UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MELEAH CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 22-03422 (AHA) v.

MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,

Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion

Meleah Campbell, a former employee of KIPP DC public charter school, sues the school,

school personnel, and the D.C. Mayor asserting she was unlawfully terminated for not complying

with a school policy implementing D.C.’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate. The KIPP defendants and

Mayor move to dismiss, arguing that Campbell’s amended complaint fails to state a claim. The

Court agrees and grants the motions to dismiss.

I. Background1

Campbell was a teacher at KIPP. ECF No. 39 ¶ 9. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the

Mayor issued an order requiring school employees to get vaccinated against COVID-19 by a

specific deadline. Id. ¶ 14. KIPP implemented the vaccine mandate and created a process for

requesting exemptions, including by submitting a religious accommodation form. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12,

14. According to the amended complaint, Campbell requested an exemption without completing

the school’s exemption form, instead submitting a personal statement that questioned the efficacy

1 As required at the pleading stage, the Court accepts the amended complaint’s well-pled allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in Campbell’s favor. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). and safety of the COVID-19 vaccine and indicated that her faith prevented her from taking the

vaccine.

¶¶ 11–13; ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 8–9. After receiving the incomplete submission, a KIPP

employee contacted Campbell to obtain a completed form so that her religious exemption could

be processed. ECF No. 39 ¶ 12. Campbell refused to submit a completed exemption form,

responding she should not have to do so because the school had previously afforded her a religious

accommodation related to medications and her personal statement should have sufficed. Id. ¶ 13.

KIPP further cautioned Campbell that if she did not complete the exemption request form, she

would be required to obtain a vaccination and the failure to do so would lead to termination; KIPP

also provided further opportunities to comply. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. After Campbell did not respond, KIPP

terminated her for failing to comply with the school’s vaccine policy. Id. ¶ 17. In addition to these

allegations concerning the back-and-forth preceding her termination, Campbell alleges the “Covid-

19 vaccine is a monstrous fraud” created by the government. Id. ¶ 27.

Campbell filed this action against KIPP, KIPP employees who corresponded with her about

the vaccine policy, and the D.C. Mayor, asserting claims under the First Amendment and Title VII,

as well as fraud and battery under D.C. law. The KIPP defendants and Mayor have filed separate

motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF

Nos. 41, 47.

II. Discussion

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.”

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

2

(quoting Twombly,

). The Court “must take all the factual allegations in the

complaint as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,

(1986).

In cases involving an unrepresented, or “pro se” litigant, the Court is careful to give extra

leeway. The Court evaluates the pro se complaint here “in light of all filings, including filings

responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Ho v. Garland,

, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting

Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015)). Of course, a pro se

plaintiff still “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct.” Jones v. Horne,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Atherton

v. District of Columbia,

, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “As such, while ‘detailed factual

allegations’ are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must

furnish ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.’” Montgomery v. Mayorkas, No. 23-cv-03931,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 4,

2024) (quoting Twombly,

).

A. The District Is Substituted As Defendant For The Mayor

As a preliminary matter, the Mayor observes that a suit against her in her official capacity

“is deemed a suit against the municipality such that the District, rather than the District official, is

the proper party defendant.” ECF No. 41-1 at 8; see Pollard v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016) (explaining that “an official-capacity suit against an individual is

‘equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself’” (quoting Atchinson v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1996))). Because all of Campbell’s allegations against the Mayor

pertain to a municipal order that the Mayor signed in her official capacity, the Court substitutes

the District for the Mayor as the proper defendant. See Alma v. Bowser,

(D.D.C. 2016) (observing that when a plaintiff “mistakenly names Mayor Bowser in her official

3 capacity instead of the District, the established remedy for this pleading problem is substitution of

the named party”).

B. Campbell Does Not State A First Amendment Claim

Campbell claims that the termination of her employment violated her free exercise rights

under the First Amendment. ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 1, 25.

“[T]he First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as

opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice.” Levitan v. Ashcroft,

(D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,

(D.C.

