UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-1232 (TNM) v.

JOHN G. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Presiding Officer of the Judicial Conference of the United States, et al.,

Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Freedom of Information Act announced a policy of broad disclosure of government

documents. Broad disclosure, however, does not mean unlimited disclosure. While FOIA

promises access to many Executive Branch records, Congress excused itself and the courts from

FOIA’s reach.

In 2024, America First Legal Foundation (“America First”) requested various documents

from the Judicial Conference of the United States and Administrative Office of the United States

under FOIA. Both entities rejected the request on the basis that they are part of the Judiciary, so

FOIA does not apply to them. America First disagreed. Taking a narrower view of FOIA’s

court-documents carve out, America First sees the Judicial Conference and Administrative

Office as agencies subject to FOIA. So America First sued and asks the Court to compel the

heads of the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office to comply with its FOIA request.

See Am. Compl., ECF No. 2. Defendants moved to dismiss America First’s Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss at 11, ECF No. 14. 1 They argue that

both entities comprise part of the Judicial Branch, which exempts their records from FOIA as

those of “courts of the United States.”

(1)(B). Because the Judicial Conference

and the Administrative Office indeed fall outside FOIA’s reach, the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the records request. So it will grant the motion to dismiss.

I.

“To the Framers, the separation of powers and checks and balances were more than just

theories. They were practical and real protections for individual liberty in the new Constitution.”

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,

(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the

judgment). In creating the Constitution’s system of divided power, the Founders “considered it

essential that ‘the judiciary remain[] truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive,’”

and thus free from political winds. Stern v. Marshall,

(2011) (quoting

Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).

Judicial independence defined federal courts then as it does today. How courts operate,

though, has changed dramatically. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the judicial machine

was “characterized by its simplicity.” Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, The History of

the Administrative Office of the United States Courts: Sixty Years of Service to the Federal

Judiciary 3 (2000). Minimal costs and few cases meant that courts successfully operated as

mostly “self-administered,” isolated units.

at 3–4.

That changed as the country matured. In 1870, Congress created the Justice Department

and mandated that it manage the federal courts.

Then, in 1891, Congress established the

1 All page citations refer to the page numbers that the CM/ECF system generates.

2 circuit courts of appeals. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517 § 6,

, 828. With early

twentieth century industrialization, an increase in federal laws prompted an “influx of new cases”

that “threatened to overwhelm” the 150 federal judges then serving. History of the

Administrative Office, supra, at 4. All the while, federal courts lacked a “consistent way of

bringing together judges to solve common problems.” Marin K. Levy, The Invention of the

Judicial Administrative State, 123 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2025). These challenges prompted

judges, justices, bar members, and politicians alike to seek “reform and modernization of judicial

administration.” History of the Administrative Office, supra, at 5.

Congress offered one solution—bringing judges together—in 1922, with legislation

creating the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, Act of Sept. 14, 1922,

,

, 838 (codified as amended at

(2018)), what is now the Judicial

Conference, see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,

. The Act provided that each year, a

judge from every federal circuit would convene in Washington, D.C., to discuss issues facing the

courts, see 42 Stat. at 837–38, and to “disseminate[]” its ideas to “dispersed district judges and

to Congress. Peter G. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration, 39 (1973). The

Conference would also “make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts

of the United States” and transfer judges to or from circuits as needed. See

. It

was and remains a key means of promoting “uniformity” and the “expeditious conduct of court

business” across federal courts. See

Eliminating one problem prompted solutions to others. Once judges had a collective

body in the Judicial Conference, eyes moved to another problem in the judicial system—the

Department of Justice’s administrative role for the courts. By the 1920s, the Department set

salary classifications and appointment standards for court staff. Fish, supra, at 96. Its power

3 “evoked anguished cries of protest” and fear of Executive Branch abuse among judges and

politicians. Id. As some hypothesized, for instance, the Attorney General could “force out of

office an efficient and trustworthy Clerk” he did not like simply “by fixing his salary” so low

that he must “resign his office.” Id. (quoting Judges Charles M. Hough, Martin T. Manton,

Julius M. Mayer, Henry Wade Rogers to Harry M. Daughtery, April 15, 1922, Administrative

Office Correspondence).

