UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

N-BAR TRADE, INC., et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 25-918 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 4 : AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, et al., : : Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs N-Bar Trade, Inc. (“N-Bar”) and Aymen Mohammed (“Mr. Mohammed,” and

together with N-Bar, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants Amazon.com Services

LLC and Amazon Payments, Inc. (together, “Amazon”), seeking damages for alleged violations

of contractual obligations between Amazon and N-Bar, a third-party seller on the Amazon.com

platform. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Amazon moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms

of its Business Solutions Agreement with Plaintiffs. See Defs.’ Mot. Compel Arbitration

(“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 4. For the reasons below, the Court grants Amazon’s Motion to

Compel Arbitration and dismisses the action without prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Amazon is an online retailer that permits third parties to register selling accounts and sell

products directly to Amazon customers. In May 2020, Mr. Mohammed registered N-Bar as a

third-party seller on the Amazon.com platform, through which N-Bar sold pandemic-related

supplies. See Pls.’ Am. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Compel Arbitration (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 2, ECF No. 8. N-Bar’s seller account remained active until Amazon terminated it on February 16, 2022.

Gallucci Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 4-2.

To register a selling account, Amazon requires third-party sellers to accept and agree to

Amazon’s Business Solutions Agreement (“BSA”) and the policies it incorporates. Id. ¶ 6.

Amazon explains that it “provides all sellers with an opportunity to review the BSA before they

decide whether to accept its terms and register a selling account through a hyperlink that is

present on the Seller Agreement page.” Id. A seller cannot complete the online account

registration process unless he clicks an “Agree and continue” button on the Seller Agreement

page. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. In 2020, when Mr. Mohammed registered N-Bar’s seller account, that page

contained a notice stating: “By clicking on ‘Agree and continue,’ you agree to the Amazon

Services Business Solutions Agreement.” Id. ¶ 8. The BSA was “immediately accessible

through a hyperlink in blue text.” Id.

Section 18 of the BSA, titled “Miscellaneous,” contains a provision mandating arbitration

of disputes arising under the BSA: “Amazon and [the seller] both consent that any dispute with

Amazon or its Affiliates or claim relating in any way to this Agreement or your use of the

Services will be resolved by binding arbitration as described in this paragraph, rather than in

court . . . .” Gallucci Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. A (“BSA”) § 18, ECF No. 4-3. In the same paragraph, the

BSA provides: “The arbitration will be conducted by the American Arbitration Association

(AAA) under its commercial rules.” Id. The AAA’s commercial rules, in turn, provide that

“[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any

objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the

arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim,” as well as “the power to determine the existence or

2 validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part.” Curran Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A

(“AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures”) R-7(a)–(b), ECF No. 4-7.

B. Procedural Background

In November 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit against Amazon in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia, bringing claims for alleged breach of contract. See Defs.’ Mot. at 6. In

January 2024, Amazon advised Plaintiffs that their claims were subject to a binding arbitration

agreement in the BSA and asked Plaintiffs to dismiss their lawsuit and pursue their claims in

arbitration. Id. Plaintiffs agreed to do so. Id. N-Bar’s counsel emailed the AAA to initiate a

commercial arbitration, and the AAA requested that Plaintiffs remit the appropriate filing

pursuant to its rules. Id. However, after a disagreement with Amazon over the proper arbitration

locale, Plaintiffs asked the AAA to close the matter. Id. at 6–7; Pls.’ Opp’n at 3. Plaintiffs then

sought to reinstate their case in the D.C. Superior Court, but the court denied this request. Defs.’

Mot. at 6–7.

In February 2025, Plaintiffs filed another complaint against Amazon in the D.C. Superior

Court, stating claims for “contract enforcement,” conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 24–42. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that

starting in 2021, Amazon breached contractual obligations with N-Bar when it withheld sales

proceeds and other assets from N-Bar, withdrew funds from N-Bar’s account, and ultimately

terminated N-Bar’s seller account. Id. ¶¶ 15–17. Amazon removed the case to this Court

pursuant to

and thereafter moved to compel arbitration of the case pursuant to

the BSA’s mandatory arbitration provisions. See Corrected Notice of Removal, ECF No. 3-1;

Defs.’ Mot. at 1.

3 III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a written provision requiring arbitration of a

dispute arising out of a contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such

grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . .”

. “The

FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts,” Rent-A-Ctr.,

W., Inc. v. Jackson,

, 67 (2010), and requires courts to “enforce arbitration contracts

according to their terms,” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,

, 67

(2019). Through an arbitration agreement, “parties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not

only the merits of a particular dispute but also ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as

whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular

controversy.”

at 67–68 (citation modified).

