UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DANIELLE DADE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 619 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Danielle Dade alleges that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA) discriminated against her based on disability in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA). WMATA moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), arguing that Ms. Dade’s claims are barred by WMATA’s Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. The Court agrees and dismisses Ms. Dade’s complaint without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

Ms. Dade was hired as a Special Project Manager at WMATA in 2019 and was eventually

promoted to Assistant Project Manager in 2022. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. In the latter role,

Ms. Dade was supervised by the Director of Planning and Sustainability, Amy Mesrobian.

Between November 2022 and April 2023, Ms. Dade took two periods of short-term

disability leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)—first, for “mental health issues”

and then for “an injury she sustained in January 2023 which made walking and sitting for long periods of time difficult.” Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. After returning to work, Ms. Dade was permitted to

telework full time as an ADA accommodation rather than just the two days usually allowed.

Compl. ¶ 11.

During 2022 and 2023, Ms. Dade alleges that Ms. Mesrobian repeatedly discriminated

against her based on disability in various ways. Ms. Dade claims that Ms. Mesrobian (1) imposed

more onerous supervision requirements because of her telework accommodation, Compl. ¶ 11;

(2) threatened that she would manage Ms. Dade in a more “hostile way” if she were not prevented

from doing so by the FMLA and ADA, id.; (3) requested that Ms. Dade complete work early that

was not yet due, Compl. ¶ 13; (4) suggested that Ms. Dade was not adequately explaining her work

because of disability, Compl. ¶¶ 14–15; (5) unfairly criticized Ms. Dade’s work and placed her on

a performance improvement plan even though Ms. Dade had previously received a “high

performer evaluation” from her old department, Compl. ¶ 17; and (6) interfered with Ms. Dade’s

transfer to another department, Compl. ¶ 20.

In April 2023, Ms. Dade filed a complaint with WMATA’s Equal Employment

Opportunity Office about Ms. Mesrobian’s discriminatory treatment. Compl. ¶ 12. In November

2023, she filed another EEO complaint alleging retaliation. Compl. ¶ 21. On December 1, 2023,

WMATA terminated Ms. Dade.

Ms. Dade filed this lawsuit on March 3, 2025. She alleges that WMATA violated the ADA

by discriminating against her based on disability and failing to reasonably accommodate her

disability (Count I), and by retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity (Count II).

Compl. ¶¶ 22–37. On April 28, 2025, WMATA moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 3. The motion is now ripe for review. Opp’n, ECF No. 5.

2 LEGAL STANDARD

“When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must demonstrate

that the court indeed has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear [her] claims.” Hill v. U.S. Dep’t of

Interior,

, 12 (D.D.C. 2023) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992); and then citing U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

(D.C. Cir.

2000)). And “[b]ecause the court may not address the plaintiff’s claims without subject-matter

jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) [also] imposes an affirmative obligation on

the court to ensure that jurisdiction is proper.” Himex Co. v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2014). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), courts

“construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived

from the facts alleged.” Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

WMATA argues that Ms. Dade’s complaint must be dismissed because WMATA enjoys

Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims brought under Title I of the ADA. The Court agrees.

WMATA is a mass transit system that was “created by an interstate compact among

Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.” Barbour v. Washington Metro. Area Transit

Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit has “consistently recognized that

in signing the WMATA Compact, Virginia and Maryland each conferred its immunity upon

WMATA, which therefore enjoys, to the same extent as each state, immunity from suit in federal

court based on its performance of governmental functions.” Jones v. Washington Metro. Area

Transit Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Barbour,

(“WMATA

. . . enjoys the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the two signatory states.”); Morris v. WMATA,

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(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“WMATA’s sovereign immunity exists because the

signatories have successfully conferred their respective sovereign immunities upon it.”).

When a state or state entity enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity, it may be sued only if

(1) it waives its immunity and consents to suit, or (2) Congress exercises its enforcement power

under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the state’s immunity. Barbour,

. Here, there is no indication that WMATA has waived its immunity and consented to be

sued by Ms. Dade. Nor has WMATA’s immunity been abrogated by Congressional action. While

Ms. Dade’s Complaint does not identify the specific title of the ADA under which she seeks relief,

her claims appear to be brought under Title I, which addresses disability discrimination in

employment. And the Supreme Court has directly held that “Congress did not validly abrogate the

States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I.”

Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett,

, 374 n.9 (2001).

In light of the above authorities, Ms. Dade’s claims for monetary damages under the ADA

must be dismissed. The same is true of her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. See

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

(1996) (“[W]e have often made it clear that

the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred

by the Eleventh Amendment.”) (citing Cory v. White,

(1982)); see also White v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the

plaintiff’s “request for a declaratory judgment under the ADA is barred by WMATA’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity”).

Ms. Dade appears to concede that her ADA claims must fail, Opp’n at 7, but argues that

her Complaint adequately states a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, Opp’n at 8–9. If true, this

would save the day for Ms. Dade, as the D.C. Circuit has held that WMATA has “waived its

4 immunity from suit under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal transportation funds.”

Barbour,

. The problem for Ms. Dade is that, fairly construed, her Complaint

raises only claims under the ADA. Both counts are captioned “Violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act,” Compl. at 8, 11, and nowhere in the Complaint does Ms. Dade reference the

Rehabilitation Act.

In the alternative, Ms. Dade seeks leave to amend her Complaint. Opp’n at 12–13. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) permits a party to “amend its pleading once as a matter of course

[within] . . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Outside

of that time, Rule 15(a)(2) allows a party to amend its pleading “only with the opposing party’s

written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In the absence of any apparent or

declared reason” like “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,” “leave

[to amend] . . . should . . . be ‘freely given.’” Foman v. Davis,

(1962). A court

may deny leave to amend if it would lead to “undue prejudice to the opposing party,” or if it “would

not survive a motion to dismiss.” Richardson v. United States,

, 548–49 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (citing Foman,

). But it is “an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend

unless there is sufficient reason, such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . repeated

failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments or futility of amendment.’” Joel v. Howard

Univ., No. 24-cv-1655,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2025) (quoting Foman,

) (cleaned up).

Here, Ms. Dade does not explicitly identify what amendments she plans to make to her

Complaint, but her Opposition suggests she will recast her claim as being brought under Section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Given D.C. Circuit precedent that WMATA is not immune from

suit under the Rehabilitation Act, Barbour,

, the Court is persuaded that

5 amendment would not necessarily be futile. See Reddish v. Washington Metro Area Transit Auth.,

No. 22-cv-2658,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2023) (permitting amendment under

similar circumstances). It also seems, at this early stage in the litigation, that there would be little

undue prejudice to WMATA from giving Ms. Dade an opportunity to amend. Indeed, WMATA

did not reply to oppose Ms. Dade’s request to amend her Complaint.

Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Dade an opportunity to amend her complaint. To

do so, however, she must file a motion consistent with Local Civil Rule 7(i) that is “accompanied

by an original of the proposed pleading as amended.”

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 3,

and dismisses Ms. Dade’s Complaint without prejudice. If Ms. Dade wishes to amend her

Complaint, she must file a motion requesting leave to do so pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(i) by

November 17, 2025.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: October 17, 2025

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