UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TOKTAM HOSSEINNEZHAD ARIANI, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. 25-cv-349 (TSC) v.

MARCO RUBIO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs are 58 Iranian nationals whose visa applications were refused under

(g) and placed into administrative processing. They sued the Secretary of State and another

State Department official, seeking to compel further action on their refused applications. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that State

Department officials have no duty to act on already refused visa applications. Defs.’ Mot. for J.

on the Pleadings at 10, ECF No. 58 (“Defs.’ Mot.”).

Also before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. In addition

to their original claims of unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding under the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”) and Mandamus Act, Plaintiffs now seek to challenge Presidential

Proclamation No. 10949, which suspends the entry of most Iranian nationals into the United States,

as well as two State Department policies that purport to implement the Proclamation. Pls.’ First

Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 71. For the reasons below, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, and GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiffs’ First Motion to

Amend the Complaint. A separate order will follow.

Page 1 of 15 I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background

To initiate an application for an employment-based visa, either the noncitizen applicant or

their employer—depending on the specific visa sought—must file a Form I-140 Petition with U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).

(a). If USCIS approves the

petition and the applicant resides outside the United States, the petition is forwarded to the State

Department’s National Visa Center for pre-processing. See

§ 204.5(n); see also U.S. Dep’t of

State, Immigrant Visa Process – NVC Processing, https://perma.cc/X82F-G26W (last accessed

November 18, 2025). The applicant must then submit a Form DS-260, which is forwarded to the

appropriate U.S. Embassy or Consulate for an interview with a consular officer.

;

see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Visa Process – Applicant Interview,

https://perma.cc/P2KF-X7B8 (last accessed November 18, 2025). “[B]y bringing the required

paperwork to [the] in-person interview with a consular officer,” applicants “‘execute’ their

applications.” Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024)

(quoting 9 F.A.M. § 504.1-3(a), (g)).

Once an application is executed, “the consular officer must issue” or “refuse the visa.”

(a); see also 9 F.A.M. § 504.1-3(g) (“Once an application has been executed, [the

consular officer] must either issue the visa or refuse it.”).1 If the applicant fails to establish their

visa eligibility, the consular officer “shall” refuse their application under section 221(g) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). See

(g); see also

§ 1361 (placing

burden on applicant to establish eligibility). A refusal is a “formal,” “official decision” that fulfills

1 If the applicant’s home country is under a visa sanction, the consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa.”

(a). This provision is inapplicable here.

Page 2 of 15 any obligation a consular officer has to act on a visa application. Karimova,

,

at *2 (cleaned up). That said, a consular officer “may choose to place an officially refused

application in administrative processing,” which allows the officer to “re-open and re-adjudicate”

the previously refused application if additional information comes to light. Karimova,

, at *2 (citing 9 FAM §§ 306.2-2(A)(a), (A)(a)(2)). “Unless and until” an officer re-opens

an application, it “remains officially refused.” Id.

In June 2025, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 10949. See

(June 4, 2025). Invoking his authority under section 212(f) of the INA—which provides

that the President “may . . . suspend the entry of all [noncitizens] or any class of [noncitizens]”

“[w]henever [he] finds that the entry of any [noncitizens] or any class of [noncitizens] . . . would

be detrimental to the interests of the United States,”

(f)—President Trump

suspended the entry of certain noncitizens from 19 countries, including Iran. See 90 Fed. Reg. at

24498–99. The Proclamation establishes several exceptions. As relevant here, it allows for the

entry of individuals who “the Secretary of State finds . . . would serve a United States national

interest”—the so-called “the National Interest Exception.”

. Shortly after President

Trump issued the Proclamation, the State Department “sent implementing guidance to all

diplomatic and consular posts worldwide,” informing those posts that they should refuse visas to

persons otherwise eligible if they are subject to the Proclamation. Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369

(SLS),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025). Plaintiffs refer to this as the “No Visa

Policy.”

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs originally filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of

California. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 49

Page 3 of 15 (“MTD Order”). At the time, there were 96 Plaintiffs. See Compl. ¶¶ 30–347. All were Iranian

nationals who had “applied for employment-based visas,” as well as their “derivative spouses and

minor child beneficiaries.” MTD Order at 4. “Each primary applicant plaintiff [had] participated

in a consular interview, had their visa refused under

(g),” and had their application

placed into administrative processing. Id.; see also Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, 30–347.

