UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SALOOMEH TEHRAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 25-cv-1584 (JMC)

v.

MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Saloomeh Tehran sues alongside her parents Afsaneh Molaei and Mohammad

Memarzadeh Tehran (collectively, Plaintiffs), seeking to compel the adjudication of her parents’

immigration visa applications. Plaintiffs name as Defendants Secretary of State Marco Rubio,

Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, a senior official in the Bureau of Consular Affairs,

and the former consul general for the United States in Turkey. Plaintiffs contend that the

applications at issue have been stuck in administrative processing for years and thus have been

unreasonably delayed in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus

Act. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds. While the Court

does not find all of Defendants’ arguments for dismissal persuasive, it does agree that Plaintiffs

have failed to state a plausible claim for unreasonable delay. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 1 I. BACKGROUND

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at

et seq., governs

the issuance of visas to immigrants pursuing admittance into the United States. A U.S. citizen or

lawful permanent resident seeking to help a relative immigrate to the United States must first file

with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) a Form I-130, Petition for Alien

Relative, https://perma.cc/Z5MY-RNAE. See

(a)(1), 204.2(f)(3). If USCIS

approves the petition, it is then sent to the State Department’s National Visa Center (NVC).

(f)(3). At that point, applicants must submit another application to the NVC and

await an interview with a consular officer.

.61–.62. At the conclusion of the

interview, “the consular officer must [either] issue . . . [or] refuse the visa.”

§ 42.81(a). If a

consular officer determines that there is not sufficient information to establish visa eligibility, the

officer may provisionally “refuse” the visa pending further administrative processing under

Section 221(g) of the INA, which typically consists of additional information-gathering. U.S.

Dep’t of State, Administrative Processing Information, https://perma.cc/BT4W-Q7HG; see

(g).

Plaintiff Saloomeh Tehran filed a Form I-130 Petition with USCIS on behalf of her mother,

Afsaneh Molaei, and father, Mohammad Memarzadeh Tehran, in August 2021. ECF 1 ¶¶ 13–14.

Their applications were approved for processing in January 2022.

. On October 17, 2023,

the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Ankara, Turkey interviewed both applicants.

¶¶ 22–23.

Plaintiffs allege that although a State Department database reflects that Plaintiffs’ applications

were “refused,” no such final decision was communicated to Plaintiffs.

¶¶ 32–33. Rather, after

their interviews, Molaei and Tehran received a request from the Embassy to complete a

Supplemental Questionnaire, form DS-5535.

. Plaintiffs allege that the Embassy indicated

2 that it would “continue” processing their visa applications when the additional information was

provided, and that Plaintiffs would “receive another adjudication once such processing is

complete.”

; ECF 1-6 at 19–20.

Over a year went by with no change in the status of Plaintiffs’ applications. ECF 1 ¶¶ 41,

43. While they waited, Plaintiffs allege that they were not able to visit their newborn grandchild

or assist their daughter with post-childbirth challenges, which caused them “severe emotional

distress and psychological harm.”

¶¶ 53–54. On May 16, 2025, still having heard nothing from

Defendants, Plaintiffs filed a petition for mandamus compelling Defendants to act on their visa

applications.

.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court resolves the pending motion under Rule 12(b)(6).2 Under that rule, a complaint

must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly,

(2007). In making that determination, the Court relies on the

complaint itself, which may include “documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference

in the complaint.” Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs.,

(D.D.C.

2011). The Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and afford the plaintiff

“the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air

Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

In their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case on several

grounds. To start, Defendants assert that two threshold issues bar review of Plaintiffs’ claims. First,

2 Defendants also seek dismissal of Defendant Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, under Rule 12(b)(1) because they contend that Defendant Noem had no role in adjudicating the visa applications and thus is not a proper defendant in this action. ECF 7 at 12. Because the Court dismisses this matter in its entirety for the reasons explained below, it does not decide this issue. 3 they argue that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies. ECF 7 at 17. Second, they

contend that there is no action the Court could compel Defendants to perform under the APA

because Plaintiffs’ visa applications have already been refused and thus there is no remaining non-

discretionary agency action pending. Id. at 12; see

(b), 706(1). The Court finds

that neither of these threshold issues warrant dismissal. The consular nonreviewability doctrine

does not apply here because Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Defendants’ failure to render a decision

on their applications; Plaintiffs do not seek judicial review of any consular officer’s final

determination. Additionally, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs can bring this suit to compel a final

decision on their applications that remain in administrative processing because issuing a decision

on their pending visa applications is a discrete agency action required by law.

