IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

: ANTHONY J. CANCELOSI :

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 25-2015

: COLUMBIA LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment

law case is the motion pursuant to

(a) to transfer

venue to the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia filed by Columbia Lighthouse for the Blind (“Defendant”

or “CLB”). (ECF No. 15). 1 The issues have been briefed, and the

court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule

105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to transfer venue

will be granted. Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss will remain

for resolution in the transferee district.

I. Background

A. Factual Background 2

Defendant CLB “is a non-profit charity that has served

residents who are blind and visually impaired in the Greater

Washington, D.C. area since 1900.” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 3). It “is a

1 Defendant does not move under

to dismiss or transfer for improper venue.

2 The facts herein are undisputed unless otherwise noted. resident of the District of Columbia, where it is incorporated and

maintains its principal place of business,” (Id. ¶ 4), and it

maintains an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, (ECF No. 15-3 ¶

5). Plaintiff Anthony J. Cancelosi was the President and Chief

Executive Officer of CLB from 2005 to April 30, 2025. (ECF No. 14

¶¶ 7, 19). He is a resident of Virginia and worked five days a

week at Defendant’s D.C. corporate headquarters during his

employment with Defendant. (Id. ¶ 2; ECF No. 15-3 ¶ 8).

Defendant hired Plaintiff when “it was the subject of an FBI

investigation of the former CEO’s alleged misuse of funds of the

organization.” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 9). Plaintiff’s offer letter

included twenty days of paid vacation. (Id. ¶ 7; ECF No. 14-2, at

2). On September 20, 2006, Defendant entered into an alleged

Severance Agreement with Plaintiff, which provided for “severance

of one year’s salary and benefits in the event of the President’s

involuntary termination.” (ECF Nos. 14 ¶ 11; 14-5, at 2).

Plaintiff led Defendant through the FBI investigation and into

subsequent success. (ECF No. 14 ¶ 9).

On April 9, 2025, members of Defendant’s Board held a lunch

meeting with Plaintiff at the Cosmos Club in the District of

Columbia, where they expressed their plan to replace him with a

new President. (Id. ¶ 14; ECF No. 14-7, at 2). On April 15, 2025,

Ms. Dufrane, one of Defendant’s Board members, followed up via

2 email with Plaintiff, explaining the plan to transition him into

the role of President Emeritus and attaching an Executive

Employment Agreement to that effect. (ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 15–16). Ms.

Dufrane stated that if Plaintiff did not sign the Executive

Employment Agreement by 5:00 PM of the following day, Plaintiff

would be terminated. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff did not sign by 5:00

PM the following day. On April 29, 2025, Ms. Dufrane told

Plaintiff that if he did not sign the agreement that same day, he

would be terminated. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff did not sign the

agreement. (Id. ¶ 19). On April 30, 2025, the Board voted to

terminate Plaintiff. (Id.). Dr. Deegan, a Board member, allegedly

later made discriminatory remarks about Plaintiff’s age in

connection with his termination. (Id. ¶¶ 51–52). Plaintiff was

81 at the time. (Id. ¶ 51).

On May 15, 2025, Defendant paid Plaintiff his final paycheck.

(Id. ¶ 21). This paycheck “included a payment for accrued, unused

vacation pay” that Plaintiff alleges “was substantially less than

the vacation pay owed to him.” (Id.). Defendant has not paid any

severance or benefits to Plaintiff, despite what Plaintiff alleges

is owed to him under the Severance Agreement. (Id. ¶ 22).

B. Procedural Background

On June 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against CLB,

seeking relief for breach of contract (Counts One and Two),

3 violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”)

(Count Three), violation of the District of Columbia Wage Payment

and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”) (Count Four), and age discrimination

in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (Count

Five). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff amended his complaint on July 10,

2025. (ECF No. 14). On July 24, 2025, Defendant filed a motion

to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia pursuant to

(a) or, in the

alternative, a motion to dismiss Counts One and Five for failure

to state a claim. (ECF No. 15). On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff

filed separate oppositions to Defendant’s motion to transfer

venue, (ECF No. 19), and to Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss

in the alternative, (ECF No. 18). On September 4, 2025, Defendant

filed a single reply to Plaintiff’s two oppositions. (ECF No.

20).

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Section 1404(a) provides that “a district court may transfer

any civil action to any other district or division where it might

have been brought” if doing so is to “the convenience of parties

and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.”

(a). “The threshold question on a motion to transfer is

whether the action might have been brought in the transferee

4 forum.” Howard Univ. v. Watkins, No. 06-cv-2076-DKC,

, at *3 (D.Md. Mar. 12, 2007). The parties do not appear to

dispute that this action could have been brought in the District

of Columbia, nor could they. Venue is proper in the District of

Columbia because Defendant “is a resident of the District of

Columbia, where it is incorporated and maintains its principal

place of business.” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 4);

(b)(1) (“A

civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any

defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in

which the district is located.”).

