UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Criminal Action No. 25-292 (EGS) JORDAN HOLLEY

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Jordan Holley’s (“Mr.

Holley”) Motion to Reinstate Order of Release (“Mot. to

Reinstate”). See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18. Mr. Holley is

charged with one count of Travel With Intent to Engage in

Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of

(b). The

government sought pretrial detention, but on September 15, 2025,

Magistrate Judge Matthew Sharbaugh denied the request and

released Mr. Holley to the High Intensity Supervision Program

with Home Incarceration. See Order, ECF No. 9 at 2. The

government moved for review and appeal of the release order, see

Mot. for Review and Appeal of Release Order, ECF No. 8; and

Chief Judge James Boasberg granted the government’s motion,

ordering Mr. Holley detained. See Minute Entry (Sept. 18, 2025).

Thereafter, Mr. Holley filed the pending Motion to Reinstate.

1 See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18. The government opposed the

motion and also filed a Supplement of Additional Facts. See

Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF No. 24. Mr. Holley

filed a Reply, in response to which the government filed a

Surreply. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26; Gov’t Surreply, ECF No.

28. The Court held a Detention Hearing (“Hearing”) on Mr.

Holley’s motion on October 28, 2025, at the conclusion of which

it informed the parties that it would take the matter under

advisement.

Upon careful consideration of Mr. Holley’s motion, the

government’s opposition and supplement thereto, the reply, the

surreply, the Magistrate Judge and Chief Judge detention

decisions, the parties’ arguments at the Hearing, the entire

record, and for the reasons discussed in this Memorandum

Opinion, the Court DENIES the motion and orders Mr. Holley

detained pending trial.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On August 28, 2025, Mr. Holley initiated a private chat

with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Task Force

Officer in an undercover capacity (“the UC”) on a fetish

website. See Aff. in Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1 at 3. 1

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of

2 The following is an excerpt from the exchange between Mr. Holley

(“FeetAddict202”) and the UC, in which the two refer to the

purported nine-year-old daughter of the UC:

FeetAddict202: If you ever want to teach her about BBC2 2 or cock in general, use me as a stunt cock for her practice.

UC: lol i think we might be liked minded

FeetAddict202: When I saw your post I figured we would be. Too many bulls scared to doit but im not. If you’re going to introduce your daughter to the world of BBC and cock, why not have a real one for her to use as practice

FeetAddict202: I am Brutus, and ill be your BBC you have your daughter practice with as you watch. How’s that for kinky fun? (wink emoji)

UC: where else do you like to chat I like where this is going

FeetAddict202: “Kik, telegram, my number, even email. Pick any. I’m serious about this. Live action porn in your own home. Me and her. Our secret fun time.”

UC: whats your number

FeetAddict202: 443-834-8508

The conversation then moved to text:

UC: Yes not fantasy right

HOLLEY: Correct. Real life. I have experience with daughters and fathers, you found the right bull for the job

UC: Ok any age limits before we discuss my girl not trying to get caught up

HOLLEY: No sir. Only a number for me

the filed document. 2 According to the government, “BBC” is commonly used to refer to

“Big Black Cock.” Aff. in Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1. at 3.

3 UC: Fuck yeah we are very like minded

HOLLEY: Perfect. I understand wanting to be careful. Most wouldn't do this but I am a special bull. 1 for families. Even when divorced. A father deserves to know how his daughter handles cock

UC: Well to be honest she plays with mine and had an old college buddy in town about six months ago and loved watching her sucking his cock

HOLLEY: That's real hot. A true good daughter. Is she a virgin or has that been taken care of?

. Mr. Holley and the UC described in graphic detail

plans for Mr. Holley to have sex with the UC’s purported nine-

year-old daughter. See

. The UC sent a picture of his

purported daughter to Mr. Holley, to which he responded “Oh wow,

thats perfect honestly. I am built just right for her,” and sent

a photo of his erect penis.

Mr. Holley and the UC arranged a time and place to meet at

the UC’s purported residence in Washington, D.C. (“D.C.”) for

Mr. Holley to engage in vaginal intercourse with the UC’s

purported child. See

On September 10, 2025, Mr. Holley met

with the UC, confirmed his online name, and the UC subsequently

placed him under arrest.

. Following his arrest, Mr.

