UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANGELA P., 1

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-827 (GMH) FRANK J. BISIGNANO, 2 Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Angela P. seeks to reverse the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s application for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under Title II and

XVI of the Social Security Act,

(g), 1382(c)(3). Plaintiff alleges that the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in several respects when determining that Plaintiff had

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with some additional limitations.

More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s

allegations of mental impairments, (2) failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of two

medical providers, and (3) failed to incorporate assessed limitations into her RFC. Plaintiff seeks

1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Memorandum from Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. & Case Mgmt. to Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, Chief Judges of the U.S. Dist. Cts., Clerks of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, and Clerks of the U.S. Dist. Cts. (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9T2-U5XG]. 2 The current Commissioner of Social Security is substituted as Defendant under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and a judgment that she is entitled to benefits, or in the

alternative, remand for a new administrative hearing.

Based on the parties’ arguments and review of the record, 3 the Court agrees with Plaintiff

that the ALJ did not properly account for her limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace

(“CPP”) in the assessment of her RFC. Plaintiff’s other arguments, however, are unavailing.

Accordingly, her motion for judgment of reversal is granted to the extent it requests remand to the

Commissioner for further administrative proceedings, and Defendant’s motion for judgment of

affirmance is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To be eligible for SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the Social Security

Administration must find a claimant to be “disabled,” meaning that the individual is “unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To

make that determination, an ALJ gathers evidence, holds a hearing, takes testimony, and performs

the following five-step, sequential inquiry of the disability claim:

Step one: whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial gainful activity.” 4 If

3 The relevant docket entries for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion are (1) the administrative record, ECF No. 7; (2) Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal, ECF No. 9; (3) Defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal, ECF No. 15; and (4) Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance, ECF No. 17. 4 “Substantial gainful activity” is work that “involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties” and is “done (or intended) for pay or profit.”

; see also

(defining “substantial gainful activity” for the purposes of Social Security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) claims). “If [the claimant is] doing substantial gainful activity, [the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] will find that [the claimant is] not disabled.”

(a)(4)(i); see also

(a)(4)(i) (defining the step one inquiry for DIB claims).

2 the answer is yes, then the claimant is not disabled.

Step two: whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments. 5 If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled.

Step three: whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of the disabling impairments listed in the appendix of the relevant regulation, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (the “Listings”). If the answer is yes, the claimant is disabled.

Step four: whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing his or her past relevant work. 6 If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled.

Step five: whether the claimant, in light of his or her age, education, work experience, and RFC—i.e., the most he or she is able to do notwithstanding his or her physical and mental limitations—can still perform another job available in the national economy. 7 If the answer is yes, the claimant is disabled.

See

; see also

§ 404.1520; Butler v. Barnhart,

(D.C. Cir. 2004); Hines v. Bowen,

(4th Cir. 1989).

5 An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly limit[s]” a claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” such as “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “seeing, hearing, [or] speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions”; exercising judgment; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers[,] and usual work situations”; or “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.”

; see also

(defining a severe impairment for the purposes of DIB claims). 6 “Past relevant work” is work “done within the past 15 years that was substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.”

(b)(1)(i) (amended 2024); see also

§ 404.1560(b)(1)(i) (amended 2024) (defining “past relevant work” for the purposes of DIB claims). If the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled” is required. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv); see also id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (defining the step four inquiry for DIB claims). On June 24, 2024, the definition of “past relevant work” changed to work “done within the past five years that was substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it” and that was not “started and stopped it in fewer than 30 calendar days.” Id. § 416.960(b)(1) (emphasis added); see id. § 404.1560(b)(1) (defining “past relevant work” for the purposes of DIB claims);

(Apr. 18, 2024) (outlining amendment to definition of “past relevant work”);

(Jun. 5, 2024) (deferring effective date of amendment to June 24, 2024). Because it was in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision, the fifteen-year lookback period applies in this matter. See Gregory G. v. Bisignano, No. 23-cv-2439,

, at *13–15 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025). 7 At the fifth step, the ALJ may, “‘[i]n the ordinary case, . . . resort[ ] to the applicable medical vocational guidelines’” (also known as “the grids”) to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Rosa v. Callahan,

(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Bapp v. Bowen,

(2d Cir. 1986)); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. “The grids ‘take[ ] into account the claimant’s residual functional capacity in conjunction with the claimant’s age, education and work experience.’”

(alteration in original) (quoting Zorilla v. Chater,

(S.D.N.Y. 1996)). However, when a claimant has additional limitations beyond those contemplated by the grids, the ALJ cannot rely on the grids alone to establish non-disability.

In such cases, the testimony of a vocational expert is generally required. Smith v. Bowen,

(D.C. Cir. 1987).

3 The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps of the evaluation. Callahan

v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2011). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to identify specific jobs available in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

In

making this determination, an ALJ may call a vocational expert to testify at the hearing as to

whether, based on the claimant’s RFC, he or she can perform other work that exists in the national

economy.

.

B. Plaintiff’s Disability Claims and Procedural History

Plaintiff was born in September 1969. ECF No. 7-2 at 37. She is a high school graduate

and completed two years of college but did not obtain an associate’s degree. Id. at 52. Plaintiff

last worked as a restaurant cook until March 2020, when she was let go for reasons unrelated to

her health. ECF No. 7-6 at 3.

Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB benefits on May 26, 2020. Id. at 28. In that application,

she claimed disability with an onset date of May 6, 2020, due to joint pain, high blood pressure,

and HIV infection. Id. Plaintiff’s application was denied at the initial level of review on August

14, 2020, and denied upon reconsideration on March 4, 2022. ECF No. 7-2 at 28. She thereafter

requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id.

On May 5, 2023, the ALJ held a hearing via telephone. Id. At the hearing, the ALJ heard

testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”). Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her

hip area, unintentional weight loss of about 50–60 pounds, rotator cuff pain, and a swollen thyroid.

Id. at 58–59. She also testified to pain in her chest, ankles, back of head, lower back, and neck.

Id. at 63–64, 67. Plaintiff also experienced pain from falls that occurred in May and December

2022. Id. at 62. In December 2022, she fell and hit the left side of her body on her bathtub while

she was attempting to remove mold from her bathroom ceiling. Id. Plaintiff testified that a similar

4 incident occurred in May 2022, when she was removing mold from her ceiling, fell, and hit the

other side of her body. Id. Plaintiff testified she suffers from other health issues, including HIV

and vision difficulties. Id. at 69–71.

Regarding her mental health, Plaintiff testified that she has anxiety and a family history of

schizoaffective disorder. Id. at 75. She stated that her mental health was adversely affected by

concerns about her housing, specifically the presence of mold and scabies in her apartment. Id. at

60–61, 77. She believes these worries have contributed to her anxiety, trouble sleeping, and

unintentional weight loss. Id. at 77, 79. Plaintiff also answered questions regarding cognition and

social connections. Id. at 80. When asked if she has difficulty concentrating or working on a task

until it is completed, Plaintiff testified that she can get “irritated.” Id. She testified that she has no

social connections. Id. at 81.