Once satisfied that the moving party has met this threshold

requirement, courts in the Fourth Circuit apply a four-factor test

to transfer motions: “(1) the weight accorded to plaintiff’s choice

of venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3) convenience of

the parties; and (4) the interest of justice.” Trs. of the

Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs.,

Inc.,

(4th Cir. 2015) (citing, inter alia, Lynch

v. Vanderhoef Builders,

(D.Md. 2002)). “The

burden is on the moving party to show that transfer to another

forum is proper.” Gilbert v. Freshbikes, LLC,

(D.Md. 2014) (citing Cross v. Fleet Rsrv. Ass’n Pension Plan,

(D.Md. 2005)). “Section 1404(a) reflects

an increased desire to have federal civil suits tried in the

5 federal system at the place called for in the particular case by

considerations of convenience and justice.” Van Dusen v. Barrack,

(1964). While courts frequently defer to a

plaintiff’s choice of forum, such “deference is not limitless . .

. and can be overcome.” Gilbert,

(citing

Lynch,

). Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether

to transfer venue is committed to the sound discretion of the trial

court.” Hausfeld v. Love Funding Corp.,

(D.Md. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Mamani v.

Bustamante,

(D.Md. 2008)).

B. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to little deference

in this case. “Where a plaintiff sues in her home forum, her

choice of venue is ‘ordinarily accorded considerable weight.’”

Hausfeld,

(quoting Lynch,

). Such deference “is lower when the plaintiff is not [a]

citizen of the [forum] state or the case does not otherwise have

‘significant ties’ to the forum.” Doe v. Choice Hotels Int’l,

Inc., No. 24-cv-1598-TDC,

, at *10 (D.Md. July 28,

2025) (quoting Carey v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank AG,

, 237–38 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v.

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.,

(2007) (“Where

the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum, however, the

6 presumption in the plaintiff’s favor ‘applies with less force.’”

(quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

(1981))).

Plaintiff is not a citizen of Maryland, but rather Virginia,

nor does his case have significant ties to Maryland. The venue

standard in § 1391(b)(2) is instructive. That provision permits

a plaintiff to lay venue where “a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

(b)(2). If Plaintiff cannot meet that standard, such that venue

is improper, then he necessarily is not entitled to deference

regarding his choice of forum. This court has held that venue in

this district is improper under § 1391(b)(2) if the plaintiff “may

establish all the critical elements of the action . . . without

ever making reference to events in Maryland.” MTGLQ Invs., L.P.

v. Guire,

(D.Md. 2003). “Events that relate

only tangentially to the claim” are insufficient because “they do

not ‘give rise to’ the claim at all.”

(citing Jenkins Brick

Co. v. Bremer,

(11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff

argues that he has “performed extensive work in Maryland, including

working and supervising personnel in CLB’s facilities in Silver

Spring, Maryland, meeting and working with donors and volunteers

in Maryland, and serving on several boards and commissions for CLB

there.” (ECF No. 19, at 5). Such activities, however, are merely

tangential to Plaintiff’s claims. He can state all but his MWPCL

7 claim without referring to Maryland at all. Moreover, the fact

that Plaintiff earned some wages in Maryland such that the MWPCL

is plausibly applicable does not automatically make venue in

Maryland proper. That adds nothing to the tangential nature of

the activities for which he earned those wages. Additionally, his

assertion that his MWPCL claim is based on Defendant’s “refusal to

pay him wages he earned in [Maryland],” (ECF No. 19, at 5–6), is

dubious: Plaintiff demands “severance pay and benefits” and

“accrued, unused vacation pay owed to him,” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 38).

Although these amounts might constitute “wages,” it is a stretch

to argue that they were “earned” in Maryland when they are the

product of D.C. agreements 3 and a D.C.-centered employment

relationship. Consequently, Plaintiff can allege no significant

connection to Maryland and his choice of forum merits little

weight.

C. Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties

The second and third factors tip slightly in Defendant’s

favor. As this court has previously noted, the “distance between

the federal courthouses in Washington, D.C. and Greenbelt is less

3 The parties do not clearly state where the Severance Agreement and Offer Letter were executed. Given that the parties do assume D.C. substantive law governs the alleged contracts, and Plaintiff makes no argument that the alleged contracts were executed somewhere other than the transferee forum, the court will presume at this stage that the agreements were executed in the District of Columbia. 8 than fifteen miles, making neither court appreciably more

convenient to either the parties or witnesses.” Hausfeld, 16

F.Supp.3d at 604–05 (citing Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc.,

, 681 n.8 (D.Md. 2010)). Accordingly, it is

unnecessary to engage in a detailed analysis of these two factors.

