UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GABRYELLE DANIELS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03393 (UNA) v. ) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF

No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court

grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, sues the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division.

See Compl. at 1. She challenges Defendant’s alleged failures to take action on her civil rights

complaints filed with the agency against the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.

See id. at 1–4. She contends that these actions constitute violations of her constitutional rights

under

, see

, and she seeks damages and an injunction, see

at 1–2, 4–5.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because it does bear the

authority to compel Defendant to investigate her complaints. See Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v.

Reno,

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In both civil and criminal cases, courts have long

acknowledged that the Attorney General's authority to control the course of the federal

government's litigation is presumptively immune from judicial review.”); Wightman–Cervantes v.

Mueller, 750 F. Supp .2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[A]n agency's decision whether to prosecute, investigate, or enforce has been recognized as purely discretionary and not subject to judicial

review.”) (citing Block v. SEC,

, 1081–82 (D.C.Cir. 1995)) (other citation omitted);

Martinez v. U.S.,

, 248–49 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The FBI’s decision whether or not

to investigate the supposed criminal activity reported by Martinez is a discretionary function[.]”);

Otero v. U.S. Attorney General,

, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (same). “[A]n

agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a

decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney,

(1985). In fact,

, explicitly assigns the Assistant Attorney General for

the Civil Rights Division the exclusive discretionary function of “reviewing investigations arising

from reports or complaints of public officials or private citizens,”

at § 0.50(b), and in no way

imposes “any mandatory duty to investigate or prosecute all complaints of civil rights violations,”

nor does it provide a right of review in federal court, see Patterson v. Harris, No. 22-697,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2022); Harris v. Holder, No. 15-00270,

,

at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2015) (same), aff’d sub. nom Harris v. Lynch,

(D.C. Cir.

2015) (per curiam).

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks damages, her claims also fail to survive. First, Plaintiff seeks

relief under § 1983, but that statute does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal

law, Settles v. United States Parole Comm'n,

(D.C. Cir. 2005), and here,

Plaintiff has sued the federal government. Second, “Congress has not waived immunity for suits

seeking monetary damages that arise under the Constitution.” Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Scinto v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(D.D.C. 2009)); see also FDIC v. Meyer,

(1994). (“[T]he United States simply

has not rendered itself liable . . . for constitutional tort claims.”). Although Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

(1971) establishes a private cause of

action for damages against federal officers sued in their individual capacity who commit certain

constitutional violations, see Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,

(2001), Bivens does

not extend to federal agencies or to federal officials sued in their official capacity, see Meyer,

; In re Rodriguez, No. 05-5130,

, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2005) (per

curiam); Boling v. U.S. Parole Comm'n,

(D.D.C. 2017). And even if it did,

Plaintiff has not named any federal officials as defendants.

For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3);

(e)(2)(B)(iii). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

Date: December 15, 2025 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge