UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LUIS ALBERTO RITCHIE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 25-cv-1278 (TSC) MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs are Luis Alberto Ritchie, a 28-year-old American citizen, and his father, Jesus

Ritchie Estrada, a Mexican national. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 16–17, 43, ECF No. 1. In March 2024, a

consular officer denied Estrada’s visa application on the ground that there was “reason to believe”

Estrada was or had been involved “in drug trafficking.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24; see also

(a)(2)(C)(i). Plaintiffs then filed this suit, seeking to compel Defendants to provide a facially

legitimate and bona fide explanation for the denial of Estrada’s application. Compl. ¶¶ 63–64, 73.

Defendants now move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 23. Although the court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ hardship, the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability bars their suit and, in any event, Plaintiffs have already received a

legally sufficient explanation. The court will therefore GRANT Defendants’ motion.

I. ANALYSIS

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

Page 1 of 5 “Denying a visa” is a sensitive decision that “may implicate” foreign policy or “changing

political and economic circumstances”; accordingly, such decisions are committed to “the political

branches, with limited judicial review.” Colindres v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up); see also Trump v. Hawaii,

(2018) (“For more

than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is

a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely

immune from judicial control.” (cleaned up)). Indeed, because the “Immigration and Nationality

Act . . . does not authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa,” federal courts,

“as a rule, . . . cannot review those decisions.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 (2024)

(cleaned up). This principle—known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability—is subject to

“two narrow exceptions.” Colindres,

.

“The first exception applies when ‘a statute expressly authorizes judicial review,’” but it

“is not at issue here because [Plaintiffs] have pointed to no statute that allows review.” Colindres,

(quoting Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir.

2021)). Instead, Plaintiffs rely on the “second exception,” which “lets ‘an American citizen . . .

challenge the exclusion of a noncitizen if it burdens the citizen’s [fundamental] constitutional

rights.’”

(quoting Baan Rao,

); see also

(“Because the Colindreses

cannot show that the Government’s visa denial burdened Mrs. Colindres’s fundamental rights,

their suit does not fall within the constitutional-rights exception[.]”). This exception originates

from the Supreme Court’s decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel,

(1972). But even if the

Mandel exception applies, the government need only provide “a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide

reason’ for denying [the] visa.” Colindres,

(quoting Mandel,

).

If it has, the court’s review ends. See id. at 1024.

Page 2 of 5 To the extent Estrada himself seeks to invoke the Mandel exception, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 8,

24–26, ECF No. 25, that attempt fails. The second exception allows only “an American citizen”

to challenge a visa denial “if it burdens the citizen’s constitutional rights.” Colindres,

(emphasis added) (cleaned up). Estrada, “as a noncitizen [with] no constitutional right to

enter the United States,” cannot “challenge the denial of his visa.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 902.

Although Ritchie is an American citizen, his effort to invoke Mandel fares no better.

Ritchie claims that the denial of his father’s visa burdens his procedural due process rights. See

Pl.’s Opp’n at 8, 26. An individual does not usually have “a procedural due process right in

someone else’s legal proceeding.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 916 (emphasis in original). And indeed,

“Mandel does not hold that citizens have procedural due process rights in the visa proceedings of

others.” Id. at 917. Instead, Mandel involved the denial of a visa for a self-described

“revolutionary Marxist, Ernest Mandel, who had been invited to speak at a conference at Stanford

University.” Hawaii,

(citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–57). A group of American

professors sued, arguing “that the denial of Mandel’s visa directly deprived them of their First

Amendment right[]” to hear Mandel speak. Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 918. “To make an argument

logically analogous to that of the professors, [Ritchie] would have to claim that the denial of

[Estrada’s] visa denied [his] substantive due process” by depriving him of a fundamental liberty

interest, and that this deprivation entitles him to procedural due process in his father’s visa denial.

Id. at 918–19 (emphasis added); see also Colindres,

(“Because the Colindreses

cannot show that the Government’s visa denial burdened Mrs. Colindres’s fundamental rights,

their suit does not fall within the constitutional-rights exception[.]” (emphasis added)); Muñoz,

602 U.S. at 934 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[A] fundamental right may trigger procedural due

process protectives over a noncitizen’s exclusion[.] (emphasis added)).

Page 3 of 5 But Ritchie cannot point to any right so “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history

and tradition” as to be considered fundamental. Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 910 (quoting Washington v.

Glucksberg,

, 720–21 (1997)). To start, “an adult citizen has no fundamental right to

have his or her unadmitted [noncitizen] parent immigrate into the United States.” See Khachatryan

v. Blinken,

, 860 (9th Cir. 2021); cf. Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 909 (“[W]e hold that a citizen

does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the

country.”); Butera v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“A parent does

not have a constitutionally-protected interest in the companionship of a child who is past minority

and independent.”). Ritchie suggests that the visa denial’s determination that there is reason to

believe his father has been involved in drug trafficking deprives him of his ability to do business

with his father. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, 13–17. Even assuming a deprivation has occurred—and that

is far from clear—Ritchie’s argument still fails because the fundamental “‘liberties’ protected by

substantive due process do not include economic liberties.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.

v. Fla. Dep’t of Env. Prot.,

, 721 (2010). Congress’s “broad [and] comprehensive

powers to regulate Commerce with foreign nations,” moreover, cuts against any argument that

there is a fundamental right to transact business with a foreign national. United States v. Montoya

de Hernandez,

(1985) (cleaned up); see also Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 903

(“Congress’s longstanding regulation of spousal immigration . . . cuts” against Muñoz’s contention

that there is a fundamental right to immigrate one’s spouse.).

Even if the Mandel exception applied, Plaintiffs’ claim would fail on the merits. In

applying the Mandel exception, “[c]ourts ask only whether the government has given ‘a facially

legitimate and bona fide reason’ for denying a visa”—a “requirement [that] is easy to satisfy.”

Colindres,

(quoting Mandel,

). The government meets this burden

Page 4 of 5 by merely “citing a statutory provision that specifies discrete factual predicates the consular officer

must find to exist before denying a visa.”

(cleaned up). Once the government provides such a

citation, “‘the courts will neither look behind the exercise of [the consular officer’s] discretion, nor

test it by balancing its justification’ against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens.”

Hawaii,

(quoting Mandel,

).

Here, the consular officer cited

(a)(2)(C)(i). See Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. That

statutory provision specifies a factual predicate: The consular officer must know or have reason

to believe that the applicant “is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or . . .

listed chemical,” or has knowingly aided and abetted such trafficking.

(a)(2)(C)(i).

Citing this provision “was all the officer was required to do.” Colindres,

. And

because the Ritchies make no assertion of bad faith on the part of the consular officer, there is no

question that this explanation was bona fide. See

II. CONCLUSION

Although the court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ desire for more clarity, the court is without

any power to review the denial of Estrada’s visa. Even if the Mandel exception applied, the

consular officer’s citation to

(a)(2)(C)(i) would end the court’s review. The court

is therefore constrained to GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss. A separate order will follow.

Date: December 17, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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