UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TYREEN DICKERSON,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2976 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan FRANK BISIGNANO, Comissioner of Social Security, 1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tyreen Dickerson is a young man who has been diagnosed with several mental

impairments, including oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

(ADHD), and unspecified neurocognitive disorder, among others. In 2007, when Mr. Dickerson

was about five years old, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that Mr. Dickerson

was disabled and began issuing him benefits. When he turned eighteen, the SSA automatically

re-evaluated that determination, eventually concluding that Mr. Dickerson is no longer disabled.

Mr. Dickerson sued the Commissioner of Social Security, challenging the administrative law

judge’s (ALJ) conclusion. He contends that the ALJ’s decision failed to comport with regulatory

requirements prescribing the explanations that disability determinations must include. He also

contends that the ALJ improperly accepted evidence from a vocational expert. The Court agrees

with Mr. Dickerson’s first argument, and so it declines to address the second.

1 The current Commissioner is substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

“The Social Security Act establishes a program for providing ‘disability insurance benefits’

to eligible individuals and ‘supplemental security income to individuals who have attained age 65

or are blind or disabled.’” Cunningham v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citing

, 1381, 1381a). A non-blind individual is disabled if they are unable “to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

(d)(1)(A). “To make a

disability determination, ‘an ALJ gathers evidence, holds a hearing, takes testimony, and performs

a five-step legal evaluation of the claimant using that evidence.’” Venzon v. O’Malley, No.

23-cv-1377,

, at *1 (D.D.C. May 21, 2024) (quoting Davis v. Berryhill,

(D.D.C. 2017)).

Under the five-step evaluation, the ALJ determines, “sequential[ly],” whether:

(1) the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a medically severe impairment or impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of the impairments listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant, in light of her age, education, work experience and Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), can still perform another job that is available in the national economy.

(quoting Davis, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 158–59). “The claimant bears the burden of proof during

the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the SSA Commissioner at step five.” Cunningham,

.

The most salient step in this case is step three, whether the “claimant’s impairment is

equivalent to one of the impairments listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation.”

Venzon,

, at *1 (quoting Davis,

). A claimant’s

2 impairments are “medically equivalent to a listed impairment . . . if it is at least equal in severity

and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.”

(a). For “mental

disorders,” the medical-equivalence inquiry considers “the areas of mental functioning a person

uses in a work setting”: (1) “Understand, remember, or apply information”; (2) “interact with

others”; (3) “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace”; and (4) “adapt or manage oneself.”

pt.

404, Subpart P, app. 1; see also

§ 404.1520a(c)(3). The SSA evaluates the “degree of limitation

in these areas” using a “five-point scale”: “None, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” Id.

§ 404.1520a(c)(4). For an individual’s impairments to be medically equivalent to many of the

listed impairments, it must “result in ‘extreme’ limitation of one, or ‘marked’ limitation of two, of

the four areas of mental functioning.” Id. pt. 404, Subpart P, app. 1.

B. Factual & Procedural Background

In 2007, when Mr. Dickerson was a minor, the SSA determined that Mr. Dickerson was

disabled and therefore entitled to social security payments. Administrative Record (AR) 10, 114,

ECF No. 7. In 2021, after Mr. Dickerson turned eighteen, the SSA re-evaluated whether

Mr. Dickerson qualified for social security payments under the disability rules for adults. AR 10,

137. The SSA determined that Mr. Dickerson was not disabled. AR 93, 137.

Mr. Dickerson requested a hearing before an ALJ to challenge that decision. AR 10. He

explained that he “has problems with understanding, following instructions, completing tasks, and

concentration.” AR 18. In his September 2023 decision, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Dickerson

had no past relevant work. AR 29. Next, the ALJ found that Mr. Dickerson “had the following

severe impairments: a mental impairment variously diagnosed as [ADHD], oppositional defiant

disorder, unspecified neurocognitive disorder, and learning disability, asthma, allergic rhinitis, and

obesity.” AR 12. But, at step three of the five-step inquiry, the ALJ determined that Mr. Dickerson

3 “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the

severity of one of the listed impairments” because he “has not had the minimal capacity to adapt

to changes in his environment and there are not two marked, nor is there one extreme[,] functional

limitation.” AR 13.

