UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DALIA SAHA, M.D.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-3188 (JMC)

v.

TELADOC HEALTH MEDICAL GROUP, P.A., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court are Defendants Teladoc Health Medical Group, P.A. (Teladoc),

Demetrios Themelis, and Derek Bennetsen’s motions to dismiss Plaintiff Dalia Saha’s complaint.1

Saha previously worked as a contracted physician for Teladoc—a telemedicine healthcare services

provider. She later resigned. She alleges that Teladoc and two of its employees, Themelis and

Bennetsen, relayed false information to and about her that ultimately interfered with her ability to

retain clients and secure prospective employment. Her complaint alleges two causes of action:

tortious interference with economic expectation and tortious interference with contract. Themelis

and Bennetsen seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, and all Defendants move to dismiss

Saha’s complaint for failure to state a claim. After considering the Parties’ arguments, the Court

agrees with Defendants and grants their motions to dismiss.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dalia Saha’s complaint alleges the following. Saha is a board-certified internal

medicine physician. ECF 1-2 ¶ 1. She is licensed to practice in 15 states, including the District of

Columbia. Id. In December 2016, Saha began working as a D.C.-based independent contractor for

Defendant Teladoc—a multi-state virtual and telehealth healthcare services provider. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.

Briefly, this is how the service works: Patients seeking a physician consultation through Teladoc

can request an appointment by telephone or online. Id. ¶¶ 13, 17. A Teladoc employee will then

contact one of its contracted physicians, like Saha, to explain the patient’s case and provide the

physician the option to accept or decline the patient. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. If the physician accepts, she

contacts the patient to conduct a virtual medical consultation. Id. ¶ 19. After the consultation, the

physician enters her notes, findings, and prescription information into the patient’s chart. Id. ¶¶ 22–

24.

In January 2019, Saha alleges that she exchanged emails with Derek Bennetsen, Teladoc’s

senior medical director, “under the auspices of Teladoc’s quality assurance program.” Id. ¶ 28.

The purpose of that program was to work with physicians “to improve the quality of medical care

and patient experience.” Id. Saha alleges that she followed the directives Bennetsen gave her in

connection with his quality assurance review, id., and even received positive feedback from him

in February 2020, id. ¶¶ 28–29. But, in April 2020, Bennetsen emailed Saha to relay concerns

about his review of her medical charts. Id. ¶ 30. He claimed that her charts reflected symptoms

and complaints that were unrelated to the reasons for the patients’ visits and that prescriptions and

medication dosages were not correct. Id. In his email, Bennetsen told Saha that because of “the

number of fails” he would escalate the matter to the Clinical Quality Executive Committee

(CQEC) for further action, which could include a performance improvement plan (PIP). Id.

2 About two months later, on June 19, 2020, Bennetsen emailed Saha to inform her that the

CQEC decided to place her on a 30-day PIP. Id. ¶ 32. As a result of the PIP, Teladoc limited Saha

to no more than ten consults per day, required her to accurately record her notes, and mandated

that there be no discrepancies with her prescriptions. Id. Bennetsen also advised that the CQEC

would review her charts at the end of the 30-day period for compliance and potentially terminate

her if she did not successfully complete the PIP. Id. Finally, Bennetsen told Saha that if she

declined to participate in the PIP, Teladoc would construe her refusal as a resignation while under

formal investigation, which “may trigger a National Practitioner Database Report” (NPDB). Id.

¶ 32. The NPDB is an online database that contains adverse action reports about health care

professionals.2 Saha responded acknowledging receipt of Bennetsen’s email, committing to

improving her work, and asking some specific questions about the PIP (to which Bennetsen

responded). Id. ¶¶ 33–34.

