UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM B. BALL,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 24-2365 (JEB) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff William B. Ball is currently serving a 262-month sentence in federal prison

after pleading guilty to attempted child enticement and transportation of child pornography. Ball has

continued to litigate his case — including, as relevant here, by filing multiple suits under the

Freedom of Information Act for records concerning his arrest and prosecution. After varying degrees

of success in his previous two FOIA cases, Ball is back seeking records from a new constellation of

federal Defendants. He now requests leave to amend his Complaint to add as a Defendant the

Executive Office for United States Attorneys. The Court finds the proposed amendment futile

because a prior judgment precludes Ball from adding this claim. It will therefore deny his request.

I. Background

In early 2018, Ball paid $5,000 to a “special agent posing as the father of a seven-year-

old child to organize a sexual encounter with the child.” United States v. Ball,

, 494 (11th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Ball, No. 18-69 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2018),

ECF No. 36 (Am. Plea Agreement) at 24. Plaintiff then traveled from his residence in Dubai to

Florida to consummate the act, where he was arrested by Homeland Security Investigations

agents. See Am. Plea Agreement at 24–26. He subsequently pled guilty to federal charges of

1 attempted child enticement and transportation of child pornography, id. at 1, and received a

sentence of 21 years and 10 months in prison. See Ball, No. 18-69, ECF No. 60 (Judgment) at 2.

In 2019, Ball, seeking information about his criminal case, brought his first pro se FOIA

suit against five federal agencies. Ball v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,

(D.D.C. Oct.

19, 2021). This Court dismissed claims against two and granted summary judgment for the

remaining three defendants — the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Marshals Service,

and the Department of Treasury. Id. at *1. In 2021, shortly before the first case was decided,

Ball initiated a second FOIA suit against a second set of agencies, including EOUSA. Ball v.

EOUSA,

(D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2024). That suit resulted in this Court’s granting

partial summary judgment for EOUSA — requiring disclosure of some documents while

affirming its privilege to withhold others. Id. at *1. Just prior to that judgment, Ball filed his

third and current FOIA suit seeking records from the Department of Justice Office of Inspector

General, Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, and United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 1.

During the pendency of the instant case, Ball “reasserted his FOIA request with

EOUSA.” ECF No. 28 (Mot.) at 2 (citing ECF No. 28-1, Exh. 1 (June 16, 2025, Letter from

EOUSA) at ECF pp. 2–3). EOUSA dismissed the request because it duplicated one “in

litigation.” ECF No. 28-1, Exh. 2 (July 2, 2025, Letter from EOUSA) at ECF p. 5. It told Ball

that if his request yielded any documents, they would be released in that other suit. Id.

Dissatisfied, Ball renewed the dismissed request, see ECF No. 28-1, Exh. 3 (Renewed FOIA

Request to EOUSA) at ECF pp. 7–8, and filed a Motion for Leave to Join EOUSA to this case in

order to compel its production. See Mot. at 1. That last Motion is now before the Court.

2 II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 vests in the district court the discretion to grant or

deny leave to amend and directs that the “court should freely give leave when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In this Circuit, “it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to

amend unless there is sufficient reason.” Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir.

1996). Sufficient reason includes “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of

amendment.” Foman v. Davis,

(1962). Amendment should not be permitted

if it would be futile — in other words, if the new causes of action would still be deficient

notwithstanding the proposed amendment. See In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig.,

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may properly deny a motion to amend if the

amended pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.”) (citing Foman,

);

James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a

motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to

dismiss.”) (citations omitted). “Under Rule 15(a), the non-movant generally carries the burden

in persuading the court to deny leave to amend.” Nwachukwu v. Karl,

(D.D.C. 2004).

III. Analysis

In opposing Ball’s Motion, the Government contends that the amendment would be futile

under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See ECF No. 30 (Def. Opp.) at ECF

pp. 5–6. This Court agrees and addresses each in turn.

3 A. Claim Preclusion

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, “bars further claims by parties . . .

based on the same cause of action,” Montana v. United States,

(1979), on “any

ground for relief which [the parties] already have had an opportunity to litigate[,] even if they

chose not to exploit that opportunity.” Hardison v. Alexander,

(D.C. Cir.

1981). A subsequent lawsuit is barred if there has been prior litigation (1) involving the same

claim or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a

final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Smalls v.

United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). “Whether two cases implicate the same cause

of action turns on whether they share the same nucleus of facts.” Drake v. FAA,

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). Courts in this district have held that “two [FOIA]

suits involve the same nucleus of facts when they seek the same documents.” Elec. Priv. Info.