Plaintiffs’ original complaint contained two APA claims challenging aspects of the

administrative-processing scheme, see Compl. ¶¶ 445–56, as well as four claims under the APA

and Mandamus Act for the alleged unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay in acting further

on Plaintiffs’ refused visa applications.

¶¶ 457–511. Defendants moved to dismiss all six

claims. A district court in the Central District of California dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’

two challenges to the administrative-processing scheme, see MTD Order at 10–19; determined

that venue was improper in the Central District of California as to the remaining claims of all

Plaintiffs who resided outside that District, see

at 19–23; and transferred the unlawful

withholding and unreasonable delay claims of 70 Plaintiffs to this court. See Order Dismissing

and Transferring Certain Pls.’ Claims at 3–4, ECF No. 50.

Defendants then answered the original complaint, see Answer, ECF No. 57, and moved for

judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful withholding and

unreasonable delay are barred by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Karimova v. Abate. See Defs.’

Mot. at 10–12. Plaintiffs’ opposed Defendants’ motion, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 61, and moved

“to strike certain paragraphs in Defendants’ answer” on the basis that Defendants insufficiently

denied certain allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Pls.’ Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 60.

Page 4 of 15 In July 2025, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint in response to Presidential

Proclamation 10949. They assert that “the proposed amendments to the Complaint do not alter

[their] fundamental claims” of unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay. See Pls.’ Mot. at 6.

Plaintiffs seek to add four new claims challenging the Proclamation and the State Department’s

implementation of it. See Pls.’ Reply – Ex. A (Redlined Amended Compl.) at 135–43, ECF No.

73-1 (“Proposed Am. Compl.”).

First, Plaintiffs claim that section 212(f) of the INA is an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power, and, even if it were constitutional, the Proclamation exceeds the President’s

authority under that provision. See Proposed Am. Compl. at 135–37. Second, Plaintiffs argue that

the State Department’s policy implementing the National Interest Exception is arbitrary and

capricious. See

at 137–38. Third, Plaintiffs contend that the State Department’s No Visa Policy

is contrary to law because the President’s determination that the entry of certain noncitizens into

the United States should be suspended does not necessarily mean that those noncitizens should be

refused a visa. See

at 138–41. And fourth, Plaintiffs claim that the No Visa Policy is arbitrary

and capricious. See

at 141–43. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint.

See Defs.’ Opp’n at 3–10, ECF No. 72.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(f), a party may move to “strike from a

pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “Motions to strike

are disfavored,” in part because they often “burden the court unnecessarily.” Cherokee Nation v.

Dep’t of the Interior,

, 121 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Tyson v. DeJoy, No. 21-

5279,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2022)); see also Uzlyan v. Solis,

(D.D.C. 2010) (explaining that “striking portions of a pleading is a drastic remedy” and

Page 5 of 15 motions to strike are viewed “with such disfavor that many courts will grant such a motion only

if the portions sought to be stricken as immaterial are also prejudicial or scandalous”).

It is unclear how any of the paragraphs Plaintiffs move to strike can fairly be

characterized as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f). And in fact, Plaintiffs do not attempt to meet that standard, instead arguing that

Defendants were insufficiently detailed in their denials of certain allegations. See Pls.’ Mot. to

Strike at 2–6. But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) provides that in responding to the

allegations of a complaint, a defendant need only “admit or deny the allegations asserted against

it” or state that it “lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an

allegation.” “No more [is] needed at the pleading stage.” Indigo America, Inc. v. Big

Impressions, LLC,

, 5 n.1 (1st Cir. 2010). “No response is required,” moreover, “to

legal conclusions in a complaint,” and it is “acceptable” for a defendant to state that “the terms of

documents attached to [a] complaint speak for themselves.” Khepera-Bey v. Santander

Consumer USA, Inc., No. 11-1269,

, at *5 (D. Md. May 30, 2012) (cleaned

up). The court will therefore DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to “move for judgment on the

pleadings” “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” “The standard

of review for [a] Rule 12(c)” motion “essentially mirrors the standard for motions to dismiss under

Rule 12(b).” Tapp v. WMATA,

(D.D.C. 2016). The court must “accept

as true the allegations in the opponent’s pleadings,” and ask whether “the moving party [has]

demonstrate[d] that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n v. Liberty Maritime Corp.,

, 760–61 (D.C. Cir.