The ALJ detailed his conclusions about each of the four areas of mental functioning. He

determined that Mr. Dickerson has a “moderate limitation” in “understanding, remembering, or

applying information.” AR 13. Among other things, the ALJ identified that Mr. Dickerson has a

high school education with a special education background, that he testified he has problems with

understanding, and that a mental status exam “revealed he had average intelligence.” Id. In

“interacting with others,” the ALJ determined that Mr. Dickerson has a “moderate limitation,”

noting evidence reflecting that he “could interact adequately with supervisors, coworkers, and the

public.” AR 14. Next, with respect to “concentrating, persisting[,] or maintaining pace,” the ALJ

determined that Mr. Dickerson has a “moderate limitation.” Id. The ALJ explained that

Mr. Dickerson “has been diagnosed with [ADHD],” but that he “goes shopping in stores and by

computer for games and instruments, and he is able to count change.” Id. Finally, for “adapting or

managing oneself,” the ALJ determined that Mr. Dickerson “has experienced a moderate

limitation.” Id. The ALJ identified a psychiatric assessment revealing that Mr. Dickerson was

“easily frustrated if there were a lot of noise,” but the ALJ also pointed to a mental status exam in

which Mr. Dickerson “had a normal mood and appropriate affect,” with his “thought process

[being] goal directed” and his “thought content [being] appropriate.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded that Mr. Dickerson’s mental impairments were not medically equivalent to an

impairment listed in the relevant disability regulation. AR 13.

4 The ALJ next turned to Mr. Dickerson’s Residual Functioning Capacity (RFC). AR 16.

The ALJ concluded that Mr. Dickerson had the RFC to perform “light work,” but he articulated

several limitations on that capacity. 2 Id. Finally, the ALJ accepted testimony by a vocational expert

who testified that someone like Mr. Dickerson would be able to do work “that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy.” AR 30. Summing up, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Dickerson’s

disability had ended in January 2022, and that Mr. Dickerson had not become disabled since then.

Id.

Mr. Dickerson then appealed to the SSA’s Appeals Council, which denied his request for

review. AR 1. In October 2024, Mr. Dickerson filed a Complaint in this Court against the

Commissioner of Social Security. ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges that the SSA’s decision was

not based on substantial evidence, and it requests that this Court reverse the SSA’s decision and

award him benefits. Compl. at 2. In April 2025, Mr. Dickerson filed a Motion for Judgment of

Reversal. ECF No. 9. The Commissioner filed a Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. ECF No. 14.

These motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance &

Reply Def.’s Opp’n (Pl.’s Opp’n), ECF No. 16; Def.’s Mem. Supp. His Mot. J. Affirmance &

Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (Def.’s Opp’n), ECF No. 15.

2 In detail, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Dickerson “has had the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . except the claimant has the residual functional capacity to occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation, smoke, respiratory irritants, extreme heat, extreme cold, and hazards (machinery, heights, etc.). He requires the ability to alternate between sitting and standing about every 30 minutes. He is limited to performing simple, one-to-step [sic], routine, repetitive tasks in a low stress work environment, defined as requiring only occasional decision making and occasional changes in the work setting, where there would only have occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors, and no contact with the general public, and which would not require a fast pace or production quotas such as would customarily be found on an assembly line.” AR 16.

5 LEGAL STANDARD

“Under the Social Security Act,

(g), district courts are empowered to

review decisions of the SSA, but not substitute their judgment for that of the SSA.” Banks v.

Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2008). “A district court sits in what is essentially an

appellate role when it reviews the Commissioner’s disability determination, which must be upheld

‘if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not tainted by an error of law.’” Grant v. Kijakazi,

, 135 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Smith v. Bowen,

(D.C. Cir.

1987)). “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla’”; “[i]t means—and means only—

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Biestek v. Berryhill,

(2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,

(1938)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision

[was] not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.”

Cunningham,

(quoting Muldrow v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-1385,

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2012)).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Dickerson contends that the ALJ’s decision was defective because it (1) inadequately

discussed the medical opinions of Dr. Atlener Artis-Trower, a physician who has treated

Mr. Dickerson for ten years, Pl.’s Statement P. & A. (Statement) at 8–9, ECF. No. 10; AR 457;

and (2) incorrectly accepted the testimony of a vocational expert, Statement at 10. The Court

agrees that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions did not comply with SSA

regulations, so it declines to address Mr. Dickerson’s second argument.

Mr. Dickerson argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSA regulations by inadequately

assessing the persuasiveness of Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions. Statement at 8–9. By regulation,

“medical findings from a medical source are evaluated by analyzing (1) the supportability of the

6 opinion (that is, the ‘objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by [the]

medical source to support his or her medical opinion[ ]’) and (2) the consistency of the opinion

with other evidence in the record.” Crystal M. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-2381,

,

at *10 (D.D.C. July 11, 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting

.920c(c)(1)); see

also

.920c(b)(2). ALJs are also directed to consider other, less important factors,

including “the medical source’s relationship with the claimant” and “the specialization of the

medical source.” Crystal M.,

, at *10 (citing

.920c(c)(3)–(5)).