Holley waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement.

Mr.

Holley stated that he had traveled to D.C. to find out more

about the UC “but that he planned to call law enforcement and

not go through with it.”

. A mask, sex toys, and

lubricant were recovered in Mr. Holley’s vehicle.

4 Following Mr. Holley’s arrest, the FBI began searching Mr.

Holley’s electronic devices. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 9.

Between September 30, 2023 and February 27, 2024, Mr. Holley

exchanged texts with a woman, S-1, and claimed in various texts

that he had had sex with children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16.

See

. Between February 5, 2025 and February 14, 2025,

Mr. Holley exchanged texts with a woman, S-2, and described in

graphic and violent terms how he would rape her seven-year-old

daughter. See

. He also told S-2 that he had had sex

with a nine-year-old child. See

.

On October 6, 2025, the FBI notified the government that it

had completed its review of the devices. See Gov’t Suppl., ECF

No. 24 at 1. The government states that “[n]o material that was

clearly child sexual abuse material was discovered on the

phone.”

However, in several chats, Mr. Holley discussed the

sexual abuse of children. For example, between November 8, 2024

and February 7, 2025, Mr. Holley communicated with a woman, S-3,

and the two discussed having children together and having Mr.

Holley sexually abuse children starting at age eight. See

. Between September 2024 and December 2024, Mr. Holley

communicated on multiple occasions with a man, S-6, who stated

he was interested in Mr. Holley coming to his home and having

sex with his wife and three minor children aged 16 (female), 14

(female), and 11 (male).

. Mr. Holley described in

5 graphic and violent terms orally, vaginally, and anally raping

the children, and choking and slapping them. See

. Mr.

Holley also discussed recording the abuse while he and the

children wore ski masks. See

. S-6 stopped sending

messages to Mr. Holley on December 4, 2024, but Mr. Holley

continued to send him messages through August 13, 2025.

.

The parties do not dispute the contents of the online

communications. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18; Gov’t Opp’n,

ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF No. 24; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26;

Gov’t Surreply, ECF No. 28.

B. Procedural History

Mr. Holley appeared before Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh on

September 11, 2025. See Minute Entry (Sept. 11, 2025). The

government sought pretrial detention, and Magistrate Judge

Sharbaugh released Mr. Holley on September 15, 2025 to home

incarceration under the supervision of his parents with the

following additional conditions: (1) the Defendant will be

referred for a Mental Health Assessment; (2) removal of desktop

computer from residence; (3) home visits by US Parole and

Probation for Maryland to the extent practicable; (4) the

Defendant may not have access to smart devices that can access

the Internet or use smart televisions alone; (5) all devices in

the residence must be password protected; (6) Defendant’s

6 parents’ cellphones must be on their person at all times or

locked in a safe; (7) the Defendant may not have access to any

electronic device; (8) electronic devices not in active use must

be locked in a safe; (9) an alarm system must be set to indicate

entry and exit from the residence; (10) custodians must conduct

random searches on the Defendant and his property at least twice

per week to determine that he does not have any electronic

devices; (11) the home WiFi password must be changed and not

shared with the Defendant; and (12) compliance with all rules

and regulations of supervising agency. See Order, ECF No. 9.

Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh entered the Order based on

information in the Criminal Complaint and Affidavit in Support

of a Criminal Complaint; he did not have the information in the

government’s supplemental filing. See Rough Transcript of Hr’g

(Oct. 28, 2025) (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 43:23-44:16.

The government filed a Motion for Review and Appeal of

Release Order on September 16, 2025. See Mot. for Review and

Appeal of Release Order, ECF No. 8. The parties appeared before

Chief Judge Boasberg on September 18, 2025, and Chief Judge

Boasberg ordered Mr. Holley detained. See Minute Entry (Sept.

18, 2025). When he made this decision, Chief Judge Boasberg had

before him additional online conversations set forth in the

government’s opposition, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 9-11; he

7 did not have the information in the government’s supplemental

filing that is before this Court. See Hr’g Tr. at 44:17-18.