Having resolved those issues in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court turns to Defendants’ third basis

for dismissal—that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay. A delay of just

over 18 months—from the date when Plaintiffs were interviewed to the filing of their complaint—

is not unreasonable. Further, the Court cannot practicably grant Plaintiffs’ request for relief

without reordering the queue for immigration adjudications and placing Plaintiffs’ applications

ahead of others who are also awaiting action on their visa applications. That type of reshuffling of

agency priorities is not the proper role of the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay and grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Consular Nonreviewability

The Court begins with Defendants’ argument for dismissal based on the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability. ECF 7 at 17. The doctrine of consular nonreviewability “shields a

consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from judicial review.” See Baan Rao Thai

4 Restaurant v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir. 2021). Because decisions regarding the

admission and exclusion of noncitizens “may implicate relations with foreign powers [and] involve

classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,” such

assessments “are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the

Executive.” Trump v. Hawaii,

(2018) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz,

(1976)).

That doctrine, however, does not apply where “plaintiffs do not seek judicial review of a

consular decision, but instead seek a final decision on their applications.” Afghan & Iraqi Allies

Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the United States v. Pompeo, No. 18-cv-

01388,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2019). And that is what Plaintiffs seek here.

Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to pass judgment on any reason a consular officer may have for

refusing their applications—they just want the Court to order Defendants to make a decision. That

logic applies despite the nominal “refusal” that Plaintiffs allege happened before the current

administrative processing stage began. Indeed, “a long line of decisions” from courts in this district

have concluded that the doctrine does not prohibit judicial review in cases analogous to this one

because consular nonreviewability “applies only to final decisions and thus does not bar judicial

review of a consular officer’s delay when a visa application has been provisionally refused pending

a final decision.” Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

, 11 (D.D.C.

2022) (collecting cases).

Pointing to an unpublished D.C. Circuit opinion in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

(D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024), Defendants argue that a consular officer’s initial refusal

of a visa application is a final decision that this Court cannot review, even if Plaintiffs allege that

their applications remain under consideration in subsequent administrative processing. ECF 7 at

5 19. In Karimova, the D.C. Circuit determined that the visa applicant before it could not compel a

consular officer to take further action on her application, which had been refused, because her

matter had “already . . . concluded.” Karimova,

, at *4. The Court disagrees

with Defendants’ position. First, the Court observes that Karimova is not binding on it. See

(noting that “this disposition will not be published”); Order, Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178

(D.C. Cir. Sep. 10, 2024), Doc. No. 2074062, at 1 (denying the government’s motion to publish).

Under the D.C. Circuit’s rules, the panel’s decision not to publish its opinion means “that the panel

sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2); see also Aramnahad v. Rubio,

No. 24-cv-1817,

, *7 (Mar. 31, 2025) (“This Court agrees . . . that Karimova, as

an unpublished opinion, is not binding.”) (collecting cases). So Karimova does not compel the

Court to find that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies here.

Second, the Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the majority of courts in this district—

even after Karimova—holding that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar review

where plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their applications have not reached final adjudication, such

as when they have been placed in administrative processing after a consular interview. See, e.g.,

Shushkov v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-2265,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2025) (where

plaintiff alleged his visa application was refused and placed in administrative processing after his

interview, plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that he has not yet received a final decision”); Alsaraj v.

U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-cv-3399,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 25, 2025) (same);

Tolymbekova v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-295,

, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Sep. 5, 2025) (same);

Mehrpooya v. Allen, No. 24-cv-2340,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 4, 2025) (same);

Aramnahad,

, at *8 (“[T]he court’s conclusion in Karimova that refusing an

application and placing it in administrative processing is a ‘final’ decision does not square with

6 the facts Plaintiffs have alleged . . . [and] the officer’s decision to place Plaintiffs’ application in

administrative processing is not equivalent to rendering a final decision.”).

Because the Court “must focus on what is actually happening,” and not allow the

Government to “elevate form over substance to avoid review,” the Court considers the facts

Plaintiffs have alleged to determine whether a final decision has been made on their applications.

Aramnahad,

, at *8 (quoting Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 16). After all, at

the motion to dismiss stage, the Court is bound to assume the truth of Plaintiffs’ material factual

allegations and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and inferences. See, e.g., Sparrow,

. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that their applications “remain pending” and that the

Embassy informed them it would “continue” processing their applications after their interviews.