Cir. 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff asserting a Free Exercise Clause claim “must first establish

that its free exercise right has been substantially burdened”). If a court concludes that government

conduct burdens religious practice, it generally asks two further questions: “First, a court must ask

if the burdensome policy is neutral and generally applicable. Second, if the first question can be

answered in the negative, a court will proceed to ask whether the policy can survive strict scrutiny.”

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

, 2360–61 (2025).

Here, there can be no question Campbell has alleged her sincerely held religious belief in

Christianity and that her faith precluded her from obtaining a vaccine. See Levitan,

(noting that a plaintiff’s “beliefs must be sincere and the practices at issue must be of a

religious nature” to qualify for First Amendment protection). The parties dispute whether

Campbell has satisfied the threshold inquiry by plausibly alleging that the defendants burdened

her religious practice.

As a preliminary matter, it is not clear that the First Amendment applies to KIPP or the

individual KIPP defendants. The First Amendment constrains the government, not private entities.

Cf. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck,

, 808 (2019). KIPP argues that as a

charter school, it is not a government entity and its personnel are not government employees, and

4 that even if KIPP could be considered a state actor, its termination of Campbell was a private

personnel action, not state action. ECF No. 47-1 at 11–15; see Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc.,

, 116 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (concluding that “there is no bright-line rule separating

state action from private action,” so “the inquiry is highly fact-specific in nature”); Caviness v.

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that even where

an entity is performing a traditional government function, its decisions as an employer may not be

state action). However, the Court need not decide whether KIPP is properly considered a state

actor or undertook state action in its implementation of the vaccine mandate because it concludes

Campbell has not plausibly alleged that the defendants burdened her religious exercise.

Campbell claims the defendants burdened her sincere religious beliefs in violation of the

First Amendment by presenting her “with the choice of either violating . . . her religious beliefs or

suffering a substantial penalty”—namely, losing her job. ECF No. 39 ¶ 25; see also ECF No. 53-

1 at 17 (arguing the defendants violated the First Amendment because they “coerced” her “into

either violating her faith or losing her job”). However, her amended complaint makes clear that

KIPP promptly responded to her request for a religious exemption and, despite KIPP employees’

repeated efforts to engage with Campbell to process her request, she never completed the form to

apply for a religious exemption. According to the amended complaint, Campbell requested a

religious exemption and submitted a personal statement in which she questioned the efficacy of

the COVID-19 vaccine and stated that her Christian beliefs therefore prevented her from taking it.

ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 10, 12, 14.2 Within a few days of receiving Campbell’s request and statement, a

2 Campbell’s amended complaint refers to a “religious form” being attached. ECF No. 39 ¶ 11. There is no form attached to the amended complaint, but Campbell’s original complaint attaches the personal statement she submitted, which states that it was intended “to give one a glimpse into why a Christian’s stance would forbid a man or woman from receiving certain medical procedures

5 KIPP employee asked Campbell to submit a completed exemption request form so KIPP could

process her religious exemption. Id. ¶ 12. The employee advised her to “please respond to all

questions in the accommodation form,” which would include a personal statement describing the

religious beliefs upon which she was seeking an exemption, how long she held them, and how they

had informed her life. Id. According to the amended complaint, Campbell refused to participate in

this process, responding that she should not have to submit a completed exemption request because

KIPP had previously given her a religious accommodation related to medications and that her

personal statement should suffice. Id. ¶ 13.

Over the weeks that followed, KIPP employees made further efforts, cautioning Campbell

that “[i]t appears you are declining to participate in our religious exemption process, which is your

right,” but the school could “only provide exceptions for employees who qualify for religious or

medical exemptions.” Id. ¶ 14. KIPP also informed Campbell that unless she properly applied for

an exemption, she would be expected to get vaccinated by the deadline to keep her job. Id. After

multiple further emails to Campbell without response, KIPP eventually placed Campbell on leave

and then terminated her for failing to comply with the vaccine policy by engaging in the religious

exemption process or obtaining a vaccine. Id. ¶ 17.

