ 533, ECF No. 96-5.

While the ICSID proceedings were ongoing, on June 3, 2019, NextEra petitioned this court

under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a to enforce and confirm its award. ECF No. 1.

C. Procedural History

On October 11, 2019, Spain moved to dismiss this case, or, in the alternative, to stay the

matter pending ICSID annulment proceedings. ECF No. 15. NextEra cross-moved to confirm its

award. ECF No. 21. On September 30, 2020, this court stayed the case. ECF No. 38. Meanwhile,

Spain filed suit in the Netherlands, “seeking, among other things,” to enjoin NextEra “under EU

law from proceeding with their petitions in the United States (a so-called anti-suit injunction).”

NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,

(D.C. Cir. 2024)

(“NextEra”).

Page 3 of 8 On April 29, 2022, when this court lifted the stay, Spain renewed its motion to dismiss.

Apr. 29, 2022 Min. Order; ECF No. 62. On January 12, 2023, NextEra then moved to preliminarily

enjoin Spain from seeking any relief in the Netherlands, arguing that this court had jurisdiction

under the FSIA’s waiver and arbitration exceptions. ECF No. 78-1. On February 15, 2023, this

court denied Spain’s motion to dismiss but granted in part NextEra’s preliminary injunction. ECF

No. 85. Spain appealed. ECF No. 87.

On August 16, 2025, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that this court had jurisdiction but reversed

this court’s judgment that Spain was precluded from seeking relief in Dutch courts. NextEra,

. On December 12, NextEra moved for summary judgment to confirm its arbitral

award, and on December 18, supplemented that motion to confirm the ICSID’s annulment

decision. ECF Nos. 96, 98. On December 30, Spain, rather than oppose NextEra’s motion, moved

to stay the case so that it could petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to contest the Circuit’s

jurisdictional holding. ECF No. 102. This court denied that request on January 30, 2025. Jan. 30,

2025 Min. Order.

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Spain argues that the ICSID award and annulment decision are not entitled to full faith and

credit because the arbitrators themselves lacked jurisdiction, given that Spain “never agreed to

arbitrate anything with Petitioners” and the ICSID exceeded “any authority they supposedly had

by awarding state aid.” Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Pet’rs Mot. for Summ. J. at 16, ECF No. 108

(“Opp’n”). Alternatively, it contends that the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine

independently bars enforcement of the ICSID award and annulment decision.

at 24–25.

Page 4 of 8 A. Full Faith and Credit

The D.C. Circuit has held that “the full faith and credit obligation owed final judgments

‘precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the

decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based.’” Valores

Mundiales, S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting

Milliken v. Meyer,

(1940)). “[A] court may not deny a judgment full faith and

credit because ‘it disagrees with the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong

on the merits.’”

(quoting V.L. v. E.L.,

(2016) (per curiam)). While a court

must “do more than rubber stamp” the ICSID award, to find that the award merits full faith and

credit, the court need only assure itself that (1) “that it has subject-matter and personal

jurisdiction,” (2) “that the award is authentic,” and (3) “that its enforcement order tracks the

award.” Tethyan Copper Co. Pty Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

, 268

(D.D.C. 2022).

The D.C. Circuit affirmed that this court had subject matter jurisdiction. NextEra,

. Because personal jurisdiction in FSIA cases “exists for every claim over which the

court has subject matter jurisdiction,” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

(D.C. Cir. 2002); see

(b), and service was proper, the court also finds

that it has personal jurisdiction over Spain. And as this court already determined, no dispute exists

as to whether NextEra’s arbitral award is authentic and consistent—it seeks to confirm the same

amount that it was awarded by the ICSID tribunal: €290.6 million. NextEra Energy Glob.

Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,

, 218 (D.D.C. 2023) (“NextEra I”).

NextEra’s arbitration award is therefore entitled to full faith and credit.

