UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ESTATE OF ZOUHAIR EL HALABI, et al., Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 22-cv-3190 (CRC)

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 1983 and 1984, Hezbollah bombed U.S. diplomatic facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, with

the support of Iran. The attacks killed and injured several hundred people. Among them were

three individuals whose estates and family members make up the twenty-eight plaintiffs in this

case.

The Court previously found Defendants, the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and the

Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”), liable for these bombings and appointed

three special masters to assess findings of damages for this attack. Now before the Court is

Plaintiffs’ motion to adopt the special masters’ Reports and Recommendations and for entry of

final default judgment against Iran and the MOIS, as well as their motion for leave to file a

second amended complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will adopt in part the special

masters’ recommendations as to damages and will enter final default judgment for Plaintiffs.

However, the Court will deny the motion for leave to amend the complaint. I. Background

In the spring of 1983, a man drove a vehicle full of explosives into the entrance of the

U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Corr. Am. Compl. (“CAC”), ECF No. 37-1 ¶ 74. The ensuing

blast killed 63 people and injured more than 100. Id. ¶ 75. The following year, a station wagon

full of explosives was driven into a temporary embassy facility and exploded, killing at least

eleven people and injuring over fifty. Id. ¶ 81.

Plaintiffs 1 Najem Hassan and Hassan Makki worked at the embassy and were injured in

the first blast in 1983. Report and Recommendation of the Special Master Regarding the Makki

Family (“Makki Rep.”), ECF No. 50-1 at 4; Report & Recommendations of the Special Master

Regarding the Hassan Family (“Hassan Rep.”), ECF No. 49 at 2. Mr. Makki was also injured in

the second blast, along with fellow embassy employee, Plaintiff Zouhair El Halabi. Report &

Recommendation of the Special Master Regarding Compensatory Damages for the El Halabi

Family Plaintiffs (“El Halabi Rep.”), ECF No. 51 at 3; Makki Rep. at 4. As a result of these

attacks, Plaintiffs and their families suffered both physical and emotional injuries. See CAC ¶¶

2–9, 31–42, 44–45, 52–54; see also Makki Rep. at 4–9; Hassan Rep. at 2–17; El Halabi Rep. at

3–11.

Plaintiffs allege that Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, committed these two

attacks. CAC ¶¶ 71, 77, 84. They further allege that the attacks were financed and logistically

supported by Defendants. CAC ¶¶ 77, 82, 84.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Iran and MOIS in October 2022. Compl, ECF No. 1 ¶ 1; id. at

24. They served both Defendants, who failed to respond. ECF No. 17; ECF No. 19. The Clerk

1 For ease of reading, the Court will refer to the direct victims as “Plaintiffs” even though they are deceased and their estates as proceeding as representative plaintiffs in the case.

2 of the Court then entered default, ECF No. 20, and Plaintiffs moved for default judgments as to

liability under the FSIA, ECF No. 21. In August 2024, the Court issued an opinion finding

jurisdiction and holding Iran and MOIS liable for the 1983 and 1984 attacks. Mem. Op., ECF

No. 47 at 8. The Court proceeded to adopt Plaintiffs’ administrative plan for the case and

appoint three special masters to assess the appropriate damages to be awarded to Plaintiffs. ECF

No. 46 at 1. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to adopt the damages findings of the

special masters as to the El Halabi, Hassan, and Makki estates and families and enter final

default judgment as to these Plaintiffs. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion in the

alternative for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

II. Legal Standards

The Court will set out the appropriate legal standards for Plaintiffs’ motions in the

relevant portions of its analysis.

III. Analysis

Because the Court previously established that it has subject matter jurisdiction,

determined that the Plaintiffs have causes of action, and found Defendants liable for the two

attacks at issue, the Court assesses Plaintiffs’ claims for damages only, as well as the El Halabi

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint.

A. El Halabi’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint

The Court begins with an issue affecting only one Plaintiff, Zouhair El Halabi, and his

family: whether the family’s claims include a claim for wrongful death. In their Motion to Adopt

the Reports and Recommendations, Plaintiffs request damages for El Halabi’s death, which they

claim occurred as a result of his bombing-related injuries. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 54 at 2.

However, as Plaintiffs note, the CAC “did not include a claim for wrongful death[.]” Id.

