UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES Criminal Action No. 20-220 (JDB) v. JEFFREY EWING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Having been under supervision for over two years, Jeffrey Ewing now moves for early

termination of supervised release under

(e)(1). After considering the relevant

factors under

(a), the Court finds that early termination is warranted by Ewing’s

post-release conduct and the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Court will grant Ewing’s motion.

Background

In January 2021, Ewing pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a person

convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison in violation of

(g)(1). Plea Agreement 1, Dkt. 18. The underlying convictions were first-degree assault and

unlawful possession of a firearm.

. At the time of Ewing’s offense, the statutory maximum

for a violation of section 922(g)(1) was ten years in prison and three years of supervised release.

(a)(2) (maximum prison term for section 922(g)(1) violation), 3583(b)(2)

(maximum term of supervised release for Class C felony), 3559(a)(3) (defining felony as Class C

where maximum prison sentence is from ten to 25 years) (2018).1

1 In June 2022, Congress increased the maximum penalty from ten to fifteen years in prison and moved the relevant penalty provision from

(a)(2) to § 924(a)(8). See United States v. Butler,

, 588 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2024).

1 Based on Ewing’s offense level and criminal history category, the guidelines range for a

term of imprisonment was from 37 to 46 months.2 The range for supervised release was one to

three years. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). The government recommended 28 months in prison and

three years of supervised release. Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 7, Dkt. 22. Ewing requested

20 months. Def.’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 9, Dkt. 23. The Court sentenced Ewing to 27

months followed by three years on supervised release. Judgment 2-3, Dkt. 27.

In August or September 2023, Ewing was released from prison and began his period of

supervised release.3 Ewing’s time under supervision has mostly passed without incident,

indicating successful reintegration into society. He has been working as a truck driver for the last

18 months, lives with his mother, and recently had a baby with his partner of several years. Def.’s

Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release 2, Dkt. 38. He plans to purchase a truck, get

his commercial driver’s license, and start his own trucking business. Id. He also spends time with

his siblings and their children, including volunteering as an assistant coach for his nephew’s little

league football team. Id. at 3. And his social circle is mostly his work colleagues. Id.

However, in August 2025 probation petitioned for a hearing on violations of supervised

release (HOV), reporting one instance of unlawful use and possession of tetrahydrocannabinol

(THC)—a controlled substance—and Maryland citations for moving violations, including

negligent driving, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol while transporting

2 A violation of

(g)(1) after a felony conviction for a crime of violence—such as first-degree assault—carries a base offense level of 20. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Ewing received a three-level decrease in offense level for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 17. See id. § 3E1.1. Under the then- applicable guidelines, Ewing had a criminal history score of eight based on two convictions of over one year each and committing the

(g)(1) violation while under a criminal justice sentence, resulting in a criminal history category of IV. See

§ 4A1.1(a), (d) (2018). Thus, Ewing’s sentencing guidelines range was 37-46 months. See id. ch. 5, pt. A. 3 Ewing states that he was released from prison and supervision began on August 21, 2023. Def.’s Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release 1, Dkt. 38. Probation states that supervision began on September 8, 2023. U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. 1 (Set HOV Pet.), Dkt. 31. Either way, supervised release began over two years ago.

2 a minor. U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. 2-3 (Set HOV Pet.), Dkt. 31. After Maryland decided not to prosecute

the moving violations, Probation recommended dismissing its petition and allowing supervision

to resume. U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. (Dismiss HOV Pet.), Dkt. 37. Ewing also represented to the Court

that the government agreed with that dismissal. Def.’s Status Report, Dkt. 36. The Court therefore

dismissed the violations.

Ewing now moves to terminate supervised release early. Def.’s Mot. Probation does not

oppose Ewing’s petition, id. at 1, but the government does, Govt’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., Dkt. 39.

The motion is now fully briefed.

Discussion

Supervised release “‘fulfills rehabilitative ends’ and ‘provides individuals with

postconfinement assistance.’” Esteras v. United States,

(2025) (quoting United

States v. Johnson,

(2000)). It enables courts “to provide postrelease supervision

for those, and only those, who need[] it.” Johnson v. United States,

(2000).

Thus, after considering the

(a) factors except (a)(2)(A) and (a)(3), a court may

terminate a term of supervised release following the first year of supervision “if it is satisfied that

such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”

(e)(1).

Modification of supervised release must also comport with the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

Under those rules, a hearing is required unless the defendant waives that right or

the relief sought is favorable and the government has received notice, has had a reasonable

opportunity to object, and has not done so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c); United States v. Tanguay,

Crim. A. No. 8-cr-271-5 (RCL),

, at *3 (D.D.C. May 17, 2021). The Court did

not hold a hearing here because Ewing waived his right. Def.’s Resp. to Court Order, Dkt. 40.