In considering a motion to compel arbitration, a court first determines whether an

arbitration agreement exists between the parties. See

; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,

(1985). The court makes this determination

pursuant to the summary judgment standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, treating the

motion to compel “as if it were a request for summary disposition of the issue of whether or not

there had been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.” Aliron Int’l, Inc. v.

Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under Rule

56(a), summary judgment is granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party

seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to

demonstrate the existence of an arbitration agreement. See Mercadante v. XE Servs., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2015). “The burden then shifts to [the non-moving party] to show

4 that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the making of the agreement.”

(quoting

Haire v. Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP,

(D.D.C. 2013)). If the

pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties show that there is no genuine dispute as to those

facts and that the moving party is entitled to arbitration as a matter of law, the court must compel

arbitration. See

IV. ANALYSIS

Amazon moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA and the terms of the BSA. Mr.

Mohammed counters that he should not have to arbitrate the merits of his dispute with

Amazon—whether Amazon breached its contractual provisions with N-Bar—because the BSA’s

arbitration provisions (collectively, “Arbitration Agreement” or “Agreement”) are procedurally

and substantively unconscionable and therefore invalid. And regardless, Mr. Mohammed argues,

Amazon has waived its right to compel arbitration through inconsistent conduct.

When a party moves to compel arbitration, “a court’s role is limited to determining

whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and whether the specific dispute falls within the

scope of the arbitration agreement.” Mobile Now, Inc. v. Sprint Corp.,

, 63

(D.D.C. 2019). Here, however, Amazon argues that the Arbitration Agreement grants the

arbitrator the power to resolve “gateway” questions of “arbitrability,” including whether the

parties’ contractual dispute is within the scope of the Agreement and whether the Agreement is

invalid due to unconscionability. See Defs.’ Mot. at 11–12. An agreement to delegate threshold

arbitrability questions to the arbitrator is “simply an additional, antecedent agreement” on which

“the FAA operates . . . just as it does on any other” arbitration agreement. Rent-a-Ctr., 561 U.S.

at 70. Therefore, if a court determines that an arbitration agreement exists, and if that agreement

5 delegates arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, a court may not decide those questions. See

Henry Schein, 586 U.S. at 69.

As set forth below, the Court determines that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate,

that this agreement delegates arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and that Amazon has not

waived its right to compel arbitration through inconsistent conduct. Accordingly, the Court

mandates arbitration and refrains from ruling on Mr. Mohammed’s unconscionability arguments,

which must be referred to the arbitrator.

A. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement

“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve

those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan,

(1995). “[B]efore referring a dispute to

an arbitrator,” however, “the court determines whether a[n] . . . arbitration agreement exists.”

Henry Schein, 586 U.S. at 69. This issue—whether the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate

a certain dispute—is for courts to decide. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,

, 296 (2010) (“[W]here the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is

generally for courts to decide.”). In resolving that question, courts “apply ordinary state-law

principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options,

. Amazon

asserts that Washington law applies here, and Mr. Mohammed does not challenge the substance

of that claim.1 See BSA § 18 (providing that the BSA’s “Governing Laws” are “the laws of the

1 In his Opposition to Amazon’s Motion to Compel, Mr. Mohammed appears to criticize Amazon’s contention that Washington law governs their contractual dispute. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. However, he does not offer any substantive argument as to why District of Columbia law should apply instead. Regardless, the contract-formation inquiry is substantially similar under the laws of Washington state and the District of Columbia, and applying District of Columbia law would not change the Court’s conclusion that the parties here formed an agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Christian v. Uber Techs., Inc.,

, 278 (D.D.C. 2025).

6 State of Washington” and other applicable federal law). Washington law provides that a contract

is formed when the parties “objectively manifest their mutual assent” to its terms. Hauenstein v.

Softwrap Ltd., No. C07-0572MJP,

, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2017) (citing

Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp.,

, 177–78 (2004)).