“These regulations set forth a minimum level of articulation to be provided in determinations and

decisions, in order to provide sufficient rationale for a reviewing adjudicator or court; where an

ALJ does not meet these minimum levels of articulation, the court’s ability to determine whether

the plaintiff’s disability determination was supported by substantial evidence is frustrated.”

(cleaned up).

In Mr. Dickerson’s view, the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Artis-Trower’s medical opinions

violated these regulations. Statement at 8–9. The ALJ’s decision recounted reports from

Dr. Artis-Trower in November 2022 and February 2023. AR 24. Relevant here, Dr. Artis-Trower

diagnosed Mr. Dickerson with “[ADHD], combined type,” “Oppositional defiant disorder,” and

“PTSD”—further noting a “Marked” limitation in “[t]he ability to maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods of time” as well as “[t]he ability to perform at a consistent pace

with a standard number and length of breaks.” AR 455–56, 461–62. The ALJ acknowledged these

opinions, as well as Dr. Artis-Trower’s other opinions, in his decision. AR 24–25. But the ALJ

concluded that these opinions were only “somewhat persuasive.” AR 25. He explained: “the

marked limitations are not supported by objective findings or subjective reports as PHQ-2 scores

have been consistently zero (0) and few significant objective findings have been noted.”

7 In Mr. Dickerson’s view, this discussion violated

.920c(b)(2), which says

that the SSA will “explain how [it] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a

medical source’s medical opinions.” See Statement at 8–9. Mr. Dickerson argues that the ALJ’s

discussion “does nothing to address supportability” because “an adequate discussion of

supportability would note that Dr. Artis-Trower supported her opinion with citation to diagnoses

of [ADHD] (combined type) and PTSD, and that . . . she cited an additional diagnosis of

Oppositional Defiant Disorder.” Statement at 8. Mr. Dickerson further argues that the ALJ’s

“consistency analysis [was] insufficiently developed.” Statement at 9. He contends that “a simple

citation to ‘few significant objective findings’ is not specific enough to meet this requirement.”

“There is no specific format required for addressing supportability and consistency, and

those terms need not be used in the opinion, provided that there is sufficient explanation for a

reviewing court to determine that the ALJ analyzed those factors.” Stephanie G. v. O’Malley,

No. 22-cv-904,

, at *11 (D.D.C. May 20, 2024) (alteration omitted) (quoting

David W. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-3370,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2023)).

Beginning with supportability, the ALJ explained that Dr. Artis-Trower’s finding of marked

limitations was “not supported by objective findings” and indeed that “few significant objective

findings have been noted.” AR 25. The ALJ’s decision acknowledged that Mr. Dickerson reported

difficulty following instructions and that he had been diagnosed with ADHD. AR 14. The ALJ

concluded that this supported a moderate limitation in the functional area of “concentrating,

persisting[,] or maintaining pace.”

With respect to Dr. Artis-Trower’s diagnosis of oppositional

defiant disorder, the ALJ noted that “the oppositional defiant disorder was reportedly currently in

8 remission.” AR 25. Although Mr. Dickerson may have wanted the ALJ to say more, it is incorrect

to say that the decision failed to address supportability.3

But the same cannot be said about consistency. The Court recognizes that even a minimal

discussion by the ALJ may be sufficient to comply with

.920c(b)(2). For example,

a court has found “a sufficient discussion of consistency” where “the ALJ simply discussed the

opinion’s relation to other evidence such as medical treatment records even though the ALJ did

not make these comments specifically in reference to the medical opinion’s persuasiveness.”

David W.,

, at *12 (citing Cody v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-cv-2620,

, at *6–*7 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2021), rep. and recommendation adopted sub nom.,

Belinda C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-cv-2620,

(D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2021)).

And another court found a discussion sufficient where “the ALJ not only mentioned differences

between the medical source opinion and other record evidence, but he also explained why he found

those differences important for assessing the persuasiveness of the medical source opinion.”

Even compared to the minimal discussion accepted in those cases, the ALJ’s decision here is

inadequate. The decision does not make any comparison between Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions and

any record evidence. See AR 25–26. That absence is hard to miss given that the ALJ’s discussion

of the opinions of every other medical expert explicitly addresses consistency—indeed, using the

word “consistent.” See

Citing to the same portions of the ALJ’s decision discussed above, the Commissioner states

that “the ALJ properly explained in his decision that Dr. Artis-Trower’s . . . findings of marked

3 Mr. Dickerson also takes issue with the ALJ’s reference to “PHQ-2 scores.” See AR 25. He says that “PHQ scores are meant to assess depression, not ADHD.” Statement at 8. But even setting the ALJ’s reference to those scores aside, for the reasons set out above, the ALJ’s decision reflects that he considered whether Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions were supported.