3 Accordingly, the Court previously found Iran and MOIS liable for El Halabi’s injuries, but not

his death. Mem. Op., ECF No. 47 at 7–8. Because the claim for wrongful death is not included

in the complaint and the Court did not find Iran liable for wrongful death, it denies the request

for damages stemming from El Halabi’s death.

As a fall back, Plaintiffs move for leave to file a second amended complaint containing

the wrongful death allegations. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 54 at 2. Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a)(2), leave to amend “should be freely given in the absence of undue delay, bad

faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or futility.”

Richardson v. United States,

, 548–49 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

The Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion to amend on futility grounds because the Court is

unconvinced that the bombing was a proximate cause of El Halabi’s death. To succeed in

bringing a wrongful death claim, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) Iran's actions were a substantial

factor in the sequence of events that led to [El Halabi’s death]; and (2) the [death] was

reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence of Iran's actions.” Est. of

Fakhoury v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 21-cv-1218,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Nov.

13, 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Owens v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.C. Cir. 2017)). As a result of the bombing, El Halabi suffered partial deafness. El Halabi

Rep. at 3. He died two years later in a car crash, brought on because, allegedly, “he could not

hear the car honking” while crossing the street. Id. at 5. It appears that none of El Halabi’s

relatives were present and that their account of the accident is secondhand. Id. Plaintiffs can

show that Iran’s actions were a substantial factor leading to the embassy bombings. See Mem.

Op., ECF No. 47 at 4. But it is not a natural consequence of a terrorist bombing that El Halabi

4 would have been killed years later in a car crash—a crash where the driver saw El Halabi and

still hit him. See El Halabi Rep. at 5.

Plaintiffs cite to Sheikh v. Republic of Sudan,

, 269 (D.D.C. 2020),

and Opati v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.D.C. 2014), in support of their

position, but neither is particularly helpful. The courts in both cases gave wrongful death awards

where the victims were exposed to HIV and infected at the scene of the attack. Sheikh, 485 F.

Supp. 3d at 269; Opati,

. But that chain of causation is far less attenuated

than a car accident several years after an attack, where another person’s actions caused El

Halabi’s death. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the

attacks in fact led to El Halabi’s death. The special master’s report specifies that “each of the 6

surviving family members” attributed El Halabi’s death to his inability to hear the car. El Halabi

Rep. at 15. But “there is no official record referencing the hearing loss as a contributing factor in

Mr. El Halabi’s death.” Id. at 14. Without a police report, statements from people who

witnessed the crash, or further medical evidence, the evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the

Court denies Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and will consider the El

Halabi family’s award solely on the basis of the injuries El Halabi sustained during the bombing.

B. Damages Standards

The FSIA provides for three forms of compensatory damages: pain and suffering,

solatium, and economic damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Direct victims of bombing attacks

“who survived an attack may recover damages for their pain and suffering” while “family

members can recover solatium for their emotional injury[,] and all plaintiffs can recover punitive

damages.” Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing

Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2010)). To establish

5 damages, plaintiffs “must prove the amount of the damages by a reasonable estimate consistent

with th[e] [D.C. Circuit’s] application of the American rule on damages.” Hill v. Republic of

Iraq,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). “In determining the

reasonable estimate, courts may look to expert testimony and prior awards for comparable

injury.” Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quotation

marks omitted). For plaintiffs who are not U.S. citizens, recovery is still available under state

tort law. See Est. of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2011); see

also Republic of Sudan v. Owens,

(D.C. 2018).

As the Court has previously recognized in assessing damages, “the process of assessing

pain and suffering is an imperfect science, as no amount of money can properly compensate a

victim and his family for their suffering during and after a terrorist attack.” Bathiard v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, No. 16-cv-1549,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2020) (Cooper, J.);

see also Goldstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2019) (Cooper,

J.); Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2017) (Cooper, J.). “In

the interest of fairness, however, courts strive to maintain consistency of awards as between the

specific plaintiffs and among plaintiffs in comparable situations.” Cohen,

.

Accordingly, the Court adheres to the $5 million baseline established in Peterson v.

Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by

Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court further relies

on the Wamai framework, which was similarly animated by the “need to maintain uniformity”

across injuries that “span a broad range” and identified five general categories of physical

injuries while reserving the $5 million Peterson baseline for those individuals with the most

severe physical injuries. See Wamai v. Republic of Sudan,

, 91–93 (D.D.C.

