UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DANI BUTLER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 20-cv-02514 (ACR) v.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)—one of a handful of states

whose egregious human-rights abuses first prompted the passage of the terrorism exception to

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)—kidnapped Reverend Dong Shik Kim

(Reverend Kim or the Reverend) from China in 2000. Strong evidence suggests that thereafter,

it tortured and eventually killed the Reverend in a kwan-li-so, a political penal-labor colony.

Some of his relatives have already successfully sued North Korea for damages under the

terrorism exception. Plaintiffs in this case are additional relatives: Reverend Kim’s widow

(Young Hwa Chung Kim) and two of his children (Dani Butler and Chun Kook Kim). They

moved for default judgment when North Korea failed to appear.

After independently weighing the evidence submitted, the Court GRANTS the Motion

for Default Judgment, Dkt. 28, and awards damages to Plaintiffs.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the same events as those at the center of a previous suit that

Reverend Kim’s son and brother brought. See Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of

1 Korea (Han Kim I),

(D.D.C. 2013), rev’d and remanded, Han Kim II,

(D.C. Cir. 2014); Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Han Kim III),

(D.D.C. 2015). “In 1993[,] Reverend Kim moved to China from his

congregation in the [United States] to work as a missionary providing humanitarian and

religious service for the families of North Korean descent who had fled across the Chinese–

[North] Korean border.” Dkt. 24-1 (Report of Yoshikuni Yamamoto) ¶ 20. He “set up

numerous refugee shelters and a school . . . for expatriate North Korean children and

handicapped persons” near the border.

A South Korean court later convicted a North

Korean intelligence agent of Reverend Kim’s 2000 abduction from China. Dkt. 24-2 (Decl. of

J.D. Kim & South Korean Court Order) at 4. Following his abduction, the trail of direct

evidence concerning Reverend Kim’s fate grows cooler. But according to a 2009 U.S.

Department of State (State Department) Country Report and various other pieces of evidence

discussed below, North Korea likely imprisoned, tortured, and killed the Reverend within the

year. See Dkt. 24-14 (Decl. of Robert Tolchin & 2009 State Department Country Report) at 3.

After the conclusion of the Han Kim litigation, Young Hwa Chung Kim, Butler, and

Chun Kook Kim filed the instant suit also seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

Plaintiffs served North Korea pursuant to

(a)–(b). Dkt. 19. After North Korea

failed to appear, the Clerk of Court entered default. Dkt. 22; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

The Court now considers Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiffs submitted

in support the documentary evidence submitted in the Han Kim litigation, along with four

pieces of evidence presented in another case concerning North Korea’s abuse of a U.S. citizen,

Warmbier v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, No. 18-977 (BAH) (D.D.C.). See Dkt. 24.

2 In addition, each Plaintiff has provided the Court a declaration for its consideration. Dkts. 25–

27.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Default judgment is appropriate where “the claimant[s] establish[] [their] claim or right

to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.”

(e). In the Han Kim case, the

Circuit clarified how district courts should apply the § 1608(e) standard when it reversed the

district court’s initial denial of default judgment to one of the Reverend’s sons and his brother.

Even though the plaintiffs had presented no “direct, firsthand evidence of [Reverend Kim’s]

torture and murder,” the Circuit concluded that (1) evidence of Reverend Kim’s abduction,

coupled with (2) expert testimony establishing that North Korea “invariably tortures and kills

prisoners like him” in a kwan-li-so sufficed under the statute. Han Kim II,

.1

On remand, the district court entered default judgment in favor of the Han Kim plaintiffs

and awarded damages. Han Kim III,

. The Court now determines its

jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the proffered evidence in this action under the same standard.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court has jurisdiction in this case to the extent that North Korea’s actions qualify

for the FSIA’s terrorism exception. Concluding that North Korea is indeed liable under that

provision, the Court awards damages to Plaintiffs.

1 Plaintiffs must also submit evidence admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Han Kim II,

. They have satisfied this standard here. See

at 1049–50; Sotloff v. Syrian Arab Republic,

, 130 nn.8, 10 (D.D.C. 2021); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony); Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (providing for the public-records exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence). 3 A. The FSIA’s Terrorism Exception

North Korea is both “a mainstay on the State Department’s list of terror sponsors” and

“one of a small handful of bad actors that spurred Congress to adopt the terrorism exception in

the first place.” Han Kim II,

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995)).2

That exception provides that the ordinary immunization of foreign governments from suits in

U.S. courts does not attach to state sponsors of terrorism like North Korea. Rather, plaintiffs

may recover from North Korea for “torture” and “extrajudicial killing,” among other acts. 28

U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).

For purposes of the statute, torture is “any act, directed against an individual in the

offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally

inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person

information or a confession, punishing that individual . . . , intimidating or coercing that

individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Id.