Mr. Holley was indicted on one count of Travel With Intent

to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of

(b) on September 19, 2025. See Indictment, ECF No. 12. On

September 29, 2025, Mr. Holley filed the Motion to Reinstate,

asking this Court to reinstate the original release conditions

imposed by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh. See Mot. to Reinstate,

ECF No. 18. The government opposed and filed a supplement of

additional facts. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF

No. 24. Mr. Holley filed a reply, to which the government filed

a surreply. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26; Gov’t Surreply, ECF

No. 28.

The Court held a Detention Hearing on October 28, 2025,

which was attended by Mr. Holley, the government, and Pretrial

Services Agency (“Pretrial”) staff. The parties proceeded by

proffer and did not call any witnesses. Mr. Holley entered into

the record a letter from Dr. Hildembrand Forensic Psychology

Consulting, LLC stating that she had been retained by defense

counsel to complete a pretrial psychosexual risk assessment for

Mr. Holley, should he be released. Hr’g Tr. at 4:18-23. Mr.

Holley’s parents were also present, and at times counsel for Mr.

Holley conferred with Mr. Holley’s parents on matters related to

8 the proposed release conditions. At the conclusion of the

Hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.

II. Legal Standard

“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to

trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”

United States v. Salerno,

(1987). The

“provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of

1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.”

The Act

provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and

convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of

conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person

as required and the safety of any other person and the

community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of

the person before trial.”

(e)(1), (f)(2)(g). The

danger a person poses to the community is a sufficient reason to

order pretrial detention. Salerno,

; United

States v. Simpkins,

(D.C. Cir. 1987).

The government bears the burden of showing that no

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate danger to

the community based on clear and convincing evidence. See United

States v. Munchel,

(D.C. Cir. 2021);

(f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence

standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining

whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably

9 assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . .

. the community”, see

(g); courts consider four

factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3)

the history and characteristics of the person, and (4) the

nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the

community that would be posed by the person's release.” Munchel,

(internal quotations omitted). The Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)

explains that “a defendant's detention based on dangerousness

accords with due process only insofar as [her] history,

characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that

... she poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety.”

; see

(explaining that government must

demonstrate defendant's “identified and articulable threat to

the community”).

“When there is probable cause to believe that the defendant

committed an offense involving a minor victim under

(a)(2), as here, there is a rebuttable presumption that ‘no

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

... the safety of the community.’” United States v. Farina, No.

25-cr-232,

, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2025)(quoting

(e)(3)(E)). “Once the rebuttable presumption is

triggered, ‘the defendant bears the burden of production to

10 offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory

presumption.’”

(citing United States v. Blanchard, No. 18-

MJ-101,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting

United States v. Alatishe,

(D.C. Cir. 1985)).

“The defendant may carry this burden by coming forward with some

evidence that he will not ... endanger the community if

released.”

(quoting United States v. Garner, No. CR 24-533,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025) (citation

omitted)). “If the defendant rebuts the presumption ‘the

presumption is not erased but rather remains in the case as an

evidentiary finding militating against release to be weighed

along with other evidence.’”

At the detention hearing, “[t]he person shall be afforded

an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-

examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present

information by proffer or otherwise.”

(f).

Furthermore, the “rules concerning the admissibility of evidence

in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and

consideration of information at the hearing.”

III. Analysis

Mr. Holley does not contest that the rebuttable presumption

in § 3142(e)(3)(E) applies here. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No.

18 at 4-6. Rather, he argues that the rigorous release

11 conditions Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh imposed will reasonably

ensure the safety of the community. See id. at 6.

A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Weigh in Favor of Detention

The first factor directs the Court to consider “the nature

and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the

offense ... involves a minor victim.”

(g)(1).

The charged offense in this case is extremely serious—Mr. Holley

is charged with traveling from Maryland to D.C. to have vaginal

intercourse with a nine-year-old child.

The Court is aware of only one case in this District,

United States v. Oglesbee, where a defendant charged with the

same offense as Mr. Holley was released to the High Intensity

Supervision Program. See Minute Entry (July 31, 2020) in Case

No. 22-cr-177. The government argues that Mr. Holley’s case is

distinguishable because the defendant in Oglesbee had a medical

condition that placed him at a high risk for complications from

COVID-19, which is not at issue with Mr. Holley. See Gov’t

Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 28-29. In all other cases in this District

of which the Court is aware, however, defendants charged with

the same offense have been detained. See

, 27

(citing United States v. Breeden, No. 15-MJ-0506,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2015); United States v.

