UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STANLEY BOSS,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-616 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Stanley Boss, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant Pillsbury Winthrop

Shaw Pittman LLP (“Pillsbury”) initiated a United States Customs Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) citizenship inquiry into him to disadvantage him in future employment, in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Eighth Amendment.

Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 30. The court granted Boss’s motion to amend his complaint, ECF

No. 24, and now Pillsbury moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for insufficient service of

process and lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), and for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28. Boss moves for

default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 29. For the following

reasons, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for

Default Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Boss, a Black man, was employed by Pillsbury from approximately March 2018 to May

2019. Am. Compl. at 2; Mot. to Dismiss at 1. In June 2019, Boss reached an Equal

Page 1 of 7 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) discrimination settlement with Pillsbury. Am.

Compl. at 1. In 2022, he was hired by Bentall Green Oak, who asked for his W-2 from Pillsbury

during his onboarding process. Id. ¶¶ 3, 21. Boss attributes this request to a 2022 USCIS

citizenship status inquiry that he claims Pillsbury opened with Bentall Green Oak’s help. Id. ¶ 6.

In 2024, Boss applied for a position at Edward Jones Financial and was rejected after a multi-

step interview and testing process. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15–19. He claims he was denied the position

because of the USCIS inquiry, which “Pillsbury used . . . to retaliate and exempt [his] status to

legally work in the United States.” Id. at 2. He contends that Pillsbury’s initiation of the

citizenship inquiry constituted a cruel and unusual practice in violation of the Eighth

Amendment as well as discriminatory treatment under Title VII. Id. ¶ 3. He seeks $394,305 in

punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 6–7.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving

that he has effectuated proper service by demonstrating that he complied with the relevant

portions of Rule 4 “and any other applicable provision of law.” Light v. Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a

complaint.” Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). A “complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”

(citing Twombly,

). The court must assume all “well-pleaded

factual allegations” are accurate,

, and “grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that

Page 2 of 7 can be derived from the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994).

“Although ‘[p]ro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by

counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings,’ they still bear the burden of

demonstrating that service was properly effected.” Anderson v. Gates,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev.,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)).

And while they are likewise held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner,

, 520–21 (1972), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient. Ashcroft,

(citing Twombly,

).

III. ANALYSIS

The court will first address the issue of personal jurisdiction over Pillsbury. To

determine the applicable procedures for service of process, the court looks to the law of “the

state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e),

(h)(1)(A). “In the District of Columbia, service of process may be effectuated by ‘mail

addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt.’ D.C. Code § 13–431; see

D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(c)(3), (h)(1). If the defendant is a corporation or partnership, a copy of the

summons and complaint must be delivered to an officer or agent authorized to receive service of

process on the entity’s behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(h)(1).” Hardy v.

Joseph I. Sussman, P.C.,

(D.D.C. 2013). Because Boss served his

Amended Complaint via certified mail, his proof of service must be accompanied by a signed

receipt attached to an affidavit. D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1)(B). If the return receipt “does

not purport to be signed by the party named in the summons,” the affidavit must include

Page 3 of 7 “specific facts from which the court can determine that the person who signed the receipt meets

the appropriate qualifications for receipt of process set out in Rule 4(e)-(j).” Id. 4(l)(1)(B)(iv).

Here, Boss’s affidavit is not accompanied by a signed receipt, nor does it state that he

served Pillsbury’s registered agent or someone authorized to accept service. See ECF Nos. 25,

26. While Boss asserts that Pillsbury’s counsel in this matter, Meaghan Murphy, accepted

process, there is no evidence that Pillsbury intended to confer such authority on Murphy. See

Fenwick v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2010) (finding service was

insufficient without evidence that employee who accepted process was specifically authorized to

do so); Mot. to Dismiss at 11. Without such evidence, the court cannot conclude Boss made

proper service upon Pillsbury. See Hardy,

.

