UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FLORENCE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 22-3118 (CKK) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER (October 6, 2025)

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ [121] Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. Upon consideration of the parties’

submissions,1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court shall DENY

Defendants’ Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project (“FIRRP”) and other legal

services organizations filed this action on October 13, 2022, alleging that the Department of

Homeland Security and other Defendants were not providing constitutionally and statutorily

required access to counsel for people held in certain immigration detention facilities. Compl., ECF

No. 1. On February 1, 2023, the Court entered a preliminary injunction against Defendants,

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto: • Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, ECF No. 118; • Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 121; • Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 124; and • Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 127.

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues presented in the pending motion. See LCvR 7(f).

1 holding that Plaintiff FIRRP had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that

attorney-access conditions at the Central Arizona Florence Correctional Complex (“Florence”)

were constitutionally deficient because they amounted to punishment. Ams. for Immigrant Just. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 22-cv-3118, ECF No. 79,

(D.D.C. Feb. 1,

2023) (CKK) (“PI Op.”). The Court found that FIRRP had shown “a clear likelihood of success

on its punitive-detention claim as to Florence” and that Defendants had “effectively blocked

attorney access in toto” at the Florence facility.

at *16–17. However, the Court found that the

other groups that had filed suit alongside FIRRP were not entitled to preliminary injunctions

because those groups had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their own claims. See

id. at *21. The Court also found that one Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed its claims for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.; Order, ECF No. 78, at 1.

To remedy the likely harm that FIRRP established at the preliminary injunction stage, the

Court ordered that Defendants must, within 60 days, either install “six private, confidential

attorney-client visitation rooms in which counsel may utilize translation services and physically

pass documents to and from their detainee client[s]” or “a ratio of 25 detainees to one telephone

that block[s] all others from listening to legal calls while in progress.” Order, ECF No. 78, at 1.

The Court further ordered that, in making these changes, Defendants “shall otherwise comply with

every provision” of the applicable national detention standards. Id.

After several extensions of time to comply with the Court’s Order, Defendants notified the

Court on August 30, 2023, that they had installed 24 soundproof virtual visitation booths at the

Florence facility and implemented procedures for detainees to use these booths for private virtual

meetings with attorneys. See Defs.’ Cert. of Compliance, ECF No. 120.

2 However, FIRRP’s success at the preliminary injunction stage is merely one step in the

litigation. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Lackey v. Stinnie, such success is “a

transient victory at the threshold of an action” that “is “tentative [in] character, in view of the

continuation of the litigation to definitively resolve the controversy.”

(2025)

(quoting Sole v. Wyner,

(2007)).

Before Defendants certified compliance with the Court’s preliminary injunction, the Court

severed the several Plaintiffs’ cases from one another, retaining jurisdiction over FIRRP’s case

and transferring the cases of the other remaining Plaintiffs to other Districts. See Order, ECF

No. 102. FIRRP then filed a Second Amended Complaint on August 11, 2023, removing factual

allegations, claims, and parties that the Court had transferred or dismissed and adding factual

allegations related to FIRRP’s existing claims. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 118; see also Notice

of Consent to Filing of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 (explaining changes implemented in

the Second Amended Complaint). The Second Amended Complaint relates in extensive detail

alleged deficiencies in access to communications between FIRRP and its detained clients. See,

e.g., Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 6–13, 23–36, 47–149, 161–73.

Defendants have now moved to dismiss FIRRP’s Second Amended Complaint. See Defs.’

Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 121. FIRRP opposes the Motion. Pl’s Opp’n to Defs.’

Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 124.

Defendants’ Motion presents the Court with three central arguments.

First, Defendants argue that because detainees who are FIRRP’s clients “[can] access

counsel through several mediums and [that] Defendants abide by the appropriate performance-

based national detention standards,” the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under

either the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause or the Rehabilitation Act. Defs.’ Mot. at 1.

3 Second, Defendants argue that FIRRP “has not pled sufficient facts to establish third-party

standing or to provide Defendants with sufficient notice about the claims.”

Specifically, they

argue that FIRRP has failed to “identify any client who was injured by Defendants’ procedures in

any actual proceeding or show that FIRRP clients are hindered in bringing their claims as first-

party litigants.”

Third, and finally, Defendants contend that FIRRP’s claims must be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim because FIRPP “does not offer sworn

statements from FIRRP counsel or any declarations from detained clients in support of its claims.”