Hesitation went both ways. Some Attorneys General also felt reluctant to manage the

courts and judges. “What would [a judge] think,” Attorney General Homer Cummings said in

1938, “if I wrote him a letter saying ‘Why don’t you speed up?’ He will think I am impertinent

and will probably tell me so.” Fish, supra, at 99 (citing U.S., Congress, Sentence, Committee on

the Judiciary, Hearings, on S. 3212, Administrative Office of the United State Courts, 75th Cong.,

3d Sess. at 13 (1938)) Tensions aside, too, court administration was low on the Department’s

priority list, so tasks like facilitating “intercircuit assignment[s] of judges” went undone. Id. at

102.

Congress ironed out these wrinkles in 1939, when it established the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts. See Act of Aug.7, 1939,

Stat. 1223,

1225–26 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601–10 (2018)). The 1939 Act vested in the

Administrative Office all “powers and duties” that the Justice Department or Attorney General

had possessed “respecting clerks of courts, deputy clerks of courts, and clerical assistants, law

clerks, secretaries, and stenographers . . . and librarians.” Id. at 1226.

Instead of the Attorney General at the head, a Director and Deputy Director, both

appointed by the Chief Justice and subject to removal by him after consulting the Judicial

4 Conference, would run the Administrative Office. See id. at 1223. 2 The Act provided that the

Director would supervise “administrative matters” related to clerks’ offices and clerical

personnel, disburse appropriated funds for the courts’ maintenance and operation, prepare

statistical data and reports on the courts’ business, purchase equipment and supplies, prepare an

estimate of the Judiciary’s annual budget. Id. at 1223–25.

The Judicial Conference and Administrative Office serve their original purposes today,

though both have grown. In present form, the Conference’s governing statute provides for

numerous functions. The Judicial Conference has authority to: (1) “promote uniformity of

management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business”; (2) “prepare plans for

assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary”; (3) study “the operation

and effect” of the federal rules and recommend changes to them; (4) submit “an annual report” of

its proceedings and legislation recommendations to Congress; and (5) “consult” with the

Marshals Service about “security requirements for the judicial branch.” See

.

More, the Conference has grown as new circuit courts joined the federal Judiciary, and as

representative district judges joined the Conference. See Judicial Conference of the United

States: Members, Federal Judicial Center, https://perma.cc/CE3F-BA7E. Its areas of work have

expanded too. Originally, the Conference authorized five committees to address specific issues,

but now it has twenty that cover topics ranging from budget to codes of conduct to case

management to financial disclosures to technology and security. See About the Judicial

Conference, United States Courts, https://perma.cc/M86S-ZMTM (listing all committees).

2 The 1939 Act called what is now the “Deputy Director” the “Assistant Director.” Compare 53 Stat. at 1223, with Act of 1959,

,

, 652 (codified as amended at

(2018)).

5 The Administrative Office likewise has expanded. Once comprised of 77 employees, the

Administrative Office personnel now measure over 1,000. History of Administrative Office,

supra at viii. The Director still supervises “administrative matters” related to clerks’ offices and

clerical personnel, fixes judicial employees’ compensation, disburses appropriated funds for the

courts’ maintenance and operation, purchases property for the judicial branch, and accepts gifts

to “aid[] or facilitate[e] the work of the judicial branch.”

(a)(17). But the

Administrative Office has also taken on new tasks, for example, working to modernize the

courts’ electronic filing system. Director’s Annual Report, 2024, United States Courts,

https://perma.cc/UM5L-YWHT. As things change, its role as the administrative backbone for

the courts remains the same.

***

This case touches on some of the inter-branch tensions that prompted Congress to create

the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office nearly a century ago.

America First wants records from the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office

concerning communications between both entities and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse,

Representative Hank Johnson, or their staff members. Am. Comp. ¶ 23. In July 2024, it

submitted FOIA requests to both entities along those lines.

A couple of months later, Legal

Counsel to the Supreme Court denied America First’s request to the Judicial Conference.

. The Judicial Conference, he reasoned, is part of the Judicial Branch and thus exempt from

FOIA, which applies only to documents from executive agencies.

Soon after, Counsel to the

Financial Disclosure Committee Counsel to the Administrative Office did the same in response

to America First’s request to the Administrative Office.

. Again, he reasoned that FOIA

does not cover the Administrative Office, as an arm of the Judiciary.

6 Those answers prompted this lawsuit. America First sued the Chief Justice, in his

capacity as presiding officer of the Judicial Conference, and Judge Robert Conrad in his capacity

as Director of the Administrative Office.

. It claims that they violated FOIA by declining

to provide it with records responsive to its requests.

. America First argues that the

Judicial Conference and Administrative Office are properly considered Executive Branch

agencies that must comply with FOIA’s disclosure demands. See

. America First

seeks: (1) a declaration that the records it seeks must be disclosed; (2) a declaration that FOIA

applies to the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office as independent agencies within the

Executive Branch; (3) an order directing them to search for records responsive to Plaintiff’s

FOIA requests; (4) an order that Defendants produce records by a certain date; and (5) an award

of attorney’s fees and costs, as well as other relief.

at 13–14. Defendants moved for

dismissal, Mot. to Dismiss at 23, and the Court heard oral argument, see Minute Entry, Nov.

19, 2025. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it grants Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.3

II.

Under Rule 12(b)(1), this Court presumes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.,

(1994). Federal courts have limited

jurisdiction and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”

And when

a defendant brings a challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

that the court has jurisdiction. See

3 America First listed individuals, not entities, as Defendants. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18. The Court could dismiss the case on this ground alone because FOIA applies to entities, not individuals. See Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). But for the reasons that follow, America First’s challenge would fail even had it properly listed entities.

7 In FOIA cases like this one, a plaintiff must show that a defendant withheld agency

records before he can establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Am. Civil Liberties Union

v. CIA,

, 667–68 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of FOIA case for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because congressional records were not agency records). That is

because FOIA grants federal district courts jurisdiction only “to order the production of any

agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.”

(a)(4)(B) (emphasis

added). Non-agency documents “are not subject to FOIA’s disclosure requirement,” and thus do

not suffice. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2004); Banks v.

Lappin,

(D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction FOIA claims against the President, Vice President, House, and Senate because the

Office of the President and Congress were not agencies under FOIA). 4

III.

The case boils down to one issue. Are the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office

“agencies” subject to FOIA?

FOIA directs agencies to provide certain records in response to public requests.

(a). The Act defines an “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United

States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.”

§ 551(1). What

an “agency” or “authority of the Government” means, it turns out, is not always obvious. See

Partington v. Houck,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the “statutory definition of

‘agency’ is not entirely clear”) (cleaned up).

4 Defendants asked the Court to dismiss either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court “cannot proceed at all in any cause” without jurisdiction, it addresses subject matter jurisdiction alone, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

(1998), although the Court’s rationale would similarly apply to a 12(b)(6) analysis.

8 But § 552(f)(1) adds additional color. It provides that the definition of “agency”

“includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government

controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government

(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency.”

(f)(1). Note the focus on the Executive Branch and so-called independent agencies.

Indeed, FOIA covers most, but not all, Executive Branch entities. Cf. Kissinger v. Reps. Comm.

for Freedom of the Press,

(1980).

And setting aside what entities “agency” includes, a neighboring statutory provision

names several that this definition excludes. None is part of the Executive Branch. As § 551

specifies, the meaning of “agency . . . does not include,” “the Congress . . . the governments of

the territories or possessions of the United States . . . the government of the District of

Columbia” or “courts martial and military commissions.”

(A)–(G). Also, and

most relevant here, § 551 lists “the courts of the United States” as outside the definition of

“agency.” Id. § 551(B). Putting the pieces together, FOIA’s definition of “agency” reaches

many Executive Branch arms, but not those of its peer branches.

Guided by those contours, the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office fall outside

FOIA’s ambit. For starters, neither is like the Executive Branch entities FOIA explicitly

contemplates as examples of an “agency.” See id. § 552(f)(1). Neither resembles something like

the Department of Defense, see Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force,

, 265–66 (2d Cir. 1974),

or Department of Interior, see Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton,

(D.C. Cir. 1974). These entities are not military departments like a state’s branch of the National

Guard. See In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 2009). They are not government

9 corporations like a home mortgage company subject to “substantial federal control over its day-

to-day operations.” See Rocap v. Indiek,

(D.C. Cir. 1976).

Nor are the Judicial Conference or Administrative Office properly described as

independent agencies. Their governing statutes include no language naming either as an

“independent agency.” See, e.g.,

(a) (calling Social Security Administration an

“independent agency”);

(calling United States Postal Service an “independent

establishment”);

(calling Office of Personnel Management an “independent

establishment”);

(a) (calling Consumer Product Safety Commission an

“independent regulatory commission”). Thus, the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office

do not appear to be the type of entities Congress had in mind in creating FOIA—Executive

Branch departments and independent agencies.