§ 1605A(h)(7); id. § 1350 statutory note. An extrajudicial killing is “a deliberated killing not

authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the

judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id.

§ 1605A(h)(7); id. § 1350 statutory note.

2 The FSIA requires designation of the defendant state as a sponsor of terrorism when the relevant events occurred; and either continued designation when the claim was filed or designation “within the 6-month period before the claim [wa]s filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). This action meets these criteria. The State Department first so designated North Korea in 1988, see

(Feb. 5, 1988), and then rescinded that designation in the period 2008 to 2017, see

(Oct. 24, 2008). The State Department redesignated North Korea in 2017. See

(Nov. 27, 2017). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in September 2020.

4 Plaintiffs in this case meet the threshold eligibility requirement in the terrorism-

exception provision. Each was a legal permanent resident at the time of North Korea’s actions

and has since obtained citizenship. See Dkt. 23 (Decl. of Robert J. Tolchin & Pls.’ Passports);

Dkt. 25 (Butler Decl.) ¶ 4; Dkt. 26 (Chun Kook Kim Decl.) ¶ 4; Dkt 27 (Young Hwa Chung

Kim Decl.) ¶ 6. They may recover under the statute because “individual[s] deemed to owe a

permanent allegiance to the United States and who actively pursue[] U.S. citizenship” satisfy

the requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) that they are “nationals of the United

States” “at the time the [covered] act” occurred. See Han Kim I,

; Asemani

v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2003).3

Altogether, then, this Court has jurisdiction to enter default judgment in favor of

Plaintiffs to the extent that their evidence establishes to the Court’s “satisfact[ion],”

(e), that North Korea tortured or killed Reverend Kim without due process. See Moradi

v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2015).4

B. The Court Will Independently Weigh the Evidence in This Case

The Court next considers the weight it can accord the Han Kim litigation, given its

shared facts with the instant case.

Courts in this Circuit have declined to give full issue-preclusive effect to determinations

made in prior cases on default judgment, because such prior cases lacked adversarial

presentation of factual issues. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 20

3 The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(5), incorporates the definition of “national of the United States” contained in

(a)(22), which defines a “national of the United States” to include individuals “ow[ing] permanent allegiance to the United States.” 4 The statute of limitations poses no bar to this action here. The ten-year limitations period, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b) is a “nonjurisdictional” “affirmative defense[]” that North Korea forfeited when it failed to appear or raise this defense. Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2019). 5 (D.D.C. 2001); 18A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 4442 (3d ed. Sept. 2025

update). Rather, as a compromise, they have taken judicial notice of the relevant prior opinion

and then “review[ed] evidence considered” in the previous case for the purposes of making

their own findings “without [requiring] the re-presentment of such evidence.” Murphy v.

Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2010); accord Brewer v. Islamic

Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2009). In this particular case, however, the

Court is mindful that the Circuit, and not merely another district court, has concluded in a

precedential opinion that the very pieces of evidence now before this Court supported default

judgment in favor of Reverend Kim’s relatives. See Han Kim II,

.

To eliminate all doubt, however, the Court follows the lead of other district courts in

taking judicial notice of the relevant Han Kim decisions and Warmbier v. Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea,

(D.D.C. 2018). It dispenses with the formal presentation

of the same evidence from those cases in this present action and will undertake an independent

examination of the submissions under the default-judgment standard.

C. The Evidence Supports the Conclusion That North Korea Tortured and Killed Reverend Kim Without Due Process

The Court concurs with the Han Kim decisions that the evidence supports default

judgment here.5

There is direct evidence, via South Korea’s conviction of the responsible North Korean

agent, that North Korea abducted Reverend Kim while he was undertaking his missionary work

in China in 2000. See supra p. 2. Other indirect evidence makes clear North Korea tortured and

5 While Plaintiffs’ Complaint also asserts state-law claims, see Dkt. 1 at 15–16, their Motion for Default Judgment focuses upon the FSIA count only, see Dkt. 28-1 at 1. Therefore, with its grant of default judgment as to the FSIA claim, the Court disposes of all of Plaintiffs’ claims.

6 killed him. As the 2009 State Department Country Report explains, “[i]n 2008[,] the media

reported South Korean missionary Kim Dong-shik had most likely died within a year of his 2000

disappearance.” 2009 State Department Country Report at 3. And among other pieces of

evidence about the operation of the kwan-li-so, Plaintiffs offer the declarations of Professor

David Hawk, an expert on human rights in North Korea who has interviewed dozens of former

kwan-li-so prisoners, Dkt. 24-6 (Hawk Decl.); and Ernest Downs, a former senior Defense

Department official and member of the board of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North

Korea, Dkts. 24-7 (Downs Decl.), 24-16 (Supp. Downs Decl.).