A VE also testified at the hearing, classifying Plaintiff’s past work and answering a series

of hypothetical questions about jobs available in the national economy for someone with her

physical and mental limitations. Id. at 88–92. With respect to Plaintiff’s past work, the VE testified

that her work as a security guard had a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) 8 of three, and her

job as a grill cook had an SVP of 7. Id. at 89. The ALJ then proposed a hypothetical individual

with the Plaintiff’s age and education who could perform light work limited to SVP 1 or SVP 2

with the following additional limitations:

• Frequently climbing ramps and stairs • Occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds • Frequently balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling • Avoiding greater than occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants • Having no exposure to hazards • Performing simple, routine tasks, and simple work-related decisions

8 “SVP” is a term “used within the DOT to define the time generally required to learn certain skills for particular jobs.” Tiana O. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2051,

, at *13 n.13 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2023). An SVP of 1–2 corresponds to unskilled work, 3–4 corresponds to semi-skilled work, and 5–9 corresponds to skilled work. See

5 • Having frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public • Tolerating few changes to work processes and settings.

at 89–90. The VE testified that, although a person with these limitations could not perform

Plaintiff’s past work, there would be other jobs available to them in the economy, including tanning

salon attendant, furniture rental consultant, and retail marker.

at 90–91.

On cross examination, Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE whether a person having less than

an occasional ability to pursue a work-related task could find employment in the national economy.

. The VE testified that no jobs would be available because such a person would be off

task more than ten percent of the time.

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits engaged in the standard five-step sequential

inquiry as outlined below.

1. Substantial Gainful Employment, Severe Impairments, and the Listings

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since the alleged onset date of disability on May 6, 2020.

. At step two, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: hypertension, thyroid disorder,

sciatica, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and PTSD.

The ALJ found that her other

ailments—HIV and retinopathy—do not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work. 9

. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically

equal the severity of any of the impairments in the Listings.

. Specifically, he found that

her physical ailments did not meet the requirements of Section 1.00 of the Listings, which concerns

musculoskeletal disorders.

As for psychological impairments, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with

9 Plaintiff takes medication for her HIV and is asymptomatic.

Plaintiff also does not wear contact lenses or glasses for any vision problems and denies blurred vision.

6 moderate limitations in all areas of mental functioning—understanding, remembering, and

applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace

(“CPP”); and adapting and managing oneself.

at 31–32.

2. Plaintiff’s RFC

Prior to step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “light work” 10 except

that she was limited to:

• Frequently climbing ramps and stairs • Occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds • Frequently balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling • Avoiding greater than occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants • Having no exposure to hazards • Performing simple, routine tasks, and simple work-related decisions • Having frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public • Tolerating few changes to work processes and settings.

.

In determining the RFC, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable

ailments of hypertension, thyroid disorder, sciatica, anxiety, depressive disorder, and PTSD “could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”

. However, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of those

symptoms, both mental and physical, were not “entirely consistent” with the medical and other

evidence in the record.

As to her physical ailments, Plaintiff reported pain in her arms, thighs, hips, buttocks, feet,

ankles, back, and shoulders, and when squatting, bending, and standing.

Because of the pain,

10 The regulations define “light work” as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. . . . [A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”

(b). SSR 83-10 further explains that “the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for . . . approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10,

, at *5–6 (S.S.A. Jan. 1, 1983).

7 she reported that she needed extra time to perform personal care tasks and could walk for only 30

minutes before needing to rest for ten minutes.

Regarding her mental health symptoms,

Plaintiff stated that she was easily distracted and struggled with concentration and following

instructions; had difficulty handling stress, including from changes in routine; had difficulty

sleeping; was often emotional and tearful; and had no social support.

The ALJ considered the findings of multiple deformities of Plaintiff’s vertebrae, abnormal

blood pressure, and abnormal thyroid levels, but noted her physical examinations showed “only

some occasional outpatient treatment for her musculoskeletal pain and fatigue dating back to 2019,

including prescription medication.”

. In addition, the ALJ observed that while Plaintiff

had some limitations in her physical abilities, such as a limited range of motion in the lumbar spine

and partial range of motion in the wrist and fingers, physical examinations showed that she had a

normal gait, no need for assistance in getting on or off the examination table, a full range of motion

in her cervical spine, shoulders, knees, and ankles, and intact dexterity.

.

Addressing Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms, the ALJ noted that she regularly reported

symptoms including post-traumatic stress, victimization, anxiety, irritability, and excessive worry

to her treating physicians.

However, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff failed to follow up on

recommendations to meet with a mental health practitioner.

She sometimes presented with

“restless movements, fast speech, and difficulty staying on topic, but she was also noted to be

easily redirectable and was able to address specific questions with reminders.”

Overall, the

ALJ noted that Plaintiff had “not followed through with recommendations for mental health

treatment” or “undergone any inpatient hospitalization or emergency room treatment for her

mental or physical symptoms,” and that her “diagnostic studies have been generally normal, and

[her] physical and mental examinations do not support the level of limitation alleged.”

.

8 The ALJ then reviewed the medical opinions in the record, including those of Dr. Colon,

who prepared a report in August 2023 after performing a consultative psychiatric examination of

Plaintiff; Dr. Carlson, a colleague of Plaintiff’s primary care physician, who completed a physical

impairment questionnaire and a mental impairment questionnaire on Plaintiff’s behalf in April

2023; and Nurse Ware, who prepared a report in July 2023 after performing a consultative physical

examination of Plaintiff. See ECF No. 7-9 at 55–63, 119–29, 135–42. In doing so, the ALJ

expressly noted that she could not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including

controlling weight, to any prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including

those from medical sources.” ECF No. 7-2 at 35.

Dr. Colon opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her “ability to interact

adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public[;] sustain concentration and perform a

task at a consistent pace[;] and regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain wellbeing.” He

further found that she had mild limitations in her “ability to understand, remember, and apply

complex directions and instructions[;] use reasoning and judgment to make work-related

decisions,[;] and sustain an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work”; and no limitations in

her “ability to understand, remember, and apply simple directions and instructions [and] maintain

personal hygiene and appropriate attire” or in her “awareness of normal hazards and taking

appropriate precautions.” The ALJ found Dr. Colon’s reasoning largely persuasive because it was

supported by his own examination of Plaintiff and consistent with her progress notes. She appears

to have adopted his findings as to interacting with others and adapting and managing oneself,

assessing Plaintiff with moderate limitations in those areas of functioning.

at 31–32. Regarding

the remaining two limitations—CPP and understanding, remembering, and applying

information—the ALJ adopted more restrictive limitations than those recommended by Dr. Colon,

9 finding that she had moderate rather than mild restrictions in these domains. See

at 31–32.

Conversely, the ALJ did not find persuasive the opinions of Dr. Carlson or Nurse Ware. In

her April 2023 questionnaires, Dr. Carlson opined (among other things) that Plaintiff would need

to recline; had limited ability to stand and walk; required unscheduled breaks; was unable to work

an eight-hour day, five days a week job on a sustained basis; would be absent from work four or

more times per month; had extreme limitations in her ability maintain socially appropriate

behavior; and had marked limitations in her ability to work in coordination or proximity to others

without being distracted by them, perform at a consistent pace, interact appropriately with the

general public, accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism, respond appropriately

to changes in the work setting, and travel in unfamiliar places.

. Noting that Dr. Carlson

was merely “a colleague of the claimant’s primary care physician and had reviewed her treatment

notes and met with the claimant starting only that same month,” the ALJ rejected those severe

restrictions because they were unsupported by Plaintiff’s progress notes and inconsistent with the

facts that she had not required any emergency room visits or in-patient hospitalizations and she

had “not followed through with recommendations for mental health treatment.”

.

Similarly, he found unpersuasive Nurse Ware’s opinion that Plaintiff had “extreme” physical

limitations—such as an ability to perform only sedentary work and strict constraints on sitting,

standing, walking, reaching, climbing, and exposure to environmental hazards—because it was

“inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, which “does not show any medically

determinable impairment that would support such extreme limitations.”

.

In sum, the ALJ found that many of Plaintiff’s claimed physical and mental limitations had

some support in the record but resolved conflicting evidence in favor of moderate limitations rather

than the more severe limitations claimed by Plaintiff, Dr. Carlson, and Nurse Ware.

10 3. Conclusion of the Five-Step Sequential Inquiry

Relying on the testimony from the VE, the ALJ determined that an individual with

Plaintiff’s RFC would be able to perform the occupations of tanning salon attendant, furniture

rental consultant, and retail marker.

at 37–38. Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not

disabled.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal district court has jurisdiction over a civil case challenging a final decision of the

Commissioner.

(g). A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision

if it is based on substantial evidence in the record and the correct application of the relevant legal

standards. Id.; Butler,

.

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision is not

based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Lane-Rauth v.

Barnhart,

(D.D.C. 2006). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,

(1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,

(1938)). It

requires “more than a scintilla [of evidence], but can be satisfied by something less than a

preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC,

, 365–66 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir 2002)).

“The substantial evidence standard requires considerable deference to the decision rendered by the

ALJ.” Crosson v. Shalala,

(D.D.C. 1995).

The reviewing court may neither reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the

Commissioner’s judgment “concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.”

; see

also Butler,

(finding that the district court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence but

11 only to determine whether the ALJ’s findings are “based on substantial evidence and a correct

application of the law”). However, “this standard of review requires the Court to carefully

scrutinize the entire record to ensure that the Commissioner, through the ALJ, has both analyzed

all of the evidence available and has sufficiently explained his/her reasoning and the weights given

to the facts.” Pinkney v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Lane-Rauth,

(“[T]his standard of review ‘calls for careful scrutiny of the entire record,’ to

determine whether the Commissioner, acting through the ALJ, ‘has analyzed all evidence and has

sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits[.]’” (second

alteration in original) (quoting Butler,

)).

Moreover, the Court’s job is to “consider the grounds actually proffered by the ALJ” rather

than to make those determinations for itself, Ward v. Berryhill,

(D.D.C.

2017), or credit “post-hoc rationalization[s]” advanced by the parties, Cooper v. Berryhill, No. 16-

cv-1671,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

(1947) (holding that a reviewing court “must judge the propriety of [an agency’s

judgment] solely by the grounds invoked by the agency”); Jones v. Astrue,

(D.C.

Cir. 2011) (citing Chenery,

).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff mounts a multipronged attack on the RFC set by the ALJ. First, she contends that

the ALJ improperly discounted her own testimony regarding the intensity and persistence of her

symptoms. Second, she claims that the ALJ erred by rejecting the more severe limitations

recommended by Dr. Carlson and Nurse Ware. And third, she argues that the ALJ did not properly

account for Plaintiff’s CPP limitations within the RFC assessment. The Commissioner responds

that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. See ECF No.

12 15 at 31. The Court concludes that the second prong of Plaintiff’s challenge has merit but finds

that the ALJ’s opinion is otherwise supported by substantial evidence.

A. The Intensity and Persistence of Plaintiff’s Symptoms

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s own testimony regarding the

intensity and persistence of her symptoms. Social Security Ruling 16-3p sets forth guidance on

how ALJs must consider a claimant’s “symptoms,” which are “the individual’s own description or

statement of his or her physical or mental impairment(s).” SSR 16-3p,

, at *2

(S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016). There are two steps to the SSR 16-3p analysis. First, the ALJ must

determine whether a “medically determinable impairment” exists that could cause the claimant’s

symptoms.

. Next, the ALJ must evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and functionally

limiting effects” of those symptoms.

. Plaintiff’s argument relates to the ALJ’s decision

to discount Plaintiff’s own testimony at the second step of the inquiry.

The credibility determination that takes place within the second step is “solely within the

realm of the ALJ.” Grant v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2012). However, if the

“ALJ fails to articulate a rational explanation for his or her finding,” a reviewing court may

intercede.

The D.C. Circuit has found that an ALJ may articulate a rational explanation by

issuing a decision that “contain[s] specific reasons for [a] finding on credibility, supported by the

evidence in the case record, and [is] sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and reasons

for that weight.” Butler,

(quoting SSR 96-7p,

, at *2); see, e.g.,

Willis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-CV-1503,

at *23 (N.D. Ohio July 23,

2025) (upholding the ALJ’s determination of 16-3p symptoms when the ALJ “clearly articulated

how he considered the evidence of record in making his findings and made a determination that

13 was supported by substantial evidence”), report and recommendation adopted,

(N.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2025). This Court has thus emphasized that the ALJ, as the fact finder, “has

great discretion in evaluating a claimant’s testimony and is generally entitled to deference.”

Demetria R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3227,

, at *10 (D.D.C. June 30, 2022), report

and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022).

“In evaluating the intensity and persistence of symptoms, the ALJ should consider such

factors as the objective medical evidence, medical opinions, daily activities, type of

pain/symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors, medication and other treatment, any other

measures used to relieve symptoms, and any other factors concerning functional limitations.”

. It is well established that an ALJ “may consider ‘whether there are any inconsistencies in

the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between [the claimant’s] statements

and the rest of the evidence,’” McCormick v. Saul, No. 18-cv-1704,

, at *9

(D.D.C. June 25, 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Butler, 353 F.3d at 1004–05), including

whether the claimant failed to seek recommended treatment, see Goodman v. Saul,

(D.D.C. 2017). In particular, an ALJ may consider whether a claimant has followed

their prescribed treatment plan and may find that the failure to do so undercuts a claimant’s

testimony regarding the intensity of his or her symptoms. See SSR 16-3p,

, at

*8 (“We will consider an individual’s attempts to seek medical treatment for symptoms and to

follow treatment once it is prescribed when evaluating whether symptom intensity and persistence

affect the ability to perform work-related activities[.]”).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity and persistence of her

symptoms were inconsistent with other evidence in the record, and therefore discounted them.

ECF No. 7-2 at 33–37. Specifically, as relevant here, the ALJ relied on the fact that that her

14 “diagnostic studies have been generally normal” and that “she has not followed through with

recommendations for mental health treatment.”

. Plaintiff challenges both findings. First,

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s “allegations of mental dysfunction” by

ignoring “abnormal mental status results” that support Plaintiff’s own testimony. ECF No. 9 at 23.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on “the fact that she failed to follow-up on

her treatment provider’s recommendation to pursue mental health treatment” to discount her claims

about the severity of her symptoms. Id.; see also ECF No. 17 at 7. Neither argument is persuasive.

First, the ALJ did not ignore evidence of Plaintiff’s abnormal mental status. For example,

the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s doctors reported that she showed “restless movements, fast

speech, and difficulty staying on topic”; “mildly impaired attention and concentration, borderline

intellectual functioning, somewhat limited fund of information, and fair insight and judgment”;

“‘mild’ limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and apply complex directions and

instructions, and use reasoning and judgment to make work-related decisions”; that Plaintiff

reported “dysphoric moods, loss of energy, excessive crying, irritability, social withdrawal, loss of

interest, flashbacks, nightmares, hypervigilance, avoidance, and occasional auditory

hallucinations”; that a mental status examination showed “tearfulness, anxious appearance,

depressed mood, fair manner of relating, and fair insight and judgment”; and that Plaintiff regularly

reported mental health symptoms to her treating physicians, “including symptoms of post-

traumatic stress, victimization, anxiety, irritability, excessive worry, fear of environmental

exposure, and problems getting along with others.” ECF No 7-2 at 31–35. But the ALJ also relied

on other evidence that is inconsistent with that evidence. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff

was also “easily redirectable and was able to address specific questions with reminders” and that

she was able to perform daily activities.

at 31–33, 35. Similarly, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff

15 had “intact orientation, normal thoughts, adequate speech, normal motor behavior, and appropriate

eye contact.”

at 31–33. In short, the ALJ considered all the evidence, including the evidence

that supported and undercut Plaintiff’s reports of the intensity and persistence of her symptoms,

and concluded that it supported “moderate” limitations.

