UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) DESHARNE WOODERTS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-3606 (ABJ) ) MARS INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Desharne Wooderts filed a complaint for legal and equitable relief against Mars,

Inc. (“Mars”); Mars Confectionary Supply; Mars Food; Mars Wrigley; Mars Wrigley

Confectionary U.S., LLC; Pacific Marks Esaka; Starburst Duos; Wrigley Starburst; Jane Doe, 1;

and Jane Doe, 2. See Compl. [Dkt. # 1–2] (“Compl.”). Plaintiff claims that when she was a child,

she sent the candy manufacturers a letter suggesting that two Starburst flavors should be combined

in one piece of candy, and that they misappropriated her designs, descriptions, and ideas when

they later produced and marketed “Starburst Duos.” Compl. ¶¶ 37–42. She seeks an award of

unspecified damages, punitive damages, and equitable relief, “including but not limited to, moving

Mars, Inc. into . . . government trustee receivership for the benefit of Plaintiff Ms. Wooderts, world

children, the state, and the country.” Compl. ¶ 48.

For the reasons set forth below and after review of the entire record, the Court will DENY

plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to Superior Court and GRANT defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

1 BACKGROUND

When plaintiff was eleven years old, she suggested a candy concept as a school assignment.

Compl. ¶ 12. Her idea involved combining two existing Starburst candy flavors into a single piece

of candy. Compl. ¶ 12. On an unspecified date, plaintiff submitted her design to Mars, the creator

of Starburst, in an unsolicited letter, Compl. ¶ 15, and she alleges that the company notified her by

mail that it had received it, Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff also asserts that in a signed letter on Mars

letterhead, defendants stated that “the idea(s) belonged to Plaintiff Ms. Wooderts,” Compl. ¶ 18;

“refused” her suggestions and hard work, Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21; and “promised” her “not to use

anything contained in that letter.” Compl. ¶ 21. The complaint gives no hint as to how long ago

this took place, although it appears that plaintiff is now an adult: the complaint describes her as “a

real taxpayer within the United States of America,” Compl. ¶ 30, who is now a parent herself.

Compl. ¶ 34.

On February 19, 2019, Mars announced on PR Newswire, a press release distributor, a new

candy product called “Starburst Duos” that combined two flavors into a single piece of candy.

Compl. ¶ 25. On the following day, February 20, 2019, popculture.com published an article

reporting that Mars had begun selling the Starburst Duos the day before. Compl. ¶ 26. The article

notes that “the treats were first teased back in November, with Delish having reported that the

fruity new fusions would be hitting store shelves sometime in 2019 featuring two flavors in one

burst.” According to the defendants, the reference to Delish in the February 20, 2019

popculture.com article operated as a link to a post on the food website Delish.com dated November

1, 2018, unveiling Starburst Duos. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. [Dkt

# 12-1] (“Dismissal Memo.”) at 6; see Ex. B to Dismissal Memo. [Dkt # 12-3] (“Ex. B”).

2 On February 18, 2022, plaintiff took steps to initiate this action in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia. Dismissal Memo. at 3. Her complaint, which was filed by plaintiff’s

then counsel, was not in compliance with D.C. Superior Court Rule 11(a), because it lacked a

signature, summons, and case information sheet. A notice was sent out by the court, stating a

signature had been omitted from the filing, and the valid signed complaint was not submitted until

February 28, 2022.

The complaint includes ten claims for relief. Compl. ¶¶ 37–47. Counts One through Six

allege the misappropriation of plaintiff’s design or designs: (1) “acquisition misappropriation of

design(s)”; (2) “acquisition misappropriation of candy-cover design(s)”; (3) “improper disclosure

misappropriation of design(s)”; (4) “improper disclosure misappropriation of candy-cover

design(s)”; (5) willful and malicious misappropriations of the designs”; and (6) willful and

malicious misappropriations of the candy-cover designs. Compl. ¶¶ 37–42. Count Seven seeks

relief on a quantum meruit theory based on “valuable services and goods” plaintiff rendered to

defendants. Compl. ¶ 43. Count Eight alleges that defendants were unjustly enriched by “us[ing]

the benefit of [plaintiff’s] services, goods in the form of the design(s), descriptions(s), and idea(s).”