At the end of the 30-day PIP period, on July 20, 2020, Bennetsen emailed Saha to complain

about “insufficient data” from her patient charts, which reflected that she had not performed a

Teladoc consultation since July 9. Id. ¶ 35. Bennetsen’s email prompted a back-and-forth exchange

between the two about Saha’s PIP. Saha told him that she had been asked to assist in the hospital

and had been picking up more inpatient shifts in lieu of Teladoc consults. Id. ¶ 36. In his responses,

Bennetsen explained that by failing to perform consults for about 10 days of the review period,

Saha had failed to successfully complete her PIP. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39. He stated that he would share this

2 The NPDB is operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NPDB, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, https://perma.cc/ETW2-SF8R. Pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, “[e]ach health care entity which . . . accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician . . . while the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible incompetence or improper professional conduct” must report such action to HHS.

(a)(1(B)(i).

3 information with the CQEC, who would then determine whether her employment would continue.

See

Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, Saha resigned shortly thereafter.

.

After she resigned, Saha received a notification that Themelis, Teladoc’s credentialing

manager, reported Saha’s resignation to the NPDB.

. She appealed to Teladoc, but Teladoc

denied her request and maintained its position that her resignation was required to be listed in the

NPDB.

¶¶ 43–44.

In August 2023, Saha filed this lawsuit against Defendants in the Superior Court for the

District of Columbia alleging tortious interference with economic expectation and tortious

interference with contract. Her complaint alleges that Bennetsen gave her false information, and

that he did so knowing that she would rely on that information “in the timing and manner of her

resignation from Teladoc,”

, and “in her appeal,”

. She also claims that he supplied

misleading information about her to Teladoc, knowing that Teladoc would rely upon that

information in making decisions about her employment.

. Her allegations against Themelis

include that he “knew, should have known, or chose not to determine if the information in the

report he had written concerning Dr. Saha was false, misleading or incomplete.”

.

According to her complaint, Teladoc is responsible for the actions of its employees and has an

independent obligation to evaluate the performance of its employees, which she claims it did not

fulfill here.

¶¶ 59–67. She alleges that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, current and

prospective clients have “declined to hire and otherwise retain” her,

, and that “[e]ach

of the Defendants knew there was a reasonable probability that Dr. [Saha] intended to and would

enter into a business relationship as a physician with other medical providers,” id.—suggesting

that they purposefully (or at least recklessly) supplied false information to her and others knowing

that it would interfere with her ability to work as a doctor.

4 Defendants removed Saha’s action from the Superior Court to this court pursuant to

. See ECF 1. Each Defendant separately moved to dismiss. ECF 5, 6, 22. Saha

opposed each of the Defendants’ motions. ECF 9, 10, 11, 25. All pending motions are fully briefed

and ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of

personal jurisdiction, “the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise

of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Reuber v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). To meet

this burden, the plaintiff “must allege specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum,” as

“[c]onclusory statements . . . do not constitute the prima facie showing necessary to carry the

burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.” First Chicago Intern. v. United Exch. Co., Ltd.,

, 1378–79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This requirement “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush

v. Savchuk,

(1980). When considering whether personal jurisdiction exists, the

Court “may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to assist it in determining the

jurisdictional facts.” United States v. Philip Morris Inc.,

, 120 n.4 (D.D.C.

2000). Any factual discrepancies are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Crane,

.

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007);

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), a court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and afford the plaintiff

“the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air

Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000). That said, a court “need not accept inferences

5 drawn by plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, nor

must the court accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations.” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Saha has not met her burden to establish a factual basis for exercising

personal jurisdiction over Themelis and Bennetsen and that jurisdictional discovery is

unwarranted. The Court also agrees with Defendants that Saha’s complaint fails to allege facts

sufficient to state either a tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with

prospective economic advantage claim and thus dismisses this case in its entirety. The Court

explains the bases for its decision below.

A. The Court dismisses Saha’s claims against Themelis and Bennetsen for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).

1. Saha has failed to show any reasonable connection that Themelis and Bennetsen have with the District.

The Court begins with Themelis and Bennetsen’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction. ECF 5; ECF 22. Both Defendants have submitted declarations swearing that they are

not residents of the District of Columbia, and Saha does not dispute that. See ECF 5-2 (Themelis

Decl.); ECF 22-2 (Bennetsen Decl.); see generally ECF 10-1; ECF 25. The Court thus employs a

two-prong inquiry to determine whether it has jurisdiction over these nonresident defendants. The

Court must first “examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state’s long-arm statute and

then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due

process.” GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

The District of Columbia’s long-arm statute provides for:

personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s . . . 1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; (2)

6 contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia; (3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.