Even assuming the KIPP defendants could be considered state actors and implementation

of the vaccine mandate was a state action, Campbell cannot show that KIPP’s engagement with

her in response to her exemption request and its advice to complete an exemption request form as

part of the exemption process burdened her religious practice. The requirement to engage with the

like a vaccine.” ECF No. 1-1 at 8. Campbell’s statement goes on to express doubt as to the vaccine’s effectiveness against the dominant COVID-19 variant and draw a correlation between the COVID-19 vaccine and cancer, and to explain that taking the vaccine would therefore violate her faith. Id. at 8–9. Campbell also stated that she viewed it as “patently illegal” to require her to complete the exemption request form. Id. at 8.

6 school’s exemption process and submit a completed exemption form is at most an “inconsequential

or de minimis burden on religious practice” that would not implicate the First Amendment. See

Kaemmerling v. Lappin,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (further clarifying that a substantial

burden exists when the government places “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his

behavior and to violate his beliefs” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd.,

(1981))).

Campbell’s First Amendment claim is even further removed as to the District because, as Campbell

acknowledges, the District simply adopted a general policy that explicitly allowed exemptions

based on religion. ECF No. 53-1 at 13–14.

Campbell raises two arguments in response. First, Campbell argues that she should not

have had to fill out the form because KIPP previously granted her a religious accommodation

related to medicines. ECF No. 39 ¶ 14. However, while it may have been convenient for Campbell

to not complete an additional form for the COVID-19 policy, the Court cannot conclude that

requiring Campbell to complete a form related to the exemption she was seeking imposed a burden

on religious practice.

Second, Campbell contends that requiring her to fill out the exemption form was itself a

violation of the First Amendment because the form asked her to provide certain details about her

religious beliefs preventing her from getting the vaccine, including how long she had held those

beliefs and examples of how the beliefs had informed past life choices. Id. ¶ 12; ECF No. 53-1 at

4. However, a state employer does not violate the First Amendment by requiring an employee to

provide information to affirm that the exemption is sought on the basis of a personal and genuine

religious belief as opposed to a secular one. The Supreme Court has noted that “[s]tates are clearly

entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise

Clause” given the “difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular convictions and in

7 determining whether a professed belief is sincerely held.” Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp. Sec.,

(1989); see also Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC,

(7th

Cir. 2013) (observing “it is not enough for the belief to be religious in nature, it must also be the

employee’s own religious belief”).

To be sure, the Court’s analysis would be very different—and it would raise serious First

Amendment concerns—if Campbell had completed the form to apply for an exemption and then,

as Campbell argues, state actors questioned “the validity or logic” of her religious beliefs. See ECF

No. 53-1 at 24. It is beyond question that a person’s religious belief or practice “need not be

acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment

protection.” Thomas,

. But those are not the allegations before the Court, and

nothing in Campbell’s amended complaint supports an inference that KIPP’s prompt engagement

with her to process her religious exemption was pretext for religious discrimination. To the

contrary, the amended complaint makes clear KIPP had previously granted Campbell religious

accommodations she had applied for. ECF No. 39 ¶ 13.

C. Campbell Does Not State A Title VII Claim

In her opposition brief, Campbell argues that KIPP violated Title VII by denying her a

religious accommodation and treating her differently because of her religion. ECF No. 53-1 at 2,

7. KIPP argues that Campbell never asserted a Title VII claim in her amended complaint and raised

it for the first time in her briefing, so the claim is therefore not properly before the Court. ECF No.

60 at 3. However, recognizing that Campbell is pro se, the Court construes the amended

complaint’s brief mention of Title VII, as well as Campbell’s briefing, to assert a claim that KIPP

violated Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of

Prisons,

(D.C. Cir. 2002); ECF No. 39 ¶ 21. “[S]o long as the basis for a claim

is clear, a complaint need not ‘plead law’ in specific detail.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v.

8 Fame Jeans Inc.,

, 18 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, the Court concludes this claim

must be dismissed for reasons similar to Campbell’s First Amendment claim.