Compl. ¶ 44. Counts Nine and Ten allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress

when defendants “disregard[ed] their promise not to use [plaintiff’s] design(s), description(s), and

ideas.” Compl. ¶¶ 45–46.

Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 26, 2024. Notice of Removal

[Dkt # 1] (“Notice”) at 1.

On January 22, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case, see Mot. to Remand to

State Court [Dkt. # 10] (“Remand Mot.”), and on January 23, 2025, defendants moved to dismiss

the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the

3 complaint is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) it fails to allege any cognizable cause of

action. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt # 12] (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 1–2; see also Dismissal Memo.

Both motions are fully briefed, and each party opposes the other’s motion. See Response to

Remand Mot. [Dkt. # 21] (“Remand Opp.”); Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt # 19]

(“Dismissal Opp.”); Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. [Dkt # 24] (“Dismissal

Reply”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove a civil action from a state court to the federal district court when

the district court has original jurisdiction.

(a); see Julien v. CCA of Tenn., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2003). A federal district court has original jurisdiction when the

amount in controversy in the civil action exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the

action is between “citizens of different states.”

(a). When a plaintiff seeks to

remand a case that was removed to federal court, “[t]he party opposing a motion to remand bears

the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Int’l Union of

Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the West,

(D.D.C. 2005);

see also Phillips v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(D.D.C. 2005) (placing the burden

of proving jurisdiction on the defendant when the plaintiff files a motion to remand). “Because

federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” they must strictly “strictly construe[]” the removal

statute. Int’l Union,

(citation omitted). Any doubts as to whether federal

jurisdiction exists must be resolved in favor of remand.

4 Failure to State a Claim

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). In Iqbal,

the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable

to legal conclusions,” and “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss.”

at 678–79, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

, citing

Twombly,

. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

quoting

Twombly,

. A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”

quoting Twombly,

,

and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”

citing Twombly,

.

The pleadings of pro se parties are “to be ‘liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.’”1 Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam), quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976). However, even though a pro se complaint must be liberally construed,

1 While plaintiff may have had assistance from an attorney at some point, it appears that she is now proceeding pro se. For this reason, the Court affords her the leniency given to pro se plaintiffs.

5 the complaint must nonetheless “present a claim on which the court can grant relief.” Chandler v.

Roche,

(D.D.C. 2002), citing Crisafi v. Holland,

(D.C. Cir. 1981). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may

ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or

incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial

notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao,

(D.D.C. 2002), citing EEOC v. St.

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch.,

, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Will Be Denied.

In her motion for remand, plaintiff argues that this Court does not have subject-matter

jurisdiction given a lack of complete diversity between the parties. Remand Mot. at 13.

Plaintiff does not identify her state of residence in the complaint, see Compl. ¶ 10 (averring

only that plaintiff “consents to jurisdiction”), but she implies in her motion that she is a resident

of Texas. See Compl. ¶ 13 (stating that one of Mars’s primary production facilities is in Texas and

that “no diversity of citizenship appears to have been accomplished based on the pleadings,

particularly, if Defendants have a principle (sic) place of business in the state resided by the

Plaintiff”).

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is considered a citizen of both its state

of incorporation and its principal place of business.

(c)(1). A corporation’s

principal place of business is “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and

coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

, 92–93 (2010). “In

practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters –

6 provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the

‘nerve center.’”

. “A corporation’s ‘nerve center’ . . . is a single place.”