Beauchamp-Perez,

(D.D.C. 2011); United

12 States v. Johnston, No. 17-MJ-0046,

, at *4

(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017); United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-

133 (Moss, J.); United States v. Scott, No. 24-cr-287,

(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2024).

The nature and circumstances of the offenses in these cases

are similar to the one before the Court. For example, similar to

the defendant in Breeden, in addition to discussing his interest

in sex with children online, Mr. Holley “took the affirmative,

unequivocal step of driving his vehicle into the District of

Columbia to arrive at the appointed time and place,” and “but

for the fact that defendant was communicating with an undercover

officer, defendant could have come fact-to face with a minor and

a willing parent.”

at 15 (quoting Breeden,

at * 7). Additionally, Mr. Holley described in detail and

boasted about purported past encounters with minors, and he did

not “equivocate or hesitate or express any apprehension about

the upcoming meeting.”

In Scott, the court denied release to a defendant charged

with nearly identical conduct. Scott,

, at *7.

The defendant in Scott similarly engaged in chat discussions

with the UC online, described how he wanted to sexually abuse a

minor girl, and traveled from Maryland to D.C. to meet with the

UC. Id.; see also Beauchamp-Perez,

(defendant traveled to meet a 12-year-old girl); Johnston, 2017

, at *4 (defendant planned to meet with UC’s purported

nine-year-old daughter and admitted to past sexual encounters

with children); United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-133

(defendant planned to meet with fictitious child via online

chat).

Mr. Holley argues that despite the graphic descriptions of

his past encounters, these conversations are merely common

sexual fantasies in online environments. See Def.’s Reply, ECF

No. 26 at 14-23. However, the Court notes that when asked by the

UC if the proposed plan was “not fantasy right,” Mr. Holley

responded “Correct. Real life. I have experience with daughters

and fathers, you found the right bull for the job.” Aff. in

Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1 at 4. Mr. Holley also told

the UC that the “[b]est part is we can make it a regular thing.

And train her for life as a slut.”

.

In addition to the conversation between Mr. Holley and the

UC, the records from Mr. Holley’s electronic devices provide

examples of Mr. Holley and other individuals discussing sexually

abusing children. See generally Gov’t Suppl., ECF No 24. In a

conversation with S-6, Mr. Holley describes in graphic detail

over the course of 225 pages of records how he will sexually

abuse S-6’s children, including wearing a mask while the two

film child pornography.

. Mr. Holley and S-6 exchanged

real-life photos of what S-6 says is his daughter’s genitalia

14 and a video of what Mr. Holley claims to be “the son of a

friend” performing oral sex on him, though the government cannot

discern the age of the individuals in the images.

.

In his messages with S-6, Mr. Holley became more aggressive

and demanding of in-person contact, but S-6 stopped responding.

See

Mr. Holley continued to send S-6 text and voice messages

demanding their address so that he could rape S-6’s wife and

children. See

Mr. Holley argues that his reactions in this

online exchange “need not indicate an intention to pursue the

interaction in real life” and can be attributed to his

frustration with a long-term online conversation ending. See

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 23.

While it is possible that some of Mr. Holley’s descriptions

of past encounters are fantasy or empty boasting, the Court

agrees with the government’s point that “the conversation he had

with the UC and his subsequent actions were reality,” and that

he “discussed abusing a child and then traveled into Washington,

D.C. with that intent, bringing with him lubricant, condoms, and

a mask to wear while filming the abuse.” Gov’t Surreply, ECF No.

28 at 4. Mr. Holley therefore escalated those fantasies into

what, but for the intervention of law enforcement, would have

been the sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl. This reflects a

transition from fantasy to concrete action. See Gov’t Surreply,

ECF No. 28 at 4-5.

15 The nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor

of detention. Mr. Holley’s conduct was not limited to graphic

and violent online conversations about sexually abusing minor

children, but rather, he acted upon these conversations by

traveling to actually meet with the purported child and parent,

bringing with him sex toys, condoms, and a mask to hide his face

during the intended filming of the abuse.

B. The Weight of the Evidence Against Mr. Holley Weighs in Favor of Detention

The second factor directs the Court to consider “the weight

of the evidence” against the defendant.