3 I. Section 3553(a) factors

Section 3553 provides that the Court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater

than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2).”

§ 3553(a); see also

Dean v. United States,

(2017) (describing this as the “parsimony principle”). The

paragraph (2) considerations relevant to early terminations of supervised release are the need to

“afford adequate deterrence”; to “protect the public”; and to provide the defendant with “needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”

(a)(2)(B)-(D).4 The other relevant section 3553 factors are (1) the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (4) the sentencing range for the

offense, (5) any pertinent policy statement by the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid

unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (7) the need to provide any victim restitution.

§ 3553(a)(1), (4)-(7).5

To begin, the Court considers the nature and circumstances of Ewing’s offense and his

history and characteristics.

(a)(1). The nature of the offense weighs in his favor

but its circumstances weigh against him. On the one hand, Ewing’s instant offense was non-

violent, although his predicate offense of first-degree assault was violent. Indeed, Americans

generally have a right to bear arms, U.S. Const. amend. II, and Ewing lost that right only due to

the fact of having a prior conviction for a crime punishable by over one year in prison, 18 U.S.C.

4 The four considerations of section 3553(a)(2) are, in order, “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” Esteras, 145 S.Ct. at 2038. But section 3583(e) excludes any consideration of retribution from the termination of supervised release analysis. Id. at 2039 & n.3 (citing section 3553(a)(2)(A)); see also id. at 2041 (distinguishing “forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution)” from “backward- looking purpose of retribution”). 5 Section 3583(e) excludes consideration of the kinds of sentence available because supervised release—a component of a prison sentence—is the only matter at issue. Esteras, 145 S.Ct. at 2039 (citing section 3553(a)(3)).

4 § 922(g)(1).6 On the other hand, in fleeing from police Ewing’s firearm accidentally discharged

and shot a hole in his trousers, highlighting the danger posed to any bystanders. Statement of

Offense 3, Dkt. 17. Ewing’s history also weighs against him but his characteristics weigh in his

favor. Ewing has a history of two prior serious offenses: first-degree assault and unlawful

possession of a firearm. See Plea Agreement 3. However, he now has a “stable home, dedicated

family, and consistent employment record.” Def.’s Mot. 5. The government argues that section

3553(a)(1) weighs against Ewing, but in support it only identifies his history of firearms-related

offenses. Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. That history is indeed troubling, but it must be balanced against the

other section 3553(a)(1) subfactors. Although the circumstances of Ewing’s offense and his

history weigh against him, the nature of his offense and his characteristics weigh in his favor, so

the Court finds the first factor is neutral overall.

Next, the Court considers deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.

(a)(2)(B)-(D). First, the Court finds that a prison sentence of 27 months followed by over

two years of supervised release is a sufficient specific and general deterrent to unlawfully carrying

a firearm after being convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. In support

of its argument that deterrence weighs in favor of denial, the government concedes that Ewing has

been “doing well since being released from prison” but then makes the conclusory assertion that

“deterrence may continue to prevent him from committing crimes.” Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. Without

more, the Court is unconvinced that Ewing has not been adequately deterred.

6 As such, Ewing’s instant offense may be characterized as malum prohibitum (wrong only because prohibited by legislation) rather than malum in se (wrong in itself). See 1 Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.6(b) (3d ed. 2017, Oct. 2025 update); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,

, 379 n.21 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing malum prohibitum and malum in se (citing Wayne LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law § 6 (1972))); cf. Medina v. Whitaker,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining in

(g)(1) case that predicate offense of felony fraud is malum in se).

5 Second, Ewing’s successful completion of “all of the treatment programs recommended by

Probation, specifically anger management and substance abuse courses,” and broader compliance

with the terms of supervised release indicate that he does not pose a danger to the public. Def.’s

Mot. 2, 5. The government argues that Ewing must remain under supervision to protect the public

because of his history of firearm offenses. Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. But Ewing has already served prison

sentences for those offenses—which took place nine and five years ago, respectively—and for the

instant offense, and the government provides no reason why he presently poses a threat to the

public. The Court also notes that, in August 2025, Probation petitioned for a hearing related to

allegations of several serious moving violations and a controlled substance violation. See Set

HOV Pet. But those alleged offenses were not prosecuted, Probation then moved to dismiss the

petition, and the Court understands that the government agreed with dismissal. See Dismiss HOV

Pet.; Def.’s Status Report. As such, the Court ascribes limited weight to the alleged violations.

Third, “Ewing’s stable housing and employment” show that further supervision is not

necessary for rehabilitative purposes. Def.’s Mot. 6. The government wonders “who is to say that

[Ewing’s] improvements are not attributable to the requirements of supervised release?” Gov’t’s

Mot. 4. That may be true—and indeed is a large part of the purpose of supervised release—but

the government provides no indication of why regression should be expected here if supervised

release is terminated early after close to 75 percent completion. Accordingly, the Court finds that

the relevant paragraph (2) factors weigh in favor of early termination.