Defendants have supplied information to show that Mars is incorporated in the state of

Delaware, and it is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, where its corporate executives and

directors are located and operate the company’s business. See Remand Opp. at 2–3; Ex. A to

Remand Opp. (Virginia Secretary of State records); Ex. A. to Notice of Removal (civil cover

sheet). Plaintiff relies instead on the results of an inquiry posed to “open informational AI source”

ChatGPT to argue that diversity jurisdiction has not been shown; according to her (and ChatGPT),

“Mars Wrigley, the company that owns Starburst, manufactures Starburst candies at multiple

facilities around the world. In the United States, one of the primary locations for Starburst

production is in Waco Texas.” Remand Mot. at 12–13. That may be true, but the location of a

manufacturing facility is not the determining factor.

Given that neither defendant Mars’s state of incorporation nor its principal place of

business is in Texas, where plaintiff suggests she resides, diversity jurisdiction exists.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand will be denied.2

II. Plaintiff’s Misappropriation Claims Will Be Dismissed.

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to state a claim because: (1) plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) the allegations in the complaint are

insufficient to state any cognizable legal claims. Defs.’ Mot. at 1–2.

2 These facts leave the Court questioning why venue is proper in the District of Columbia, but since neither party has raised that issue, the Court declines to address it here.

7 A. The statute of limitations has expired.

A motion to dismiss may be granted on statute of limitations grounds only if “the facts

giving rise to the defense are apparent on the face of the complaint.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. Lexington Ins. Co.,

(D.D.C. 2005). As the D.C. Circuit has cautioned,

“because statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal is

appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred.” Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

Under D.C. law, a three-year statute of limitations period applies to all actions “for which

a limitation is not otherwise prescribed,” and it is measured “from the time the right to maintain

the action accrues.”

(a). Plaintiff’s opposition does not suggest that any other

time limit applies, see Compl. ¶ 26 (identifying February 19, 2019, as a “possible date of initiation

of statute of limitations”); her main objection to the motion to dismiss appears to be that the

defendants did not file an “answer,” see Dismissal Opp. at 13–14,3 even though what both the D.C.

and federal rules require is a “responsive pleading.” See D.C. Super. Ct. R. 12(a); Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(a).

Putting plaintiff’s procedural objection aside, the question to be determined, then, is when

the cause of action accrued. And in her complaint, plaintiff points to February 19, 2019, the date

PR Newswire published an article about the availability of the two-flavor Starbursts, as when the

statute “possibly” began to run. Compl. ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiff does not allege that she saw the article,

3 “As a statement, perhaps for the mere agape love towards all little girls or children in America, the Defendants really decided not to Answer the Complaint. . . . A defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint. Each defendant decided not to serve Plaintiff or Counsel of the Plaintiff with an answer 21 days of any of the complaints and summons.” Dismissal Opp. at 14.

8 so she appears to be acknowledging that a public announcement put her on notice of a potential

claim.4

The District of Columbia applies the discovery rule, Diamond v. Davis,

(D.C. 1996), and under D.C. law, the “statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has

either actual or inquiry notice of (1) the existence of the alleged injury, (2) its cause in fact, and

(3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” Drake v. McNair,

(D.C. 2010).

Plaintiff points to February 19, 2019, the date PR Newswire published an article on

Starburst Duos, which was also the date identified in the popculture.com post as when the new

candy was first marketed, as “a possible date of initiation of statute of limitations.” Compl. ¶¶ 25–

26. And in the next paragraph of the complaint, she alleges, “[o]n February 20, 2019, defendant

had intentionally taken design(s), description(s), and ideas . . . . ” Compl. ¶ 27. However,

plaintiff’s reliance on these publications reveals that the impending release of the new candy was

a matter of public knowledge even earlier than that. The popculture.com article plaintiff refers to

in the complaint states that Starburst Duos were publicly announced on the food website Delish in

November of 2018. Dismissal Memo. at 5; see Ex. B.5

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[a] court may [] consider documents attached to a

motion to dismiss if they are ‘referred to in the complaint,’ integral to the claim(s), and if their

authenticity is undisputed.” Langeman v. Garland,

(D.C. Cir. 2023), citing

Kaempe v. Myers,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). Thus, plaintiff’s reference to these

4 Plaintiff also seems to point to May 2020 as when she “discovered” the existence of the two-flavored candy, Compl. ¶ 28, so the complaint is not a model of clarity on this issue. 5 Defendants also note that the popculture.com article contained a link to the earlier Delish article, but that link is no longer operative.