(g)(2).

The evidence proffered against Mr. Holley is strong. In addition

to the conversations with the UC in which he discussed sexually

abusing a fictitious child, Mr. Holley executed a plan to meet

the UC in person, bringing with him a variety items to use

during the encounter, including lubricant, sex toys, and a mask

to wear during in the interaction so that the two could film

child pornography. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 17. The

evidence also includes text conversations between Mr. Holley and

other individuals in which he claims that he had had sex with

children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20

at 9-10.

Mr. Holley argues that the Court should consider the lack

of additional evidence in this case in weighing the evidence

16 against him. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 9. He

specifically points to the fact that there were no child

pornographic images exchanged, nor was there an “identifiable

victim,” i.e., a real child he had direct contact with, as was

the case in United States v. Willis, No. 22-MJ-122

(Merriweather, J.) (Howell, J.), where the court released the

defendant. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 3.

But other courts in this District have noted that it is

uncertain that a “lack of more incriminating evidence

constitutes ‘evidence’ that rebuts the presumption arising from

the undisputed facts of the case.” Breeden,

, at

*7. Furthermore, in cases where courts denied release, there

were also no pornographic images exchanged and the child was

similarly fictitious. E.g., id.; Scott,

, at *7;

United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-133. Therefore, the Court

will rely only on the proffered facts, rather than the absence

of other facts, in assessing the weight of evidence against Mr.

Holley.

The weight of the evidence favors detention. The

government’s case is supported by the communications between Mr.

Holley and the UC, his actual in-person meeting with the UC, and

the physical evidence seized from his car, which tends to

corroborate his intent to sexually abuse the UC’s purported

nine-year-old daughter. The government also supports its case

17 with evidence of Mr. Holley’s activity on the fetish website for

at least two years.

C. The History and Characteristics of Mr. Holley Weigh In Favor of Detention

The third factor directs the Court to consider “the history

and characteristics” of the defendant, including the defendant's

“community ties,” “family ties,” “history relating to drug or

alcohol abuse,” “criminal history,” and “record concerning

appearance at court proceedings.”

(g)(3).

Mr. Holley states that he has “strong ties to the community

and has a strong supportive network. He has no history of drug

or alcohol use. He has no record of failing to appear at court

proceedings.” Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 10. Mr. Holley

provides no elaboration on these assertions, nor does he provide

any documents pertaining to his history or characteristics. See

generally id.; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26.

The government acknowledges that Mr. Holley does not have a

criminal history but argues that “there is reason to believe

that he has engaged in criminal activity prior to his conduct in

this case.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 19. The government points

to Mr. Holley’s statement to the UC that he had sexually abused

a ten-year-old girl, that he had “experience” with fathers and

daughters, that he told two women that he had experience

sexually abusing children, and that he sent a photograph of a

18 clothed prepubescent child whom he claimed was a prior victim.

The government also points to Mr. Holley’s “use of common

language and knowledge of information associated with

individuals who sexually abuse children” and the fact that he

brought condoms, lubricant and multiple sex toys to the meeting

with the UC.

Mr. Holley does not specifically respond to this argument,

but in the context of arguing that his online conversations do

not prove that he poses a danger to the community, he argues

that the conversations are mere fantasy. See Reply, ECF No. 26

at 14-21.

Mr. Holley’s lack of criminal history weighs in his favor.

However, “the absence of criminal history alone cannot rebut the

statutory presumption of dangerousness where the surrounding

circumstances are so indicative of culpability.” Scott,

, * 5 (citing Breeden,

, at *7 (defendant

with no criminal history detained for dangerousness); Beauchamp-

Perez,

(same)). Even if some of Mr.

Holley’s online communications were “mere fantasy,” in other

online communications he stated that he had sexually abused

children in the past and sought to do so in the future. His

descriptions of what he said that he had done in the past and

what he would like to do in the future are graphic and violent.

And although the support of his mother, asserted lack of alcohol

19 or drug abuse, and his appearance at a single hearing—the

September 18, 2025 hearing before Chief Judge Boasberg

(following his release by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh on

September 15, 2025)—along with the lack of criminal history—

weigh in his favor, he has not provided any elaboration on his

asserted “strong ties to the community and . . . strong

supportive network.” Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 10. He has

not provided any information about his education or employment.