ECF 1 ¶¶ 36, 41. Additionally, the notice the State Department sent to Plaintiffs as recently as

March 2025 states that they “will receive another adjudication once such processing is complete.”

ECF 1-6 at 19–20. Taken together, these facts support the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ allegations that

their applications remain under consideration and they are still awaiting a final decision. See Janay

v. Blinken,

, 112 (D.D.C. 2024) (“In other words, the application is still being

processed and a decision is still forthcoming. It has only been ‘refused’ in the far-from-literal sense

that it has not yet been ‘granted’ or ‘denied.’”).

Because Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to review any consular officer’s decision, but

instead seek a final decision or determination that adjudication has been unreasonably delayed, the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not apply to bar judicial review of Plaintiffs’ claims.

B. Non-discretionary Duty to Take Agency Action

Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to identify “a clear, non-discretionary

duty requiring a consular officer to take any action” necessary to establish a mandamus claim or a

7 claim of agency inaction under APA Section 706. ECF 7 at 12–13. Under the APA, to assert a

claim of unreasonable delay, a plaintiff “must first allege that the agency ‘failed to take a discrete

agency action that it is required to take.’” Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,

(2004)); see

also

(b) (requiring agencies to take non-discretionary actions within a “reasonable

time”);

(1) (granting courts the authority to “compel agency action unlawfully

withheld or unreasonably delayed”). To obtain a writ of mandamus, a plaintiff must show that the

Government possesses “‘a clear duty to act’ under the circumstances.” Aramnahad,

, at *5 (quoting Fornaro v. James,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)); see also

(providing district courts with jurisdiction over mandamus suits to compel action by an

officer of the United States). Because “the standards for obtaining relief” under the Mandamus Act

and the APA are “essentially the same,” the claims are evaluated jointly. Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp.

3d at 17 (quoting Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki,

, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

Plaintiffs argue that the non-discretionary action Defendants are required to take here is to

complete the processing of their visa applications. ECF 1 ¶¶ 62–63. Plaintiffs contend that this

duty comes from the plain text of the INA,

(b), which provides that “[a]ll

immigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.”

But

because Defendants take the view that a final adjudication already occurred when Plaintiffs’

applications were provisionally refused after their October 2023 interviews, they maintain that

there is no remaining agency action they are required to take by law. ECF 7 at 12. Again, the Court

disagrees with Defendants.

As support for their position that they have already discharged their statutory duties with

respect to Plaintiffs’ applications, Defendants again point to Karimova, which they argue is

8 “dispositive” in cases like this where “[p]laintiffs seek to compel State Department officials to act

further on visa applications refused under INA Section 221(g) and undergoing post-refusal

administrative processing.” ECF 7 at 14. As discussed above, Karimova is not binding authority,

so the decision would at best be persuasive, not dispositive. See supra Section III.A. The Court

has already concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleges that they are still awaiting a

final decision on their visa applications, id., and thereby rejects Defendants’ argument that they

have complied with their nondiscretionary duty to provide a final adjudication. See Hajizadeh v.

Blinken, No. 23-cv-1766,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024) (citing Khazaei v.

Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2023)) (Issuing a final

decision on a visa application is “plainly a discrete agency action” required by law.); Shushkov,

, at *6 (collecting cases).

Additionally, Plaintiffs rely on—and the Court finds persuasive—an argument not

considered by the court in Karimova. In Karimova, the plaintiff “rooted the asserted duty to act on

her visa in Section 555(b) of the [APA],” an “ancillary provision stating that ‘each agency shall

proceed to conclude a matter presented to it’ ‘with due regard for the convenience and necessity

of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time.’” Karimova,

, at *2–4 (citing

(b)). The court in Karimova considered whether

(b) “and only Section 555(b)—places a clear, non-discretionary duty on [a] consular officer”

and found that such an ancillary, “non-specific directive” did not.

. Plaintiffs here do not

rely solely on the ancillary provision of APA Section 555(b), but instead look to

(b)

as supplying Defendants’ duty to act. ECF 1 ¶¶ 62–63. Since Karimova, many courts in this district

confronting this question have held that

(b) “confers on consular officers a

nondiscretionary duty to review and adjudicate immigrant visa applications,” even those placed in

9 post-interview administrative processing. Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369,

, at

*11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025) (collecting cases). Because section 1202(b) requires that “[a]ll

immigrant visa applications shall be reviewed,” that section of the INA “establishe[s] a specific

principle of comprehensive review and adjudication by consular officers.”