6 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Owens v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Opati v. Republic of

Sudan,

(2020), and aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Owens v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.C. Cir. 2019).

Under Wamai, courts award $1.5 million to plaintiffs who suffer “little physical injury—

or none at all—but have claims based on severe emotional injuries” (“Category 1”); $2 million to

plaintiffs who suffer “minor injuries (such as lacerations and contusions caused by shrapnel),

accompanied by severe emotional injuries” (“Category 2”); $2.5 million to plaintiffs who suffer

“physical injuries, such as broken bones, head trauma, some hearing or vision impairment, or

impotence” (“Category 3”); $3 million to plaintiffs who endure “injuries [] [that] include[e]

spinal injuries not resulting in paralysis, more serious shrapnel injuries, head trauma, or serious

hearing impairment” (“Category 4”); and the $5 million baseline to plaintiffs who survive “some

mix of serious hearing or vision impairment, many broken bones, severe shrapnel wounds or

burns, lengthy hospital stays, serious spinal or head trauma, and permanent injuries” (“Category

5”). 60 F. Supp. 3d at 91–93 (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 84–85). These categories all

“assume severe psychological injuries.” Schertzman Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-

cv-1214,

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2019).

For Category 5 baseline injuries, where victims of the attack received $5 million in

compensation, Wamai awarded “$4 million to spouses of injured victims, $2.5 million to parents

[and children] of injured victims, and $1.25 million [] to siblings of injured victims.” 60 F. Supp.

3d at 94 (citing Peterson,

(D.D.C. 2007)). While solatium awards may be

adjusted up or down based on the circumstances, “solatium awards for relatives of victims

should be proportionate to the pain-and-suffering awards to the victims themselves.” Goldstein,

7

(citing Cohen,

). Where courts depart from the

Category 5 baseline pain and suffering award for direct victims, a proportionate adjustment to

their relatives’ solatium damages is generally appropriate. See, e.g., Davis v. Islamic Republic of

Iran,

(D.D.C. 2012); Bathiard,

, at *5. As the Court has

done previously, it “will scale family member awards based on the servicemember's award: 30%

of the baseline awards for plaintiffs whose relatives suffered Category [1] injuries; 40% for

Category 2; 50% for Category 3; 60% for Category 4; and the baseline awards for Category 5.”

Est. of Fishbeck v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 18-cv-2248,

, at *11 (D.D.C.

Sep. 9, 2024) (Cooper, J.).

Non-citizen plaintiffs (who were not employed by the U.S. government) lack a cause of

action under the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). In such cases, courts generally “apply

District of Columbia law to the claims of any plaintiffs for whom jurisdiction is proper, but who

lack a federal cause of action under the FSIA.” Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2017) (Cooper, J.) (quoting Wamai, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 89–90). “Under the

FSIA, a solatium claim is indistinguishable from an IIED claim.” Valore,

.

To prove an IIED claim in lieu of an FSIA claim, plaintiffs need to show “(1) extreme and

outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) either intentionally or recklessly (3)

causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Islar v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Larijani v. Georgetown Univ.,

(D.C.

2002)). Terror attacks are “extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of

emotional distress.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2009).

Therefore, the Court will award damages for Plaintiffs without a federal cause of action if they

can show severe emotional distress.

8 C. Pain and Suffering Damages

1. The Estate of Najem K. Hassan

Special Master Stephen Saltzburg proposed an award of $5 million in pain and suffering

damages to Plaintiff Najem Hassan. Hassan Rep. at 4. Mr. Hassan was an employee of the

Beirut embassy during the 1983 bombing. Id. at 2. Due to the bombing, he suffered “a lacerated

spleen, multiple bowel lacerations, and lacerations on his face.” Id. at 3. “His liver was

collapsing,” his “gut was out,” and he “was in intensive care.” Id. at 11. He was hospitalized

for “[m]ore than two and a half months” as a result of the bombing and related injuries. Id. at 3.

One of his children noted that “he was not the same person that he was before.” Id. at 16.