Rather, as part of the Judicial Branch, the Judicial Conference and the Administrative

Office fall within FOIA’s exception for “courts of the United States.”

§ 551(1)(B). Recall

that the Judicial Conference serves as the Judiciary’s policymaking body. Tasks within its

purview include: surveying “business in the courts of the United States,” planning “for

assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary,” recommending policy “to

the various courts to promote” management uniformity, and working with the United States

Marshal Service on “security requirements.”

.

Meanwhile, the Administrative Office, through its Director, supervises “all administrative

matters relating to the offices of clerks and other clerical and administrative personnel of the

courts.”

(a)(1). That includes fixing judicial employees’ compensation,

disbursing appropriated funds for the courts’ operation, and purchasing property for the Judicial

10 Branch.

§ 604(a). The Administrative Office, in short, is the Judiciary’s back office, an

extension of the various offices of the clerks of courts.

Nothing about either entity’s structure suggests the President must supervise their

employees or otherwise keep them “accountable,” as is the case for executive officers. See Free

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,

, 483 (2010). Rather, the

Administrative Office answers to the Judicial Conference and Supreme Court, see

, and the Judicial Conference is run by the Chief Justice of the United States, see

§ 331.

That makes sense. The Judicial Conference, like Article III courts, is “composed of Article III

judges.” See Tashima v. Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts.,

, 1270 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). In

fact, the whole point of creating the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office centered

around giving courts “some management power,” and diminishing Executive Branch control

over them. See Chandler v. Jud. Council of Tenth Cir. of U.S.,

(1970). And

assigning a degree of managerial authority to the courts is nothing new. The Constitution, after

all, allows “the Courts of Law,” not just the Executive, to appoint some “inferior Officers.” U.S.

Const., art. II § 2, cl. 2.

Likewise, neither’s tasks involve the “execution of the law in a meaningful sense” as is

the case for Executive Branch entities. Bowsher v. Synar,

(1986) (cleaned

up). Consider Bowsher, where the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional the Balanced Budget

and Emergency Deficit Control Act’s assignment of certain functions to the Comptroller

General.

. Under that Act, the Comptroller General had “ultimate authority to

determine” certain “budget cuts,” binding even the President to follow the Comptroller’s

conclusions in executing the Act.

. That power amounted to the exercise of

“judgment concerning facts that affect[ed] the application of the Act,” a power “typically” held

11 “by officers charged with executing a statute.”

. Because the Comptroller, through

“implement[ing] the legislative mandate,” saw through “the very essence of ‘execution’ of the

law,” he wielded executive power.

Not so for the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office. Neither makes policy

decisions that bind the public (like Congress), or Executive Branch officials as Bowsher

contemplated. 478 U.S. at 732–33. Both entities support judicial operations. The

Administrative Office has “purely an administrative” role and “collect[s] information for use by

the courts themselves.” Chandler, 398 U.S. at 97–98 (Harlan, J., concurring) (cleaned up); see

(a). This Court “know[s] of no authority for the proposition that courts’

administrative . . . activities” must “be labelled as ‘executive’ simply because” they are “non-

adjudicative in character.” See Hastings v. Jud. Conf. of U.S.,

, 99 n.36 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (internal citation omitted). Rather, such “ministerial and mechanical” duties fall outside

the realm of meaningful law execution that Bowsher contemplates.

.

The Judicial Conference, meanwhile, provides a chance for “friendly interchange among

judges” to better understand “problems of judicial administration.” Chandler, 398 U.S. at 97–98

(Harlan, J., concurring). It studies and addresses those problems ranging from judicial

assignments to security needs. See

. Sometimes, to be sure, it participates in

policymaking processes, as when it “recommend[s]” changes to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure to the Supreme Court for its “consideration” and potential adoption,

but even in

that example, its role is an advisory one. When the Judiciary makes binding policy, it does so

only to regulate itself and Judicial Branch procedures and operations. See, e.g., Report of the

Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, United States Courts, Sept.

16, 2025, https://perma.cc/T2SS-5UU8 (summarizing a variety of the Conference’s recent

12 operational and procedural decisions). None of these features suggests that the Judicial

Conference is properly understood as an Executive Branch entity.

This conclusion aligns with the Supreme Court’s teaching in Mistretta v. United States,

(1989). Mistretta involved a separation-of-powers challenge to the U.S.