2019) (cleaned up). Page 6 of 15 Defendants have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’

claims of unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the APA and the Mandamus Act.

To prevail under either statute, Plaintiffs must make the same “threshold” showing that the State

Department has “‘failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.’” Karimova,

, at *1 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,

(2004)).2

Because Plaintiffs fail to point to any duty requiring the State Department to take further action on

already-refused visa applications, they cannot prevail on these claims as a matter of law. 3

Although Plaintiffs are correct that a consular officer must “issue” or “refuse” a visa once

an application is executed, Pls.’ Opp’n at 8 (quoting

(a)), Plaintiffs have

“already received” the “official refusal[s]” to which they are entitled. Karimova,

, at *4. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute that their visa applications have been refused

under section 221(g) of the INA. Instead, they assert that an “interim 221(g) refusal” is insufficient

to satisfy the State Department’s purported duty to “conclusively adjudicate visa applications.”

Pls.’ Opp’n at 6, 15. But a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit squarely rejected that argument in

Karimova v. Abate. There, the Court explained that even if a consular officer places an executed

application into administrative processing after refusing it, the officer has still issued a “formal”

and “official refusal” that discharges any duty to act under

(a) and section

2 See also In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (To obtain the “extraordinary remedy” of mandamus, Plaintiffs “must first establish that the agency has violated a crystal-clear legal duty.” (citation modified)); Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (To prevail on a claim of agency inaction under the APA, Plaintiffs must “identify a legally required, discrete act that [the agency] has failed to perform.”). 3 Because the court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims on this ground, it need not address Defendants’ alternative argument that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars Plaintiffs’ claims. See Almaqrami v. Pompeo,

, 784 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Courts may assume without deciding that a plaintiff’s statutory claims are reviewable and proceed to the merits notwithstanding consular nonreviewability.” (citation modified)).

Page 7 of 15 555(b) of the APA. Karimova,

, at *2, 4. This likewise fulfills any obligation

under

to “properly and promptly” process a visa application, to the extent such

an obligation exists. See Hemmat v. Blinken,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sep. 17, 2024).

Because Plaintiffs identify no clear requirement that the State Department must act further once

issuing a 221(g) refusal, they cannot state a claim under either the APA or the Mandamus Act. See

Sedaghatdoust v. Blinken,

, 7 (D.D.C. 2024) (“[T]he only duty that the statute or

regulations impose on consular officers is a duty to grant or refuse a visa. And that duty has been

performed; [plaintiff’s] application has been refused. The statute does not create an additional

duty to engage in post-refusal reconsideration . . . .”).

Plaintiffs attack Karimova as an “unpublished per curiam opinion.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 18.

Although “courts in this district are split on whether unpublished circuit decisions like Karimova

are binding,” see Seifan v. Sweeney, No. 25-cv-261,

, at *3 (D.D.C. July 31,

2025) (collecting cases), this court has already concluded that it “must follow” Karimova. See

Deylami v. Kvien, No. 23-cv-1393,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2025). While

unpublished decisions of the D.C. Circuit are not binding on future panels of the Court of Appeals,

those decisions are “precedential” if entered on or after January 1, 2002. Davis v. U.S. Sent’g

Comm’n,

, 666 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Because it was unpublished, while that decision

is precedential, it is not binding on this panel.” (emphasis added)); see also Khaksari v. Chairman,

Broad. Bd. of Governors,

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (explaining that

unpublished opinions after January 1, 2002, have “the force of precedent”); accord In re Grant,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Although our circuit does not have a local rule directly on

point, we agree that unpublished dispositions should not strictly bind panels of the court.”

(emphasis added)). Given “our hierarchical system of absolute vertical stare decisis,” Klayman v.

Page 8 of 15 Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of

rehearing en banc), this lower court is unwilling to depart from the directly on point, unanimous

decision of three appellate judges.

In any event, “regardless of whether Karimova is actually binding, it is still a case decided

by the Circuit that contains reasoning the court finds persuasive.” Pour v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-573,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (cleaned up); see also Doroodchi v. Rubio, No.

