UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHSEN KACHOOEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-00139 (TNM)

DAVID ALLEN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mohsen Kachooee is an Iranian citizen whose Turkish employer wants to send him to the

United States for business. So he applied for a visa. After an October 2023 interview at the U.S.

Embassy in Armenia, his visa was refused and his application was placed into “administrative

processing.” Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 1-3. That was the last substantive update he received. To

speed things up, he now sues the Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission and the Secretary of State.

The Government moves to dismiss the case. The Court will grant that motion because there is no

remaining nondiscretionary duty for the Court to compel and the suit is barred by the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability.

I.

Kachooee is an Iranian citizen who lives in Turkey with his family. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 13,

ECF No. 1. His Turkish employer decided to transfer him to the company’s U.S. branch.

Compl. ¶ 6. To permit the transfer, the company filed an L-1 nonimmigrant visa application on

Kachooee’s behalf. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 17. Kachooee’s son is a derivative beneficiary of that

application. Compl. ¶ 17. Kachooee and his son sat for an interview in October 2023 at the U.S. Embassy in

Armenia. Compl. ¶ 19. Soon after, Kachooee was told that his “case has been refused under

Section 221(g) of the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).” Ex. A at 2. The

application then went into “administrative processing,” which the consular officer said “can take

several months.” Ex. A at 2. The Consular Officer has taken no action since. See Ex. E, ECF

No. 1-7 (“Case Last Updated: 25-Oct-2023 . . . A U.S. consular officer has adjudicated and

refused your visa application.”).

Anxious for a decision, Kachooee asked about his application several times—both on his

own and with help from Sen. Cory Booker. Ex. C at 2–4, ECF No. 1-5; Ex. D at 2–3, ECF No.

1-6; Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. But the administrative processing remains ongoing. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25.

Kachooee, meanwhile, remains in limbo with his family in Turkey. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7. The delay

has harmed his business plans and family life. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7.

Unsatisfied, Kachooee sued the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Armenia

and the Secretary of State, arguing that they have unreasonably delayed a final decision on his

application. 1 See Compl. ¶¶ 31–53. He thus asks this Court to order them to render a decision

on his application “within fifteen (15) calendar days.” Compl. ¶ 55. The Government moves to

dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8. That motion is now ripe.

1 Marco Rubio, the current Secretary of State, is substituted for his predecessor as a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The claims against the Secretary will, however, be dismissed because the Secretary cannot give Kachooee the relief he seeks. See Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft,

, 97–98 (D.D.C. 2024);

(a) (preventing the Secretary from taking “functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas”). David Allen, meanwhile, appears to be an appropriate defendant and does not argue otherwise. See

(“[T]he chief of mission to a foreign country . . . shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country.”). So the case will not be dismissed on standing grounds.

2 II.

The Government moves to dismiss the complaint and petition for a writ of mandamus

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 The Court applies the familiar standards under

that rule. A complaint survives a 12(b)(6) motion only if it contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (cleaned up). To do so, its factual allegations must “allow[] the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

But

the Court need not “assume the truth of legal conclusions.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

III.

Kachooee brings a familiar sort of visa challenge. It fails twice over. The Government

has finally refused his application, so there is no remaining nondiscretionary duty for the Court

to compel. For the same reason, the suit is also barred by the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability.

A.

Kachooee seeks a writ of mandamus and relief under

. Compl. ¶¶ 31–53.

“To state a claim for unreasonable delay under

, or to make out an entitlement to

mandamus relief, a plaintiff must identify a nondiscretionary duty held by the defendant.”

Sedaghatdoust v. Blinken,

, 7 (D.D.C. 2024); accord Norton v. S. Utah

2 The Government also moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Mot. to Dismiss at 7, but does not make any argument about subject matter jurisdiction. As much as the Government argues that the consular nonreviewability doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction, that is incorrect. See Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 n.4 (2024).

3 Wilderness All.,

, 63–64 (2004). Because Kachooee has not pointed to an unfulfilled

duty the Government owes him, his claims fail. See Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 7.

To start, the Government is incorrect that Karimova v. Abate,

(D.C.

Cir. July 24, 2024), requires dismissal, Mot. to Dismiss at 11–12 n.2; see Akter v. Rubio, --- F.

Supp. 3d ---,

, at *4–5 (D.D.C. 2025). Unpublished circuit opinions “may be

considered persuasive authority, but they do not constrain a panel of the court from reaching a

contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full consideration of the issue.” In re Grant,

(D.C. Cir. 2011); see D.C. Cir. Rule 36(e)(2). The Government acknowledges

as much but says that district courts are still obligated to follow what D.C. Circuit panels are not.