Id. at 6.

Each of Defendants’ contentions is predicated on alleged failures and inadequacies in

pleading by FIRRP. The Court has carefully considered Defendants’ arguments and FIRRP’s

factual allegations under Rule 12. Although the Second Amended Complaint does not provide

full factual development of FIRRP’s allegations, the allegations that it does contain are sufficient

to establish FIRRP’s standing and satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Defendants’ [121] Motion to Dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A plaintiff’s

complaint need not contain “‘detailed factual allegations,’” but it must be “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

(quoting Twombly,

). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must “‘construe the complaint liberally,’

granting the [plaintiff] ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’”

4 Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2023)

(quoting Zukerman v. USPS,

(D.C. Cir. 2020)).

Although the court “is limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint, any documents

attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice,

and matters of public record,” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc.,

(D.D.C.

2008) (CKK), there is no requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a plaintiff attach

declarations to the complaint. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Unless a rule or statute specifically states

otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.”). A motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”

Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). At this juncture, the court “do[es] not

‘assess the truth of what is asserted or determine[e] whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back

up what is in the complaint.’”

(second alteration in original) (quoting ACLU Found. of S. Cal.

v. Barr,

(D.C. Cir. 1991)).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants advance three arguments for dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint: that

FIRRP lacks third-party standing to raise attorney-access claims on behalf of its clients, that it fails

to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and that it fails to state a claim

under the Rehabilitation Act. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 121. For the reasons that follow, the

Court concludes that none of these arguments warrant dismissal. The Court shall therefore DENY

Defendants’ motion.

A. The Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges third-party standing.

Defendants first argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) because it lacks

third-party standing to raise claims on behalf of its detained clients. This Court disagrees.

5 Third-party standing is a limited exception to the general principle that litigants must assert

their own legal rights. Cf. Warth v. Seldin,

(1975). To proceed on the basis of

third-party standing, a litigant must satisfy three requirements: (1) an “injury in fact” to the

litigant’s own interests, (2) “a close relation to the third party” whose rights are asserted, and

(3) “some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.” Powers v. Ohio,

, 410–11 (1991); see Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. at 130 (describing latter two

requirements as “additional showings” on top of injury-in-fact requirement). The allegations in

the Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to satisfy all three requirements in this case.

First, FIRRP has adequately alleged an injury-in-fact to its own interests. An injury-in-

fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ ‘actual or

imminent,’ and ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged act of the defendant, and likely to be redressed

by a favorable decision in the federal court.” Navegar, Inc. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

, 560–61 (1992)). An

organizational Plaintiff can establish injury-in-fact by showing a sufficient “personal stake” in the

outcome of the case, such as a direct impediment to its own activities. See Havens Realty Corp.

v. Coleman,

, 379–80 (1982).

As this Court previously held, the barriers to attorney access that FIRRP has alleged are

direct impediments to its mission, and FIRRP has organizational standing to challenge those

barriers. See PI Op. at *7 (citing Ukrainian-Am. Bar Ass’n v. Baker,

(D.C.

Cir. 1990)). The Second Amended Complaint relates in detail the injury-in-fact allegedly suffered

by FIRRP in its representation of its detained clients. These extensive allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint, combined with the Court’s prior ruling, support a finding of injury-in-fact

to FIRRP that is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the third-party standing framework.

6 Second, FIRRP has adequately alleged “a close relation to” the third parties whose rights

it intends to assert. The third parties at issue here are immigration detainees at the Florence facility,

and FIRRP alleges that it serves as counsel to some of these detainees. See, e.g., Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 17 (“FIRRP currently represents clients detained at Florence who are harmed by

Defendants’ restrictions on access to counsel, and are otherwise impeded from protecting their

own interests regarding attorney access.”). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, an allegation of an

actual attorney-client relationship provides a sufficient basis to find that FIRRP has satisfied the

second prong of the third-party standing inquiry. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United

States,

, 624 n.3 (1989) (holding that a law firm could assert the rights of an existing

client and noting that the attorney-client relationship “is one of special consequence”); cf.

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131 (noting that an “existing attorney-client relationship is, of course, quite

distinct from [a] hypothetical attorney-client relationship,” and holding that the latter does not

support third-party standing).