(a)(1)-(4).

If the Court finds that it can exercise personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, it

then moves to the second part of the analysis to determine whether exercising jurisdiction is

constitutional. For personal jurisdiction to comport with the Due Process Clause, a defendant must

“have certain minimum contacts with . . . [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

(1945). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden to

establish that the Court has jurisdiction over Bennetsen and Themelis under the District’s long-

arm statute, which warrants dismissing the claims against them.

Defendants have submitted sworn declarations affirming that they do not reside in the

District of Columbia. See ECF 5-2 ¶ 2 (Themelis stating that he is a resident of New Hampshire);

ECF 22-2 ¶ 2 (Bennetsen stating that he is a resident of Arizona). Both also state that they have

not visited or intentionally interacted with the District of Columbia for personal reasons for many

years and have never visited or intentionally interacted with the District for work. See ECF 5-2

¶ 5–6; ECF 22-2 ¶ 5–6. On the other hand, Saha proffers no competing allegations about where

Defendants reside, work, or solicit or conduct their business.3 For Themelis, she seems to believe

3 While Saha included allegations about personal jurisdiction in her complaint, ECF 1-2 ¶ 5, the Court recognizes that a plaintiff has “no obligation to make specific allegations relevant to personal jurisdiction in [the] complaint because lack of personal jurisdiction is an affirmative defense and so must be raised by the defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). But a plaintiff does have an “obligation to make some allegations relating to personal jurisdiction … after [defendant] [has] filed [his] motion to dismiss and supporting affidavit.

7 that the “Court has personal jurisdiction over [Themelis] because [his] tortious conduct was

directed towards a resident of the District of Columbia and related to the performance of her

occupation in the District of Columbia.” ECF 1-2 ¶ 5. She makes the same argument about

Bennetsen, but further argues that Bennetsen’s emails to Saha, regarding Saha’s performance at

Teladoc, are sufficient contacts with D.C. to confer jurisdiction under subsection (a)(4). Saha

claims that the emails “represent a long-standing pattern of relevant interactions between Dr. Saha

and Defendant Bennetsen over a considerable period of time during which she was physically

located in the District of Columbia.” ECF 25 at 4. Bennetsen counters that exchanging emails,

while out-of-state, with a D.C. resident cannot establish personal jurisdiction. ECF 22-1 at 4.

The Parties dispute whether contacts with a forum on behalf of an employer may be

considered in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Bennetsen and Themelis claim that personal

jurisdiction over employees must be based “on their personal contacts with the forum and not their

acts and contacts carried out solely in a corporate capacity.” ECF 5-1 at 4; ECF 22-1 at 4. Saha

counters that contacts in a corporate capacity are still relevant to the analysis. See ECF 25 at 5–6.

The D.C. Circuit has explained that “when evaluating under the Due Process Clause an

individual’s contacts with the forum state, courts cannot ignore contacts made by the individual

just because they were made in his or her capacity as an employee or corporate officer.” Urquhart-

Bradley v. Mobley,

(D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, “under certain circumstances,

individual defendants can fairly be haled into court based on actions they took on behalf of their

business organization.” Tierney v. de Wet,

, 86 (D.D.C. 2023). The Court finds

that it can consider actions taken by Defendants in their work capacities in assessing personal

jurisdiction.

8 But even after considering Defendants’ work-related actions, the Court agrees with

Defendants that Saha has not demonstrated that they meet the requirements of the D.C. long-arm

statute. While there is no “mechanical test for determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction

over an individual defendant who acted on behalf of an organization,” the Court looks to certain

factors related to the extent and nature of Defendants’ contacts with the District in their work

capacity.