9 materials reveals that any claim would have accrued on November 1, 2018, and plaintiff had until

November 1, 2021, to file her complaint. Plaintiff did not file her complaint until February 18,

2022, at the earliest. Therefore, to the extent one agrees with the plaintiff that her cause of action

accrued, and she knew or should have known she had a claim, when the public was informed about

the defendants’ intention to market a two-flavored candy, the claims in Counts One through Six

of the complaint are time-barred.

B. The complaint fails to state a misappropriation claim.

Even if plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred, the complaint does not state a

misappropriation claim on which the Court can grant relief. Although plaintiff was represented

by an attorney at the time the complaint was filed, it is largely overwrought and unintelligible, and

not one of the overlapping and highly repetitive first six causes of action contains a reference to

any statute or other legal basis for the claim. Plaintiff identifies the causes of action as “Acquisition

Misappropriation of Design(s),” Compl. ¶ 7, which seems to be referring to the design of the candy

itself; “Acquisition Misappropriation of Candy-Cover Design,” Compl. ¶ 38; “Improper

Disclosure Misappropriation of Design(s),” which again appears to reference the candy, Compl.

¶ 39: “Improper Misappropriation of Candy-Cover Design,” Compl. ¶ 40; “Willful and Malicious

Misappropriation of the Design(s),” referring to the candy, Compl. ¶ 41; and “Willful and

Malicious Misappropriation of the Candy-Cover Design,” Compl. ¶ 42.

Paragraph 39 refers to plaintiff’s “trade secret design,” paragraph 40 refers to plaintiff’s

“trade secret(s) candy-cover design,” and paragraph 41 alleges that defendants “knowingly and

consciously reproduced the trade secret(s) of plaintiff.” Construing the complaint liberally as the

Court is required to do, and granting the now pro se plaintiff the benefit of a less stringent standard

of review, the Court will conclude that plaintiff is seeking to ground her legal claims on the federal

10 Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and/or the D.C. Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“DCUTSA”).

But plaintiff does not set forth facts that plausibly allege the necessary elements of either cause of

action.

Under both DTSA and the DCUTSA, the complaint must allege: (1) the existence of a trade

secret; (2) that the trade secret was misappropriated; and (3) damages caused by the

misappropriation. See

(3);

(4). “The ‘threshold inquiry’ in

every trade secret case is ‘whether or not there [is] a trade secret to be misappropriated.” DSMC,

Inc., v. Convera Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2007), quoting Catalyst & Chem. Servs. v.

Glob. Ground Support,

(D.D.C. 2004). Under both statutes, a “trade secret”

is defined as information that “derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally

known” when “the owner . . . has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret.”

(3); see

(4) (defining a “trade secret” to be information that “(A)

[d]erives actual or potential independent economic value from not being generally known to, and

not being readily ascertainable by, proper means by another who can obtain economic value from

its disclosure or use; and (B) [i]s the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy”).

Here, notwithstanding the conclusory use of the term “trade secret,” plaintiff does not

allege any facts that would give rise to an inference that her design was a secret, that it derived any

value from the fact that it was not generally known, or that she made any efforts to protect it.

Indeed, she acknowledges sending an unsolicited letter describing the candy concept to Mars, see

Compl. ¶ 15 (“Plaintiff Wooderts, encouraged by her teacher, wrote a description(s) of her

design(s) on paper and mailed, through the United States Post Office, to Mars. Inc for designing

the ‘newest’ and ‘bestest’ new candy in the world.”), and Compl. ¶ 14 (“Determined, this 11 year

old started to draw her designs for her new candy to be produced for all the children in the world,

11 especially for herself.”), and she mentions that she shared the idea with her teacher and peers,

negating any claim of secrecy. See Econ. Rsch. Servs., Inc. v. Resol. Econ., LLC,

, 232–33 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing misappropriation of trade secrets claim because the

complaint contained no factual allegations that any of the information defendants allegedly

misappropriated was valuable because of its secrecy or that the plaintiff used reasonable efforts to

safeguard its secrecy).