Second, the ALJ did not err by considering Plaintiff’s failure to follow-up on recommended

treatment. SSA regulations provide that an ALJ can consider “noncompliance” as one factor in

analyzing a complainant’s credibility. See SSR 16-3p,

, at *8 (“[I]f the

frequency or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree of

the individual’s subjective complaints, or if the individual fails to follow prescribed treatment that

might improve symptoms, we may find the alleged intensity and persistence of an individual’s

symptoms are inconsistent with the overall evidence of record.”); see also Vega v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec.,

, 375 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that it is “not improper” for the ALJ to consider

the claimant less credible if the claimant fails to follow a treatment plan without good reason);

Kenneth W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-0825,

at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,

2020) (finding that the ALJ properly considered the plaintiff’s non-compliance with mental health

treatment and medications when determining the alleged intensity and persistence of plaintiff’s

symptoms); Diaz-Sanchez v. Berryhill,

(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that the

ALJ properly construed the plaintiff’s inaction in receiving treatment for an allegedly disabling

mental health condition as evidence that the condition was not seriously limiting).

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to inquire about or “consider whether Plaintiff had

reasons for not pursuing” the treatment recommended by her doctors. ECF No. 9 at 23. This Court

has recognized that when determining the claimant’s credibility, “the ALJ should . . . ‘review the

case record to determine whether there are explanations’ for a claimant’s failure to follow

16 treatment.” Darlene M. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1817,

, at *23 (D.D.C. Sep. 3,

2021) (quoting SSR 16-3p,

, at *10), report and recommendation adopted sub

nom. Darlene M. v. O’Malley,

(D.D.C. June 3, 2024). That is because a

sufficient explanation for the claimant’s noncompliance, such as that the claimant cannot afford

the treatment, can negate the inference that the claimant’s symptoms are not as severe as claimed.

See Michael C. v. Kijakazi, 18-cv-1935,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2022).

However, this Court has rejected the contention that the ALJ must “engag[e] in ‘detailed

questioning’ of the claimant to ascertain the reason(s) for failing to follow the prescribed

treatment.” Darlene M.,

, at *22 (quoting SSR 82-59,

, at *2)).

To be sure, there are situations in which such an inquiry must occur—it is required “where the ALJ

concludes that a claimant is disabled and must thereafter determine whether the noncompliance

should block her entitlement to benefits.”

(collecting cases). But this is not such a situation.

More, this Court and others have found that an ALJ’s failure to consider reasons a claimant did not

engage in recommended treatment may be cause for a remand where that “noncompliance [is] the

only thing barring relief,” but not where that noncompliance is “‘merely . . . a factor’ in their

decision.” Dennison v. O’Malley, No. 24-cv-2301,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 26,

2025) (quoting Darlene M.,

, at *23). Here, as noted above, the ALJ also pointed

to medical evidence inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms. Put another way,

“the ALJ’s credibility determination regarding Plaintiff’s statements about her impairments, given

their inconsistencies with various medical records, is supported by [substantial] evidence.” Troy

v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-916,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. 2017); cf. Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

(6th Cir. 2013) (“[E]ven if an ALJ’s adverse credibility determination is

17 based partially on invalid reasons, harmless error analysis applies to the determination, and the

ALJ's decision will be upheld as long as substantial evidence remains to support it.”).

Finally, even assuming that the ALJ erred by not considering Plaintiff’s explanation, it

made no difference in the outcome. See Katrina M. v. O’Malley,

, 11 (D.D.C.

2024) (“For an ALJ’s error to warrant reversal or remand, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

error was prejudicial and affected the disposition of the claim.”). Plaintiff’s briefs nowhere provide

an explanation for her noncompliance. See ECF No. 9 at 23; ECF No. 17 at 7. And the only reason

the Court can find in the record is Plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Carlson that she “want[ed] to wait

until other acute issues [were] handled.” ECF No. 7-9 at 8. In other words, Plaintiff’s own

explanation for her noncompliance is that her mental symptoms were not so severe that they

required immediate treatment. Unlike, for instance, an “inability to afford treatment,” Michael C.,

at *8, Plaintiff’s explanation does nothing to negate the inference that her

symptoms were not as severe as she claimed—indeed, if anything, it further supports that

conclusion. So there is no need to remand, even assuming error, because the ALJ would reach the

same result after considering Plaintiff’s explanation for her noncompliance.

B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinions

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Carlson’s and Nurse Ware’s medical

opinions. As explained below, neither of those challenges has merit.

1. Dr. Carlson

Dr. Carlson assessed more severe physical and mental limitations than the ALJ ultimately

adopted, finding that Plaintiff had an “extreme limitation” in her ability to complete a normal

workday and workweek, would struggle to maintain socially appropriate behavior, and would

likely have four or more absences from work per month. ECF No. 7-2 at 35. Dr. Carlson opined

18 that Plaintiff “would need to recline” and “had a limited ability to stand and walk.”

Dr. Carlson

also found that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in her ability “to work in coordination or proximity

to others without being distracted by them, perform at a consistent pace, interact appropriately

with the general public, accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism, respond

appropriately to changes in the work setting, and travel in unfamiliar places.”

The ALJ

ultimately rejected Dr. Carlson’s opinion as “unpersuasive” given Dr. Carlson’s limited

observation of Plaintiff and Dr. Carlson’s opinion’s inconsistency with other evidence in the

record.

For a variety of reasons, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ should have adopted Dr. Carlson’s

opinion and that the ALJ’s refusal to do so is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court,

however, concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Carlson’s opinion.

The opinion of a medical professional who has treated a claimant can be persuasive

evidence of a claimant’s condition. But an ALJ is not obligated to defer to any medical

professional. SSA regulations governing claims filed, like this one, after March 27, 2017, provide

that an ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,

to any medical opinion,” including an opinion from a medical source who has treated the claimant.

.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, medical opinions are evaluated based on (1) the

supportability of the opinion (that is, the “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations

presented by [the] medical source to support his or her medical opinion []”) and (2) the consistency

of the opinion with other evidence in the record.

at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), (c)(1)–(2),

416.920c(b)(2), (c)(1)–(2). An ALJ may also consider the medical source’s relationship with the

claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the

purpose of the treatment relationship, the kinds and extent of examinations and testing performed,

and whether the medical source examined the claimant or merely reviewed evidence; the

19 specialization of the medical source; and “[o]ther factors” such as the medical source’s familiarity

with other evidence or understanding of SSA’s policies. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(3)–(5),

416.920c(c)(3)–(5). At bottom, an ALJ must evaluate a medical opinion on its own merits, and

the ALJ’s evaluation must be supported by substantial evidence. To pass muster under the

substantial evidence standard, the ALJ must compose a “narrative discussion” identifying the

evidence that supports each conclusion within his decision. SSR 96-8p,

, at *7;

Butler,

. The narrative must permit the reviewing court to construct a “logical

bridge” connecting the ALJ’s conclusions to the evidence of record. Lane-Rauth,

.