24-cv-3170,

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025) (“Published or not, [Karimova]

represents the considered and unanimous judgment of a D.C. Circuit panel.”). As the D.C. Circuit

persuasively explained, the fact that the State Department might “re-open and re-adjudicate” a

refused application based on new information does not change the fact that the Department has

already acted on and refused the application, thus satisfying the only duties set forth by federal

regulation. See Karimova,

, at *2, *4–5. And critically, “nothing in federal

law” prevents a consular officer from “hold[ing] onto [a refused] application in case circumstances

later change in the applicant’s favor, thereby saving the applicant the time and cost of filing a

whole new visa application.”

. Indeed, by “keeping the door open,” “administrative

processing can only benefit, never hurt, the applicant’s entry prospects.”

. To hold

otherwise would only incentivize the State Department to deny visa applicants the opportunity of

administrative processing. Accordingly, the court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings.

IV. FIRST MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party who seeks to amend their complaint

more than 21 days after service of a responsive pleading must obtain “the opposing party’s written

consent or the court’s leave.” Such leave “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). But leave may be denied Page 9 of 15 if there is good reason to deny, such as “undue delay . . . on the part of the movant” or if allowing

the amendment would cause “undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Atchinson v. District of

Columbia,

, 425–26 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). A district court may also “deny a

motion to amend a complaint as futile if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to

dismiss.” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012). “It is the opposing party’s

burden to demonstrate why leave should not be granted.” Lannan Found. v. Gingold,

(D.D.C. 2017). For the reasons below, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part

Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Amend the Complaint.

As an initial matter, the court will deny Plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint with

respect to their claims for unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay. As detailed above, those

claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs have not identified any further action that the State

Department is required to take on already-refused visa applications. See supra Part II. Plaintiffs

concede that the “proposed amendments to the Complaint” merely repeat and “do not alter” those

claims. Pls.’ Mot. at 6; see also Pls.’ Reply at 9, ECF No. 73 (“In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs

repeat[] their unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding claims.”). The proposed amendments

do not, for example, identify some new source of law imposing an obligation on the State

Department to act further on a refused application that has been placed into administrative

processing. Thus, because it is well settled that “amendment of a complaint is futile where the

proposed amendment does not modify the substance of the complaint,” Payne v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011), the court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion as to

Counts Five through Eight of the proposed amended complaint, which merely repeat Plaintiffs’

original claims for unlawful withholding or unreasonable delay.

Page 10 of 15 It is a closer call whether Plaintiffs should be permitted to bring their proposed new claims

related to Presidential Proclamation 10949. Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ challenges to

the Proclamation would “be futile because Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint does not allege

that any individual Plaintiff’s visa application has been re-adjudicated and refused under INA

§ 212(f) pursuant to the Proclamation” and therefore Plaintiffs lack standing. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6–

7. But in evaluating standing, the court is not limited to allegations in the complaint; it may also

“‘consider materials outside the pleadings,’” “including additional declarations or affidavits

provided by a plaintiff to support standing.” Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin. Corp.,

, 70 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Marsh v. Johnson,

(D.D.C.

2003)); see also Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.,

, 28 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“This court

and the district court may properly consider affidavits submitted by the parties, in addition to the

complaint, to resolve the standing question.”); Warth v. Seldin,

(1975) (“[I]t is

within the trial court’s power to allow . . . the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint

or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff’s

standing.”). Plaintiffs have provided evidence that at least three Plaintiffs—Nima Ghiasidoost,

Ghazal Delnavaz, and Mohammed Erfan Kazemi—have received § 212(f) refusals explicitly

pursuant to the Proclamation and were also denied a National Interest Exception. See Pls.’ Notice

of Change in Material Facts, ECF No. 74. Receiving an employment-based visa denial—and the

attendant “lost professional opportunities”—is a “traditional harm[] that [is] obviously concrete.”

Ranjan v. DHS,

, 199 (D.D.C. 2024). Defendants thus do not dispute that a

person who has received a § 212(f) refusal under the Proclamation would have standing to

challenge it.