Finally, the Court considers the sentencing guidelines range, Sentencing Commission

policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide

any victim restitution.

(a)(4)-(7). There is no restitution in this case and the

parties state that there are no pertinent policy statements, so these factors are irrelevant. See Def.’s

6 Mot. 6 n.2; Gov’t’s Opp’n 2 n.1. The sentencing guidelines range for supervised release is one to

three years, so terminating supervised release now would still put Ewing’s period of supervised

release at almost three quarters of the recommended range. Courts have often found the sentencing

disparities factor to be of “limited utility” in the early-termination context because it is a “case

specific inquiry.” United States v. Braithwaite, Crim. A. No. 11-186 (JDB),

,

at *4 (D.D.C. June 26, 2025) (first quoting United States v. Harris,

(D.D.C. 2017); then quoting United States v. Raymond, Crim. A. No. 9-183 (RMC),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2019)). But see United States v. Tanguay, Crim. A. No. 8-271-5

(RCL),

, at *5 (D.D.C. May 17, 2021) (comparing to co-defendants’ sentences).

Of course, it would be unwarranted to grant early termination to certain defendants and not grant

it to otherwise similarly situated defendants. But the parties have not identified any such

circumstances here. Thus, these factors are neutral.

On balance, therefore, the section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of terminating Ewing’s

period of supervised release early.

II. Post-release conduct and interest of justice

Some courts in this district and other circuits have held that more than “model post-

incarceration conduct and unblemished compliance with the terms of supervised release” is

required for relief under

(e)(1). Harris,

-49 & n.9

(collecting cases and disagreeing with that interpretation); see also United States v. Taylor,

, 475 (7th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (“[M]ere compliance with the terms of supervised release

is expected, and without more, insufficient to justify early termination under

(e).”).

7 That is a “misreading of the statute” arising from United States v. Lussier,

(2d

Cir. 1997), that most circuits—including the Second Circuit—have subsequently abandoned. See

Braithwaite,

, at *5 (collecting cases repudiating that interpretation). As

explained in Harris, “construing § 3583(e)(1) to require the defendant to exhibit objectively

extraordinary or unusual conduct during supervision is a stretch not expressed in the statutory

text.” Harris,

; accord Braithwaite,

, at *5.7 Instead,

the statutory text gives the Court broad discretion to terminate supervised release after the first

year, provided that it has considered the section 3553(a) factors and it is “satisfied that such action

is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”

(e)(1); see also United States v. Hale,

, 641 (6th Cir. 2025) (recognizing

district courts’ “broad discretion” when considering section 3583(e)(1) motions).8 The Court is so

satisfied.

Ewing “exhibits not only compliance with supervision terms but also dedication to

excelling in his career and close family ties.” Braithwaite,

, at *5. He has

obtained and kept a full-time job as a truck driver, recently welcomed a new baby, volunteers as

an assistant coach at his nephew’s school, and socializes with family and work colleagues. Def.’s

Mot. 2-3. This post-release conduct indicates that further supervision is not needed. See Harris,

(granting early termination where defendant “compli[ed] with all of the

7 Harris also noted that, although the D.C. Circuit quoted approvingly from Lussier in United States v. Mathis- Gardner,

(D.C. Cir. 2015), it did so only to highlight that the district court there abused its discretion in denying without explanation a motion to terminate supervised release early where the record indicated that the defendant met even Lussier’s “high burden.” Harris,

n.9 (quoting Mathis-Gardner,

). 8 Even starting from the premise that “mere compliance ‘generally’ is not enough to satisfy a court that early termination is warranted” because “compliance with all conditions is expected of an individual on supervised release, and non-compliance is a ground for revocation,” Braithwaite,

, at *5 (quoting Hale, 127 F.4th at 641), compliance with all conditions for multiple years is, in fact, “fairly extraordinary,” id. (quoting Raymond,

, at *3).

8 terms of his supervised release”; changed his “circle of friends”; achieved “gainful and successful

full-time employment”; and “participat[ed] in his community through church attendance, assisting

at his son’s pre-school, and volunteering in a youth program); Tanguay,

, at *3

(granting early termination where defendant was “entirely compliant” and “successfully

reintegrated into his community,” including by maintaining a stable residence, spending time with

family, participating as member of his church, and taking care to pay towards his fine balance).

For the same reason, early termination is also in the interest of justice. See Harris,

; Raymond,

, at *4.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Ewing’s motion for early termination of

supervised release. A separate order will accompany this opinion.

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Date: November 14, 2025

9