Amazon has met its initial burden of showing that the parties formed an agreement to

arbitrate. As established by the evidence Amazon submits, Mr. Mohammed manifested assent to

the terms of the BSA when he registered online for an Amazon selling account. On the Seller

Agreement page, Mr. Mohammed was required to click an “Agree and continue” button, and a

message above the button indicated the following: “By clicking on ‘Agree and continue,’ you

agree to the Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement.” See Gallucci Decl. ¶¶ 7–8. The

BSA was “immediately accessible through a hyperlink in blue text.” Id. ¶ 8. And Section 18 of

the BSA contains the Agreement’s arbitration provisions. See BSA § 18. Under Washington

law, clicking a button to “agree” to the terms of a contract is considered a manifestation of assent

to the contract, including any arbitration provisions found therein. See, e.g., Peters v. Amazon

Servs. LLC,

, 1167–71 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (compelling arbitration because

the plaintiffs clicked on a box indicating they had read Amazon’s BSA and agreed to its terms);

Costless Wholesale, Inc. v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. SACV 23-01330-CJC (JDEx),

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2023) (finding Amazon’s BSA to be “an enforceable

‘clickwrap’ agreement, routinely upheld under Washington law”); Hauenstein,

, at *2 (compelling arbitration because the plaintiff “manifested his assent to the License

Agreement by ‘clicking’ the appropriate box”).

(finding that a contract forms under District of Columbia common law “when the parties ‘express an intent to be bound . . .’” (citation modified) (quoting Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P.,

(D.C. 2008))).

7 Although Mr. Mohammed does not affirmatively dispute that he clicked the “Agree and

continue” button, he asserts that he “has no recollection” of clicking the button, being presented

with the BSA during the seller registration process, or being advised that he would enter into a

binding agreement by clicking the button. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 5. However, neither a plaintiff’s

“inability to recall seeing reference to the terms” of a contract nor his “failure to review” them

can overcome objective evidence of assent to the contract. Saeedy v. Microsoft Corp.,

, 1197 (W.D. Wash. 2024); see also Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co.,

(2003) (noting that a party is bound to a contract he signed even if he did not

read its terms). Amazon need not, and indeed presumably cannot, submit video evidence that

Mr. Mohammed clicked the “Agree and continue” button. It is enough that Amazon submitted

evidence that, as a matter of course, if a seller does not click that button, he “cannot advance to

the next page of the seller registration process, cannot open a selling account, and cannot sell on

Amazon.” Gallucci Decl. ¶ 7; see also Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C06-1325Z,

, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2006) (“[E]vidence that signed agreements are

required before service will be provided is evidence of the existence of a contract.” (citing Indus.

Elec.-Seattle, Inc. v. Bosko,

(1966))).

Because Mr. Mohammed does not proffer evidence sufficient to rebut Amazon’s proof

that he manifested assent to the BSA, he has not created an issue of material fact as to contract

formation. See Cureton v. Duke,

(D.D.C. 2017) (“If the nonmoving party

fails to proffer relevant evidence, the moving party may succeed on summary judgment.”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute that Amazon and Mr.

Mohammed formed an agreement to arbitrate.

8 B. Delegation of Arbitrability

Given that the parties agreed to arbitrate, the Court next considers whether their

Arbitration Agreement instructs it to refer arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. “Courts should

not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clear and

unmistakable’ evidence that they did so.” First Options,

(citation modified)

(quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,

(1986)). The D.C.

Circuit has “held that the requisite clear and unmistakable delegation occurs when the parties’

agreement incorporates arbitral rules that in turn assign questions of arbitrability to the

arbitrator.” Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. AT&T Inc.,

, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

Here, Section 18 of the BSA provides: “The arbitration will be conducted by the

American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its commercial rules.” BSA § 18. The AAA

commercial rules, in turn, provide that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her

own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the

arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim,” as well as “the power

to determine the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part.”

AAA Com. Arb. Rules & Mediation Procs. R-7(a)–(b) (2022). Following D.C. Circuit

precedent, the Court holds that the BSA’s incorporation of AAA rules, which empower the

arbitrator to rule on “the arbitrability of any claim” and on “any objection” to the scope or

validity of the Agreement, is “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties agreed for the

arbitrator to decide threshold arbitrability questions, including whether Mr. Mohammed’s

contractual claims against Amazon are subject to arbitration and whether the Arbitration

Agreement is invalid due to unconscionability. See id. (emphasis added); AT&T Inc., 6 F.4th at

9 1347 (“[T]he parties clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability questions to the arbitrator

by incorporating the AAA rules.”).

As a final matter before referring these questions to arbitration, the Court addresses

whether Mr. Mohammed’s challenge to the validity of the Arbitration Agreement precludes the

Court from enforcing the Agreement’s delegation provision. Mr. Mohammed argues that the

Arbitration Agreement is invalid because it is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

See Pls.’ Opp’n at 4. It is procedurally unconscionable, Mr. Mohammed contends, given the

parties’ unequal bargaining power and the lack of alternative marketplaces for small sellers like

Mr. Mohammed, which put pressure on him to accept Amazon’s terms. See id. at 5–7. And it is

substantively unconscionable, he claims, because it burdens him with the steep costs of

arbitration. See id. at 7–9.

