UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 22-cv-3813 PRO-FOOTBALL INC. d/b/a, WASHINGTON COMMANDERS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, the District of Columbia, moves to remand this case to D.C. Superior Court,

arguing that this court lacks diversity jurisdiction. Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 6–12, ECF No. 16

(“Remand Mot.”). It also requests attorneys’ fees associated with its remand motion. Id. at 13–

14. For the reasons below, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the District’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2020, media reports claimed that the Washington Commanders, the

District’s professional football team, and its owner, Dan Snyder, had fostered a culture of sexual

harassment and verbal abuse. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 13 (“Compl.”). These revelations sparked

public criticism and raised consumer concerns. Id. ¶ 4. Responding to the growing backlash, the

National Football League (“NFL”) announced an independent investigation, and the Commanders

pledged their full cooperation. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. The District claims that “[d]espite their public

proclamations promising to uphold the integrity of the investigation,” the Commanders and the

NFL “worked to thwart the investigation and suppress its results” by entering into an agreement

Page 1 of 10 whereby Snyder could “block the public release of any information” stemming from the

investigation. Id. ¶ 8.

On November 10, 2022, the District brought a consumer protection enforcement action in

D.C. Superior Court against the Commanders, Snyder, the NFL, and NFL Commissioner Roger

Goodell, under the District’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”). Id. at 3;

et seq. That act “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from

merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received

in the District.”

(c). The District’s Attorney General has the authority to

“bring an action in the Superior Court” representing the District’s “public interest.”

§ 28-

3909(a). The District can “obtain a temporary or permanent injunction prohibiting the use of [a]

method, act, or practice” and require “the violator to take affirmative action, including the

restitution of money or property.” Id.

Count One of the Complaint alleges that Defendants misled consumers and failed to

disclose material information related to the Washington Commanders’ internal investigation, in

violation of

(e)–(f-1). Compl. ¶¶ 149–55. Count Two asserts that the

Washington Commanders and Snyder misled the public as to their knowledge of, and Snyder’s

role in, the Commanders’ hostile work environment, violating

(e)–(f-1).

¶¶ 156–63. The District seeks, inter alia, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution.

.

On December 23, 2022, Defendants—none of whom are District citizens—timely removed

the case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8–27, ECF No. 1

(“Notice of Removal”); Compl. ¶¶ 14–18. On December 30, 2022, the District moved to remand

this case. Remand Mot. at 3–14.

Page 2 of 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). A defendant may therefore only remove a civil action to federal

district court if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See

(a). Where, as here, a plaintiff moves to remand a case to state court, the removing

defendant “bears the burden of proving that removal was proper.” Arenivar v. Manganaro

Midatlantic, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted).

Courts construe the removal statute narrowly. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

(1941). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

(c).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Defendants assert that federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to the court’s diversity

jurisdiction under

. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8–27. To satisfy diversity

jurisdiction, the parties must be citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy must

exceed $75,000. See

(a)(1). It is undisputed that none of the Defendants are

citizens of D.C., but “a State is not a ‘citizen’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” Moor v.

Alameda Cnty.,

(1973). As such, states cannot typically sue or be sued in federal

court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See

The same principle applies to the District of

Columbia.

(e) (specifying that the District is a state for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction); Long v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We think we

must treat the District like a state . . . .”). The citizenship of a nominal or formal party, however,

is disregarded in determining the existence of diversity, and only those with a real and substantial

Page 3 of 10 interest in the controversy are considered. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee,

, 460–61

(1980).

Defendants argue that the court has diversity jurisdiction because the District is merely a

nominal party and not a real party in interest, with the real plaintiffs being only those customers

who relied on Defendants’ alleged deceptive conduct. See generally, Defs.’ Opp’n to Remand

Mot. at 3–12, ECF No. 30 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”). In assessing whether the District is a real party in

interest, thereby destroying diversity jurisdiction, the court examines: (1) whether the District has

asserted a quasi-sovereign interest in this lawsuit by articulating “an interest apart from the

interests of particular private parties” involved in the case; and (2) whether the challenged conduct

affects a “sufficiently substantial segment” of the District’s population. Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,

(1982).

i. Quasi-Sovereign Interest

A state “has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and

economic—of its residents in general.”