Third, and finally, the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges “some hindrance

to” FIRRPs’ clients’ “ability to protect [their] own interests.” Powers,

. The

hindrance prong of the third-party standing test “does not require an absolute bar from suit, but

‘some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.’” Pennsylvania

Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting

Powers,

). Hindrances justifying third-party standing can include “systemic

practical challenges to pursuing one’s own rights,” “deterrence from filing suit due to privacy

concerns,” or “the ‘imminent mootness’ of a case.” United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (JDB) (citing Singleton v. Wulff,

(1976)). The

Second Amended Complaint’s allegations in this regard sufficiently plead facts supporting

7 hindrance to a third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 30, 44, 46, 49–67, 73, 114, 125, 131.

Although Defendants suggest that FIRRP should have attached declarations from its clients

to substantiate its assertion of third-party standing, this argument lacks merit. See Defs.’ Mot. at

8–9, 13. Declarations are not required to establish standing or any other element of a claim at the

motion-to-dismiss stage. See Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir.

2019) (explaining that at the pleading stage, “a plaintiff is required only to state plausibly that each

standing element exists”); see also Browning,

(noting that when evaluating a

motion to dismiss, a court must “accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true”).

Accordingly, consistent with the Court’s prior determination at the preliminary injunction

stage, the Court finds that FIRRP has sufficiently established third-party standing to raise attorney-

access claims on behalf of its detained clients. See Powers,

.

B. The Second Amended Complaint states a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

Next, Defendants urge this Court to dismiss FIRRP’s claim under the Fifth Amendment

Due Process Clause. The Court declines to do so.

FIRRP’s Fifth Amendment Due Process claim is founded in the allegation that Defendants

have functionally denied FIRRP’s clients detained at the Florence facility from accessing their

attorneys without due justification. FIRRP supports this claim with myriad factual allegations

regarding asserted deficiencies in client access. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 44, 46, 49-

67, 73, 114, 125, 131.

The crux of Defendants’ motion to dismiss is the argument that FIRRP’s factual allegations

of attorney-access barriers at Florence are “conclusory and do not reference a specific claim,” and

therefore fail to satisfy Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), leaving Defendants

8 incapable of “formulat[ing] an informed defense.” Defs.’ Mot. at 14. Defendants also briefly argue

that FIRRP’s claims regarding the adequacy of in-person visitation must fail because the applicable

national detention standards “do not impose a set number of visitation rooms.” Id. at 15.

However, at the preliminary injunction stage, the Court already concluded that “FIRRP has

shown a clear likelihood of success on its punitive-detention claim as to Florence.” PI Op. at *16.

The Court found that Defendants have “functionally stripped detainee-clients of access to their

attorneys without due justification,” and that their failure to provide confidential legal visitation

and calls “effectively vitiates attorney-client access in its entirety.” Id. at *16, *21.

Immigration detention is “undisputedly civil—i.e., non-punitive in nature.” S. Poverty L.

Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (SPLC I), No. 18-cv-0760,

, at *18 (D.D.C.

June 17, 2020) (CKK) (quoting R.I.L-R v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2015) (JEB)).

Detained immigrants can establish unconstitutional punishment by showing that there is “an

expressed intent to punish,” or that the challenged conditions are either “not ‘rationally related to

a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’” or “excessive in relation to that purpose.”

Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

(2015) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish,

(1979)); see also SPLC I,

, at *18. To determine whether a challenged condition

is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, the court considers “whether the

conditions are ‘employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative

and less harsh methods.’” SPLC I,

, at *18 (quoting Bell,

n.20).

Where conditions at a detention facility are “not more considerate than those at pretrial and

prison facilities,” they “may be punitive in nature.” SPLC I,

, at *19 (quoting

Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 2019)); see also

PI Op. at *12 (explaining that detained immigrants establish a “‘presumption’ of punitive

9 detention” where conditions are “equal to or worse than conditions experienced by inmates

convicted of a criminal offense”). Upon establishing such a presumption, “a makeshift burden then

generally shifts to the defendant to establish that the conditions are rationally related to a non-

punitive purpose and those conditions were not excessive.” PI Op. at *12.

In its Second Amended Complaint, FIRRP has adequately alleged that attorney-access

conditions at Florence are more restrictive than those in which prisoners serving criminal sentences

are held, both at the very same facility and similarly situated facilities. See, e.g., Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 34, 55, 57, 78, 104.