Plaintiff also does not allege facts showing misappropriation as defined under DTSA or

DUTSA. “Misappropriation” means either “(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person

who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (B)

disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person . . . . ”

See

(5);

(2). Plaintiff did not attach the letter she sent to Mars

or the company’s response, but what she alleges does not show that the defendants improperly

acquired or actually used plaintiff’s trade secret. See Compl. ¶ 20 (defendants responded by

thanking her for her suggestion but refusing to accept it to “avoid confusion of ownership.”).

Plaintiff’s allegations that the company stored, preserved, or used her design are all entirely

conclusory, and they are insufficient to state a plausible claim.

Finally, plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the alleged misappropriation

caused her damages. There are no facts alleged to show that product’s development or market

success was in any way attributable to her submission; instead, plaintiff suggests that she was not

alone in proposing a candy combination. She quotes the company as saying “we must refuse many

wonderful suggestions each year — some very similar to yours.” Compl. ¶ 20. Without factual

support linking the alleged use of her freely offered idea to any harm, the complaint fails to state

a misappropriation claim.

12 III. Plaintiff’s Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment Claims Will Be Dismissed.

As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment

claims are also barred under the statute of limitations. As was the case for plaintiff’s

misappropriation claims, the statute of limitations for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment

claims is three years. See Glenn v. Fay,

, 134 (D.D.C. 2017), citing D.C. Code

§ 12–301(8). For both claims, “the statute of limitations begins to run ‘when the plaintiff’s last

service has been rendered and compensation has been wrongfully withheld.’” Id. at 136, quoting

News World Commc’ns v. Thompsen,

(D.C. 2005). This is a two-part test in

which the second part “requires determining when compensation has wrongfully been withheld

from the plaintiff.”

The date of that rejection is significant “because quantum meruit and

unjust enrichment claims can only accrue ‘when the defendant’s enrichment is unjust.’”

quoting Thompsen,

(emphasis omitted).

Plaintiff identifies May 6, 2020 as the date she “discovered” her design had been used or

taken, and when she “sent a text to her relative in disbelief.” Compl. ¶¶ 28, 29. She also asserts

that she contacted defendants at some point in time after the announcement of Starburst Duos in

the article on popculture.com. Compl. ¶ 43 (“Before the three-year statute of limitations from

discovery of the services, goods were used and from the date the defendant advertised the use of

services, goods had accrued, Plaintiff Ms. Wooderts reached out to the defendant(s) for

remuneration of their use of services, goods, but defendant(s) declined to pay.”). Plaintiff does

not specify when she contacted defendants or when the alleged request for payment was refused;

the only allegations that suggest a time frame for when she was harmed point to May 6, 2020. See

Compl. ¶¶ 27–28. Thus, the Court lacks sufficient information to determine whether plaintiff’s

equitable claims are time barred. However, plaintiff’s claims fail for other reasons.

13 To state a claim for quantum meruit, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that valuable services

were rendered, (2) to the person from whom recovery is sought, (3) which services were accepted

by that person, and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person that the plaintiff

expected to be paid by that person.” Dorsky Hodgson & Partners, Inc. v. Nat’l Council of Sr.

Citizens,

(D.C. 2001), quoting Vereen v. Clayborne,

, 1193–94

(D.C. 1993) (emphasis added). This claim fails on the face of the complaint. While plaintiff does

not supply a copy of the letter the Mars company sent to her as a child, she quotes it in paragraph

20 of the complaint as saying: “to avoid confusion of ownership . . . we must refuse many

wonderful suggestions each year, some very similar to yours.” See also Compl. ¶ 21 (referring to

“the refusal of the hard work by defendant(s)” and “the refusal of the defendant(s) to use the

design(s), description(s), and “idea(s) . . . .”). Therefore, the complaint does not plausibly allege

that plaintiff’s services were “accepted.”