“If a party challenges the validity of a delegation agreement, the district court ‘must

consider the challenge before ordering compliance,’” because a party cannot be made to arbitrate

arbitrability, or any other matter, if he has not agreed to do so through a valid contractual

provision. Mercadante,

(quoting Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70). However,

the validity challenge “must be directed specifically at the delegation agreement and not at

‘another provision of the contract, or to the contract as a whole,’” or else a court cannot consider

the challenge. Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70). This is because, unless a party has

challenged an agreement’s delegation provision specifically, the FAA instructs courts to treat it

as valid and enforce it, “leaving any challenge to the [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.”

Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70, 72.

The Court must refrain from considering Mr. Mohammed’s unconscionability arguments

because they are directed at the entire Arbitration Agreement, and not at its delegation provision

10 specifically. Mr. Mohammed does not argue that the Agreement’s incorporation of AAA rules,

which delegate arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, suffers from procedural or substantive

unconscionability. In fact, nowhere in his Opposition to Amazon’s Motion to Compel does Mr.

Mohammed even reference arbitrability or the AAA rules, despite Amazon having specifically

argued in its Motion that the parties agreed to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

See Defs.’ Mot. at 11–12. Because Mr. Mohammed does not challenge the validity of the

Agreement’s delegation provision, the Court must give it effect. Accordingly, the Court declines

to address objections as to the Arbitration Agreement’s scope and validity, as these matters must

be decided by an arbitrator.2

C. Waiver

Mr. Mohammed asserts that, even if the Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable, he

should not be compelled to arbitrate because Amazon has waived its right to compel arbitration

under the Arbitration Agreement through inconsistent conduct. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 11; see also

Khan v. Parsons Global Servs., Ltd.,

, 424–25 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[C]onsistent with

arbitration’s contractual basis, a party may waive its right to arbitration by acting inconsistently

with the arbitration right.” (citation modified)). Mr. Mohammed argues that Amazon acted

inconsistently with its arbitration right by allegedly obstructing the parties’ initial attempt at

arbitration—for example, by insisting that the arbitration be conducted in Washington state (even

2 The Court specifically finds that the delegation provision in the parties’ Arbitration Agreement precludes it from considering Mr. Mohammed’s arguments that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 4–10, and that compelling arbitration would deny Mr. Mohammed a forum for resolving his claims, see

at 13–16, as this latter argument sounds in substantive unconscionability. Mr. Mohammed does not appear to contest arbitration on the grounds that his contractual dispute falls outside the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. Even if he did, the Court finds that this is a question of arbitrability that must be decided by an arbitrator.

11 if through Zoom) as opposed to Mr. Mohammed’s preferred locale of the District of Columbia—

and by removing the current case to federal court from the D.C. Superior Court before moving to

compel arbitration. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 11–13. This conduct, Mr. Mohammed declares, has

prejudiced him and effectively denied him a forum to resolve his contractual claims against

Amazon. See id. at 13.

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that it may consider Mr. Mohammed’s waiver

arguments. Although “gateway procedural issues such as ‘waiver, delay, or a like defense to

arbitrability’ are generally for the arbitrator, not a court, to resolve,” see Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast

Dist., Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Mar. Corp.,

, 460 (D.C.

Cir. 2021) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

(2002)), Mr.

Mohammed’s “specific assertion here of ‘waiver-through-inconsistent-conduct claims’ . . . may

be decided by a court,” see HFA Specialty Acquisitions LLC v. NexGen Flight Sols., LLC, No.

24-cv-1891,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2024) (quoting JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed

Holdings, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 2008)).3 This is for good reason. As the Sixth

Circuit has explained, “[w]aiver-through-conduct issues ordinarily turn on whether a [party]

abused the litigation or pre-litigation process, and a court is most adept at policing procedure-

abusing conduct.” JPD, Inc.,

.

3 Amazon does not appear to argue that the AAA’s commercial rules delegate to the arbitrator the power to rule on claims of waiver through inconsistent conduct. Nevertheless, the Court notes a consensus among circuits to have considered this question that the AAA’s commercial rules do not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate waiver-through-inconsistent- conduct claims to the arbitrator. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s S’holders Corp. v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.,

(11th Cir. 2012); Martin v. Yasuda,

(9th Cir. 2016); Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd.,

, 265 (5th Cir. 2021).

12 Mr. Mohammed’s waiver arguments fail. “[T]he party asserting waiver must

demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts

inconsistent with that existing right.” Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,

, 1015

(9th Cir. 2023). However, Mr. Mohammed submits no evidence that Amazon “engag[ed]

in . . . litigation conduct evidencing an[] intent to relinquish [its] arbitration rights.” HFA,

, at *5. Amazon’s choice to remove this case to federal court before moving to

compel arbitration is not a “conscious decision to continue to seek judicial judgment on the

merits of the arbitrable claims.” Martin v. Yasuda,

(9th Cir. 2016)

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). As Amazon notes, it filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration

within seven days of removal, as required under Rule 81(c)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 13, ECF No. 9.

Furthermore, Amazon’s evidence shows that, far from obstructing the parties’ initial attempt at

arbitration, Amazon’s disagreement with Mr. Mohammed about the proper locale for arbitration

was lodged with the arbitrator and in the manner requested by the arbitrator. See Curran Decl.

¶ 6, Ex. D, ECF No. 9-5; id. ¶ 7, Ex. E, ECF No. 9-6. Finally, assuming the truth of Mr.

Mohammed’s allegation that he would be prejudiced if forced to arbitrate in Washington state,

such allegation does not show that Amazon has declined to exercise its right to arbitrate or

otherwise acted so inconsistently with that right as to constitute waiver. To the contrary, the

Court agrees with Amazon that the procedural history here shows that Amazon has consistently

sought to bring Mr. Mohammed’s claims to an arbitrator. See Defs.’ Reply at 12. Therefore, the

Court finds that Amazon has not waived its right to compel arbitration.

13 V. DISMISSAL

Because the Court holds that arbitration is required under the parties’ Arbitration

Agreement, it must decide whether to dismiss the case without prejudice or to stay it pending

arbitration. “When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party

requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the proceeding.”

Smith v. Spizzirri,

(2024); see also

. Here, however, Mr.

Mohammed did not request a stay in his Opposition to Amazon’s Motion to Compel Arbitration,

even though Amazon argued in its Motion that the Court should dismiss the case unless Mr.

Mohammed requested a stay. See Defs.’ Mot. at 15. The Court therefore finds, like other courts

in this district, that dismissal is appropriate here. See, e.g., Abadi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

No. 22-cv-3684,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2024), (“[Because] [the plaintiff]

made no response to [the defendant’s] request that the Court dismiss the case rather than issue a

stay . . . dismissal is appropriate.”); L. Firm of LarJack, PLLC v. Citibank, N.A., No. 21-cv-1592,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (dismissing a case rather than staying it

pending arbitration partly because “plaintiffs made no response to [the defendant’s] request that

the Court dismiss the case rather than issue a stay”).

VI. USE OF NONEXISTENT QUOTATIONS

As this Court has observed, “[c]ourts have recently seen increasing reliance on artificial

intelligence in legal proceedings, leading to the use of nonexistent citations in court documents.”

Williams v. Cap. One Bank, N.A., No. 24-cv-2032,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,

2025); see

(collecting cases). Concerningly, Mr. Mohammed’s counsel, Mr. Kamal Nawash,

may have relied on artificial intelligence to draft Mr. Mohammed’s Opposition, which contains

quotations that do not actually appear in the cases to which they are attributed. See Defs.’ Reply

14 at 11–12 & n.5 (explaining that Amazon was unable to locate several quotations cited in Mr.

Mohammed’s Opposition).

Mr. Nawash is advised that it is not acceptable to submit filings to the Court containing

nonexistent quotations. Such conduct contravenes an attorney’s duty toward his client to

exercise professional judgment and responsibility. See Park v. Kim,

, 614 (2d Cir.

2024). In particular, Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[b]y

presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper,” an attorney “certifies that to

the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable

under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Furthermore, Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the District of

Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that an attorney “shall not

knowingly . . . [m]ake a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” D.C. R. Prof. Cond.

3.3(a)(1). The Court agrees with the Second Circuit that, at minimum, such rules “require that

attorneys read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which

they rely.” Park, 91 F.4th at 615.

Courts have taken diverse disciplinary actions against attorneys who have filed pleadings

and other court papers citing nonexistent legal authorities and quotations, ranging from striking

the pleadings, see, e.g., Grant v. City of Long Beach,

, 1256–57 (9th Cir. 2024); to

ordering counsel to show cause why sanctions should not issue, see, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc.,

No. 22-cv-1461,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2023); and referring counsel to a

court’s grievance panel, see, e.g., Park, 91 F.4th at 612. Because this case is being referred to

arbitration, the Court refrains from taking further action against Mr. Nawash at this time.

15 However, if this case somehow returns to this Court, Mr. Nawash will be required to show cause

why he ought not be sanctioned for his use of nonexistent quotations in his filing.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 4) is

GRANTED and this action is dismissed without prejudice. An order consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: October 22, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

16