Hassan later described the sensation of the “roof just sitting on his stomach.” Id. at 4. The

special master recommended a Category 5 award to Hassan on the basis of his “lengthy

hospitalization” and severe impacts of the bombing on him. Id. Because Category 5 provides

specifically for “lengthy hospital stays,” and two and a half months is a lengthy hospital stay, the

Court finds that Hassan belongs in Category Five. Wamai, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 92–93. And while

Hassan was not a U.S. citizen, he was an embassy employee, allowing him to use the FSIA cause

of action for employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(III); Hassan Rep. at 2. As such, the

Court awards the full $5 million Category 5 baseline to Hassan’s estate.

2. The Estate of Hassan Makki

Special Master Michael Borden proposed an award of $2 million in pain and suffering

damages to Hassan Makki. Makki Rep. at 5. Mr. Makki was an employee of the Beirut embassy

and was injured in both the 1983 and 1984 attacks. Id. at 4. His injuries included “injuries to his

hand and head . . . evidently from shrapnel[.]” Id. Makki’s children recounted seeing him in

bed, “bruised” and “bandaged.” Id. In later years, Makki recalled “flying through the air after

9 the explosion” and “seeing dead bodies and body parts at the scene.” Id. at 4–5. During the

1984 attack, Makki suffered an injury “which resulted in a limp[.]” Id. at 5. In the aftermath of

both of these attacks, Makki was “broken,” “severely depressed,” and “distant[.]” Id. As with

Najem Hassan, Makki was a U.S. embassy employee and can seek damages pursuant to the

FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(III); Makki Rep. at 4. Under the Wamai framework,

plaintiffs with “minor injuries” like “lacerations . . . caused by shrapnel” fall into Category 2 and

receive awards of $2 million. Wamai,

. Because Makki’s injuries map

neatly onto Wamai Category 2, the Court agrees with the special master’s findings and awards

Makki the Category 2 award of $2 million.

3. The Estate of Zouhair El Halabi

For Zouhair El Halabi, the Court rejects the special master’s recommended award of $4

million and instead awards El Halabi a Category 4 award of $3 million. El Halabi was an

employee of the Beirut embassy during the attack and suffered “various lacerations and

abrasions, hearing loss, and psychological injuries.” El Halabi Rep. at 3. His family members

suggest that he was “hit by falling debris” during the attack. Id. at 4. The report indicates that El

Halabi suffered from “partial permanent deafness” and that he “experienced pain from the

injuries . . . until his death.” Id. at 3. However, El Halabi was able to return to work within

“several days after the attack.” Id. at 4. Following the bombing, El Halabi “was more reserved,

distant, and unengaged[,]” and his emotional injuries were “severe[.]” Id. These injuries map

onto Wamai Category 4. That category includes “those with even more serious injuries, such

as . . . serious hearing impairment[.]” Schertzman Cohen,

, at *6 (quoting

Wamai,

). Courts generally award $3 million to Category 4 plaintiffs, and in

this case, the Court believes that this sum is sufficient to compensate El Halabi for the injuries

10 sustained in the bombing and for the consequences of hearing loss. See Est. of Fishbeck,

, at *10. A larger award, as proposed by the special master, appears unwarranted,

since El Halabi did not spend months in the hospital or suffer from injuries like multiple broken

bones. See El Halabi Rep. at 3, 22; see also Wamai,

. Accordingly, the Court

awards El Halabi $3 million in pain and suffering damages.

D. Economic Damages

“Section 1605A explicitly provides that foreign state-sponsors of terrorism are liable to

victims for economic losses stemming from injuries or death sustained as a result of the foreign

state's conduct.” Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic,

(D.D.C. 2016)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)). “Such damages may be proven by the submission of a forensic

economist's expert report.” Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C.

2015) (citing Belkin, 667 F. Supp. at 24). “In considering an award for lost future earnings, the

Court shall take account of the reasonableness and foundation of the assumptions relied upon by

the expert.” Id. (citing Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C.

2012)).

The special masters only proposed economic damages for one Plaintiff, Zouhair El

Halabi, which the Court will deny. See El Halabi Rep. at 13. Special Master Greenspan

proposed $449,934 in economic damages, calculating that El Halabi would have worked until

age 54, had he not died.

at 13–14. But because the Court has not found Iran and MOIS liable

for El Halabi’s death and because Plaintiffs did not request economic damages between 1984 and

1986 when he was alive but injured, the Court has no basis on which to award economic

damages. See id; see also Mem. Op., ECF No. 47 at 8.