Here, the Court is persuaded that the ALJ properly analyzed the supportability and

consistency of Dr. Carlson’s limitations based on substantial evidence in the record. To start, the

ALJ provided a reasoned explanation for why he found Dr. Carlson’s decision lacked

supportability. For instance, the ALJ noted that, despite Dr. Carlson’s severe recommended

limitations on standing and walking and the need to recline, Dr. Carlson’s physical examinations

of Plaintiff revealed “generally good range of motion and strength in all extremities, intact

dexterity, normal gait, and no evidence of edema or effusion” and “have only revealed some pain

and limited range of motion.” ECF No. 7-2 at 35–36 (citing Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, 6F, 22F, 26F, 29F,

and 30F). Similarly, with respect to Dr. Carlson’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental health, the ALJ

noted it was based on relatively weak evidence: Plaintiff’s “self-report and [Dr. Carlson’s] limited

observation of the claimant.”

at 36 (citing Exhibit 28F). Elsewhere in her opinion, the ALJ

also noted Dr. Carlson’s observation that Plaintiff “was not on any mental health medication,” and

that, while Plaintiff’s “objective examination [by Dr. Carlson] showed some report of restless

movements, fast speech, and difficulty staying on topic,” it also “noted [Plaintiff] to be easily

20 redirectable and [that she] was able to address specific questions with reminders.”

at 35 (citing

Exhibit 26F).

Moreover, the ALJ adequately explained the inconsistencies with other evidence in the

record that led her to reject Dr. Carlson’s opinion. She noted that “the progress notes from

[Plaintiff’s] primary care physician do not show any support for [Dr. Carlson’s recommendations

regarding Plaintiff’s] need to recline or such extreme limitations in her ability to stand and walk.”

Id. at 35. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s lack of need for emergency care, hospitalization, and

lack of follow up on mental health treatment were inconsistent with Dr. Carlson’s conclusions

about the severity of Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. Id. at 36. And the ALJ considered the

relationship between Plaintiff and Dr. Carlson, noting that Dr. Carlson “was a colleague of the

claimant’s primary care physician and had reviewed her treatment notes and met with the claimant

starting only that same month.” Id. at 35. Together, that analysis is sufficient to explain the ALJ’s

refusal to adopt Dr. Carlson’s more extreme limitations.

Seeking to avoid that result, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s reasoning at virtually every turn.

None of those challenges has merit. First, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Carlson’s

limited observation of Plaintiff is “contradicted by [the ALJ] later finding” persuasive other

witnesses who had not examined Plaintiff at all. ECF No. 9 at 15. Had this been the only fact on

which the ALJ relied, then Plaintiff might have a point. But as the above summary of the ALJ’s

reasoning should make clear, her consideration of Dr. Carlson’s relationship with Plaintiff was

only one of many factors counseling against adopting Dr. Carlson’s recommendation. The ALJ

gave top billing to facts undercutting the supportability and consistency of Dr. Carlson’s opinion.

That treatment comports with SSA rules that define supportability and consistency as “the most

important factors,” but provide that ALJs “may, but are not required to,” consider other factors,

21 such as the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship” and the “[e]xtent of the treatment relationship.”

.1520c(b)(2), (c)(3), 416.920c(b)(2), (c)(3). Put simply, the ALJ provided a

sufficient explanation for finding Dr. Carlson unpersuasive, even though Dr. Carlson examined

Plaintiff.

Relying on two Social Security Rulings, Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ erroneously

based her decision finding Dr. Carlson’s opinions unpersuasive on Plaintiff’s noncompliance with

treatment because she “failed to show where Plaintiff’s treatment providers recommended specific

treatment and how treatment would be expected to restore [Plaintiff’s] ability to engage in

substantial gainful activity.” ECF No. 9 at 15–16 (citing SSR 18-3p; SSR 16-3p). Plaintiff

misreads those Rulings. Neither apply to an ALJ’s evaluation of a medical source opinion. SSR

18-3p stipulates that SSA will “only perform” the more particularized “failure to follow prescribed

treatment analysis discussed in [SSR 18-3p] after [the SSA] find[s] that an individual is entitled to

disability . . ., regardless of whether the individual followed the prescribed treatment.” SSR 18-

3p,

, at *3 (S.S.A. Oct. 2, 2018). That was not the situation here—that is, the

ALJ did not initially find the Plaintiff disabled and then retract that finding because she failed to

comply with prescribed treatment. Rather, the ALJ permissibly relied on record evidence that

Plaintiff failed to follow up with treatment as one factor to evaluate the weight of the evidence—

that is, Dr. Carlson’s conclusions about the severity of Plaintiff’s mental health impairments. ECF

No. 7-2 at 36; see Annette P. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-cv-2798,

, at

*3 (D. Md. Sept 29, 2022) (finding the requirements of SSR 18-3p inapplicable because the ALJ

did not initially find the claimant disabled and permitting the ALJ to consider failure to comply

with prescribed treatment as a factor in discounting a medical opinion). Similarly misplaced is

Plaintiff’s reliance on SSR 16-3p. ECF No. 9 at 15–16 (citing SSR 16-3p). It provides guidance

22 on how the SSA considers a claimant’s failure to follow treatment when evaluating the claimant’s

own testimony regarding their symptoms, not on an ALJ’s assessment of the consistency of a

medical opinion with other record evidence. SSR 16-3p,

, at *2. In any event,

the ALJ did in fact provide the explanation that Plaintiff claims is missing. The ALJ noted that

Plaintiff: (1) “reported mental health symptoms to her treating physicians on a regular basis,” (2)

“that she was recommended to follow-up with a formal mental health practitioner,” (3) that “the

record does not contain any evidence of any follow-up treatment,” and (4) that Plaintiff “was not

on any mental health medication.” ECF No. 7-2 at 35. That reasoning is sufficient even under the

rules Plaintiff incorrectly invokes.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s lack of hospitalization,

noting that “Plaintiff did not need to be psychiatrically hospitalized in order to show mental

dysfunction.” ECF No. 9 at 16. Although it is true that hospitalization or inpatient care is not

required for a disability finding, courts may consider “‘a pattern of conservative medical

treatment,’ such as mental health treatment ‘with medication and therapy’ but not ‘in-patient or

hospitalization care.’” Thomas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

, 89 (S.D.N.Y.

2020) (citation modified) (quoting Reyna v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-cv-636,

, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2019)). So the ALJ appropriately relied on Plaintiff’s lack of

emergency room visits and inpatient hospitalizations as one factor that undercut Dr. Carlson’s

opinion of “extreme” and “marked” limitations. And more fundamentally, the ALJ’s single

sentence concerning Plaintiff’s lack of emergency room visits and inpatient hospitalizations

followed a lengthy discussion of the findings from Dr. Carlson’s examination and included

references to multiple exhibits containing medical records across the different doctors. See ECF

No. 7-2 at 35–36. Thus, even if the lack of hospitalization did not support the ALJ’s conclusion,

23 the ALJ still offered sufficient reasoning to discount Dr. Carlson’s opinions based on other

evidence.

Finally, Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of ignoring evidence that supported Dr. Carlson’s

opinion, including “Plaintiff’s abnormal mental status examination results,” and of “cherry-

pick[ing]” evidence that supported the ALJ’s conclusion. ECF No. 9 at 16. But the ALJ did not

ignore Dr. Carlson’s findings that support a more restrictive RFC. The ALJ noted that Dr. Carlson

opined that Plaintiff would require unscheduled breaks and be unable to complete a typical

workday and workweek. See ECF No. 7-2 at 35. The ALJ also recognized that Plaintiff often

reported mental health symptoms to her treating physician. See

The ALJ observed that while

Plaintiff was not on any mental health medication, Dr. Carlson’s examination showed “restless

movements, fast speech, and difficulty staying on topic” and that Plaintiff was “easily

redirectable.”

