UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GEBRE LLC,

Petitioner, Case No. 20-cv-1795-ABJ-MJS v.

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court previously entered default judgment against the Kyrgyz Republic

(“Kyrgyzstan”), confirming a sizeable arbitration award in favor of Gebre LLC (“Gebre”) and

against Kyrgyzstan. Having provided notice of the judgment to Kyrgyzstan more than five months

ago, Gebre now requests approval to seek attachment and execution of the judgment under

(c). Because the Court agrees a reasonable time has elapsed since Gebre provided

proper notice of the judgment pursuant to the statute, it GRANTS the motion (ECF No. 45).1

BACKGROUND

Judge Jackson described the backdrop to this dispute in her decision granting default

judgment against Kyrgyzstan. See Gebre LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic,

, at *1

1 U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson referred Gebre’s motion to the undersigned pursuant to LCvR 72.2(a). (See ECF No. 46.) Because the motion seeks non-dispositive relief concerning matters related to the judgment-collection process, the Court’s ruling takes the form of a memorandum opinion and order, rather than a report and recommendation. See, e.g., Whiteside v. Allegiance Bank,

, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2024) (“A magistrate judge unquestionably has the right to decide non-dispositive post-judgment matters involved in the judgment collection process[.]”) (cleaned up) (quoting Pac. Premier Bank v. Kulwant Kaur Sandhu,

, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2022)).

1 (D.D.C. June 14, 2022). The Court here recites only a high-level overview of the underlying facts,

along with the salient procedural history relevant to its resolution of this motion.

This dispute springs from a controversy over mining investments made by Stans Energy

(“Stans”) and its wholly owned subsidiary, Kutisay Mining LLC (“Kutisay”). Beginning in 2009,

Stans and Kutisay entered into a series of licensing agreements with Kyrgyzstan to mine certain

mineral deposits in the Aktyuz Ore Field. After several years, Kyrgyzstan reportedly began

implementing measures that hindered Stans’ and Kutisay’s “effective use and control” of those

licenses. So Stans and Kutisay commenced legal action, asserting that Kyrgyzstan’s actions

amounted to an unlawful expropriation of their investments. They arbitrated the dispute, and the

arbitral tribunal awarded Stans and Kutisay over $15,000,000 in damages, plus legal costs and

interest. Stans and Kutisay assigned their rights in the award to Gebre (formerly known as Gillham

LLC), and Gebre then petitioned to confirm the arbitration award. (See ECF No. 1.)

Kyrgyzstan never appeared in these proceedings. In turn, Judge Jackson granted Gebre’s

motion for default judgment and confirmed the award. See Gebre,

, at *8–9.

The Clerk mailed the judgment—accompanied by an official Russian translation—to Kyrgyzstan

in July 2022, in accordance with

(a)(3). (See ECF Nos. 32, 33.) Around the same

time, Gebre discovered that some legal costs were mistakenly omitted from the original judgment,

and Judge Jackson approved Gebre’s request for an amended order that included those amounts.

(ECF No. 34.) At Gebre’s request, Judge Jackson then issued an amended judgment for the new

total amount. (ECF No. 38; Min. Order, Apr. 30, 2025.) The Clerk mailed the amended default

judgment—again, accompanied by an official Russian translation—to the head of Kyrgyzstan’s

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (ECF Nos. 41, 42.) These documents were delivered on May 28,

2 2025.2 Then, about a month later, Gebre’s counsel followed up with a demand letter to Kyrgyzstan

asking for payment by July 18, 2025, and indicating that absent payment, Gebre would take steps

to enforce the judgment. (ECF No. 45-2.) Kyrgyzstan reportedly did not respond to the letter or

otherwise take steps to comply with the judgment. Faced with continuing radio silence, Gebre then

filed this motion requesting judicial authorization to pursue attachment and execution of the

amended judgment in accordance with

(c). (ECF No. 45.) Judge Jackson recently

referred the matter to the undersigned for resolution. (ECF No. 46.) This ruling now follows.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) allows for attachment and execution of

certain property in the United States for purposes of enforcing certain judgments against foreign

states. See

(a)–(b). This includes judgments “based on an order confirming an

arbitral award rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or

execution, would not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement.”

§

1610(a)(6). But there is a threshold requirement: before allowing attachment or execution, a court

must “determine[] that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment

and the giving of any notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.” Id. § 1610(c). In other

words, a court must (1) confirm that proper notice of the judgment was given to the foreign state

and (2) ask if a “reasonable” time elapsed after entry of judgment and the giving of notice. See,

e.g., Eurofinsa, S.A. v. Gabonese Republic,

, at *1 (D.D.C. June 11, 2025).3

2 ECF No. 42-1 includes a FedEx tracking number, which the Court independently reviewed for purposes of taking judicial notice of the completed delivery on May 28, 2025. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 3 This predicate judicial finding does not, in and of itself, “authorize the attachment or execution upon any particular property,” but instead allows the applicant to move forward generally in the enforcement process. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.D.C. 2015).