For example, FIRRP alleges that there are no “private, confidential attorney-client

visitation rooms where counsel can utilize interpretation services and physically pass documents

to and from detained clients.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 48; see also id. ¶ 51 (attorneys cannot share

legal documents in private visitation rooms due to plexiglass walls); id. ¶ 67 (“If attorneys elect to

use the private meeting rooms at Florence, they cannot exchange documents or procure signatures

without giving them to a guard, breaching confidentiality.”). FIRRP also alleges that the only

visitation area where attorneys can share documents is in a cafeteria-like setting, where there is no

privacy. Id. ¶¶ 50–51 (“Legal visits at Florence occur primarily in a large, cafeteria-style visitation

room, which does not provide any confidential space for attorneys and clients to communicate.”).

Similarly, FIRRP alleges that there is no video teleconferencing availability for confidential

attorney-client communication, id. ¶ 103, and legal calls made from housing units are not private

or confidential, id. ¶ 82. FIRRP alleges that, following the Court’s preliminary injunction order,

Defendants provided FIRRP clients with prepaid cell phones for attorney-client communication.

Id. ¶ 69. However, FIRRP alleges that calls made using these cell phones are not always

confidential, and they are often held in a hallway or in a cafeteria-style visitation room, where

10 FIRRP’s clients can be overheard by others. Id. ¶ 76. Taken together, these factual allegations

plausibly state a claim that the attorney-access conditions for immigration detainees at Florence

are more restrictive than those applicable to prisoners serving criminal sentences. Those

allegations are therefore sufficient to state a Fifth Amendment punitive-detention claim. Accord

PI Op. at *16.

Defendants’ arguments for dismissal maintain that FIRRP’s factual allegations of attorney-

access barriers at Florence are “conclusory and do not reference a specific claim,” and fail to satisfy

Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), leaving Defendants incapable of “formulat[ing] an informed defense.”

Defs.’ Mot. at 14. The breadth and detail of the allegations contradict that assertion. Nonetheless,

Defendants parse the Second Amended Complaint and point to separate factual allegations that

they contend do not violate the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 18–20 (citing lack of scheduled phone

calls, burdensome pro bono call system, use of cellphones and printers, and lack of fax and email

to exchange documents). However, although single restriction in isolation may not reach the level

of a constitutional violation, the combination of many such restrictions may make the whole

greater than the sum of the parts. The crux of the analysis of attorney-access restrictions must

therefore be based on the “totality of these circumstances.” PI Op. at *14 (quoting SPLC I,

, at *24).

Defendants also suggest that FIRRP should have submitted declarations from attorneys or

clients to substantiate its allegations regarding attorney-access conditions, but this Court disagrees.

As the Court noted in response to Defendants’ similar argument that FIRRP should have submitted

declarations to show third-party standing, declarations are not required to establish any element of

a claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Jeffries,

; Browning,

.

11 In this Court’s view, the Second Amended Complaint’s allegations are sufficient to meet

the pleading requirements of Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6). To the extent that Defendants need

additional specificity to construct their defense as the case proceeds, they can obtain the necessary

information through the discovery process.

Defendants’ additional argument that the “continued immigration detention of Plaintiff’s

clients pending removal cannot be described as punitive or excessive in relation to the legitimate

government purpose of enforcing the immigration laws” is beside the point. Defs.’ Mot. at 20.

This lawsuit does not challenge the lawful detention of immigrants who have allegedly violated

the immigration laws. It only seeks redress for the alleged violation of those detainees’ rights to

have unimpeded access to their counsel. For the reasons the Court has explained, the Second

Amended Complaint states a valid substantive due process claim sufficient to overcome the motion

to dismiss.

C. The Second Amended Complaint states a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

Finally, Defendants seek to dismiss FIRRP’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Because

the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that the attorney-access conditions at the

Florence facility functionally exclude otherwise-qualified detained individuals with disabilities

from participating in a public program or activity, the Court shall not dismiss this claim.

In the Second Amended Complaint, FIRRP defines a category of individuals it describes

as “Detained Clients with Disabilities.” See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107-09). FIRRP contends

that these clients face particular barriers to attorney access “because Defendants impose certain

barriers disproportionately on Detained Clients with Disabilities and because other barriers . . .

have a disproportionate effect on Detained Clients with Disabilities.” Id. ¶ 120.