Page 11 of 15 Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Proclamation on nondelegation and

excess-of-statutory-authority grounds would be futile. On this point, the court agrees. As another

court in this district recently held, the claim that section 212(f) “is itself unconstitutional under the

non-delegation doctrine” is “borderline frivolous.” Thein,

, at *14 n.14. To be

sure, section 212(f) is a “comprehensive delegation” that “exudes deference to the President” and

“vests the President with ample power to impose entry restrictions.” Trump v. Hawaii,

, 684–85 (2018). But the Supreme Court has “found intelligible principles in a host of statutes

giving agencies significant discretion,” including statutes authorizing agencies “to regulate in the

‘public interest.’” FCC v. Consumers’ Rsch.,

, 683–84 (2025) (quoting NBC v. United

States,

, 225–26 (1943)); see also Chamber of Comm. v. Reich,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven the basic doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, while by no means

repudiated, remains only a shadowy limitation on congressional power.”). And “in the national

security and foreign policy realms, the nondelegation doctrine . . . has played an even more limited

role.” Id. at 706 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

To survive a nondelegation challenge, a statute need only “provide[] an intelligible

principle to guide an agency’s exercise of discretion.” Sanchez v. Off. of State Superintendent of

Educ.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). As several courts in this District have held, the “textual

limits” on the President’s power under section 212(f) amply supply an intelligible principle.

Gomez v. Trump,

, 187 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up); see also Thein,

, at *14 n.14. In particular, the statute requires that the President identify “a class of

[noncitizens] whose entry is restricted,” “make a finding” that their entry would be “detrimental

to the interests of the United States,” and “suspend” their entry only “for a fixed period of time or

until resolution of a triggering condition.” Gomez, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (cleaned up). Although

Page 12 of 15 “standards such as ‘detrimental to the interests of the United States’ . . . convey an expansive grant

of power,” “they are no more capacious than the broad standards deemed sufficiently intelligible

by the Supreme Court in all but two of its cases.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ argument that the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under section

212(f) would likewise be futile in light of the Supreme Court’s decision Trump v. Hawaii. In

Presidential Proclamation 10949, President Trump found that the entry of noncitizens from Iran

would be detrimental to U.S. interests because of “inadequacies” in Iran’s “information-sharing

and identity-management protocols and practices,” which, the President determined, undermine

“the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States.” 90

Fed. Reg. at 24498–99. The Supreme Court deemed a virtually identical finding sufficient in

Trump v. Hawaii and warned that a more “searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the

President’s justifications” would be “inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference

traditionally accorded the President in this sphere.”

. Accordingly, the court will

deny Plaintiffs’ motion as to Count One of the proposed amended complaint.

The court will, however, grant Plaintiffs leave to bring Counts Two through Four of the

proposed amended complaint, challenging State Department policies implementing the

Proclamation. Although Defendants amply demonstrated the futility of Plaintiffs’ direct

challenges to Presidential Proclamation 10949, Defendants do not explain why Plaintiffs’

challenges to the No Visa Policy and the State Department’s implementation of the National

Interest Exception would be futile. See Gingold, 300 F. Supp. at 12 (explaining that the burden is

on the non-moving party to show that leave should be denied). Moreover, although the court will

not prejudge the merits of these issues before it has briefing, there is some reason to think that at

least Plaintiffs’ challenge to the No Visa Policy might succeed. “Several other courts in this

Page 13 of 15 District have held that the Department of State cannot rely on proclamations issued pursuant to

[section 212(f)] to deny visa applications” because the INA appears to distinguish between

suspending entry and denying visas. Thein,

, at *15 (collecting cases).

Defendants have likewise failed to establish that there is some other valid reason to deny

leave to amend with respect to Counts Two through Four. Plaintiffs did not engage in any undue

delay—they moved to amend their complaint within a month after the President issued Presidential

Proclamation 10949. Nor can it be said that a challenge to policies governing the issuance of visas

to Iranian nationals “bears no more than a tangential relationship to the original” claims regarding

visa applications submitted by Iranian nationals. Geter v. U.S. Gov’t Publ’g Off.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Miss. Ass’n of Coops. v. Farmers Home Admin.,

(D.D.C. 1991)). The “nature of the case” remains the same: Plaintiffs want their visa

applications approved.

Although the court will not require Defendants to relitigate the claims

regarding unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay, nor fight off plainly meritless challenges

to Presidential Proclamation 10949, Rule 15(a) “afford[s]” Plaintiffs “an opportunity to test” their

claims regarding the State Department’s implementation of the Proclamation “on the merits.”

Foman v. Davis,

(1962).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the court will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike;

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and GRANT in part and DENY in

part Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Amend their Complaint. A corresponding order will follow.

Page 14 of 15 Date: December 17, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 15 of 15