Ctr. v. IRS,

, 92 (D.D.C. 2021); see also Roman v. Nat’l Reconnaissance Off.,

(D.D.C. 2013) (claim preclusion applied when previous lawsuit

concerned FOIA request for “identical” documents); Negley v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that case in which records were “not absolutely identical to those

involved in the prior proceeding” did not involve same nucleus of facts).

Ball seeks to amend his Complaint for the “limited purpose” of adding a FOIA claim

against EOUSA. See Mot. at 1. His Motion confusingly states that he seeks a “Complaint” and

a “DOJ memorandum authorizing the Middle District of Florida to file the Complaint.”

at 1–

2. His underlying FOIA request, however, seeks a single record. See Renewed FOIA Request to

EOUSA at ECF p. 7. The request explains that the document’s existence “was revealed in

previous FOIA litigation,” and it cites the corresponding Vaughn Index item number.

The

4 item number corresponds to an internal DOJ memorandum. See Ball v. Off. of Int’l Affs., No.

21-1949, ECF No. 58-18 (Vaughn Index) at 10, item no. 633 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2024) (“DOJ

Internal Memorandum to file (Complaint), dated Feb 13, 2018”). Whether one calls this

document a complaint or a memorandum, Ball’s claim to obtain it is barred by this Court’s

decision in that case. See Ball,

.

Take the first element of whether the action involves the same claim or cause of action as

previously litigated. Ball has narrowed his search from “any and all records related to him”

sought in his formerly litigated FOIA request, id. at *1, but the record that he seeks now was

nonetheless at issue in that action. See Ball, No. 21-1949, Vaughn Index at 10, item no. 633.

Since Plaintiff seeks to compel disclosure of a record “absolutely identical” to one litigated in a

prior FOIA proceeding, the Court finds that his cause of action shares the “same nucleus of

facts.” Negley,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Continuing to the remaining three elements of claim preclusion, this Court issued

summary judgment in Ball’s 2021 FOIA case, concluding that EOUSA had properly withheld

the very document as work product under Exemption 5. Ball,

, at *8. It

reviewed supporting declarations that the “draft document grant[ed] internal approval to file the

[criminal] complaint” and pronounced it “classic attorney work product.”

(internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). That summary-judgment ruling thus (1) involved the same claim or

cause of action (2) between the same parties, (3) adjudicated in a final, valid judgment on the

merits (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court thus finds that if Ball were to add a

FOIA claim against EOUSA, it would have to be dismissed as precluded.

5 B. Issue Preclusion

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, is meant to conserve

judicial resources by “prevent[ing] a party from relitigating an issue that has already been

decided.” Jackson v. Off. of the Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2018). Under this

doctrine, “an issue of fact or law that was actually litigated and necessarily decided is conclusive

in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies.” McAlister v. Potter,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Allen v. McCurry,

(1980)). “Collateral

estoppel requires that (1) ‘the same issue now being raised must have been contested by the

parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case;’ (2) ‘the issue must have been

actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in that prior case;’ and

(3) ‘preclusion in the second case must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first

determination.’” Montgomery v. Internal Revenue Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022)

(quoting Martin v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)). Courts in this district have held

that issues in two FOIA actions are the same when “the materials responsive” to the later request

do not “differ materially” from the “materials at issue in the prior action.” Lardner v. DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Roman,

.

The first and second elements of issue preclusion are met here in a similar manner to

claim preclusion. Ball’s Motion to join EOUSA raises the propriety of its withholding of a

specific document. Compare Renewed FOIA Request to EOUSA at ECF p. 7 (requesting draft

complaint revealed in previous litigation), with Ball, No. 21-1949, Vaughn Index at 10, item no.

633 (“DOJ Internal Memorandum to file (Complaint), dated Feb 13, 2018”). The document does

not “differ materially” from one in the prior action. Lardner,

. This Court

6 previously determined that the work-product privilege protected such withholding. Ball,

, at *8.

As to the third element, preclusion in the instant case would not be unfair because Ball

and EOUSA were parties to the previous suit with the same stakes. See Otherson v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

(1979) (unfairness concern is heightened when plaintiff seeks to use issue preclusion

“offensively” against defendant when plaintiff was not party to prior suit). There is also no

evidence that the prior proceedings were seriously defective. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc.

v. Univ. of Ill. Found.,

(1971) (fairness is implicated whenever there is risk

that “prior proceedings were seriously defective”).

The Court finds the amendment is futile as Ball’s claim against EOUSA is barred by both

claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

IV. Conclusion

The Court will thus deny Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Leave to Join Party. A

contemporaneous Order so stating will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: November 24, 2025

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