To find jurisdiction under subsection (a)(4), courts in this district have required that

plaintiffs demonstrate defendants’ ties to the District include a “plus factor” that shows some

“reasonable connection between the [forum] and the defendant.” Hindu Am. Found. v. Viswanath,

, 94 (D.D.C. 2022). “The purpose of the plus factor is to filter out cases in which

the in[-]forum impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, affiliations

with the forum.”

At a minimum, the contacts must be “continuing in character.”

Plaintiff has failed to show that either Defendant has continuing ties to the District that

satisfy a finding of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Defendants live and work in other

states. See ECF 5-2 ¶ 2 (Themelis stating that he is a resident of New Hampshire); ECF 22-2 ¶ 2

(Bennetsen stating that he is a resident of Arizona). They work for a company that, by Plaintiff’s

own account, is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. ECF 25 at 2 (Plaintiff’s

brief citing Teladoc’s SEC filings). As part of their work, they were drawn into an employment

dispute over Plaintiff’s work performance. Plaintiff happened to live and work in the District and

Defendants’ jobs required them to communicate with her and file a report about her. For Themelis,

Plaintiff’s allegations focus on his submission of a report to the NPDB. ECF 1-2 ¶ 3. For

Bennetsen, Plaintiff argues that their email correspondence amounts to a course of conduct in the

District. ECF 25 at 4. Both allegations focus on out-of-state actions that were transmitted towards

the District. But courts have held that the relevant conduct itself needed to occur in the District,

9 not merely be directed at a District resident or entity. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd.,

, 1096 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia

Berhad,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (stating that “regular” telephone calls to D.C. are

insufficient to establish jurisdiction); FutureGen Co. v. Carter,

(D.D.C.

2013) (explaining that the D.C. long-arm statute “requires that the persistent course of conduct

occur in the District; directing conduct from another state into the District via telephone, internet,

and mail is insufficient”). In sum, Plaintiff has alleged isolated incidents in which Defendants have

sent communications to the District, without any ongoing ties or activities in the forum. Her

complaint is thus “devoid of any facts establishing a real connection between Defendants and the

District.” Viswanath, 646 F. Supp. 3d at 95. As a result, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s suits

against Themelis and Bennetsen for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).

2. The Court will deny Saha’s request for jurisdictional discovery.

Saha argues that, in the event the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction, the Court

should permit her to conduct jurisdictional discovery. ECF 10-1 at 3; ECF 25 at 4. Saha fails to

show that additional discovery could cure the jurisdictional problems underlying her complaint.

Additionally, even if the Court could exercise jurisdiction over Themelis and Bennetsen, Saha

would fail to state a claim against them for the same reasons explained below as to Teladoc. As a

result, jurisdictional discovery would be futile in this case.

“This Circuit’s standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite liberal.” Diamond

Chem. Co. v. Atofina Chems., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2003). “[H]owever, in order to

get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery

will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Caribbean

Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Moreover, “a

10 plaintiff must make a ‘detailed showing of what discovery it wishes to conduct or what results it

thinks such discovery would produce.’” Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Philip Morris,

n.16). “Where there is no showing

of how jurisdictional discovery would help plaintiff discover anything new, it [is] inappropriate to

subject [defendants] to the burden and expense of discovery.”

Saha does not make the necessary showing. She requests discovery related to Teladoc’s

operations in D.C. and the role Themelis and Bennetsen played in such D.C.-based operations. See

ECF 10-1 at 2; ECF 25 at 4–7. Saha states that “it is difficult to believe that corporate Teladoc

which bragged in its 2022 Annual Report that it reached 50 million virtual visits . . . had no

interactions in the District of Columbia.” ECF 10-1 at 2. She also cites to a 2024 SEC report filed

by Teladoc stating that “Teladoc Health empowers all people everywhere to live their healthiest

lives,” seemingly implying that “all people” includes residents of D.C. ECF 25 at 2–3. Relying on

the inference that Teladoc has operations in D.C., Saha maintains that discovery is needed to

ascertain whether Themelis and Bennetsen also had contacts with D.C. on behalf of Teladoc. For

Themelis, Saha does not detail any particular discovery she plans to request. See ECF 10-1 at 2.

