UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KIN WAH KUNG,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-03459 (TNM)

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Frustrated by unwanted texts soliciting political donations, Kin Wah Kung filed this

lawsuit. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23, ECF No. 16. He quickly settled with most of the

defendants—including the politicians who allegedly sent the texts. See Notice of Settlement,

ECF No. 10. The only named defendants left now move to dismiss the complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Am. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 16; Mot. to

Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 18-1. Because the Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the

Massachusetts-based defendants, it will grant their motion.

I.

Kung is a California resident who received several political text messages in the months

before the 2024 presidential election. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 22–30; see Am. Compl. at 14–21

(screenshots of messages). Some messages identified Kamala Harris as the sender. Am. Compl.

at 14, 16, 19, 21. Others said they came from Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Doug Emhoff.

Am. Compl. at 15, 17; Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Each text asked Kung to donate to Harris’s campaign

using a provided link. Am. Compl. at 14–21. Kung did not want these messages. See Am. Compl. ¶ 31. In fact, he sued the

Democratic National Committee and several politicians in the Northern District of Ohio over

similar texts in 2020. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–20. That lawsuit settled and Kung was unbothered for

a time. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21.

When the messages resumed the next election cycle, Kung sued here. See Compl., ECF

No. 1. Proceeding pro se, Kung brings a Telephone Consumer Protection Act,

,

claim and a California tort claim. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–42, 43–50. Among the named defendants

were the four individual politicians who allegedly sent the texts, the DNC, a state political party,

and two campaign committees. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–8. Most of these defendants were party to

Kung’s last lawsuit, and they settled yet again. See Notice of Settlement.

After the settlement, four named defendants remained. See Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Those

defendants, collectively known as “ActBlue,” are related nonprofits that help Democrats

fundraise. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. They apparently ran the donation website linked in the texts Kung

received. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–30; see Am. Compl. at 14–21 (text screenshots showing a link to a

“secure.actblue.com/donate”). ActBlue now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. That motion is ripe. 1

II.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Kung

must make a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

1 After opposing dismissal, Kung noted that he intends to file a second amended complaint. Notice of Intent, ECF No. 23. He plans to substitute the unnamed Doe defendants for named defendants.

. Kung’s notice does not, however, explain how these potential defendants relate to this case. Nor does he provide information enabling the Court to evaluate its jurisdiction over these entities. See

at 1–2. Further, Kung has not actually moved to amend his complaint. He says he will not do so until the Court decides ActBlue’s motion to dismiss.

. The Court thus does not address the propriety of the proposed amendment.

2 Mwani v. Bin Laden,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). And while the Court applies a less stringent

standard to Kung’s allegations than to pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Harris v. Bowser,

, 195 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2021), he must still “plead

an adequate jurisdictional basis” for his claims, Gomez v. Aragon,

(D.D.C. 2010).

“Bare allegations and conclusory statements are insufficient.” Johns v. Newsmax Media,

Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2012). Kung “must allege specific facts upon which

personal jurisdiction can be based.” Azamar v. Stern,

, 170–71 (D.D.C.

2009). And the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant

a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005).

III.

Because no federal long-arm statute applies, D.C. law dictates whether this Court has

personal jurisdiction over ActBlue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); United States v. Ferrara,

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Any exercise of personal jurisdiction must also suit the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,

, 358 (2021). Under both D.C. law and the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction exists

in two forms—general and specific. See id.;

, 13-423(a). The Court tackles

each in turn, concluding that neither species exists here. And because Kung has not explained

how the Court could have personal jurisdiction over ActBlue, the Court will also reject his

request for jurisdictional discovery.

3 A.

General personal jurisdiction does not exist here. “A District of Columbia court may

exercise [general] personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of,

or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim

for relief.”

. Kung concedes that ActBlue does not satisfy these

requirements. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at 4, ECF No. 21. The ActBlue defendants are

incorporated in and have their principal place of business in Massachusetts. Am. Compl. ¶ 9;

Def.’s Ex. 1 (“Hoke Decl.”) ¶ 3(a), ECF No. 13-1. That means that the ActBlue defendants are

not “essentially at home” in the District. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad,

, 889–

90 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). So the Court cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction

over them.

B.

Specific personal jurisdiction is also lacking. The Court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if permitted by both the District’s long-arm

statute,

(a), and the Due Process Clause, Forras v. Rauf,

,

1105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Each source of law requires a connection between the defendant’s

“suit related conduct” and the District. Walden v. Fiore,

(2014). No such

connection exists here.

Start with the District’s long-arm statute. Kung does not address this law. In fact, he

essentially concedes that the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over ActBlue. Mot. to

Dismiss Resp. at 4. Still, the Court considers the three clauses of the long-arm statute that might

apply.

4 First, the District permits personal jurisdiction “as to a claim for relief arising from the

person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia.”

(a)(1).

Kung says that ActBlue does business in the District and gives evidence that “3 of the ActBlue

entities” have registered for that purpose. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at 4; see

at 8–10. 2

But the fact that ActBlue has some business here is not enough. Section 13-423(a)(1) is

expansive, but it still “contemplates a connection that is related to the claim in suit.” Forras,

(cleaned up). And Kung offers no theory for how ActBlue’s business here

“relate[s]” to the texts he apparently received in California. Id.; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 39, 45

(suggesting Kung received the texts in California, where he lives). Indeed, ActBlue’s only

apparent connection to the texts is that it ran the donation website. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–30;

see Am. Compl. at 14–21. And even the mere fact that ActBlue’s website is theoretically

accessible in the District would not justify haling ActBlue into court here. GTE New Media

Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000); Safex Found., Inc. v.

SafeLaunch Ventures Ltd.,

, 10 (D.D.C. 2023). Without more, subsection

(a)(1) does not apply.

Kung falls even further short of invoking the long-arm statute’s tort-related provisions.

Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) permit personal jurisdiction over claims related to a defendant’s

actions that caused “tortious injury in the District of Columbia.”

(a)(3), (4).

Again, Kung does not allege that he suffered injury here. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 39, 45. So these

provisions cannot apply. Forras, 812 F.3d at 1106–08.

2 This evidence comes from Kung’s response to the motion to dismiss, but the Court considers it together with his complaint because Kung is pro se. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

5 More, even if Kung had satisfied the statute, the Due Process Clause would still

independently forbid the Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over ActBlue. When the

defendant is not “essentially at home” in the forum, “personal jurisdiction can be exercised only

with respect to claims that arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”

Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at 358–59. Because Kung’s claims are unrelated to ActBlue’s actions in

the District, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over ActBlue.

C.

Finally, the Court will deny Kung’s request for jurisdictional discovery. Mot. to Dismiss

Resp. at 3–4. Jurisdictional discovery is appropriate when “a party demonstrates that it can

supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery.” GTE New Media Servs.,

. Kung has not made this showing. His request rests instead on conclusory allegations

and supposition. Again, although Kung says ActBlue does some business here, he does not

explain how that business could relate to the unwanted texts. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at 3–4.

Without more, there is no reason to believe that jurisdictional discovery would be anything but

“a fishing expedition.” Lewis v. Mutond,

, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

IV.

Because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over ActBlue, it will grant the motion to

dismiss. That dismissal will be without prejudice, as it must be. See Shatsky v. Palestine

Liberation Org.,

, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2020). An appropriate Order will issue today.

2025.10.20 16:32:39 -04'00' Dated: October 20, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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