Mot. to Dismiss at 11–12 n.2. But the Government offers no authority in support of that

argument. Nor can it. After all, “[i]f an opinion has intentionally disclaimed precedential value,

that disclaimer would attach to the opinion, not the court considering the opinion.” Akter,

, at *4.

Though not binding, Karimova is persuasive. And that decision, as well as others from

this Court, rightly conclude that the only discrete duty the Government owes a visa applicant like

Kachooee is “to grant or refuse a visa.” Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 7; Karimova,

, at *4; Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft,

, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2024). This

duty arises from the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations.

The INA says that “[a]ll nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a

consular officer.”

(d). And its implementing regulations specify that once “a

visa application has been properly completed and executed . . . the consular officer must issue

the visa, refuse the visa, or . . . discontinue granting the visa.”

(a).

4 The crux of this dispute is whether the Government has fulfilled that duty. The

Government says it has—stressing that Kachooee’s visa application was “refused” in October

2023 under INA § 221(g),

(g). Mot. to Dismiss at 10. Kachooee disagrees,

arguing that the Government’s § 221(g) refusal was pro forma, and that the real final decision

cannot occur until his application undergoes administrative processing. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at

13–16, ECF No. 9. So, Kachooee says, the Government’s duty is unfulfilled and this Court can

compel the Government to complete it. Id.

That is incorrect. As the Court explained at length in Yaghoubnezhad, neither the INA

nor its implementing regulations require the Government to timely complete—or complete at

all—“administrative processing” once it has refused a visa under § 221(g). 734 F. Supp. 3d at

100–03; see Karimova,

, at *4 (reasoning that

(b) does not

impose such a duty). That same analysis largely disposes of Kachooee’s arguments here.

Kachooee does, however, raise one novel argument. He says that the Government’s

promises to him that he will receive another visa adjudication after administrative processing is

completed affirmatively imposed a duty on the Government to complete his administrative

processing. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at 14, 22. But Kachooee offers no authority to support his

argument that promises of this sort impose a legal obligation on the Government. Further, the

standard for showing agency action subject to compulsion under the APA or mandamus is high.

“The law must not only authorize the demanded action but require it; the duty must be clear and

indisputable.” Illinois v. Ferriero,

, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Stray

governmental remarks do not satisfy that standard.

5 B.

Consular nonreviewability also bars Kachooee’s suit. The idea behind this doctrine is

simple. Because the “admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign

attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial

control,” a consular officer’s decision “to admit or to exclude an alien” is not ordinarily subject

to judicial review. Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 907–08 (2024) (cleaned up); see also

Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7.

Resisting the doctrine’s application here, Kachooee again insists that the Government’s

§ 221(g) refusal of his application was not final. Mot. to Dismiss Resp. at 18–22. Consular

nonreviewability, he says, does not apply when “no final decision” has been made and the

plaintiff instead challenges “the delay in rendering a final decision.” Id. at 20. That is incorrect.

Consular nonreviewability bars judicial review of the decision to place an application into

“administrative processing” for “discretionary re-adjudication” as well as “the substance of a

consular officer’s visa determination.” Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 103–04 (cleaned up);

Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7.

The facts of this case illustrate why. The consular officer, in his discretion, denied

Kachooee’s application under § 221(g). Ex. A at 2. And that decision was final, as already

discussed. See supra Part III.A. The Government can reconsider and grant Kachooee’s

application after more factfinding. But the Court has no authority to compel it to do so.

Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 104; Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7. Kachooee tries

to evade that limitation—framing his claim as a mere request to expedite its decision. Mot. to

Dismiss Resp. at 22–23. “But that is, in effect, no different from ordering the State Department

to reopen a dispositive adjudication.” Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 104. “A substantive

6 change in the outcome of State’s visa determination is, after all, the ostensible purpose of

requiring State to conclude administrative processing.” Id. “Even if such an order does not

expressly mandate State to reach a specific outcome on Plaintiffs’ visas, it still affects the

substance of State’s initial refusals by requiring their reexamination.” Id. And that is exactly

what the consular nonreviewability doctrine forbids. See Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 907–08.

IV.

The Government has validly refused Kachooee’s application for entry into this country.

At this point, “[t]he Judicial Branch has no role to play.” Muñoz,

. The Court

will therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss. A separate Order will issue today.

2025.10.23 17:16:49 -04'00' Dated: October 23, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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