And most importantly, as explained above, the ALJ explained why other

evidence undercut the evidence on which Plaintiff now relies. In short, the ALJ did not ignore

Plaintiff’s mental health claims, including her regular mental health symptom reports to her

physicians. Rather, the ALJ weighed them against the other evidence in the record, including

Plaintiff’s lack of follow up with mental health care, lack of emergency mental health care, and

Dr. Carlson’s own concession that her opinion on Plaintiff’s mental health was limited to her self-

report and Dr. Carlson’s limited observation of her. See

at 35–36.

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ provided a sufficient explanation based on substantial

evidence for rejecting Dr. Carlson’s recommendations.

2. Nurse Ware

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ erred by rejecting the limitations recommended by Nurse

Ware. Nurse Ware opined that Plaintiff was limited “to a range of the sedentary exertional level,

24 with sitting limited to 20 minutes to one hour, standing limited to 40 minutes to one hour, walking

limited to 30 minutes to one hour, frequent handling, fingering, and feeling on the right, occasional

reaching, pushing, and pulling on the right, [and] never reaching on the left,” among other

restrictions.

. The ALJ concluded that the record “does not show any medically

determinable impairment that would support such extreme limitations.”

The Commissioner

responds that the ALJ properly considered supportability and consistency factors in finding Nurse

Ware’s “extreme assessment” not persuasive. ECF No. 15 at 25.

The ALJ here, too, provided a sufficient explanation for finding Nurse Ware’s opinion

unpersuasive based on its supportability and consistency. To begin, the ALJ explained the lack of

support for Nurse Ware’s recommended limitations. As the ALJ noted, physical examinations of

Plaintiff “only revealed some pain and limited range of motion,” which the ALJ concluded “does

not support” the “extreme limitations” recommended by Nurse Ware. ECF No. 7-2 at 36. While

the ALJ could have been clearer in her analysis, she properly evaluated the objective evidence

provided by Nurse Ware through the citations to Exhibit 30F, Nurse Ware’s examination notes.

See ECF No. 7-2 at 31, 34–37 (citing ECF No. 7-9 at 119, 136). Exhibit 30F contains a plethora

of normal physical findings and emphasizes Plaintiff’s “increased need for psychiatric evaluation.”

ECF No. 7-9 at 122. The ALJ discussed and cited the evidence Nurse Ware relied on to support

the ALJ’s reasoning. The ALJ properly considered the objective medical evidence and supporting

explanations presented by Nurse Ware through the ALJ’s citations to the record and corresponding

analysis.

The ALJ also properly articulated the lack of consistency between Nurse Ware’s opinion

and other evidence in the record. The ALJ noted that the record “does not show any medical

determinable impairment that would support such extreme limitations” as those recommended by

25 Nurse Ware. ECF No. 7-2 at 36. As the ALJ explained, for instance, Plaintiff’s physical

examinations only show “some pain and limited range of motion.”

And it is clear from the

ALJ’s opinion that Nurse Ware’s extreme limitations were inconsistent with a plethora of other

findings, including: (1) the progress notes from Plaintiff’s primary care physician, (2) Dr. Colon’s

findings, (3) Dr. Carlson’s findings of a “generally good range of motion and strength in all

extremities, intact dexterity, normal gait, and no evidence of edema or effusion,” (4) Plaintiff’s

“generally normal” diagnostic studies, and (5) Plaintiff’s history of “only some occasional

outpatient treatment for her musculoskeletal pain and fatigue.”

at 34–37.

In short, although the ALJ’s opinion on this issue may not be a paragon of clarity, the Court

can identify the ALJ’s reasoning based on the opinion as a whole. See Wonzell C. v. O’Malley, No.

22-cv-3828,

, at *16 (D.D.C. May 8, 2024) (“An ALJ is not required to reiterate

his appraisal of the evidence in making a conclusion if the basis for that conclusion is identifiable

elsewhere in his opinion.”), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. July

3, 2024). Accordingly, the ALJ provided an adequate explanation for rejecting Nurse Ware’s

opinion.

C. Plaintiff’s RFC

Plaintiff finally raises multiple challenges to the RFC itself. Plaintiff chiefly claims that

that although the ALJ found Dr. Colon’s opinion consistent with other medical records and

supported by her examination of Plaintiff, the ALJ “failed to adopt numerous crucial limitations

assessed by Dr. Colon.” ECF No. 9 at 8–9. In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by

failing to account for Dr. Colon’s finding, which the ALJ adopted, that Plaintiff “has a moderate

limitation” in “concentrating, persisting[, and] maintaining pace,” ECF No. 7-2 at 32. ECF No. 9

at 9. Plaintiff also faults the ALJ’s decision for failing to include other limitations in her RFC,

26 claiming that the ALJ erred by not including a restriction corresponding to Plaintiff’s moderate

limitation in her ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being and by

allowing for “frequent” social interaction after finding that Plaintiff had a moderate social

interaction limitation. Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ’s RFC did not properly account for

Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations. However, Plaintiff’s other contentions lack merit.

1. Consistency, Persistence, and Pace

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not properly account for her moderate

limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. ECF No. 9 at 9–11. The Commissioner

contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence and properly

accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations. ECF No. 15 at 22–23. On this issue, the Court

agrees with Plaintiff.

The CPP domain “refers to the [claimant’s] abilities to focus attention on work activities

and stay on-task at a sustained rate.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(E)(3). Here, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff has a “moderate” CPP limitation. ECF No. 7-2 at 32. In SSA parlance, a

“moderate” limitation means that the claimant’s “functioning in this area independently,

appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair.” Id. § 12.00(F)(2)(c). Though the SSA

regulations do not define “fair,” this Court has previously explained that “a moderate limitation”

in maintaining CPP “necessarily establishes some deficit in the claimant’s ability to sustain focused

attention and concentration long enough to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks

commonly found in work settings.” Demetria R. v. Kijakazi,

, at *14 (citations

modified) (quoting Nsiah v. Saul, No. 19-cv-42,

, at *14 (D.D.C. May 12,

2020), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2021)).

27 Since a CPP limitation can affect a claimant’s ability to work, the ALJ must consider a CPP

limitation when “tailor[ing] a claimant’s RFC to his or her specific limitations.” Mirlin T. v.

Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-960,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021) (citing Williams v.

Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2015)), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022). Many ALJs attempt to account for “moderate” CPP limitations

by restricting the claimant’s RFC to simple, routine, unskilled, and/or repetitive work (or some

derivative of those limitations). These attempts have received mixed reviews by federal courts.

Compare, e.g., Patrice V. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-2221,

, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 12,

2019) (finding that such an RFC did not, without more, sufficiently address moderate CPP

limitations), and Eichelberger v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-3299,

, at *2 (D. Md. Apr.

12, 2018) (similar), with, e.g., Taft W. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-2781,

, at *4 (D. Md.

Dec. 3, 2020) (finding that limiting claimant to one to four step routine, repetitive tasks adequately

addressed moderate CPP limitations), and Stout v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-2596,

, at

*12 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2015) (similar). Though the D.C. Circuit has yet to weigh in on this issue,

district courts have set out principles that guide the analysis in this case.

As this Court has observed, the fact that a claimant “can perform simple and repetitive

tasks says nothing about whether the individual can do so on a sustained basis.” Yamise R. v.

