UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAHSIN RAHMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01836 (TNM)

MEGAN BOULDIN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tahsin Rahman is a Bangladeshi citizen who wishes to live in the United States with her

husband. Rahman’s husband, himself a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition for her to join him, and

she interviewed at the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh. After multiple inquiries, Rahman learned

that her application has been denied but remains in administrative processing. Disheartened by

the delay, Rahman sues to compel the Government to more quickly adjudicate her application.

The Government moves to dismiss the case. The Court will grant the Government’s motion.

I.

Tahsin Rahman is a Bangladeshi citizen who lives in Bangladesh with her U.S. citizen

daughter. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 8, 11. In early May 2022, Rahman’s now-husband—a U.S.

citizen living in the United States—filed an I-130 visa petition on her behalf. Id. ¶¶ 2, 17.

Although Rahman and her husband did not marry until 2023, they hoped to live together in the

United States, especially after welcoming their daughter in 2024. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 19. To that end,

Rahman interviewed in September 2024 at the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.

Later that year, Rahman’s husband reached out to the embassy about her case, and

embassy staff informed him that Rahman’s application had been adjudicated and denied. Id. ¶ 23; Pl.’s Ex. E, ECF No. 1-5, at 8–9. Unsatisfied with this response, Rahman’s husband

inquired twice more over the following months, and embassy staff told him that Rahman’s case

needed additional processing. Compl. ¶¶ 24–26; Pl.’s Ex. E at 2–7. Currently, the State

Department website shows Rahman’s visa status as “Refused”—and specifies that if her “case

was refused for administrative processing, [her] case will remain refused while undergoing such

processing.” Compl. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 1-4, at 2. Rahman and her husband remain

separated during her application’s processing, putting financial and emotional strain on their

family. Compl. ¶¶ 6–10. Rahman cannot work in Bangladesh and relies solely on income from

her husband, who cannot afford to visit her. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.

Exactly nine months after her interview, Rahman sued the Deputy Chief of Mission at the

U.S. embassy in Bangladesh and the Secretary of State, 1 asserting that the Government has

unreasonably delayed its duty to adjudicate her visa application. Id. ¶¶ 27–38. Rahman asks this

Court to order the Government to “process [her] visa application within fifteen (15) calendar

days . . . or as soon as reasonably possible.” Id. ¶ 39. The Government moves to dismiss, and its

motion is now ripe.

II.

The Government’s dismissal request invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2

To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

1 The Court will dismiss Rahman’s claims against the Secretary of State because consular officers—not the Secretary—have exclusive authority to adjudicate visa applications. Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft,

, 97–98 (D.D.C. 2024); Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir. 2021);

(a). Because the Secretary cannot provide Rahman the relief she seeks, she lacks Article III standing to sue him. Accord Liew v. Sanders,

, 36 (D.D.C. 2024). 2 The Government also moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 7. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rahman’s claims against the Secretary. Supra n.1; see Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir.

2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). The complaint must “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

The Court must accept all “well-pleaded

factual allegations,” but it need not credit “legal conclusions.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v.

Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

III.

Rahman’s lawsuit resembles others that the Court has previously dismissed. Like those

cases, Rahman’s claims falter for two independent reasons: first, because the Government has

performed its nondiscretionary duty by denying her visa; and second, because consular

nonreviewability bars her suit. The Court discusses each reason in turn.

A.

Rahman wants the Court to compel the Government to more quickly adjudicate her visa

application. She invokes the Mandamus Act,

, and the Administrative

Procedure Act,

. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 33. The parties agree that Rahman’s pleading

burden is essentially the same for both causes of action, so the Court addresses them together.

See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 11; Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, at 17; In re Core

Commc’ns, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008). The crux of both claims is that Rahman

must plausibly allege that the Government “failed to take a discrete agency action that it is

required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,

(2004) (emphasis in

2012) (“Standing under Article III is jurisdictional.”). The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rahman’s claim under the Mandamus Act because she cannot meet its requirements. See infra Part III.A; Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). But the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under

over Rahman’s APA claim. More, the Supreme Court has made clear that consular nonreviewability is non- jurisdictional. Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 n.4 (2024).

3 original); see also In re Bluewater Network,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[I]ssuance

of the writ [of mandamus] is an extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most transparent

violations of a clear duty to act.”).

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that “[a]ll immigrant visa

applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.”

(b).

When adjudicating the application, “the consular officer must issue the visa, refuse the visa

under INA 212(a) or 221(g) or other applicable law or . . . discontinue granting the visa.”