To succeed on its Rehabilitation Act claim on behalf of these individuals, FIRRP must

show that “(1) one or more of its [Detained Clients with Disabilities] are ‘disabled’ within the 12 meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) one or more of [Detained Clients with Disabilities] are

‘otherwise qualified’ for a particular program or activity; (3) one or more of its [Detained Clients

with Disabilities] were ‘excluded from[] or denied the benefit of’ that program or activity; and (4)

‘the program or activity is carried out by a federal executive agency or with federal funds.’” PI

Op. at *19 (citing Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)).

This inquiry is necessarily fact-intensive. See Solomon v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2014);

Brown v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J., concurring).

In the portion of the Court’s preliminary injunction ruling that assessed a Rehabilitation

Act claim by Plaintiff Americans for Immigration Justice (“AIJ”), the Court determined that it

would have required specific factual evidence of “the specific identity of any clients’ disabilities,

how disabling their respective conditions are, the details of prior requests for accommodation(s),

and the efforts (if any) by [the facility] to provide any such requested accommodation(s)” in order

to evaluate AIJ’s Rehabilitation Act claim at the preliminary injunction stage. PI Op. at *19.

FIRRP’s Second Amended Complaint responds to the concerns that the Court previously

expressed about AIJ’s Rehabilitation Act claim by adding specific and detailed factual allegations

regarding two of its clients that are detained at Florence, who FIRRP identifies as “Jose” and

“Pedro.” See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–33, 107–18 (describing Jose and Pedro’s symptoms and

potential diagnoses, the impediments to attorney access that the experienced, and the

accommodation requests that FIRRP made on their behalf). These detailed factual allegations,

taken together with FIRRP’s legal allegations reciting the elements of a Rehabilitation Act claim,

satisfy the requisite pleading standards.

Two challenges remain. Defendants seek dismissal of FIRRP’s Rehabilitation Act claim

on the grounds that: (1) it provides inadequate notice, and, (2) even drawing all factual inferences

13 in its favor, FIRRP cannot satisfy the third prong of the relevant test: that “one or more of its [two]

purportedly disabled clients were ‘excluded from or denied the benefit of’ th[e] program or

activity.” See Defs.’ Mot. at 24–25; Defs.’ Reply at 16–18.

Defendants contend that the Second Amended Complaint “fails to provide sufficient

information about specific individuals’ diagnoses and mental disabilities, or the specific

accommodations requested, the specific accommodations that were denied, and the basis for any

denial.” Defs.’ Mot. at 24; Defs.’ Reply at 16–18.

However, this contention lacks merit. The Second Amended Complaint alleges facts about

specific individuals’ diagnoses and mental disabilities. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl. ¶ 112

(alleging that Jose’s diagnoses of “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Insomnia Disorder, Major

Depressive Disorder with mood congruent psychotic features, and Unspecified Major

Neurocognitive Disorder, [are] most likely due to Traumatic Brain Injury”), ¶ 116 (alleging that

“Pedro’s symptoms are so extreme that it was difficult to conduct a formal evaluation and obtain

a clear diagnosis,” but that “he experienced psychosis and suicidality”). It similarly contains

detailed allegations of the “accommodation requests” that FIRRP has made. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 114,

¶ 118. The Second Amended Complaint also alleges that the specific accommodations were

denied. Id. ¶¶ 114, 118. It further asserts that there appears to be no logically sound basis for these

denials. See, e.g., id. ¶ 110 (explaining that Defendant Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) established a directive requiring the type of attorney access for clients with disabilities

that this case seeks), ¶ 114 (explaining that facility staff denied a request for private, scheduled

legal phone calls “despite interest in such a system by those charged with telephonic visitation

scheduling at Florence,” and that facility staff “denied or attempted to deny” visits even when they

were specifically approved by ICE beforehand). The Second Amended Complaint therefore gives

14 Defendants adequate notice of the essential Rehabilitation Act allegations. Contrary to

Defendants’ suggestion, there is no need for a declaration from a client or a client’s medical

provider at this stage of the proceeding. See Defs.’ Mot. at 24; Browning,

. To

the extent that Defendants require further information to formulate their defense, discovery is the

appropriate vehicle for obtaining that information.