This interest includes advocating for “the continuing

prosperity of [a state’s] econom[y].” Pennsylvania v. Kleppe,

, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

As noted above, the District is suing Defendants for their alleged “public misrepresentations,

omissions, and ambiguities of material fact” to customers regarding Defendants’ cooperation with

an investigation into complaints of sexual misconduct, harassment, and a hostile work

environment. Compl. at ¶¶ 1–11. Courts in this district have found that when the District sues

under the CPPA, a quasi-sovereign interest exists because the CPPA provides an avenue for the

District to protect “the economic well-being of their citizens who were defrauded.” District of

Columbia v. JTH Tax LLC, No. 22-cv-3165,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2023)

(quotations and citation omitted); District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

,

Page 4 of 10 110 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

So too here. The CPPA’s statutory framework makes clear that the District has a quasi-

sovereign interest in “prosecuting consumer protection violations.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 640 F.

Supp. 3d at 110. For instance, the CPPA authorizes the District to sue “in the public interest,”

rather than solely to recover for private individuals.

(a). It also empowers

the District to seek forms of relief unavailable to private citizens, such as civil penalties,

§ 28-

3909(b), and to seek injunctive relief without demonstrating actual damages, id. § 28-3909(a). As

other judges on this court have noted, these distinctions show that the District has its own

“pecuniary interest in this lawsuit distinct from the private financial interests of individual

citizens,” thereby establishing a quasi-sovereign interest that goes beyond merely advocating on

behalf of injured consumers. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

at 111 (cleaned up); see also

JTH Tax,

, at *3.

Defendants advance three counter arguments, none of which are persuasive. First, they

contend that the CPPA should not categorically confer quasi-sovereign status just because it is

invoked and that the court should instead assess whether such an interest exists by examining “the

essential nature and effect of the proceeding.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 5–10 (citation omitted). While it

is true that courts must “look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties are not

improperly . . . destroying diversity jurisdiction,” Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,

(2014), Defendants fail to meaningfully differentiate the nature of the District’s

interest in this litigation—to prosecute allegedly deceptive business activities “calculated to

mislead consumers so they would continue to support the Team financially,” Compl. ¶ 2,—from

the quasi-sovereign interests that courts have recognized in other consumer protection cases. See,

e.g., JTH Tax,

, at *3–4 (recognizing the District’s quasi-sovereign interest in a

Page 5 of 10 CPPA action against a tax preparation business that allegedly deceived consumers); Exxon Mobil

Corp.,

at 110–11 (recognizing the District’s quasi-sovereign interest in a CPPA

action against energy companies for alleged misrepresentations regarding the harmful effects of

fossil fuels); New York by Abrams v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

, 705–07 (S.D.N.Y.

1982) (recognizing New York’s quasi-sovereign interest in an action against a car company for

deceptive business practices involving defects in a type of transmission); Nevada v. Bank of Am.

Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing “Nevada’s sovereign interest in protecting

its citizens and economy from deceptive mortgage practices”).

Defendants’ second argument is that the District does not allege that it suffered any actual

injury as a result of the alleged misstatements, but Defendants cite no caselaw requiring such

allegations to show a quasi-sovereign interest. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10. Indeed, requiring a state

to allege a direct injury would be superfluous in the context of prosecuting consumer protection

violations because such actions, by definition, seek to protect consumers. In any event, the CPPA

makes clear that unfair and deceptive business practices run afoul of the District’s public interest.

See

(a) (authorizing the District to act “in the public interest” in bringing

CPPA enforcement actions). Such harm to the District’s public interest therefore satisfies any

injury requirement under the quasi-sovereign interest inquiry. See JTH Tax,

, at

*3.

Finally, Defendants claim that the District lacks a quasi-sovereign interest because the

relief sought would primarily benefit District consumers and is available to “affected individuals

themselves, were they to file a complaint on their own behalf.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 11 (citation

omitted). Not so. “The fact that private parties may also benefit from the District’s lawsuit does

not negate the District’s substantial interest in this case.” JHH Tax, LLC,

, at *4.

Page 6 of 10 Moreover, the District also seeks civil penalties, which individuals cannot obtain. Compl. at 37;

(b). It also seeks injunctive relief for violations without having to prove

damages, which private citizens cannot do. Compl. at 37; compare

(b), with

(k). “These distinctions make clear that the District has its own pecuniary

interest in this lawsuit distinct from the private financial interests of individual citizens.” Exxon

Mobil Corp.,

at 111 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Bank of Am.