The same applies to the ICSID tribunal’s annulment decision. Spain argues that NextEra

mischaracterizes the interest attached to the annulment decision, describing it as a monthly, instead Page 5 of 8 of an annual, compound rate. Opp’n at 25–26. But that dispute cannot preclude summary

judgment because Spain does not argue that it bears on any element of the three-part confirmation

test, Tehtyan, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 268, which would be “essential” to NextEra’s burden of proof if

it were to proceed to trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986). And even if Spain

had argued that the interest issue is a dispute of fact material to an element of the confirmation

test, NextEra copies the text of the interest awarded in its annulment decision to its proposed order

here. Compare Annulment Comm. Dec. at 146, 147, ECF No. 68-60 (awarding NextEra interest

“at the rate of 0.234% compounded monthly”), with Proposed Order at 2, ECF No. 98-3 (seeking

interest “at the rate of 0.234% compounded monthly”).

Spain’s primary argument in opposition, which is best categorized as a challenge to the

first jurisdictional prong of the three-part confirmation test, is unpersuasive. Opp’n at 15–22.

Although Spain believes that the ICSID arbitrators lacked jurisdiction, it cannot succeed on the

merits by “recycl[ing] a losing jurisdictional argument” that ICSID considered and rejected before.

Tethyan, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 276. The terms of the ICSID Convention bar United States courts

from examining “the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction to render the award.” Mobil Cerro Negro v.

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

(2d Cir. 2017). Moreover, “a judgment is

entitled to full faith and credit—even as to questions of jurisdiction—when the second court’s

inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the

court which rendered the original judgment.” Durfee v. Duke,

(1963). The

ICSID tribunal considered Spain’s jurisdictional arguments previously and rejected them. Award

II ¶ 32 (“The Tribunal notes that Respondent lost on essentially all of the jurisdictional grounds [it

raised.]”). Those arguments were therefore “fully and fairly litigated.” Durfee,

.

Page 6 of 8 Because this court has determined that the FSIA does not bar its jurisdiction, and that it has

personal jurisdiction, the first confirmation prong is satisfied.

Spain also argues that the Circuit did not take a “position on the ultimate enforceability of

the[] [arbitral] award[]” and that it declined to “address the merits question whether [the ECT’s]

arbitration provision extends to EU nationals and thus whether Spain ultimately entered into

legally valid agreements with the companies.” Opp’n at 1 (quoting NextEra,

).

But federal law instructs that “pecuniary” awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention

“shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final

judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a).

Therefore, the fact that the Circuit did not address the merits does not preclude this court from

following Congress’s directive to confirm the award if it is entitled to full faith and credit, as is the

case here.

B. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine

Alternatively, Spain contends that the court is barred from enforcing NextEra’s arbitral

award and annulment decision under the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine and “the principles

of comity that underlie it.” Opp’n at 24. This court already rejected this identical argument before,

albeit in a preliminary posture. NextEra I, 656 F. Supp. at 219. But after this court’s initial

determination, each court in this district that has considered a similar argument has agreed that the

doctrine is inapplicable as applied to these ICSID arbitral awards. See Blasket Renewable Invs. v.

Kingdom of Spain, No. 23-cv-2701,

, at *13 (D.D.C. Sep. 26, 2024);

Infrastructure Servs. Luxembourg S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 18-cv-1753,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2025); Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV v. Kingdom of Spain,

No. 20-cv-1708,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025); Blasket Renewable Invs. v.

Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-cv-817,

, at *8–10 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2025). Because Page 7 of 8 Spain offers no basis for the court to reverse its previous determination, it will not disturb its prior

opinion rejecting this argument. See Morris v. Wheeler, No. 11-cv-701,

, at *1

(D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019) (refusing to “disturb its prior Opinion” when a party repeated an argument

previously rejected).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NextEra’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 96, and

Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 98, are GRANTED. The parties are

directed to file a joint proposed final judgment by October 31, 2025. A separate Order shall

promptly follow.

Date: September 30, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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