Other than the support of his parents, he has not provided any

elaboration of or letters of support attesting to his community

ties and supportive network. Furthermore, during his custodial

interview, he claimed that he had traveled to D.C. to find out

more about the UC to report him to law enforcement, a claim

contradicted by the condoms, lubricant, and sex toys found in

his car and therefore shows a readiness to be deceitful.

The Court credits Mr. Holley’s parents’ willingness to

serve as his custodians. However, on balance, the Court finds

that Mr. Holley’s history and characteristics weigh in favor of

detention.

D. The Nature and Seriousness of Danger Release Would Pose to Any Person Cannot be Reasonably Mitigated by the Proposed Conditions

The final factor directs the Court to consider “the nature

and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community

that would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.”

142(g)(4). The danger Mr. Holley poses to the community is

presumed under the statute, see

(e)(3)(E); and

he must present “credible evidence that he does not pose a

danger to the community.” Breeden,

, at *7.

Mr. Holley argues that “[t]he Court should reinstate the

release Order because its strict conditions adequately protect

against any threat to the community.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26

at 2. Mr. Holley points to other cases in this District where

release was ordered despite a greater risk of future

dangerousness, see

; and argues that the cases relied

on by the government where detention was ordered are

distinguishable, see

. Finally, and as mentioned

above, Mr. Holley argues that the online conversations the

government points to as evidence of the danger he poses to the

community are “non-dangerous online fantasy discussions of

various uncommon sexual (“fetish”) interests.”

.

The Court credits Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s careful

crafting of strict conditions designed to mitigate the risk.

However, as explained above, he did not have before him the

online conversations that were later found on Mr. Holley’s

devices.

The Court is not convinced that the strict conditions

imposed adequately protect the community for several reasons.

The Court does not doubt the sincerity of Mr. Holley’s parents

21 nor their ability to comply with the conditions that require

their cooperation and commends them for their willingness to

serve as his custodians. He is fortunate to have supportive

parents willing to make significant sacrifices for him in the

hope that the Court will release him. However, and as other

courts have noted, there are “practical reasons” that release to

third party custodians cannot always reasonably assure the

mitigation of those risks. See United States v. Cunningham,

Order, ECF No. 54 in Case No. 23-CR-7 at 9 (denying release

despite family members’ willingness to serve as custodians

because it is “unrealistic” to expect proposed custodian to

conduct around the clock supervision). It is simply not possible

for Mr. Holley’s parents to supervise him 24 hours a day, seven

days a week.

The conditions imposed by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh

included, among other things, an alarm system that sets off

alerts when one enters or exits the home and required Mr. Holley

submit to GPS location monitoring. See Order, ECF No. 9 at 3.

Regarding the home alarm system, counsel for Mr. Holley

explained at the Hearing that if Mr. Holley were to leave the

home, his parents would receive an alert, and they would then

need to contact law enforcement. See Hr’g Tr. at 26:2-14. As to

the GPS monitoring, Pretrial informed the Court at the Hearing

that if Mr. Holley were to cut off the GPS after business hours

22 or over the weekend, they would not become aware of it until the

next business day. See

. Were that to occur,

Pretrial would request a warrant from a judge, and upon the

issuance of the warrant, a warrant squad would begin to search

for him,

; all of which could take “a couple of

hours,”

. Given this lag time, it is possible that

Mr. Holley could leave the home, obtain an Internet-connected

device, hide it in the home, and use it while his parents are

asleep or otherwise not observing him. Pretrial confirmed at the

Hearing that home searches are “cursory”; they are not warrant

searches where law enforcement, for example, opens drawers and

other containers.

. Mr. Holley could therefore

obtain and conceal a new Internet-connected device despite the

conditions. The Court also notes that Mr. Holley’s parents

reside within walking distance from both an elementary and

middle school.

. The information provided at the

Hearing indicates that if Mr. Holley were to cut off the GPS and

leave the home overnight or in the early morning, he could walk

to the schools before any steps were taken to apprehend him.