For Bennetsen, Saha lists nine discovery requests related to his role at Teladoc. See ECF 25 at 6–

7. For example, she requests Bennetsen’s written agreement with Teladoc, a list of his

responsibilities at Teladoc, his contacts with the D.C. Department of Health and other

governmental entities, and the current status of his employment with Teladoc.

She also claims

that jurisdictional discovery is needed regarding whether “the tortious act [was] part personal and

part business” and whether “Defendant Bennetsen and other parties including Teladoc [were]

11 independent joint tortfeasors.” Id. at 7.4 The Court declines to order discovery based on these

representations by Saha.

The Court does “not see how any” of the requested information would cure Saha’s “failure

to tie her jurisdictional theory” to Bennetsen and Themelis in particular, not Teladoc broadly. See

Livnat v. Palestinian Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, Teladoc has not moved to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. There is no dispute for this Court to resolve regarding

Teladoc’s contacts with the District of Columbia, but the thrust of Saha’s requested discovery turns

almost entirely on Teladoc’s contacts with D.C. Saha does not offer any good-faith belief or basis

as to why, if Teladoc had interactions with D.C., Themelis or Bennetsen must have, too, especially

in the face of two sworn declarations attesting to the opposite. See Viswanath, 646 F. Supp. 3d at

95 (“[A]s a general rule, courts cannot exert jurisdiction over individual corporate officers or

employees just because the court has jurisdiction over the corporation.”). Accordingly, “mere

conjecture [and] speculation” regarding Themelis and Bennetsen’s business conduct on behalf of

Teladoc in D.C. cannot support a request for jurisdictional discovery. FC Inv. Grp.,

; see also Atlantigas Corp.,

(denying plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional

discovery “to confirm that the . . . [d]efendants have customers in the District of Columbia or

otherwise ‘transact business’ in the District of Columbia” because “[s]uch generalized predictions

are not enough to justify jurisdictional discovery”).

Even if Saha could remedy the jurisdictional defects via discovery, as the Court will explain

below, her claims against Themelis and Bennetsen are otherwise subject to dismissal for failure to

4 With respect to Themelis only, Saha requests discovery as to whether the “100-mile bulge rule” is applicable because the NPDB, the entity he submitted notice of her resignation to, is purportedly located in Fairfax or Chantilly, Virginia. ECF 10-1 at 2. But, as already explained above, transmitting a document from out-of-state would be insufficient to establish jurisdiction, regardless of whether it was received within 100 miles of the District.

12 state a claim. Because Saha fails to plausibly state a claim against any Defendant, the Court

separately finds that any discovery would be futile and it is thus “inappropriate to subject

[Defendants] to the burden and expense of discovery.” Id.; see also Geier v. Conway, Homer &

Chin-Caplan, P.C.,

(D.D.C. 2013). As such, the Court declines to allow

jurisdictional discovery in this case.

B. Under Rule 12(b)(6), Saha has failed to state a claim against any Defendant.

Saha brings a tortious interference with contract claim and an interference with economic

expectation claim against Defendants. She fails to state either claim. As a result, the Court

dismisses all claims against Teladoc under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court also finds that, in the

alternative, Plaintiff’s claims against Themelis and Bennetsen also fail under Rule 12(b)(6).

To state a claim of tortious interference with contract in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff

must allege: “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional

procurement of a breach of the contract; and (4) damages resulting from the breach.” Teltschik v.

Williams & Jensen, PLLC,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). “A tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim

has identical elements, except that the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence, knowledge, and

intentional procurement of a breach of a prospective advantageous business transaction instead of

meeting those elements as to a contract.”

(citing Casco Marina Dev., LLC v. Dist. of Columbia

Redev. Land Agency,

(D.C. 2003)). The existence of a valid contract or business

relationship of expectancy “require[s] rather specific business opportunities,” not just “generic

opportunities of any successful enterprise.” Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp.,

(D.C.