Sentencing Commission.

. Though the Sentencing Commission is formally “locate[d]”

in the Judicial Branch, see

, it makes policy judgments about criminality by

promulgating sentencing guidelines,

. Petitioners thus argued that the

Commission impermissibly “unites both judicial and legislative power” in the Judicial Branch.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391–92. But the Court rejected that argument and found no constitutional

problem with the Commission’s “unique composition and responsibilities.”

.

How Mistretta arrived there proves helpful guidance. As the Court explained, its

“approach to other nonadjudicatory activities that Congress ha[d] vested in federal courts or in

auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch” suggested that the Sentencing Commission could

consistently exist in the Judicial Branch.

. What were those auxiliary bodies? “The

Judicial Conference of the United States” and “the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts.”

“[E]stablished practice,” had shown the Court “recognized Congress’ power to

create” these entities.

The delegations to the Judiciary, according to the Court, posed no

constitutional issues as long they were “appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary” and

involved no entrenchment “upon the prerogatives of another Branch.”

The Judicial

Conference and Administrative Office’s constitutional inoffensiveness, in other words, supported

the Sentencing Commission’s.

Mistretta leaves little room for debate here. Deeming the Judicial Conference and

Administrative Office properly established Judicial Branch entities alone forecloses the notion

13 that either is an Executive Branch agency.

But even had the Court not named them, the

result is the same. Whether the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office properly exist

within the Judicial Branch poses an easier question than it did for the Sentencing Commission.

The problem for the Commission’s status as a Judicial Branch entity stemmed from its power to

make policy judgments about criminality by promulgating sentencing guidelines. See

;

. And even still, the Supreme Court deemed it constitutional. Mistretta,

. The Judicial Conference and Administrative Office pose far less of (if any) a

separation-of-powers threat. By collectively addressing intra-branch issues (Judicial

Conference) and otherwise handling court operations (both), each entity merely sees through

“fair and efficient fulfillment of responsibilities that are properly the province of the Judiciary.”

. They carry out “administrative or rulemaking duties that . . . are necessary and proper

. . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to

pronounce.”

(cleaned up). If the Sentencing Commission constitutionally exists within the

Judicial Branch, the same is true for these entities.

In line with these observations, courts consistently reject arguments that either the

Administrative Office or the Judicial Conference qualifies as an executive agency subject to

FOIA. See Isiwele v. United States HHS,

(D.D.C. 2015) (“FOIA does

not apply to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts because it is an arm of the

judicial branch, which is not subject to FOIA.”); Hairston v. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., No. 25-

1139,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2025) (concluding that the

Administrative Office “is not obligated to respond because it is not subject to FOIA requests”)

(cleaned up); Adams v. Comm. on Jud. Conduct & Disability,

(N.D.

Cal. 2016) (noting that “FOIA specifically exempts the judicial branch” in a case involving a

14 Judicial Conference Committee) (emphasis in original); Wayne Seminoff Co. v. Mecham, No. 02-

2445,

, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003) (rejecting FOIA claims

against the Administrative Office as “part of the judicial branch” and “not an agency” for FOIA

purposes). The Court knows of no authority requiring either entity to respond to a FOIA request.

And it sees no reason to stray from that well-trodden path. Neither the Judicial Conference nor

the Administrative Office qualifies as an agency for FOIA purposes.

America First’s strongest counterargument focuses on FOIA’s reference to “the courts.”

It claims that, by excluding “the courts” from its coverage, FOIA refers only to judges and their

law clerks, who directly see through courts’ Article III duties. In its view, that exemption does

not include other Judicial Branch entities like the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office.

Hr’g Tr. 24:15–25. This understanding of FOIA takes too cramped a read of the statutory

provision at hand. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

356 (2012) (“[A] sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the forest for the trees.”) (quoting New York

Tr. Co. v. Commissioner,

(2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.)).

True enough, as America First claims, one might construe “the courts” to include only

those who resolve cases—judges. But that is not always true. In some contexts, one understands

“the courts” to encompass the institutional and administrative superstructure supporting case

resolution. To determine which meaning governs, the Court looks to the context. “In common

language,” as Chief Justice Marshall once explained, “the same word has various meanings, and

the peculiar sense in which it is used in any sentence is to be determined by the context.”

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

(1831). Here, the context suggests that “the

courts” covers the entire Judicial Branch.