9 limitations were . . . inconsistent with the objective findings and subjective reports.” Def.’s Opp’n

at 14. But the Commissioner does not quote or otherwise identify the aspect of the decision he had

in mind. Instead, the Commissioner follows up that assertion with two pages of his own

comparisons between Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions and other evidence.

at 16–17. Of course, the

Commissioner’s current views about the consistency between Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions and

other evidence does nothing to show that the ALJ’s decision complied with the SSA’s regulatory

obligation to “explain how [it] considered the . . . consistency factor[] for [Dr. Artis-Trower]’s

medical opinions.”

.920c(b)(2); see SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

(1947) (“[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is to the effect that a reviewing

court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is

authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the

agency.”).

For his part, Mr. Dickerson seems to believe that the ALJ’s reference to “few significant

objective findings” was related to the consistency factor, arguing that reference was “not specific

enough to meet this requirement.” Statement at 9. But that is not how the Court understands the

ALJ’s decision. To reiterate, the relevant portion of the ALJ’s analysis respecting

Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions was: “the marked limitations are not supported by objective findings

or subjective reports as PHQ-2 scores have been consistently zero (0) and few significant objective

findings have been noted.” AR 25. As the Court reads this sentence, the “few significant objective

findings” are a reason why “the marked limitations are not supported”—not a comment about the

separate consistency factor.

Thus, this is not a case in which a claimant challenges the “specific format” used by the

ALJ to “address[] supportability and consistency,” complaining that “those terms [were] not used

10 in the opinion.” Stephanie G.,

, at *11. Nor is it one in which the ALJ performed

the requisite analysis elsewhere in the decision and is faulted for not “repeat[ing] these citations to

the records a few pages later when he discussed his findings.” Crystal M.,

,

at *14. Here, “[t]he ALJ’s reasoning is not simply ‘spare’ . . . —in crucial particulars it is missing.”

Butler v. Barnhart,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The Court “can scarcely perform its

assigned review function, limited though it is, without some indication” that the ALJ considered,

“rather than simply ignored,” the consistency of Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions with other evidence.

(quoting Brown v. Bowen,

(D.C. Cir. 1986)). SSA regulations, however,

require that the ALJ address the consistency of all medical opinions.

.920c(b)(2).

And the medical opinions here were by a doctor who had treated Mr. Dickerson for ten years.

AR 457. Ensuring that the ALJ has considered whether such opinions match with other evidence—

especially when those opinions are contrary to the conclusion ultimately reached—is a principal

reason for the explanation requirement. See Stephanie G.,

, at *11 (explaining

that

.920c(b) is satisfied when “there is sufficient explanation for a reviewing court

to determine that the ALJ analyzed [the regulatory] factors” (quoting David W.,

, at *11)).

To be clear, the Court is not faulting the ALJ for writing an insufficiently lengthy decision.

The decision here was twenty pages long and detailed every fact and medical opinion in the record.

See AR 18–27. Although there is something to be said for comprehensiveness, lengthy decisions

are not necessarily in the interest of benefit applicants, ALJs, or courts. Cf. Brown v. Berryhill,

No. 18-cv-589,

, at *6 (D.D.C. 2019) (“An ALJ does not have to state on the

record every reason justifying a decision. An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not

indicate that such evidence was not considered.” (quoting Brault v. SSA,

(2d

11 Cir. 2012) (cleaned up))). Still, SSA regulations require ALJs to meet a minimum level of

articulation regarding the persuasiveness of medical opinions.

.920c(b). ALJs

should consider how they can discharge that regulatory responsibility without talismanically using

the words “consistent” and “supported,” while also keeping their decisions concise.

REMEDIES

Under

(g), the Court has the power to “enter, upon the pleadings and

transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Pursuant

to this provision, the Court will reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand the case to the

Commissioner for further proceedings. The Court expresses no view about the degree

Dr. Artis-Trower’s opinions should be considered persuasive, or whether the ALJ’s decision was

supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Mr. Dickerson’s Motion for Judgment of

Reversal, ECF No. 9, and denies the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance,

ECF No. 14. The Court remands this case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further

proceedings consistent with this decision.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: October 30, 2025

12