Those declarations indicate that North Korea tortured Reverend Kim. Professor Hawk

averred that Reverend Kim was “likely . . . transferred to a kwan-li-so” following his abduction.

Hawk Decl. ¶ 20. He explained that prisoners in the kwan-li-so “are provided only enough food

to be kept on the verge of starvation” and endure “[b]rutal beatings.” Id. ¶¶ 14–15. The

Reverend likely had to perform at least twelve hours of “back-breaking labor” every day of the

week. Id. ¶ 14. And a “customary punishment” in the kwan-li-so is “long-term solitary

confinement in punishment cells which do not have enough space for a person to completely lie

down or stand up, causing inmates to experience a loss of circulation and atrophy of legs, and

often leading to death within several weeks.” Id. ¶ 15. Meanwhile, Downs explained that he

does not “know of any case in which [a] . . . prisoner was not subjected to torture while in the

prison camp.” Supp. Downs Decl. ¶ 10. Such acts of torture include mutilation, deprivation of

sleep and food, beatings, water torture, and stress positions, including being made to kneel

motionless for hours and “‘pigeon torture’ with [one’s] arms pinned behind [one’s] back and

attached to cell bars in ways that ma[k]e it impossible either to stand up or sit down.” Id., Ex., at

149.

7 Furthermore, Professor Hawk reported that “because Reverend Kim was such a valuable

target,” he was likely “subjected to additional brutality” relative to other prisoners. Hawk Decl.

¶ 20; accord Supp. Downs Decl. ¶ 8. The additional declarations and testimony that Plaintiffs

have submitted from the Warmbier litigation also corroborate the harsh treatment Reverend Kim

likely endured. See Dkt. 24-22 ¶¶ 15–18; Dkt. 24-24 ¶¶ 18–20; Dkt. 24-25 at 108–136. North

Korea undoubtedly “intentionally inflicted” upon the Reverend “severe pain or suffering.” 28

U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7); id. § 1350 statutory note.

So, too, does the evidence show that North Korea targeted Reverend Kim for his religious

and political dissent—another requirement to meet the definition of torture. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605A(h)(7); id. § 1350 statutory note. Professor Hawk reported that Reverend Kim was

targeted for his “political dissent” and “humanitarian activities” in his missionary work. Hawk

Decl. ¶ 21. Downs concurred that he is “virtually certain” that “political considerations”

motivated North Korea’s torture of Reverend Kim. Supp. Downs Decl. ¶ 7; accord Downs Decl.

¶ 34.

As to extrajudicial killing, Plaintiffs “need demonstrate only that [North Korea] killed the

Reverend without due process.” Han Kim II,

. Professor Hawk averred that he

“believe[s]” that Reverend Kim suffered an “untimely death” from “torture and eventual

starvation.” Hawk Decl. ¶ 20. And Downs reported that in his expert opinion, “Reverend Kim

was killed by his North Korean captors.” Supp. Downs Decl. ¶ 7.

Altogether, these representations make clear that after abducting him from China, North

Korea tortured and eventually killed Reverend Kim without due process. Plaintiffs have

submitted evidence “satisfactory to the court” in support of default judgment,

(e), which the Court grants.

8 D. The Court Awards Damages to Plaintiffs

Having determined it jurisdiction and North Korea’s liability, the Court proceeds to the

question of damages. The statute provides for compensatory and punitive damages. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605A(c). At the September 29, 2025, hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment,

Plaintiffs requested that the Court assess damages based on their respective declarations without

a formal hearing. The Court will do so, see Weinstein,

.

1. Compensatory Damages

To qualify for compensatory damages, a plaintiff must prove damages “are reasonably

certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur” and that the requested amount is “a reasonable

estimate consistent with [the D.C. Circuit’s] application of the . . . rule on damages.” Hill v.

Republic of Iraq,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs here claim only

compensatory solatium damages—or damages as redress for “the mental anguish, bereavement[,]

and grief that those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience, as well as the

harm caused by the loss of the decedent’s society and comfort.” See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic

of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2011) (alterations adopted) (cleaned up). Each has

clearly suffered grievously because of North Korea’s actions.

Young Hwa Chung Kim is the widow of Reverend Kim. She married Reverend Kim in

South Korea in 1988 and immigrated to the United States in 1992. Young Hwa Chung Kim

Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. She, too, was involved in missionary work. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6. She recalls the Reverend’s

“constant displays of kindness and giving” throughout their marriage. Id. ¶ 5. Young Hwa

Chung Kim’s declaration describes how her mental and physical health deteriorated upon

learning of her husband’s abduction and death, with effects that continue “[t]o this day.” Id.