Kijakazi, 21-cv-3059,

, *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2023) (quoting Crump v. Saul,

(7th Cir. 2019)); see also Petty v. Colvin,

, 206 (D.D.C. 2016)

(finding that, generally, limiting a claimant to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” is insufficient

to address moderate CPP limitations because “the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the

ability to stay on task” (quoting Mascio v. Colvin,

(4th Cir. 2015))). Stated

differently, “someone with problems concentrating may not be able to complete a task consistently

28 over the course of a workday, no matter how simple it may be.” Martin v. Saul,

(7th Cir. 2020); see also Johnson v. Saul, No. 19-cv-3829,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 5,

2021) (“As numerous courts have noted, . . . the problem with finding a moderate CPP limitation

by requiring ‘simple, routine, and repetitive tasks’ is that such a restriction, without more, does not

actually address plaintiff’s mental impairments because the difficulty of a task does not necessarily

say anything about his ability to concentrate on it.”). Limiting a claimant to simple tasks therefore

may not adequately account for a moderate CPP limitation.

But the inverse is true, too. A claimant with a moderate CPP limitation may still be able to

perform simple, repetitive tasks without additional restrictions. As this Court has explained, “it is

decidedly not the case that ‘an RFC limiting a claimant to,’ for example, simple, routine, unskilled,

and/or repetitive work and tasks with a limited number of steps ‘can never be consistent with a

moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.’” Laura A. v. Kijakazi, No.

21-cv-451,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nsiah,

, at *15 n.4). And as always, when considering a claimant’s CPP limitation,

the ALJ must build an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion” and

explain why the claimant’s ability to perform simple tasks is consistent with a moderate limitation

in the ability to stay on task (i.e., concentrate and/or persist on a task). Lane-Rauth,

(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart,

(7th Cir. 2002)). At

bottom, then, the ALJ must account for a moderate CPP limitation, and, as always, must do so in

a way that is susceptible to judicial review.

Lacking guidance from the D.C. Circuit on this issue, this Court has maintained that “‘an

ALJ’s RFC assessment must either adequately account for this deficit or adequately explain why,

notwithstanding that finding, the claimant’s overall limitations do not actually affect her capacity

29 to sustain simple, routine, or unskilled work.’” Yamise R.,

, at *11 (citation

modified) (quoting Demetria R.,

, at *14). This Court has therefore held that

an ALJ may address a moderate CPP limitation by either (1) “including additional limitations in

the RFC relevant to the CPP domain beyond an unadorned simple, routine, unskilled and/or

repetitive tasks (or its equivalent) restriction, or (2) adequately explaining why, notwithstanding

the moderate CPP limitation, the plaintiff’s overall limitations do not affect his or her capacity to

sustain simple, routine, unskilled and/or repetitive work.” Shea M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2204,

, at *18 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2023) (citation modified) (quoting Terri D. v. Berryhill,

No. 17-cv-11,

, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sep. 28, 2018)).

Here, the ALJ did neither. Instead, the ALJ did exactly what this Court has previously held

is insufficient: limited Plaintiff to the performance of “simple, routine tasks, and simple decisions;

frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and few changes to work

processes and settings,” ECF No. 7-2 at 33, without explaining how those limitations account for

Plaintiff’s CPP limitation. See Yamise,

, at *11.

None of the limitations imposed by the ALJ adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s moderate

CPP limitation. To start, the restriction to “simple, routine tasks, and simple decisions” is

substantially the same as other RFC restrictions that this Court has found inadequate—without

further explanation by the ALJ—to address a moderate CPP limitation. See Yamise R.,

, at *11 (rejecting an RFC limiting claimant to “jobs that have only simple tasks, decisions,

and instructions, not performed in a fast-paced production environment,” as insufficient);

Demetria R.,

, at *14 (finding that limiting the claimant “to perform simple,

unskilled (SVP 1 or 2) sedentary work” did not adequately account for her moderate CPP

limitation); Nsiah,

, at *15 (concluding that an RFC restricting claimant to

30 “simple, routine, unskilled tasks; occasional changes in a routine work setting; and occasional

interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors” did not adequately account for plaintiff's

moderate CPP limitation); Mirlin T.,

, at *10 (finding that the “ALJ’s limitations

of ‘simple work, without fast pace or strict production quotas” did not adequately address plaintiff's

moderate CPP limitation). To be sure, this Court has recognized that a restriction to “simple 1–4

step, routine, repetitive tasks” can form part of a permissible RFC. See Teresa D. v. Bisignano,

No. 24-cv-2864,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2025) (collecting cases). But this

Court has emphasized “that such a limitation is materially different than a limitation to ‘simple,

routine, and repetitive tasks’ because the limit on the steps ‘necessarily narrows the universe of

tasks and jobs Plaintiff can perform to a small subset that demand reduced attention and

concentration.’”

(quoting Laura A.,

, at *12). Similarly, although this Court

has upheld RFCs that restrict the claimant to “only occasional decision making,”

such a

limitation is distinguishable from a restriction to “simple decisions” because the fact that a

claimant can make simple decisions “says nothing about whether the individual can do so on a

sustained basis,” Yamise R.,

, at *11. Accordingly, that limitation is not

sufficient to account for Plaintiff’s CPP limitation.

Nor does restricting Plaintiff to “frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the

public” suffice. Indeed, that limitation is less restrictive than restrictions that this Court has found

fail to account for a moderate CPP limitation. See Yamise R.,

, at *11

(concluding that limiting the claimant to “no more than occasional” interaction with supervisors,

“coworkers, or the general public” was insufficient to account for a moderate CPP limitation);

Nsiah,

, at *15 (concluding that an RFC restricting claimant to “occasional

interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors” did not adequately account for claimant's

31 moderate CPP limitations). So that restriction does not adequately account for Plaintiff’s CPP

limitation, either.

Finally, limiting Plaintiff to jobs with “few changes to work processes and settings” does

not save the ALJ’s RFC here. In fairness to the Commissioner, “this Court and others have held

that a limitation allowing only occasional changes in the work setting helps to adequately account

for moderate CPP limitations, as it eliminates ‘constant distractions for an employee who struggles

to concentrate and stay on task.’” Teresa D.,

, at *11 (quoting Laura A.,

, at *13). But “helps to” is the operative phrase there. In other words, a restriction

on workplace changes does not on its own save an otherwise insufficient RFC. Thus, this Court

has rejected RFCs containing similar limitations where, as here, that limitation is paired only with

generic “simple task” restrictions or their equivalent. Compare Shea M.,

, at

*19 (concluding that, without more, limiting claimant to no more than “gradual” “changes in work

duties” was insufficient to account for a moderate CPP limitation), and Nsiah,

,

at *15 (concluding that an RFC restricting claimant to “simple, routine, unskilled tasks; occasional

changes in a routine work setting; and occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and

supervisors” did not adequately account for claimant's moderate CPP limitations), with Teresa D.,

, *11 (upholding RFC limiting claimant to “occasional changes in the work

setting,” in addition to restricting claimant to “simple 1–4 step, routine, repetitive tasks” and “only

occasional decision making”). Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not adequately

account for Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitation in Plaintiff’s RFC.