E. Solatium Damages

11 1. Hassan Family Plaintiffs

Special Master Saltzburg recommended Category 5 baseline awards for the family

members of Najem Hassan. Hassan Rep. at 4. They feared for his life when he was in the

hospital.

at 7–8. They also recalled that the bombing “flipped upside down” their lives. Id.

at 14. All of Hassan’s family members recalled similar stories of emotional trauma. Id. at 2–17.

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Hassan’s children and spouse suffered severe emotional

injuries as a result of the injuries that Hassan suffered in the bombing and therefore may pursue a

claim under D.C. tort law as they are not United States citizens. The Court will award damages

as follows:

• Khaled Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Khodor Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Lamia Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Manal Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Manja Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Mona Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Radwan Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Rania Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Saada Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Sabah Hassan (child): $2,500,000;

• Sawsan Hassan (child): $2,500,000; and

• The Estate of Noura Ibrahim (spouse): $4,000,000.

12 2. Makki Family

Special Master Borden recommended Category 2 awards for the Makki family, which the

Court will grant. One of Makki’s children recalled that the bombing and his father’s trauma “left

a huge gap in [his] life” while another recounted that they were “constantly living in terror”

afterwards. Makki Rep. at 6, 7. As with the Hassan family, every member of the Makki family

has demonstrated sufficiently close relationships and emotional injuries to recover under D.C.

tort law as non-citizens of the United States. The Court will therefore award the following

damages:

• Hussein Makki (child): $1 million;

• Zeina Makki (child): $1 million;

• Ali Hassan Makki (child): $1 million;

• Mirna Makki (child): $1 million; and

• Estate of Samira Ghadar (spouse): $1.6 million.

3. El Halabi Family

Every member of the El Halabi Family but one are U.S. citizens and therefore can use the

cause of action laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). El Halabi Rep. at 5–25. However, the

evidence does not establish that Yessra El Halabi was a citizen. Id. at 8–9. The Court will apply

D.C. tort law to her claims.

Special Master Greenspan recommended Category 5 baseline awards for each of the El

Halabi family Plaintiffs. Id. at 25. In the aftermath of the bombing, El Halabi’s relatives felt

“shock and fear.” And they report that the bombing had a “severe emotional effect[.]” Id. at 5,

9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated emotional distress to recover under the

13 FSIA and D.C. tort law. However, the Court will scale the awards to correspond to the Category

4 ($3 million) award given to Zouhair El Halabi.

For Ferial Harbi, the Court departs upward from the $750,000 award typically given to

siblings of Category 4 victims. On the day of the bombing, Harbi was pregnant, and when she

“heard the news . . . . she had internal bleeding and suffered a miscarriage.” Id. at 11. Courts

have awarded upward departures when relatives suffer miscarriages as a result of attack-related

trauma. See Ben-Yishai v. Syrian Arab Republic,

, 132 (D.D.C. 2022); see

also Swinney v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-cv-2316,

, at *15, 24

(D.D.C. May 30, 2025). Therefore, the Court awards Harbi a 20% increased award for a total

award of $900,000.

The Court awards damages as follows:

• Estate of Yessra El Halabi (mother): $1.5 million;

• Sadica Allouche (sibling): $750,000;

• Hoda Ammar (sibling): $750,000;

• Rima Bouchaaya (sibling): $750,000;

• Billal El Halabi (sibling): $750,000;

• Marwan El Halabi (sibling): $750,000;

• Mohamad El Halabi (sibling): $750,000; and

• Ferial Harbi (sibling): $900,000.

F. Interest

One of the special masters proposed an award of prejudgment interest in this case, in the

event that the Court decided to award economic damages to El Halabi. El Halabi Rep. at 26.

Since the Court will not award economic damages to El Halabi, it will also deny an award of

14 prejudgment interest. As the Court has observed, “prejudgment interest is not appropriate for

nonpecuniary damages already designed to provide complete compensation.” Goldstein,

. However, the Court will award post-judgment interest under the federal post-

judgment interest statute. See

(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money

judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.”).

G. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Adopt Reports and Recommendations and for Entry of Final Default Judgment. A separate

order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

DATE: November 7, 2025

15