Defendants’ failure

to move all visa applications towards a final decision—including Plaintiffs’—violates a

nondiscretionary duty imposed by section 1202(b). See

And even “[a]bsent binding precedent

supporting [P]laintiff[s’] position that the INA imposes a non-discretionary duty on the

government to adjudicate the visas, the assumption of reviewability [would] permit[] consideration

of the merits of [their] visa mandamus claim.” Hamdan v. Oudkirk, No. 24-cv-1001,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2024); Sereshti v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1288,

,

at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2024) (collecting cases on the permissibility of “assuming reviewability”

and considering the merits of Plaintiffs’ visa mandamus claims). Because Plaintiffs allege they

have not received a final decision on their applications, there remains a discrete action Defendants

are required to take under

(b).

C. Unreasonable Delay

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim of

unreasonable delay. ECF 7 at 20. Plaintiffs contend that the “fact dependent nature” of their

unreasonable delay claim precludes the Court’s ability to dismiss at this stage. ECF 8 at 17.

However, courts in this jurisdiction routinely assess unreasonable delay claims at the motion to

dismiss stage, and the Court finds it appropriate to do so here. See, e.g., Da Costa,

(affirming district court dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim of unreasonable

delay); Janay, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (granting motion to dismiss after assessing TRAC factors

and determining plaintiff failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay); Motevali,

885116, at *8 (same); Hajizadeh,

, at *6 (same); Sereshti,

,

at *11 (same). Ultimately, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently

alleged that Defendants’ delay warrants judicial intervention.

The central question in evaluating a claim of unreasonable delay is “whether the agency’s

delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”),

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). To assess unreasonable delay, courts assess six “TRAC” factors:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell,

(quoting TRAC,

).

The TRAC factors are not “ironclad” and each case “must be analyzed according to its own

unique circumstances” because each “will present its own slightly different set of factors to

consider.” Hajizadeh,

, at *4 (citing Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civ. Aeronautics

Bd.,

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). The first and fourth factors are “most important” in the

visa application context. Da Costa,

. The Court considers the factors below.

1. Factors 1 & 2

The first two factors are typically analyzed together and assess “whether there is any rhyme

or reason—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay.” Hajizadeh,

, at *4. Whether a delay is unreasonable “cannot be decided in the abstract, by reference

to some number of months or years beyond which agency inaction is presumed to be unlawful, but

11 will depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the task at hand, the significance (and

permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the agency.” Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, in the visa

application context, courts “often look to the length of delay as a rough yardstick to determine

whether the ‘first-in, first-out’ rule is, in fact, being applied.” Sivananthan v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-

1181,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2023). In this district, the length of delay is usually

evaluated from the most recent government action to the date upon which a plaintiff seeks relief

in court. See e.g., Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-1581,

, *7 n.7

(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (“The proper method for calculating delay, however, is the length of time

between the last action the government took on a visa application and the filing of plaintiff's

complaint . . . The last action taken on plaintiff’s visa application was his consular interview.”).

In this case, there was about an 18-month delay from the date of Plaintiffs’ interviews to

when they filed the complaint. ECF 1 ¶ 41. On its face, that timeline tilts in favor of Defendants.

Courts in this jurisdiction have routinely found that similar delays are not unreasonable. See e.g.,

Shabestary v. Sanders, No. 24-cv-362,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024) (finding

a 22-month “delay in processing” was not unreasonable); Pourabdollah v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-

1603,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (20 months); Sharifymoghaddam v. Blinken,

No. 23-cv-1472,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2024) (15 months). Even if the delay

were evaluated from another benchmark Plaintiffs reference—the date from when Plaintiffs

submitted their visa applications to the date that they filed this action (about 40 months)—the

Court’s conclusion would not change. While the Court acknowledges that there are “[n]o bright

lines . . . district courts have generally found that immigration delays . . . between three to five

years are often not unreasonable.” Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-0035,

, at *6

12 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020). The delay here falls well within the realm of general reasonableness no

matter how the Court calculates it. See, e.g., Da Costa,

(concluding that a 4 year

delay is not unreasonable); Zaman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-3592,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021) (finding that a delay of 42 months was “insufficient to

warrant emergency relief in this district”); Pourshakouri v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-0402 ,

, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2021) (finding delay of 44 months not unreasonable);

Varghese v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-2597,

, at *5 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022) (finding

delay of “around four years” does “not warrant judicial intervention, standing alone”). As such,

these factors weigh in favor of Defendants.