Cir. 2010). Indeed, “tortious interference claims are routinely dismissed where the plaintiff fails

to name specific contractual relationships that the defendant allegedly interfered with, or to

13 identify any facts related to future contracts compromised by the alleged interferer.” Nyambal v.

Alliedbarton Sec. Servs., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2016), recons. granted on other

grounds,

(D.D.C. 2018).

Teladoc asserts that Saha has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim because “[o]ther than

a cursory mention that ‘all Defendants’ knew that Dr. Saha would become ineligible for future

employment as a physician, Plaintiff never alleges facts to demonstrate that Teladoc knew of the

existence of a contract or business relationship or expectancy” or “that Teladoc intentionally

procured a breach of any contract or interfered with any business relationship or expectancy.” ECF

6-1 at 4–5. In the alternative, Teladoc argues that even if Saha sufficiently stated a claim, the claim

still fails because Teladoc’s conduct was “justified or privileged.” ECF 6-1 at 5–6 (citing Sorrells

v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads Inc.,

(D.C. 1989)). Saha

responds that the “complaint set out [her] education, background, training and employment,” and

alleged that Teladoc knew that “Saha throughout her career was employed as an itinerant

contractor providing medical services.” ECF 11-1 at 3, 9.5 Given her professional background,

Saha claims she has sufficiently stated an “ongoing career solely interrupted by Defendant’s acts.”

at 3–5. The Court agrees with Teladoc that Saha’s conclusory allegations fail to state a claim.

Reading the complaint charitably, the Court understands Saha’s overall theory to be that

Defendants’ actions caused her “former and prospective clients” to “decline[] to hire and otherwise

retain” her. ECF 1-2 ¶ 75. But her allegations are unclear. To start, Saha does not describe exactly

what Defendants did. Her complaint largely reproduces the email messages between her and

5 At one point in her opposition, Saha appears to raise a new claim, asserting that Defendants’ “tortious conduct” was the making of a report that “was false and the person or entity providing the information knew the information was false,” in contravention of

. ECF 11-1 at 9. But this claim, raised for the first time in Saha’s opposition, is not properly before this Court. See Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(D.D.C. 2003) (“It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).

14 Bennetsen, which only go to the details of her performance review. See

at 19–24. Saha alleges

Bennetsen “supplied false, unqualified, misleading or incomplete information to [her]” while

knowing she “would justifiably rely on this information in the timing and manner of her resignation

from Teladoc.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. But Saha does not identify what the false information was or how

she relied upon it in resigning. Likewise, Saha alleges Teladoc, through its employees, “prepared

documents and made oral statements which were intentionally false, unqualified, misleading or

incomplete,” id. ¶ 66, but does not describe what the statements were or how they were false,

misleading, or incomplete. Indeed, Saha does not even allege what the purported NPDB report

says. In an email, Bennetsen informs Saha that declining the performance review “would be

considered a resignation while under formal review and may trigger a [NPDB] report.” Id. ¶ 33.

But later, Saha only alleges that she received notification from the NPDB that her “resignation was

required to be listed.” Id. ¶ 41. Even if the Court could piece together Defendants’ purported

actions, however, Saha cannot state a tortious interference claim.

Other than cursory mentions of general employment opportunities, Saha does not allege

that any particular contract or contemplated transaction existed. Nor does Saha identify any

existing contract that Teladoc had knowledge of and allegedly interfered with. The only hint of a

specific employment relationship in the complaint is where Saha informs Bennetsen that, in

addition to Teladoc, she is also working at a hospital. See ECF 1-2 ¶ 36 (Saha noting that she did

not complete additional Teladoc consults because she “was asked to help out in the hospital”). But

at no point does Saha, for instance, allege that the hospital Bennetsen presumably had knowledge

of terminated its contract with her as a result of Defendants’ NPDB report. Her only allegation to

this point is that a broad category of “former and prospective clients”—who she does not allege

Teladoc had any particular knowledge of—“declined to hire and otherwise retain” her as a result