Title VII prohibits treating an employee differently with respect to their “compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is

a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the

unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Wiley v. Glassman,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Brown v. Brody,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). “[A]n

employment discrimination plaintiff is not required to plead every fact necessary to establish a

prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss.” Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must, however, plead “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal,

). In addition, Title VII requires an employer to “accommodate the

religious practice of their employees unless doing so would impose an ‘undue hardship on the

conduct of the employer’s business.’” Groff v. DeJoy,

, 453–54 (2023) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Campbell argues that KIPP’s religious exemption process treated her differently on the

basis of her religion because KIPP “chose to apply a stricter standard to religious exemptions while

granting medical ones.” ECF No. 53-1 at 14. However, neither Campbell’s amended complaint

nor other pleadings provide any specific allegations to support that assertion. In making her

argument, Campbell cites to allegations in her amended complaint describing KIPP’s response to

her request for an exemption and advising Campbell to submit an exemption form so that her

9 request could be processed. See ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 14–17. None of those allegations support an

inference that KIPP handled medical exemption requests more leniently than religious exemption

requests, so Campbell has not “nudged” this claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Twombly,

.

To the extent Campbell asserts a Title VII claim for failure to accommodate her religious

beliefs, that claim fails for reasons similar to her First Amendment claim. As described,

Campbell’s allegations indicate that KIPP promptly responded to Campbell’s request for an

exemption and Campbell declined to participate in the process and apply for an exemption. See

Chloe v. George Washington Univ., No. 20-cv-03090,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 22,

2023) (concluding employer lawfully terminated employee for violating COVID-19 vaccine

mandate where employee “refused to engage in the interactive process so that [her employer] could

determine whether an accommodation may have been available based upon a sincerely held

religious belief”), aff’d sub nom. Chloe v. Dent, No. 24-7014,

(D.C. Cir. June

6, 2024).

D. Campbell Does Not State A Fraud Claim

Campbell asserts a claim against all the defendants for common law fraud. “One pleading

fraud must allege such facts as will reveal the existence of all the requisite elements of fraud.”

Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs.,

(D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). Those

elements are: “(1) a false representation (2) in reference to material fact, (3) made with knowledge

of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) action is taken in reliance upon the

representation.”

(citation omitted). Fraud claims must satisfy a heightened pleading

requirement: “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or

mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

10 Campbell’s allegations do not state a claim under this standard. The amended complaint

states only conclusory allegations that COVID-19 is “a monstrous fraud” of “biblical proportion.”

ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 27–28. In her opposition brief, Campbell argues the emails from KIPP employees

in her amended complaint show the school “misrepresented that religious exemptions were not

legally required, falsely leading Plaintiff to believe that her only option was to take the COVID-

19 vaccine or face termination.” ECF No. 53-1 at 39. But nothing in the emails cited supports that

inference. To the contrary, the emails described in the amended complaint specifically informed

Campbell that exemptions were available for religious or medical reasons, advised Campbell to

apply for a religious exemption, and then cautioned that she would be required to comply with the

mandate if she opted not to participate in the exemption process. Campbell has not plausibly

alleged any false representation of a material fact that she relied upon, let alone one that was

knowing and made with the intent to deceive—all of which are required to state a fraud claim.

E. Campbell Does Not State A Battery Claim

Campbell also asserts a common law battery claim against all the defendants. “A battery is

an intentional act that causes a harmful or offensive bodily contact.” Jackson v. District of

Columbia,

(D.C. 1980). Here, Campbell does not allege the defendants engaged

in any bodily contact with her. The amended complaint asserts that “forcing beneficial care on an

unwilling patient would be battery.” ECF No. 39 ¶ 29. But there are no facts alleged to support the

inference that the defendants forced care on her—indeed, her allegations indicate that after

declining to submit an exemption form, she did not obtain a vaccine and was terminated for not

complying with the policy through one of those avenues.

11 III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 41 and 47, are granted.

This action is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum

opinion.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: September 30, 2025

12