UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUDITH PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 379 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan TRAVIS HILL, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judith Phillips, an African American woman working at the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC), brought this lawsuit alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. Ms. Phillips claims that her supervisor discriminated and retaliated against her by making

false statements during a desk audit that occurred in 2023. The FDIC now moves to dismiss under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6) for improper venue and failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court agrees that venue in this District is improper

and transfers the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Ms. Phillips lives in Waldorf, Maryland, and works in the FDIC’s Office of Investigations

(OIG). Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. In October 2022, Ms. Phillips “requested a desk audit of her

position” to evaluate her grade level and accredited duties, which was not conducted until

September 2023. Compl. ¶ 13. She claims that the audit was “incomplete and unfair” because of “discriminatory and retaliatory interference” from her supervisor. Compl. ¶ 14. Her supervisor

allegedly made “material misstatements” to the auditor that affected her evaluation. Compl. ¶ 15.

Meanwhile, a white FDIC employee received a salary increase after a desk audit. Compl. ¶ 17.

On February 9, 2025, Ms. Phillips filed suit under Title VII. Compl. ¶ 21–27. On May 9,

2025, the Defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.

8. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 9; Reply, ECF No. 11.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(3), a court may dismiss a case for improper venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(3). “[T]he plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Varma v.

Gutierrez,

(D.D.C. 2006) (quotation omitted). “In considering a Rule

12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as

true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor, and resolves

any factual conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,

(D.D.C. 2002). “However, the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such

inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court “need not accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions

as true.” Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2014). When venue is

improper, a court may dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(3) or “if it be in the interest of justice,

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

(a). “A case may be transferred to any district where venue is also proper ‘[f]or the

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’” Ctr. for Env’t Sci., Accuracy &

Reliability v. Nat’l Park Serv.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original)

(quoting

(a)).

2 DISCUSSION

The Defendant argues that Ms. Phillips’ claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3)

and Rule 12(b)(6). The Court agrees that this District is an improper venue for Ms. Phillips’ lawsuit

and finds that transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia is appropriate.

A. Improper Venue

Venue in a Title VII case is not determined under the general venue statute. See

; see, e.g., Taylor v. Shinseki,

(D.D.C. 2014). Rather, Title VII’s

special venue provision governs. See Daniels v. Wilkie, No. 17-CV-1543,

, at

*3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2018). Under that provision, venue is proper

[1] in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, [4] but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). “Venue is proper if at least one of the section 2000e-5(f)(3) prongs is

satisfied.” Alessa v. Harker, No. 20-CV-1320,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2021)

(citations omitted). Ms. Phillips’ filings contain no facts establishing the District of Columbia as

the proper venue under Section 2000e-5(f)(3).

First, none of the relevant events occurred in the District of Columbia. Ms. Phillips alleges

that the unlawful employment practice occurred during a desk audit that was conducted virtually

when Ms. Phillips was at home in Maryland, her supervisor was in South Carolina, and the

auditor’s location was unknown, Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 9-1. And at the time, Ms. Phillips was

“assigned” to the FDIC’s Arlington, Virginia office. Muru Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, ECF No. 8-1.

Second, the relevant records do not appear to be maintained in the District of Columbia.

The Defendant has submitted a declaration stating that “all FDIC personnel records related to

3 [Ms. Phillips]” are “created, maintained and administered” at the agency’s Arlington, Virginia

office. Muru Decl. ¶ 7. In response, Ms. Phillips points to a human resources document (the SF-

50), effective two years after the audit in question, that lists the District of Columbia as her duty

station. See Opp’n 7; Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 1, at 3. But Ms. Phillips’ duty station on a human resources

document says nothing about where the relevant records are maintained. Indeed, the FDIC’s policy

is for “SF-50s [to] list Washington, DC as [a] duty station” for all employees “working within the

Washington, DC locality pay area,” which includes employees based in Arlington, Virginia. Suppl.

Muru Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 11-1. Venue is thus not proper under this prong either. See Redding v.

Mayorkas, No. 22-cv-2174,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2023) (cleaned up)

(“Declarations of human resource officers and employers are sufficient to establish where the

employment records are maintained and administered.”).

Third, there is no evidence that Ms. Phillips would have worked in the District of Columbia

but for the Defendant’s alleged unlawful employment practice. According to the FDIC,

Ms. Phillips’ office is in Arlington, VA, and no OIG employees were either assigned to or work

regularly in the D.C. office. Muru Decl. ¶ 5; Suppl. Muru Decl. ¶ 4. And Ms. Phillips herself notes

that during the relevant time period, she was “teleworking” “in Maplewood, NJ, and [her]

apartment in Alexandria, VA . . . and [then] Waldorf, MD.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. While Ms. Phillips

worked on a project with D.C.-based FBI staff and attended one in-person meeting in D.C., Pl’s

Decl. ¶ 3, this is insufficient to support venue in the District, see Michels v. Convergent Sols., Inc.,

No. 89-cv-3165,

, at *3 (D.D.C. May 10, 1991) (finding venue improper in the

District of Columbia where the plaintiff did some work in the District but her main office was in

Virginia).

4 Finally, the fourth prong of Section 2000e-5(f)(3) is inapplicable. When the respondent

can “be found in any of the districts described in the first three prongs,” then the “respondent’s

principal office . . . is immaterial” James v. Verizon Services Corp.,

, 17 n.5.

(D.D.C. 2009). Here, venue is proper in Virginia (where the relevant records are maintained and

Ms. Phillips was assigned to work) or Maryland (where the relevant events occurred and

Ms. Phillips worked remotely).

B. Transfer

“Where venue is improper, the district court ‘shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of

justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.’”

Dastmalchian v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting

(a)). Where a district court determines dismissal is not warranted, it may transfer a case “to

any other district or division where it might have been brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties

and witnesses, in the interest of justice[.]”

(a). Here, the Court declines to dismiss

this case and instead transfers it to the Eastern District of Virginia, where the relevant employment

records are “maintained and administered.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3);

(a);

Muru Decl. ¶ 7. Litigating this case in the Eastern District of Virginia is likely to be more

convenient for the parties and witnesses since that is where OIG employees have their offices and

regularly work. See

(a); Suppl. Muru Decl. ¶ 3. And there is no reason transfer

would prejudice the Defendant. See Sinclair v. Kleindienst,

(D.C. Cir. 1983).

5 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court transfers this case to the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia. A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: November 4, 2025

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