2. Factor 4

TRAC factor four requires an assessment of “the effect of expediting delayed action on

agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Because granting relief

in the context of visa applications would necessarily require “reorder[ing] a queue of applicants

seeking adjudication,” this factor is often weighed strongly in favor of the defense. Tate v. Pompeo,

, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2017); Akrayi,

, at *4 (“[P]recedent in

this circuit recognizes that expediting review here would merely redirect resources from other

cases.”); Xiaobing Liu v. Blinken,

, 13 (D.D.C. 2021) (“This factor not only

favors Defendants, but ends up altogether dooming Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay” where

“a judicial order putting the petitioner at the head of the queue would simply move all others

back.”); Sivananthan,

at *4 (collecting cases).

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs assert that they are not asking the Court to prioritize processing their

visa applications ahead of others but are instead requesting that the Court order the agency to

“follow its own guidance.” ECF 8 at 22. To support its position, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants

13 have “attempted to circumvent the law and its own policies by issuing provisional refusals, while

admitting that processing [of] the visa applications is continuing.” ECF 1 ¶ 59. However, the

pleadings do not outline how the agency is failing to follow its own guidance. Without specific

factual support, this allegation is merely conclusory. See Da Costa,

(Plaintiffs’

allegation that USCIS does not follow its stated approach was “conclusory” where Plaintiffs did

not “provide any substance” to support its allegation that agency was not following its policy); see

also Twombly,

(On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).

Ultimately, granting the requested relief would, in fact, require the Court to order the

Defendants to act on Plaintiffs’ applications. ECF 1 at 11. This would necessarily compel the

agency to prioritize resolution of their applications ahead of others. ECF 9 at 21–22. And

“deference must be given to the State Department’s priority-setting and resource-allocation

decisions” in the visa adjudication context. Hajizadeh,

, at *5 (quoting Arab v.

Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (D.D.C. 2022)); see also Manzoor v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.

Servs., No. 21-cv-2126,

, at *6 (D.D.C. May 3, 2022) (“It makes little sense to

incentivize the creation of a queue of visa applicants within the docket of the federal judiciary to

determine the order of the queue for visa applications.”). Because Plaintiffs’ request for relief

would require the Court to take charge of the consulate’s priority-setting, ordering the agency to

redistribute its resources and prioritize Plaintiffs’ applications, the fourth TRAC factor weighs in

favor of Defendants.

3. Factors 3 & 5

The third and fifth factors concern the impacts of the delay on the Plaintiffs. The third

factor identifies “whether ‘human health and welfare are at stake’—in which case judicial

14 intervention is more justified—and the fifth assesses the ‘nature and extent of the interests

prejudiced by delay.’” Milligan v. Pompeo,

, 319 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the delays in processing their applications “prevented them from

seeing their newborn grandchild, and from helping their daughter . . . with post-childbirth

challenges” leading to “severe emotional distress and psychological harm.” ECF 1 ¶¶ 53–54.

While the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations that the delay has been emotionally taxing and does

not seek to minimize that, their complaint does not include allegations of any harms that threaten

their health and wellbeing so significantly that they overcome the weight of the other TRAC factors

favoring Defendants. See Hajizadeh,

, at *6 (finding “severe emotional distress”

due to the uncertainty and “a considerable amount of money” spent on visa-related expenses were

not harms sufficiently threatening to plaintiff’s physical health and wellbeing); see also Da Costa,

(concluding that the third and fifth TRAC factors did not favor the plaintiffs where

they did not, “for example, allege that they are unable to access electricity, water, food, or shelter”).

Accordingly, these factors also tilt in favor of Defendants.

4. Factor 6

Finally, the sixth factor addresses “whether the agency’s bad faith caused the delay.”

Sawahreh v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 164 (D.D.C. 2022). Plaintiffs, by their own

admission, “do not have any direct evidence of bad faith on the part of any State Department

personnel.” ECF 8 at 23. However, the lack of plausible allegations of impropriety does not weigh

against the Plaintiffs and therefore does not alter the Court’s analysis. See Sivananthan,

, at *5. This factor is thus neutral.

15 After weighing the TRAC factors, the first and fourth being the strongest in the visa

application context, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the delay in

the administrative processing of their visas is unreasonable. The delays in visa adjudications are

undoubtedly frustrating for Plaintiffs, but the TRAC factors do not warrant judicial intervention.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF

7, is GRANTED, and as a result Plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED.

A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: December 11, 2025

16