Corp., 672 F.3d at 671–72 (highlighting various forms of relief sought by the state that were not

available to individual citizens).

ii. Substantial Injury

Under the substantial injury factor, in determining whether a state is a real party in interest,

there are no “definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must be

adversely affected by the challenged behavior.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

. And, in

evaluating whether a substantial segment of a state’s population has been harmed, courts look

beyond those directly affected to consider the broader, indirect effects of the alleged injury.

A

state may therefore satisfy this jurisdictional factor where only 0.03% of its population is directly

involved. See

. Courts in this district have similarly found that harm directly

affecting as little as “.2% of the District’s population” can qualify as a sufficiently substantial

segment to establish that the District is a real party in interest. JTH Tax,

, at *5.

Defendants suggest that the challenged conduct affects only a narrow group of

consumers—specifically, those who purchased tickets and merchandise after July 2020 and who,

despite “consider[ing] withdrawing financial support,” continued to make purchases “with the

understanding that a thorough, unbiased investigation was underway.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13.

Page 7 of 10 Defendants argue that the substantial injury requirement is unmet because this group represents a

fraction of the District’s population.

It is true that the District does not quantify the total number of consumers who were

affected by the conduct alleged in its lawsuit, and the targeted population may in fact be a “smaller

subset of an identifiable group.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13; see generally Compl. at 1–47. As noted

above, however, even if the District’s targeted consumer population is minuscule, that number can

still satisfy the substantial injury factor and weigh against finding federal jurisdiction. See JTH

Tax,

, at *5; Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

. Indeed, “numerous other

courts” have “found that ‘the raw number of individuals directly’ affected is not determinative of

whether a state has alleged injury to a substantial segment of its population.” JTH Tax,

, at *5 (quoting People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C.,

(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).

This is particularly true where, as here, Defendants’ alleged misconduct indirectly impacts

a far broader range of individuals than just those who purchased tickets with the understanding

that an unbiased investigation was underway. See Pl.’s Reply at 11–12, ECF No. 32. “Allowing

Defendant to continue deceiving District residents would undermine the integrity of D.C. law,

weaken the marketplace, and enable other residents to be harmed in the future.” JTH Tax,

, at *5. In light of these potential downstream harms, the court finds that there is a

sufficiently substantial segment of D.C.’s population affected by Defendants’ alleged misconduct.

The court therefore finds that the District qualifies as a real party in interest, that the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that the case must be remanded to D.C. Superior Court.

Page 8 of 10 B. Attorneys’ Fees

When granting a motion to remand, a district court may award attorneys’ fees under

(c). The court may only award such fees “where the removing party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp.,

(2005). The threshold for objective reasonableness is quite low, requiring only that the

defendant’s grounds for removal had “at least some logical and precedential force.” Knop v.

Mackall,

(D.C. Cir. 2011). When “non-removability is obvious or contrary to

well-settled law,” however, courts can impose associated costs and expenses. Ballard v. District

of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011) (citation omitted).

The District argues that the court should award it fees and costs because Defendants have

“failed to provide any objectively reasonable basis for removal.” Remand Mot. at 13. Defendants,

on the other hand, argue that even if the court remands, it should still not award fees and costs

because no “on-point case law from the D.C. Circuit” exists. Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. Defendants have

the better argument.

Although the court disagrees with Defendants’ theory of jurisdiction in support of removal,

they presented a position supported by logical reasoning and relevant precedent. They cited

applicable case law, made coherent arguments that a court could reasonably accept, and relied on

decisions from this district, such as Exxon and JTH Tax. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n at 3–14.

Moreover, whether the District can sue under diversity jurisdiction and the CPPA is not a settled

question in this Circuit. The Circuit’s review in Exxon focused on federal question jurisdiction.

89 F.4th at 148. Therefore, Defendants’ decision to seek removal—despite adverse precedent from

district courts in Exxon and JTH Tax—was not contrary to well-settled law.

Page 9 of 10 Consequently, because Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking

removal, the court will deny the District’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the District’s

Remand Motion, ECF No. 16. A corresponding order shall follow.

Date: November 10, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 10 of 10