A claim for unjust enrichment requires a “plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘(1) the plaintiff

conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant retains the benefit; and (3) under the

circumstances, the defendant’s retention of the benefit is unjust.’” UMC Dev., LLC v. D.C.,

, 48 n.31 (D.C. 2015), quoting Euclid St., LLC v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,

,

463 n.10 (D.C. 2012). Plaintiff did not append a copy of her letter or the company’s response to

the complaint, but what she alleges does little to establish that she conferred a “benefit,” since

Mars told her it had already received suggestions “very similar to” hers. Compl. ¶ 20. Also, any

allegations that the defendants “retained” the benefit are entirely conclusory; the complaint is

devoid of any factual allegations that defendants actually held onto or used her idea. Compl.

¶¶ 15–20.

14 Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that the letter contained any indication that the idea was

submitted with an expectation of payment, nor does she allege that defendants solicited her

submission. Sending an unsolicited letter does not create an obligation for the recipient to

compensate the sender, and plaintiff alleges no facts to support a plausible inference that she

expected to be paid for her idea at the time of its submission.6 See H.G. Smithy Co. v. Wash. Med.

Ctr.,

(D.C. 1977) (“Unless a recipient of services is put on notice by

unambiguous circumstances that the party providing those services is working for the recipient

with the expectation of compensation from the recipient, the recipient cannot be held liable for a

commission even if the recipient makes use of those services.”); Brown v. Brown,

(D.C. 1987) (“[A] promise to pay will be implied in law when one party renders valuable

services that the other party knowingly and voluntarily accepts.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff fails

to allege any agreement—express or implied—between herself and defendants such that she could

expect compensation for her submission, and her allegation that the company “refused” her design,

specifically “to avoid confusion of ownership,” is contrary to what she must allege for this claim

to proceed. Therefore, Counts 7 and 8 fail to state equitable claims upon which relief can be

granted.

IV. Plaintiff’s Emotional Distress Claims Will Be Dismissed.

The final counts in the complaint, Count 9 for intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) and Count 10 for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), allege that plaintiff

6 See Compl. ¶ 13 (“The 11 year old really didn’t know much about how to use the computer but she really wanted to get an ‘A’ . . . . ”); Compl. ¶ 14 (“Determined, this 11 year old started to draw her designs for her new candy to be produced for all the children in the world, especially for herself. Plaintiff Ms. Wooderts really loved her Starbursts and really had hope. She was convinced that anyone that made Starburst would understand how great this new candy was going to be for all the children.”).

15 has suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of defendants’ use of her Starburst Duos idea.

Compl. ¶¶ 45–46. Defendants argue first that these counts are time barred, like the

misappropriation claim. See D.C. Code § 12–301(8), stating that the statute of limitations is three

years for actions not otherwise specially prescribed. Plaintiff cites February 19, 2019, the date of

the PR Newswire article, as the potential start of the statute of limitations period. Compl. ¶¶ 25–

26. Plaintiff, however, also cites May 6, 2020, as the date when defendants caused her harm.

Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. Assuming arguendo that the PR Newswire article marks the accrual of her IIED

and NIED claims, these claims have lapsed. But even if plaintiff’s claims were not time barred,

they would still fail.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intent or recklessness in causing emotional

distress; and (3) severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff. Waldon v. Covington,

(D.C. 1980), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). As to the claim

based on negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a specific duty of

care, the breach of which caused the emotional distress. See Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic,

, 810–11 (D.C. 2011). Here, the complaint does not allege any facts demonstrating

extreme or outrageous conduct by defendants. Plaintiff asserts only that she submitted an

unsolicited letter to defendants and that they later introduced a candy product she believes is

similar to her idea. Compl. ¶¶ 23–25. This does not approach the level of outrageousness required

for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Homan v. Goyal,

(D.C. 1998) (noting that conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,

as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency”). Furthermore, the negligence claim fails because

plaintiff has not identified any special relationship or duty owed to her by the defendants.

16 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. A separate order will

issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge

DATE: December 3, 2025

17