Mr. Holley points to other cases where release was ordered

despite what Mr. Holley contends was a greater risk of future

dangerousness due to the defendants being charged with more

serious charges. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 2-7. Mr. Holley

first cites United States v. Willis, No. 22-MJ-122. See

at

23 3. Mr. Willis, an adult male, was alleged to have sent Snapchat

messages to the 14-year-old minor victim, who sent him

photographs in exchange for money. See Statement of Facts, ECF

No. 1-1 in Case No. 22-MJ-122 at 1-2. Mr. Willis sent explicit

photos of himself, and videos of himself masturbating.

.

However, unlike Mr. Holley, who traveled to D.C. to sexually

abuse a nine-year-old child, Mr. Willis did not take any

affirmative steps to travel to D.C. See generally

Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Holley’s argument that Mr.

Willis posed a greater risk of future dangerousness.

Next Mr. Holley cites United States v. Taylor, No. 21-mj-

00699 (Merriweather, J.), and United States v. Ali, No. 24-cr-43

(Alikhan, J.). In both, however, release was predicated on

underlying health issues. Mr. Taylor suffered from an

intellectual disability and was released to home incarceration

with the D.C. Department of Disability Services working with a

Medicaid-eligible provider to provide habilitation, care, and

treatment to him. See Taylor, Order, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 21-

mj-00699 at 5. Mr. Ali was diagnosed with Stage IV cancer and

was undergoing radiation treatment five times per week. See Ali,

Mot. for Release from Custody, ECF No. 8 in Case No. 24-cr-43 at

1. Mr. Holley has no comparable medical issue. Furthermore,

neither Mr. Taylor nor Mr. Ali were alleged to have attempted to

meet with their victims. See Taylor, Statement of Facts, ECF No.

24 1-1 in Case No. 21-mj-00699; see generally Dkt. in Ali, Case No.

24-cr-43.

Finally, Mr. Holley argues that the cases relied on by the

government where a defendant was charged with a travel offense

and detention was ordered are distinguishable. Def.’s Reply, ECF

No. 26 at 8-14. The Court rejects each of Mr. Holley’s

arguments.

The Court agrees that the distinction Mr. Holley makes with

the release order in Scott exists—specifically that Mr. Scott’s

mother and proposed custodian would have had to stop working and

rent a home 50 miles from D.C. to supervise him, see Scott,

, at * 6; is not present here since Mrs. Holley is

retired and Mr. Holley’s incarceration would take place at their

home. Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 9. However, the court’s

decision in Scott was largely based on its “question[ing] the

ability of any third-party custodian to provide the round-the-

clock monitoring necessary to ensure absence of ‘small[internet-

accessible] devices in [the] residence.’” Scott,

, at *6 (quoting Hoppe,

, at *6). This is

the same concern this Court has articulated. The Court also

appreciates that while Mr. Scott’s family could not finance a

psychosexual review and therapy, id.; Mr. Holley’s family has

already retained a professional to provide an evaluation, see

Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10. The Court credits the Holleys for

25 taking this step, but it remains the case that Mr. Holley could

leave the home as explained above.

Mr. Holley contends that Breeden is distinguishable because

Mr. Breeden’s mother would have been his sole third-party

custodian, but she was employed and so would have had to work

from home using an Internet-connected computer, see Reply, ECF

No. 26 at 9 (citing Breeden,

, at *6); whereas

Mr. Holley’s mother is retired and does not need to have an

Internet-connected computer in the home and so Mr. Holley would

not have access to such a computer, see

While the Court

appreciates this distinction, it remains the case that, as

explained above, Mr. Holley could leave the home, obtain an

Internet-connected device, and then return home and hide it from

his parent’s and Pretrial’s view. And the point the Court made

above about psychosexual review and treatment applies here as

well.

Mr. Holley points to cases where release was denied

because, among other things, the evidence demonstrated the

defendant’s willingness and technical ability to hide their

online activity. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 8 (citing

United States v. Hoppe, No. 23-CR-102,

(D.D.C.

May 6, 2024));

at 10 (citing United States v. White, Order,

ECF No. 6 in Case No. 24-cr-340 (Friedrich, J.)). While it is

true that no such evidence has been introduced in this case, Mr.

26 Holley has been hiding his on-line activity from his parents,

with whom he lived while engaging in the activity. See Hr’g Tr.

at 12:24-13:4. Mr. Holley briefly points to cases where release

was denied where the proposed release conditions were far less

robust than those proposed here. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at

10 (citing United States v. Martinez, No. 22-cr-78 (Jackson,

J.));

at 12-13 (citing United States v. Vides, No. 24-cr-216

(Howell, J.));

at 13 (citing United States v. Blythe, No.