15 To start, recall that FOIA’s definition of “agency” targets primarily Executive Branch

entities. See

(f)(1); supra at 8–10. It explicitly lists several Executive Branch

institutions while omitting any Legislative or Judicial Branch equivalent.

(f)(1).

That Executive Branch focus suggests that the remaining two branches, not parts of them, escape

FOIA. More, FOIA’s list of exclusions from the definition of “agency” speaks in broad strokes

when it comes to the Legislative and Judicial Branches.

§ 551(A)–(B). Congress could have

listed specific entities in either branch, as it did for the Executive, but it listed only “Congress”

and “the courts.” See id. That choice, again, suggests that FOIA’s exclusion for “the courts”

contemplates a branch, not its components. See Inst. S’holder Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (“If the Congress in one provision uses a specific

term . . . and in neighboring provisions . . . us[es] broader language, we may infer that the

Congress meant something different in its choice of the specific term.”).

Indeed, if America First were right that only judges and “law clerks,” who “directly

report[] to the judge,” count as part of “the courts,” numerous questions arise, and senseless line

drawing ensues. Hr’g Tr. at 24:23–25. As America First sees things, “law clerks are in” the

definition of courts, but “the clerk’s office is not.”

at 27:4–15. “[M]agistrate judges may be

in,” but the Administrative Office is certainly not.

(emphasis added). Where does that leave

courtroom deputies or court reporters? Why should law clerks, who are not themselves

constitutional officers, be immune from FOIA’s reach? And what about the Tax Court, which is

part of the Executive Branch but has been held immune from FOIA? See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.

v. Natl. Sec. Comm’n,

, 93 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing Byers v. U.S. Tax Court,

(D.D.C. 2016)). And what rule is to guide these inquiries? To these

16 questions, America First merely acknowledges that indeed, courts “need to draw a line

somewhere.” Hr’g Tr. at 23:15–17.

But setting “the courts” in its proper context, FOIA involves no such arbitrariness.

Rather, FOIA’s exclusion reflects that courts include a full range of “judicial adjuncts,” from

“clerks” to “court reporters,” who performs “tasks that are an integral part of the judicial

process.” See Sindram v. Suda,

(D.C. Cir. 1993); Wiggins v. New Mexico

State Supreme Ct. Clerk,

(10th Cir. 1981) (“[N]o court can discharge its

judicial duties without the aid of clerks, servants and agents.”) (cleaned up).

Consider FOIA’s exemption for the Legislature. FOIA exempts “the Congress” from

§ 551’s definition of “agency.” Presumably, this is why America First did not direct its requests

to Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson. But “Congress,” in this context, does not include only the

535 voting members and the staffers directly reporting to them, as America First argues. Hr’g

Tr. at 38:5–9. If that were correct, Congress’s “HR department[s],” the “Architect of the Capital,

Library of Congress, the general counsel,” and the “sergeant at arms” would all fall outside the

exclusion and potentially within FOIA’s reach. Id. at 39:4–9. But FOIA draws none of these

distinctions explicitly or otherwise suggests that the Court should. That comes as no surprise.

These entities support Congress’s core legislating function. Each helps make it possible for

legislators to perform their jobs by, for example, taking care of congressional buildings, see

Pulphus v. Ayers,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (Architect of the Capitol), or handling

payroll, see Romney v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1948) (sergeant of arms).

They fit comfortably within the Legislative, not Executive, Branch. Without such “auxiliary

bodies,” Congress cannot legislate just as courts cannot resolve cases. See Mistretta,

389. By capturing the Judicial and Legislative Branches as opposed to their components, FOIA

reflects that reality.

All of this explains why case law consistently interprets “courts” to cover the entire

Judicial Branch in this setting. Mayo v. U.S. Gov’t Printing Off.,

(9th Cir.

1993) (“Just as the [FOIA] in excluding ‘the courts of the United States,’

(1)(B),

excludes not only the courts themselves but the entire judicial branch, so the entire legislative

branch has been exempted from the Freedom of Information Act.”); United States v. Casas,

(1st Cir. 2004) (“The judicial branch is exempt from the Freedom of Information

Act.”); Isiwele,

(“The phrase ‘courts of the United States’ is interpreted

such that this exemption applies to the entire judicial branch of government.”) (cleaned up);

Banks v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2008) (same).