Defendants’ argument about lack of fair notice appears to misapprehend the fundamental

difference between the pleading standards and standards of proof to be established at trial or in a

motion for summary judgment. They contend that dismissal is appropriate because every fact

necessary at a trial was not alleged, citing to cases that evidence a complete failure to allege facts

supporting discrimination and characterizing the alleged facts as “legal conclusions.” Cf., e.g.,

Savoy v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2013) (RC) (“Plaintiff mentions

discrimination but he has neither alleged any acts of discrimination nor stated any facts suggesting

that the IRS’ garnishing of his wages was ‘solely’—or even probably—due to his alleged mental

disability.”); Donovan v. Powell,

(D.D.C. 2014) (CKK) (“The Court

agrees that Plaintiff has provided only a recitation of legal conclusions without any factual support

and, accordingly, Count II also should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.”); Lucas v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2010) (EGS)

(granting a motion to dismiss on a Rehabilitation Act claim in which the plaintiff’s complaint

included only conclusory, boilerplate language regarding “a policy, custom or practice” employed

by the defendant). This effort to hold Plaintiff to a trial or summary-judgment standard of proof

in the context of a motion to dismiss is unavailing.

1. Meaningful Access

The Rehabilitation Act requires government entities to provide “meaningful access” to

government programs and benefits to people with disabilities. Alexander v. Choate,

, 15 301 (1985). This requirement is not a black-and-white proposition. The government can fall short

of providing “meaningful access” even when people with disabilities have some ways of accessing

the benefit. See, e.g., Am. Council of the Blind,

, 1269–70 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(holding that blind people lacked “meaningful access” to currency despite the government’s

argument that “availability of portable currency readers to identify denominations and credit cards

as an alternative to cash” provided some access); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Trump,

, 58 (D.D.C. 2020) (JEB) (holding that “[c]losed captioning and transcripts” of coronavirus

briefings did not amount to “meaningful access” to these briefings for deaf people even though

they provided some access); Rogers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 16-cv-2733,

,

at *16 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2019) (holding that “the fact that TTYs retain some functionality” that

provides deaf incarcerated people some ability to communicate “does not equate to meaningful

access”).

Defendants argue that because FIRRP has not alleged a total denial of access to its clients

with disabilities, it cannot bring a Rehabilitation Act claim for denial of access to counsel on their

behalf. See Defs.’ Mot. at 25; Defs.’ Reply at 15–22. However, FIRRP’s Second Amended

Complaint more than sufficiently alleges that the barriers to accessing counsel at Florence are high.

See, e.g. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 113 (“at least five times over approximately two months, FCC

denied FIRRP staff in-person visitation [with its client Jose] after they had already traveled to the

facility”); ¶ 117 (14 of FIRRP staff’s 20 attempts to visit Pedro in person “were denied by staff”);

¶ 113 (over a “five-month period” when Jose was in mental health observation, FIRRP staff

succeeded in contacting him by phone only three times); ¶ 117 (“FIRRP was never able to

communicate with Pedro [by phone] despite several attempts.”); ¶ 123 (FIRRP attorney “was

denied telephone and in-person visits for nearly a month with a Detained Client with a [D]isability,

16 who was under ‘mental health watch,’ during which time the client’s case continued before the

court.”). FIRRP has also alleged that these access barriers can have serious repercussions, such as

by causing “[i]nterruption[s] in communications [that] undermine the attorney-client relationship,”

and “concrete harm” to the ability of Plaintiff and Detained Clients with Disabilities “to

communicate effectively about matters crucial to legal representation.” Id. ¶¶ 121, 129.

“Meaningful access” is a “necessarily fact-specific” inquiry, and it is not appropriate for

determination on a motion to dismiss in this case. See Am. Council of the Blind,

.

Further development of the relevant facts will allow this issue to be resolved as this case proceeds.

2. Reasonable Accommodations

The Second Amended Complaint requests a wide variety of forms of accommodations to

ensure client access. Defendants maintain that the requested accommodations are not reasonable

and that dismissal should follow. See Defs.’ Mot. at 28–35.

As with the prior question of whether the Government has upheld its obligation to provide

“meaningful access,” “whether a particular type of accommodation is reasonable is commonly a

contextual and fact-specific inquiry.” Solomon,

. Accordingly, the “reasonableness

of an accommodation under the [closely related ADA inquiry] is a question of fact appropriate for

resolution by the trier of fact and not by the Court on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”

Niece v. Fitzner,

(E.D. Mich. 1996).