But because Boss is proceeding pro se, the court will not penalize him for having

assumed delivery to Pillsbury’s counsel constituted proper service, especially when there are

other bases on which to dismiss his complaint. See

; Dominguez v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2008) (“If dismissing the claim without prejudice due to

insufficient service would lead to the refiling of a meritless claim, . . . [this] Circuit has held that

it is proper to consider other means of dismissing the [claim].”). Accordingly, although the court

lacks personal jurisdiction over Pillsbury, it will nonetheless analyze and dismiss Boss’s Title

VII and Eighth Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See Anderson,

;

Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t,

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

Title VII prohibits “discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”

in “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in executive

agencies” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). A plaintiff may plead a Title VII

discrimination claim by alleging “that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an

Page 4 of 7 adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of

discrimination (that is, an inference that his employer took the action because of his membership

in the protected class).” Brown v. Sessoms,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, “a plaintiff must

plausibly allege that (1) she ‘engaged in statutorily protected activity,’ (2) she ‘suffered a

materially adverse action by [her] employer,’ and (3) the two are causally connected.” Spence v.

U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Howard R.L. Cook &

Tommy Shaw Found. v. Billington,

(D.C. Cir. 2013)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

3(a).

Boss alleges that Pillsbury engaged in “unlawful employment practices based on race and

national origin to discriminate against [him].” Am. Compl. at 2. But merely invoking race and

national origin as part of the claim’s narrative is insufficient; to plausibly plead the causation

element, Boss must allege specific, non-conclusory facts giving rise to a reasonable inference

that Pillsbury initiated the USCIS inquiry, that it did so because of his race or national origin,

and that his rejection from Edward Jones was connected to that inquiry.

Boss fails on all accounts. He pleads no facts from which the court can reasonably infer

that Pillsbury played a role in initiating the 2022 citizenship inquiry, several years after Boss’s

employment at the firm. Instead, he asks the court to assume Pillsbury’s involvement (which

Pillsbury denies) from the mere fact that Bentall Green Oak requested Boss’s Pillsbury W-2 as

part of routine onboarding procedures. The connection between the two events eludes this court,

and it is not its role to supply one. Notably, neither the W-2 nor the existence of a citizenship

inquiry dissuaded Bentall Green Oak from hiring him, and Boss offers no facts supporting his

theory that either played any role in Edward Jones’s hiring decision. “While no ‘magic words’

Page 5 of 7 are required, the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated

ambition.” Broderick v. Donaldson,

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

Boss’s claim that Pillsbury’s conduct violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

cruel and unusual punishments is likewise unsupported. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. “Although the

Supreme Court has never definitively addressed the question of whether the Eighth Amendment

generally, or the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause specifically, applies in civil cases,

existing precedent has limited the amendment’s application to criminal cases.” DOE v. Rogers,

(D.D.C. 2015); see Browning–Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v.

Kelco Disposal, Inc.,

(1989) (“[O]ur concerns in applying the Eighth

Amendment have been with criminal process and with direct actions initiated by government to

inflict punishment.”). Pillsbury is not a government actor and Boss offers no “analogy to

criminal punishments sufficient to warrant extending the scope of the Eighth Amendment to

apply to this civil case.” Rogers,

.

Finally, Boss argues that default summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) is appropriate because Pillsbury failed to file an answer within 21 days of being

served. Mot. for Default Judgment at 1–2, ECF No. 29. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(a), a defendant must serve a responsive pleading within 21 days of being served with the

summons and complaint. But not only was Pillsbury improperly served, it filed a motion under

Rule 12, rendering the responsive pleading due “14 days after notice of the court’s action” on

that motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). Boss’s Amended Complaint was docketed on April 30,

2025, and the Summons was reissued on the same day. ECF No. 24. Pillsbury filed its 12(b)(6)

motion on May 21, 2025, within the requisite 21-day period, meaning its “time to respond to the

remaining claims is governed by Rule 12(a)(4) and runs from the date of the [c]ourt’s action on

Page 6 of 7 this motion.” Doshi v. Blinken, No. CV 23-3613 (RC),

, at *10 (D.D.C. July

22, 2024). Consequently, Boss’s claim for default judgment fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court will GRANT Pillsbury’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Boss’s

Motion for Default Judgment. A separate order will follow.

Date: October 27, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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