The court simply notes that four of the named witnesses reside in

the District of Columbia, while only two reside in Maryland. (ECF

No. 19, at 6); Dicken v. United States,

(D.Md.

1994) (favoring transfer where “a greater number of witnesses

[would] be convenienced by a transfer”). Moreover, neither party

is a resident of Maryland, and Defendant is a resident of the

District of Columbia. (See ECF No. 14 ¶ 4). Finally, Defendant’s

Human Resources Director filed a declaration stating that

“[p]ersonnel records for CLB employees, including Mr. Cancelosi,

are kept at the corporate headquarters in D.C.” (ECF No. 15-3 ¶

14). Plaintiff asserts that because some Board members who voted

on his termination live in Maryland, there are relevant documents

in Maryland related to his termination. (ECF No. 19, at 8).

Plaintiff’s conclusion does not follow, however, because Plaintiff

does not allege that any Board member actually voted in Maryland,

much less that such a vote generated documentation in Maryland, as

opposed to the corporate headquarters in the District of Columbia.

Accordingly, it appears that the relevant documents are located

9 primarily in the District of Columbia. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v.

U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex.,

, 62 n.6 (2013)

(quoting Piper Aircraft,

n.6) (noting that courts

should consider “relative ease of access to sources of proof”).

To the extent that these facts break the equipoise of the

convenience factors, the court finds that they weigh in favor of

transfer.

D. Interests of Justice

The interests of justice tip in favor of Defendant.

Appropriate considerations under this factor are “administrative

difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in

having localized controversies decided at home; and the interest

in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home

with the law.” Hausfeld,

(quoting Atl. Marine,

n.6). The parties do not raise arguments regarding

court congestion. The other two considerations, however, support

transfer.

The agreements underlying Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claims in Counts One and Two were evidently executed in the

District of Columbia and both parties assume that they are governed

by D.C. law. 4 (ECF Nos. 15-2, at 8–12; 18, at 5–12). Plaintiff

worked in the District of Columbia five days a week and maintained

4 See supra note 2. 10 his only office in the District of Columbia. (ECF No. 15-3 ¶¶ 7–

8). The lunch meeting where Defendant’s Board members notified

Plaintiff of their intent to transition Plaintiff out of his role

occurred in the District of Columbia. 5 (Id. ¶ 15). Defendant’s

payments to Plaintiff issue from the District of Columbia. (See

ECF No. 14-9, at 2). The documents pertaining both to Plaintiff’s

alleged contracts and Defendant’s alleged breach are located at

Defendant’s corporate headquarters located in the District of

Columbia. (ECF No. 15-3 ¶ 14). Plaintiff’s statutory claims in

Counts Three and Four both rest on the severance pay and accrued

vacation leave he alleges are due under D.C. agreements from his

D.C. employer. (ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 38, 45). Finally, the alleged age

discriminatory remarks underpinning Count Five appear to have

occurred in the District of Columbia. (Id. ¶ 51; ECF No. 15-3 ¶

16). In other words, the center of gravity of each Count is the

District of Columbia. Plaintiff may have done substantial work in

Maryland during his twenty-year tenure with Defendant, but

Defendant’s H.R. Director declares that Plaintiff traveled to

Maryland only “about once a quarter,” (ECF No. 15-3 ¶ 8), and none

of the complained-of conduct by Defendant appears to have unfolded

5 Neither party clearly states where the Board vote to terminate Plaintiff took place. Plaintiff alleges that the Board terminated him “at the direction of Ms. Dufrane.” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 19). Ms. Dufrane “lives and works in Virginia.” (ECF No. 15-3 ¶ 10). 11 in Maryland. Therefore, the District of Columbia has a “local

interest in having [this] localized controvers[y] decided at

home.” Hausfeld,

(quoting Atl. Marine,

n.6).

The District of Columbia is also more familiar with its own

law, which applies to four of Plaintiff’s five claims. Cf. Int’l

Masonry Training & Educ. Found. v. Haw. Masons’ Training Fund, No.

18-cv-3320-PX,

, at *3 (D.Md. Apr. 3, 2019)

(favoring transfer where four of the six counts were brought under

the transferee state’s law, even though the other two counts were

brought under federal law). Plaintiff relies on Karn v. PTS of

Am., LLC, No. 16-cv-3261-GJH,

(D.Md. Feb. 11, 2019),

for the proposition that this court “need not transfer this case

solely because [District of Columbia] law may be applied” to four

of the five claims. (ECF No. 19, at 9 (quoting Karn,

, at *6)). The Karn court, however, accorded great deference

to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, which it found “weighs more

heavily” than the accurate application of state law. Karn,

, at *6. Here, on the contrary, Plaintiff’s choice of

forum is not entitled to great deference, as discussed above.

Consequently, the court finds that the balance tips in the opposite

direction, in favor of transfer.

12 III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to transfer

venue to the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia will be granted. A separate order will follow.

/s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

13