Defendants assert that they offer reasonable accommodations for in-person visitation,

contrary to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Compare Defs.’ Mot. at 29–30,

and Defs.’ Reply at 16–18, with Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113–15, 117–18, 123, 128. Assessing the

back-and-forth between the parties over what procedures are or are not in place and are or are not

followed, or have sufficient other justification, is not a proper inquiry at the motion-to-dismiss

stage, at which the Court must assume the truth of the Plaintiff’s plausible factual allegations. The 17 Court finds that FIRRP has met its pleading burden. As this case proceeds, discovery will elucidate

the critical facts, and any remaining disputes can be resolved by the trier of fact.

Defendants also contend that an accommodation request for video teleconference visits is

moot because video visits “are now available through the virtual visitation booths” that Defendants

installed in response to the preliminary injunction entered in this case. See Defs.’ Mot. at 33.

However, “a case does not become moot simply because the defendant has complied with [an]

injunction.” Marshall v. Loc. Union No. 639, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen

& Helpers of Am., Inc.,

, 1300 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979). “If there is a substantial

likelihood that the defendant will revert back to the enjoined practice then the case is not moot.”

Id. Here, absent this Court’s preliminary injunction order, the challenged denial of access to

private attorney visitation could recur, for example through the closure or non-operation of the

new videoconference booths. See Phillips v. Mabus,

(D.D.C. 2012);

Gray Panthers Project Fund v. Thompson,

(D.D.C. 2002).

Accordingly, FIRRP’s claims regarding reasonable accommodations for video teleconference

visits are not moot.

Defendants also dispute FIRRP’s allegation that its clients with disabilities experience

particular difficulties using the call-back message system at Florence. Compare Defs.’ Mot. at 31

(maintaining that because the system worked on occasion, it is demonstrably workable), with

Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 125, 113-114, 117, 128. Again, the “reasonableness of an accommodation

under the [closely related ADA inquiry] is a question of fact appropriate for resolution by the trier

of fact and not by the Court on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Niece,

. FIRRP’s claims regarding the call-back message system therefore shall not be dismissed.

18 FIRRP also contends that, after Defendants’ policies resulted in multiple failed attempts to

visit its client Pedro, it requested—and was refused—an accommodation where its staff would

visit Pedro cell-side (i.e., go to Pedro’s isolation cell and conduct an interview through the door).

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 118. Defendants respond that “Plaintiff does not explain the basis for the

denial or if and how a ‘cell-side’ visit was a reasonable accommodation.” Defs.’ Mot. at 31.

However, given the alleged prior failures of attorney access and the allegation that a cell-side visit

was previously granted, see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 118, Plaintiff’s failure to allege a specific basis

for the denial does not warrant the dismissal of these allegations. Furthermore, Defendants

explanations in its Reply Memorandum again would require the Court to engage in fact-finding

between the versions of events. See Defs.’ Reply at 16–18. That exercise would be inappropriate

at this stage of the litigation.

Another subject for factual exploration, but not on a motion to dismiss, is the dispute over

Plaintiff’s request that Pedro be transferred to another nearby ICE facility. Defendants assert that

transfer would not be a reasonable accommodation because of the “many factors” that “must be

considered . . . including the safety and security of the detainee, other detainees, counsel, and the

staff at both facilities.” Defs.’ Mot. at 34. Quite plainly, the consideration of evidence and expert

testimony to resolve this issue is for another stage of the case.

Finally, the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges specific harms that

Defendants’ attorney-access barriers impose on its clients with disabilities. See, e.g., Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 118 (“[Plaintiff was un]able to communicate with Pedro since the day of his last court

date on January 17, 2023, until he was ultimately released from custody.”), ¶ 121 (“Interruptions

in communication can undermine the attorney-client relationship.”), ¶ 123 (“Detained Clients with

Disabilities may experience a total loss of access to counsel for weeks because of prolonged

19 periods in mental health segregation."), ,r 130 ("In some cases, FIRRP attorneys have experienced

periods-from days to months-where they could not access Detained Clients with Disabilities at

all because of these barriers."). These allegations show the requisite harm that is necessary to state

a Rehabilitation Act claim. See, e.g., Choate,

; Am. Council of the Blind,

; Nat'! Ass'n of the Deafv. Trump, 486 F. Supp. 3d at 58; Rogers,

, at *16.

* * *

In sum, the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges that FIRRP has third-party

standing to advance attorney-access claims on behalf of its clients, states a claim under the Fifth

Amendment's Due Process Clause, and states both "meaningful access" and "reasonable

accommodation" claims under the Rehabilitation Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' [ 121] Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 6, 2025

COLLEEN KOUAR-KO EL United States District Judge

20