The same is true in other, similar settings. In an Administrative Procedure Act case, for

instance, the D.C. Circuit has observed that “virtually every case interpreting the APA exemption

for ‘the courts of the United States’ has held that the exemption applies to the entire judicial

branch—at least to entities within the judicial branch that perform functions that would

otherwise be performed by courts.” Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). The APA’s definition of “agency,” as the D.C. Circuit

explained, targeted only Executive Branch entities, leading numerous courts to conclude that the

Act’s exemptions for “courts” targeted more “judicial authorities than the courts themselves.”

(cleaned up). Entities like the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office—that act as an

“auxiliary” of the “courts themselves”—fall under that umbrella.

(cleaned up).

Likewise, when it comes to the Legislature, courts consistently conclude that “Congress”

refers not just to the Senate and House of Representatives, but to “the entire legislative branch.”

18

(emphasis omitted); Ethnic Emps. of Libr. of Cong. v. Boorstin,

, 1416 n.15

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (interpreting the APA’s exemption for “Congress” to include the Library of

Congress); Mayo,

(interpreting FOIA’s exemption for “Congress” to include the

Government Printing Office). America First fails to explain why FOIA’s exemption for

“Congress” and “the courts” should be construed differently than the APA’s identical

exemptions.

Turning from the text, America First invokes Tashima v. Administrative Office of the

United States Courts as support, yet still comes up short.

(9th Cir. 1992). In

Tashima, a judge sued over the Administrative Office’s denial of litigation funds for a lawsuit in

which the judge was sued in his official capacity.

at 1266–67. True, Tashima described the

Administrative Office as a “non-Article III entity.”

. But it also noted that the

Administrative Office “works for the judiciary.”

. Given this Court’s conclusion that

FOIA’s exemption applies to the whole Judicial Branch, Tashima’s description of the

Administrative Office as a non-Article III entity within that branch does little here.

In any case, America First walked away from Tashima at oral argument. When faced

with Tashima’s conclusion that the Judicial Conference is “properly considered” an “Article III

entit[y]” given its composition of “Article III judges who possess the required attributes of life

tenure and guaranteed salary,”

at 1270 n.2, America First distanced itself from the entire case.

What matters, it explained, is “not necessarily Tashima” and its distinction between Article III

and non-Article III entities, but whether an entity is “a court of the United States” according to

FOIA’s text. Hr’g Tr. 34:10–15; 35:7–10. So even if this out-of-circuit interpretation of an

unrelated statute had persuasive value to start, America First has cast it aside.

19 America First also claims that the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office’s power

to issue investigative subpoenas and respond to congressional oversight requests renders both

executive agencies. See Resp. at 1, ECF No. 19. Not so. After all, Congress, too, may issue

investigatory subpoenas and America First does not contend (nor could it) that Congress

impermissibly sees out “quintessentially executive” functions. See id. at 18; Trump v. Mazars

USA, LLP,

, 853 (2020) (“We have held that the House has authority under the

Constitution to issue subpoenas to assist it in carrying out its legislative responsibilities.”). And

if anything, subpoena issuance is primarily conducted by the Judiciary. By carrying out tasks

that keep the Judiciary running, Judicial Branch entities do not become part of the Executive.

America First next embraces Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,

(D.C. Cir. 1995), to no avail. Armstrong addressed whether the National Security Council, an

entity all agreed was part of the Executive Branch, was so closely associated with the President

(who is exempt from FOIA) that FOIA did not apply to it.

. Armstrong says nothing

about the Judicial Branch, let alone whether by administering itself, it becomes an executive

agency.

America First’s final salvo fares no better. It claims that the Administrative Office

Director’s status as an “officer” under Title 5 of the U.S. Code makes the entity an Executive

Branch agency subject to FOIA. Resp. at 14. But FOIA applies only to “‘agencies,’ not

‘officers.’” Wayne Seminoff,

, at *19; see

(a). And

Title 5 lists the Administrative Office Directors as an “officer” for “employment benefits issues.

It does not, in any way, make the Director of the [Administrative Office] subject to the

provisions of FOIA.”

If all it took to render the Administrative Office an Executive Branch

agency was one official’s status as an officer, all federal courts would fall into the fold. Article

20 III judges, after all, count as “officers” under Title 5. But America First does not mount that

argument. Neither of these Judicial Branch entities come under FOIA.

IV.

Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it will grant the motion to dismiss.

An appropriate Order will issue today.

2025.12.18 11:00:23 -05'00' Dated: December 18, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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