(a); see also

§ 41.121(a). In other words, the consular officer has a “discrete,

nondiscretionary [duty] to adjudicate visa applications.” Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft,

, 99 (D.D.C. 2024).

The Government has fulfilled its nondiscretionary duty here. As Rahman concedes, a

consular officer adjudicated and refused her visa application under INA § 221(g). Compl. ¶¶ 22–

23; Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 15. That is all the INA and its regulations require. See

(b);

(a), 41.121(a); Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 99.

Rahman contends that the Government must do more. She asserts that “Defendants

retain a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate [her] visa application through conclusion and within

a reasonable time.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 15. The Government has not discharged that

duty, Rahman maintains, because its “preliminary” visa denial merely “plac[ed] her application

into administrative processing status.” Id.

Rahman’s position finds no footing. “By arguing that [the Government] must complete

administrative processing and issue a ‘final’ refusal, [Rahman] ask[s] the Court to impose a duty

that has no basis in the INA or its implementing regulations.” See Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp.

3d at 102. While the regulations provide various avenues for the consular officer to review or

4 reconsider visa applications, nothing requires the Government “to issue a final, unreviewable

decision” or even “complete administrative processing once it has properly refused a visa.” See

id. at 100–101 (cleaned up). As the D.C. Circuit held in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

(D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam), the Government has no duty to “make yet

another ‘final decision’ on [Rahman’s] already-refused visa application.” See id. at *6; accord,

e.g., Liew v. Sanders,

, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2024).

One note on Karimova. The Court considers that case to be persuasive authority only.

The Government, meanwhile, asserts that the D.C. Circuit’s unpublished decision is binding on

this Court. See Mot. to Dismiss at 12 n.2, 15. That is mistaken for the reasons the Court

explained at some length in Akter v. Rubio, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,

, at *4–5

(D.D.C. 2025). After all, D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) makes clear that “a panel’s decision to issue

an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.”

Still, while non-binding, Karimova persuasively explains that a visa applicant has no legal right

to anything more than the “official refusal decision she already received.”

,

at *4.

* * *

The Government has satisfied its duty by adjudicating Rahman’s visa application.

Rahman’s case fails for this reason alone.

B.

Rahman’s suit also founders on consular nonreviewability. The Supreme Court has long

recognized that “admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign

attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial

control.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 907 (2024). Courts “ha[ve] no role to play

5 unless expressly authorized by law.” Id. at 908 (cleaned up). And because the INA “does not

authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa,” “the federal courts cannot

review those decisions.” Id. (footnote omitted). 3

Rahman’s claim falls headfirst into consular nonreviewability. As Rahman admits, a

consular officer has already denied her visa application. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23. There thus “has been

a final decision on the merits of [Rahman’s] application,” and consular nonreviewability

prevents the Court from “inquir[ing] into the basis or validity of that decision.” See

Sedaghatdoust v. Blinken,

, 7 (D.D.C. 2024). In an attempt to evade consular

nonreviewability, Rahman insists that her application remains in “administrative processing,”

which supposedly makes the earlier refusal nonfinal. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 24. But that

will not do. After all, compelling the Government to speed up its administrative processing

would be “no different from ordering [it] to reopen a dispositive adjudication.” Yaghoubnezhad,

734 F. Supp. 3d at 104. That is why the “bar on judicial review applies both to ‘the substance of

a consular officer’s visa determination’ as well as the decision to place a visa application into

post-refusal ‘administrative processing’ for ‘discretionary re-adjudication of’ the application.”

Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 7 (quoting Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 103). That bar

blocks Rahman’s suit.

Because Rahman’s case already fails on two independent grounds, the Court declines to

address whether there was undue delay under the factors outlined in Telecommunications

Research & Action Center v. FCC,

(D.C. Cir. 1984). But the prospects for that

3 There is one slim carveout to consular nonreviewability: “when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.” Trump v. Hawaii,

(2018); Baan Rao, 985 F.3d at 1024–25. Even if Rahman had argued for it, this exception would not have helped her because Muñoz ruled that “a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in [his] noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.” 602 U.S. at 909.

6 claim would also be gloomy. See, e.g., Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 104–05 (holding that

a 22-month delay was not unreasonable and collecting cases upholding similar or even longer

delays); Dastagir v. Blinken,

, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding that 29-month

delay was not unreasonable).

IV.

The Government has validly refused Rahman’s application for entry into this country. At

this point, “[t]he Judicial Branch has no role to play.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 908. The Court will

therefore dismiss Rahman’s case. A separate Order will issue today.

2025.11.21 11:20:44 -05'00' Dated: November 21, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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