25-cr-253 (Friedrich, J.));

(citing United States v.

Brockerman, No. 25-mj-72 (Merriweather, J.)). The Court has

previously acknowledged the robust proposed conditions. However,

the Court has also pointed out that Mr. Holley could leave the

home, obtain an Internet-connected device, and return and hide

it with little difficulty. Finally, Mr. Holley distinguishes

United States v. James Carroll, No. 24-cr-544 (Mehta, J.), where

release was denied to a defendant with a “30+ year record of . .

. dangerous compulsivity.” Reply, ECF No. 12 at 12. The Court

notes, however, that Mr. Holley stated that he is an addict to

sex, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 10, 24; and his counsel

acknowledged at the Hearing the possibility of Mr. Holley going

to extreme lengths to leave the home to obtain another device,

see Hr’g Tr. at 32:13-21.

Finally, he argues that “the chats in which Mr. Holley

engaged reveals non-dangerous online fantasy discussions of

27 various uncommon sexual (‘fetish’) interests.” Def.’s Reply, ECF

No. 26 at 14. As an example of “fantasy talk common to fetish

sites,” he states that “[i]f in fact the parents of a 10 year

old girl held her legs apart while urging an 18 year old ‘bull’

to keep raping her while she cried, there is absolutely no way

that ‘6 strokes in’ such a poor child was giggling, laughing,

and ‘loving’ that experience.” Reply, ECF No. 26 at 19. Mr.

Holley’s support for his argument consists of his counsel’s

analysis of the discussions; he provides no authoritative

support for conclusions such as “the conversation is fairly

obviously the type of fantasy talk common to fetish sites,” id.;

or “as seems common in the online world of illicit contact, Mr.

Holley often ‘ramped up’ the fetish lingo according to the

particular interests of the person with whom he was at the

moment engaged,”

; or “[i]t is not uncommon for people,

having become accustomed to one form of pornography, to require

more and more ‘extreme’ forms of the object of their arousal in

order to achieve the same arousal which, when the same object

was new, could be achieved with less extreme forms,”

The government acknowledges that some of the messages

appear to be sexual fantasy, but points to evidence that Mr.

Holley’s interest in sexually abusing children goes beyond

fantasy. See Gov’t Surreply, ECF No. 28 at 3. For example, the

government points to S-1’s statement that her discussion of

28 sexually abusing a child was fantasy, to which Mr. Holley

responded that he would make any fantasies she wanted “to come

true, I will make come true.”

. Furthermore, Mr.

Holley sent repeated voice memos to S-6 asking for S-6’s address

so Mr. Holley could have sex with S-6’s wife and children.

.

Even if some of Mr. Holley’s online communications were

“mere fantasy,” in other online communications he stated that he

had sexually abused children in the past and sought to do so in

the future. Specifically, Mr. Holley claims that he had had sex

with children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF

No. 20 at 9-10; and describes in graphic and violent terms that

he would like to rape an individual’s seven-year-old daughter,

. It includes text conversations with another

individual in which Mr. Holley described in graphic and violent

terms that he sought to orally, vaginally and anally rape female

and male children ages 16, 14, and 11, and choke and slap them.

See Gov’t Suppl., ECF No. 24 at 3-4.

For these reasons, Mr. Holley presents a serious danger to

the community, particularly to children. And the proposed

conditions cannot mitigate that danger since it is not possible

for Mr. Holley’s parents to observe him 24 hours a day, seven

days a week.

29 IV. Conclusion

Mr. Holley has failed to rebut the presumption of

dangerousness. The evidence he points to are the rigorous

release conditions combined with his argument that the online

communications are “non-dangerous online fantasy discussions.”

The Court has explained above why the proposed conditions cannot

mitigate the danger posed by release to the community. And even

if some of Mr. Holley’s online discussions were fantasy, his

descriptions of past violent encounters with children and

statements that he seeks to violently rape young children and

teenagers demonstrate his dangerousness. The government has

therefore shown by clear and convincing evidence that no

conditions can reasonably assure the safety of the community. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge December 3, 2025

30