3 DISCUSSION

Applying the principles laid out above, the Court concludes Gebre makes the requisite

statutory showing under the FSIA and is entitled to the relief it seeks.

For starters, Gebre demonstrates that proper notice of the amended default judgment was

given to Kyrgyzstan. The FSIA requires that a default judgment be “sent to the foreign state … in

the manner prescribed for service” under the statute. See

(e). Relevant here, if

notice cannot be sent to or served on a foreign state “in accordance with any special arrangement”

or an “international convention”—as described in Sections 1608(a)(1) and (a)(2)—a party can give

notice “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk

of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state.”

§ 1608(a)(3). The

judgment must be sent “with a translation” in the foreign state’s official language. Id.; see also

Warmbier v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 9,

2019) (describing interplay between Sections 1608(e) and 1608(a)(3)). Here, because there was no

relevant “special arrangement” or “international convention” governing service on Kyrgyzstan,

the Clerk mailed the amended judgment on May 21, 2025, in keeping with

(a)(3).

More, the record before the Court reflects that the relevant documents—including an

accompanying translation—were delivered to Kyrgyzstan on May 28, 2025. (See ECF No. 42-1.)

That was proper notice. Judge Jackson previously found the original service of suit proper under

subsection (a)(3). Gebre,

, at *7. The same holds true now, as well.

The Court likewise agrees that a “reasonable period” has elapsed since that notice. The

statute is silent as to what amounts to a “reasonable period” in this context, and the qualifying

length can vary depending on the particulars of each case. That said, courts should consider the

time it may take the foreign state to “pass the minor legislation necessary to appropriate funds” to

4 pay the judgment and “to organize and transfer the appropriate assets.” Ned Chartering & Trading,

Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan,

(D.D.C. 2001). Through that lens, judges in

this District have consistently concluded that the passage of at least a few months after judgment

and proper notice is generally sufficient. See, e.g., Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab

Jamahirya,

(D.D.C. 2011) (approximately three months); see also Owens,

(three months); Eurofinsa, S.A.,

, at *3 (three months);

Saint Gobain Performance Plastics Eur. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

,

at *2 (D.D.C. July 13, 2021) (four months); Warmbier,

, at *2 (two months);

Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

, at *1 (D.D.C. June

9, 2017) (approximately two months). So, too, here. Gebre waited nearly five months after

Kyrgyzstan received notice of the amended judgment before filing its motion. A five-month span

falls comfortably within the bounds of a “reasonable period” for purposes of Section 1610(c). This

is especially true considering that the Clerk first sent notice of the original judgment to Kyrgyzstan

several years ago—in July 2022—before the judgment was amended to include the additional legal

costs requested by Gebre. Even still, there is no indication that Kyrgyzstan took any steps to satisfy

the judgment over the past several years, or even that Kyrgyzstan tried to communicate with Gebre

about it. Warmbier,

, at *2 (finding months-long timeframe “particularly

reasonable” where foreign state “made no efforts to satisfy the judgment” during that window).

Kyrgyzstan’s longstanding lack of engagement bolsters the Court’s finding that a reasonable

amount of time has passed here.4

4 Indeed, as Gebre points out, this is apparently not the first time Kyrgyzstan has failed to satisfy a federal court judgment in this context. See, e.g., Sisten Muhendislik Insaat Sanayi Ve Ticaret, A.S. v. Kyrgyz Republic,

, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (issuing contempt orders after failure to satisfy judgment), report and recommendation adopted,

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2022); see also Entes Industrial Plans Constr. & Erection Contracting Co. v. Kyrgyz Republic, No. 18-cv-2228-RC, ECF No. 35 (Sept. 14, 2020) (issuing Section 1610(c) order authorizing attachment and execution).

5 CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court finds the requirements of Section 1610(c) have been satisfied:

proper notice of the judgment was given to the Kyrgyz Republic, and a reasonable amount of time

has elapsed since that notice. As such, Gebre’s motion (ECF No. 45) to proceed with attachment

and execution efforts under

(a) and (b) is GRANTED.5

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 25, 2025 _____________________________ MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge

5 Again, this order does not itself authorize attachment or execution as to specific property; it only authorizes Gebre to pursue such enforcement generally in courts with jurisdiction over specific assets.

6