¶¶ 12–26. She was eventually institutionalized for a period and was unable to take care of her

son, Plaintiff Chun Kook Kim. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 9 Butler, Reverend Kim’s daughter, grew up in South Korea and initially immigrated to the

United States on a student visa. Butler Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. Butler remembers her father taking her

along to many of his speaking engagements and then “mak[ing] the trips special and fun for” her

“[o]n his down time.” Id. ¶ 12. She avers that Reverend Kim “always made time to take us to

concerts, special events, and traveling on family holidays.” Id. ¶ 14. Butler describes, too, the

depression and “[in]ab[ility] to function” that plagued her in the aftermath of the Reverend’s

abduction. Id. ¶¶ 33–60. For example, she “had to take time off” from her work as a teacher,

and she experienced “difficult[y]” eating and sleeping. Id. ¶ 36.

Chun Kook Kim is Reverend Kim’s son. He was ten years old at the time of his father’s

abduction. Chun Kook Kim Decl. ¶ 2. He recalls going to events related to his father’s work

and taking family trips as a child. Id. ¶ 5. His family had initially wanted to shelter him, so

Chun Kook Kim learned of Reverend Kim’s abduction only when other children from church

informed him of the news. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. He describes how his mother, Young Hwa Chung Kim,

was “no longer capable of caring for” him in the aftermath of these events, and how he

consequently “had no real time for childhood, no carefree years.” Id. ¶¶ 10–16. Rather, he

“bounced from family to family”—including living with family friends who became his legal

guardians from ages 13 to 17. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. He avers that in this time, he “never had the time to

make deep lasting friendships.” Id. Chun Kook Kim has recently begun to process his grief

through therapy. Id. ¶¶ 24-28.

“Courts may presume that those in direct lineal relationships with victims of terrorism

suffer compensable mental anguish.” Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2015). Here, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiffs maintained deep, emotional bonds with

10 the Reverend. Their declarations also establish how profoundly his abduction, torture, and death

reshaped their lives.

The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ grief defies quantifying. Still, it must assess

damages. It does so according to the best method available to it—by “treat[ing] like cases alike.”

Salzman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CV 17-2475 (RDM),

, at *17

(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2019); accord Heching v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 17-CV-1192,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2025); Lee v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-CV-00830

(APM),

, at *5 (D.D.C. July 31, 2024). In Han Kim III, the district court

awarded the plaintiffs, Reverend Kim’s son and brother, each $15 million in compensatory

damages.

. That amount represented at the time approximately $1 million

per year since Reverend Kim’s abduction.

Plaintiffs Butler and Chun Kook Kim, as the

children of the Reverend, are similarly situated to the plaintiffs in the Han Kim case. The Court

therefore awards them each $20.5 million, which reflects roughly the size of the award in Han

Kim, adjusted for inflation. See CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau Lab. Stats.,

https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2025) (reflecting 37

percent inflation between April 2015 and September 2025).

As to Young Hwa Chung Kim, the Court considers the unique psychological anguish

visited upon her because of her widowhood. Courts in this Circuit have often awarded a larger

sum in solatium to spouses, in recognition of the unique devastation of losing a life partner. See,

e.g., Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 271–73 (D.D.C. 2002); Sutherland

v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2001); Anderson v. Islamic

Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2000). Commensurate with these decisions,

the Court awards Young Hwa Chung Kim $25 million in solatium damages.

11 2. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages “serve to punish and deter” FSIA defendants, rather than directly

compensate victims. See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 55–56 (D.D.C.

2012); see also Opati v. Republic of Sudan,

, 427–28 (2020). “In determining the

proper punitive damages award, courts evaluate four factors: (1) the character of the defendants’

act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to

cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.” Acosta v. Islamic

Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2008) (cleaned up).

The Court agrees with the Han Kim III court that North Korea’s actions were “awful and

worthy of the gravest condemnation.”

(cleaned up). There is no question,

from the evidence, that North Korea caused Plaintiffs significant psychological harm. See supra

pp. 9–11. Additionally, North Korea’s acts of abduction, torture, and extrajudicial killing merit

strong deterrence. Finally, the Court notes that North Korea’s wealth (which courts often

measure by a state sponsor of terrorism’s annual expenditures in support of terrorist activities), is

not “readily accessible.” Han Kim III,

.

In considering these factors, the Han Kim III court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs a

combined $300 million in punitive damages. Heeding its duty to treat like cases alike, see supra

p. 11, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ similar request, see Dkt. 28-1 at 28, for a combined $300

million in punitive damages for North Korea’s abhorrent treatment of the Reverend.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In sum, North Korea is liable to Plaintiffs under the FSIA’s terrorism for abducting,

torturing, and killing Reverend Kim without due process. The Court hereby

12 GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, Dkt. 28, and awards (1) solatium

damages in the amount of $25 million to Young Hwa Chung Kim and in the amount of $20.5

million each to Butler and Chun Kook Kim, and (2) a total of $300 million in punitive damages

to the Plaintiffs collectively; and

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: November 4, 2025 ____________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge

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