15 of Defendants’ unspecified actions. Id. ¶ 75. To withstand a motion to dismiss, however, Saha

must “name specific contractual relationships” that Teladoc was aware of and intentionally

interfered with. Nyambal,

. Her failure to do so warrants dismissal of her

tortious interference with contract claim. Id.; see also Sharpe v. Am. Acad. of Actuaries,

(D.D.C. 2018) (dismissing tortious interference claim where plaintiff failed to

“plead the specific contracts or expectancies that the Plaintiff claims were interfered with, as he is

required to do”); DC2NY, Inc. v. Acad. Bus, LLC, No. 18-cv-2127 (RC),

, at *8

(D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2019) (dismissing tortious interference claim where “[i]nstead of naming a

relationship with a specific third party or class of third parties, the claims merely allege lost

business”).

Saha’s interference with prospective economic advantage claim fares no better. Saha

argues that, given her academic and professional background as a board-certified physician, she

has sufficiently stated a reasonable expectation of future employment opportunities that were

denied due to Defendants’ (unspecified) misrepresentations. See ECF 11-1 at 3–4. But again, other

than a general reference to “former and prospective clients,” ECF 1-2 ¶ 75, the complaint does not

identify any particular transactions, employment, or referrals Saha would have received but for

Defendants’ conduct. See Guttenberg v. Emery,

(D.D.C. 2014) (allegations

of “disparaging comments” made to the medical community that had “caus[ed] [other] doctors to

terminate their referrals to Plaintiffs” were not a sufficient basis for a tortious interference claim

because they amounted to only “general allegations of harm to their business,” without details such

as “examples of referrals which they would have received but for defendants’ conduct.”). Indeed,

Saha’s allegations are no different than those rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Jankovic,

. There, the court affirmed dismissal of an interference claim where the plaintiff similarly alleged

16 “a loss of current growth and business opportunities [and] a loss of future growth and business

opportunities.”

(explaining that the loss of such “generic opportunities of any successful

enterprise” cannot form the basis of an intentional interference claim).

Saha tries to cast her complaint as in line with cases where courts have found interference,

see ECF 11-1 at 5, but her broad allegations bear little resemblance to those cases involving

“specific anticipated transactions.”

For example, in Browning v. Clinton, the D.C. Circuit noted

that the plaintiff’s allegation that she “‘had a reasonable expectation’ of selling her book to a

publisher, might, standing alone fall short” of stating an interference claim.

, 243–44

(D.C. Cir. 2002). But Browning’s claim survived because she identified a specific example of a

prospective publishing contract that was allegedly terminated due to the defendant’s conduct.

Similarly, in Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, the D.C. Circuit held that a plaintiff had stated

an interference claim where it identified a “prospective final agreement” with WMATA that the

defendant’s actions allegedly interfered with.

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Saha has

made no similar allegations here. Instead, her reliance on general categories of lost “clients” is

analogous to claims that are consistently dismissed by courts. See Jankovic,

; Xereas

v. Heiss,

(D.D.C. 2013) (collecting cases) (plaintiff failed to state a claim

for tortious interference because he only generally alleged that defendants interfered with his “long

standing business relationships” and his “ability to maintain contact and relationships, and

continue doing business” with “current and prospective customers and industry players”);

Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. Council of Gov’ts,

(D.D.C. 2013) (“Plaintiff’s

vague assertions that she was unable to find a job after her termination” were insufficient to show

that the defendant “intentionally interfered . . . with any prospective business advantage that was

commercially reasonable to expect.”).

17 Because the Court agrees with Teladoc that Saha fails to state a claim in the first instance,

it need not consider Teladoc’s alternative grounds for dismissal premised on privileged or justified

conduct. Accordingly, Saha fails to state a tortious interference with contract claim or an

interference with economic expectation claim against Teladoc.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Themelis’ and Bennetsen’s motions to dismiss, ECF 5, 22, are

GRANTED for lack of personal jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.

Additionally, Teladoc’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF 6, is GRANTED. This

case is DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: September 30, 2025

18