Nor did the ALJ “adequately explain why, notwithstanding [the] finding [that Plaintiff had

a moderate CPP limitation, her] overall limitations do not [actually] affect her capacity to sustain

simple, routine, or unskilled work.’” Demetria R.,

, at *14 (quoting Nsiah, 2020

, at *14); see also Laura A.,

, at *11 (“This Court has maintained

that ALJs can properly account for CPP limitations by limiting the type of work and tasks the

claimant can perform—such as, for example, simple and routine tasks or work that requires a

limited number of steps—if they ‘explain how such an RFC is consistent with the claimant's

trouble with [CPP].’” (quoting Nsiah,

, at *15 n.4)). Again, an ALJ can

adequately account for a moderate CPP limitation “by limiting the type of work and tasks the

claimant can perform—such as, for example, simple and routine tasks or work that requires a

limited number of steps.” Yamise R.,

, at *11. But the ALJ must also actually

explain “how such an RFC is consistent with the claimant’s trouble with concentration, persistence,

or pace.” Nsiah,

, at *15 n.4. Here, the ALJ’s opinion provides no explanation

as to how, despite Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations, Plaintiff is capable of “sustaining focused

attention and concentration for a significant amount of time,” much less the persistence and pace

needed to complete a normal workday or workweek notwithstanding Plaintiff’s RFC restriction to

simple, low stress work. Mirlin T.,

, at *10. To satisfy this requirement, the

ALJ might have pointed to facets of Plaintiff’s life where she exhibits sustained focused attention,

or testimony that she is capable of doing so. Cf. Laura A.,

, at *9, *12 (denying

a motion for remand where the ALJ expressly concluded that the record did not reflect a significant

defect in plaintiff’s concentration, relying on an examiner’s report showing plaintiff had only

mildly impaired attention and concentration and no limitation on her ability to understand,

remember or apply simple directions and instructions and plaintiff’s own concession that she had

the ability to follow written and verbal instructions). But the ALJ did not do so. Accordingly,

because the ALJ failed to include restrictions appropriate to Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitation or

33 to explain why such restrictions are unnecessary, the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial

evidence.

Finally, the Commissioner advances no argument that the ALJ’s failure to account for

Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations constituted harmless error. 11 Given this Court’s conclusion

that Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations were not adequately addressed by the RFC, and that the

ALJ’s question to the vocational expert included only the limitations outlined in the RFC, see ECF

No. 7-2 at 89, the Court concludes that the ALJ may not have provided an accurate hypothetical

question to the vocational expert. See Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 205 (finding that an ALJ’s failure

to convey accurately the claimant’s limitations to the expert can serve as grounds for reversal

because it “undermines the expert’s testimony that a claimant can perform other work,” an

instrumental aspect of determining whether the claimant qualifies for disability benefits).

Accordingly, the Court will grant the Plaintiff’s motion for remand on this basis.

2. Plaintiff’s Ability to Regulate Emotions, Control Behavior, and Maintain Well-being

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to include restrictions that reflect

Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in her ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain

well-being. ECF No. 9 at 9. The domain of regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and

maintaining well-being in a work setting falls under the larger category of “adapting and managing

oneself.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00(E)(4). Specifically, examples of the ability

to “regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being” include:

responding to demands; adapting to changes; managing your psychologically based symptoms; distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work performance; 11 Errors of this kind have previously been considered harmless if “(1) medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace and that the hypothetical question given to the expert is limited to only include only unskilled work or (2) the hypothetical otherwise implicitly accounts for a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace.” Mirlin T.,

, at *11 (citation modified) (quoting Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d. at 206). The Commissioner makes no effort to apply that standard here, and the Court will not make that argument for him.

34 setting realistic goals; making plans for yourself independently of others; maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting; and being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has a “moderate” limitation in her ability to “regulate emotions,

control behavior, and maintain well-being.” ECF No. 7-2 at 33. Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not

including additional restrictions in her RFC to account for that finding, such as “need[ing] to be

absent from work” or “need[ing] to be off task during work.” ECF No. 9 at 9. The Court finds

that Plaintiff’s RFC sufficiently accounts for her adapting and managing limitations.

Plaintiff’s RFC limiting her to simple, routine tasks, and simple work-related decisions;

frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and few changes to work

processes and settings, sufficiently accounts for her moderate limitation in her ability to regulate

emotions. For starters, other courts have found that an RFC restriction specifically relating to

regulating emotions is not required if the RFC can otherwise account for the emotional regulation

limitation, and that a restriction to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks sufficiently accounts for

such a limitation. See, e.g., Terrence S. B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-0380,

, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2024) (finding an RFC limiting the plaintiff to “simple, routine,

and repetitive tasks,” and “occasionally interact[ing] with supervisors and coworkers” was

sufficient to account for a mild to moderate limitation in regulating emotions); Mangual v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec.,

, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (finding an RFC limiting the plaintiff to

“simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” was sufficient to account for a moderate limitation in

regulating emotions); see also, e.g., Seth M. D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-cv-1116,

, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2024) (finding an RFC limiting plaintiff to “simple, routine,

and repetitive tasks,” and “occasionally interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the public”

was sufficient to account for a moderate limitation in regulating emotions); Christina G. v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-00173,

, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 12, 2025) (same); 35 Demeca P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-504,

, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,

2024) (same).

While not binding, these decisions are persuasive. A moderate limitation in this area means

that the claimant has a “fair” ability to engage in certain tasks,

, subpt. P, App’x 1,

§ 12.00(F)(2)(c), including “[r]esponding to demands,” “adapting to changes,” “distinguishing

between acceptable and unacceptable work performance,” “setting realistic goals,” and “making

plans for [oneself] independently of others,” id. § 12.00(E)(4). Restricting Plaintiff to simple,

routine tasks and simple work-related decisions, with few changes to work processes and setting,

directly corresponds to such limitations. For instance, restricting Plaintiff to few changes to work

processes and setting corresponds to her diminished ability to “adapt[] to changes” in the

workplace. See id. And restricting her to simple, routine tasks corresponds to a diminished

capacity to “[r]espond[ ] to demands,” “mak[e] plans for [oneself] independently,” and

“distinguish[ ] between acceptable and unacceptable work performance.” See id.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s RFC is stricter than that in Mangual, where the court found that the

sole inclusion of limiting the plaintiff to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” was sufficient to

account for a moderate limitation in regulating emotions. Mangual, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 329. The

ALJ here additionally restricted Plaintiff to no more than “frequent interaction with supervisors,

co-workers, and the public; and few changes to work processes and settings.” ECF No. 7-2 at 33.

In addition, the ALJ here went further than in Mangual by separately discussing the reasons for

placing a limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to regulate emotions, rather than relying on a discussion

of the broader category of adapting and managing oneself. See id. at 32–33. The ALJ balanced

Plaintiff’s abilities, such as her capacity to get along with others, with her constraints, such as

problems sleeping and staying on task. See id. at 33.

36 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s RFC sufficiently accounts for her adapting and managing

limitation.

c. Frequent Versus Occasional Social Interaction Limitations

Plaintiff finally challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can engage in frequent rather

than occasional social interaction. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has a “moderate limitation” in her

ability interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. ECF No. 7-2 at 32. For that reason,

the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to “frequent interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.”

Id. at 33. Plaintiff argues that a more restrictive accommodation was required.

In the Social Security system, mental impairments are ranked on a five-point scale: none,

mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.

.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). 12 Here, the

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffers from a “moderate” limitation in social interaction, meaning

that her ability to engage in social interaction “is fair,” which is somewhere in between “slightly

limited” and “seriously limited.” 20 C.F.R. §. 404, subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00(F)(2). One method

of accounting for this type of limitation is to restrict how frequently the claimant may encounter

the condition. SSA regulations provide that an ALJ can restrict a claimant to never encountering

12 The Social Security Administration defines these terms as follows:

a. No limitation (or none). You are able to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.

b. Mild limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is slightly limited.

c. Moderate limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair.

d. Marked limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.

e. Extreme limitation. You are not able to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.

20 C.F.R. §. 404, subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00(F)(2).

37 the condition; occasionally encountering it, meaning up to one-third of the time; frequently

encountering it, meaning between one-third to two-thirds of the time; or constantly encountering

it, meaning two-thirds or more of the time. See Carson v. Barnhart,

(10th Cir.

2005); SSR 83-10,

, at *5–6. Here, the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to “frequent” social

interaction, meaning she could engage in social interaction one- to two-thirds of the time.

Though perhaps counterintuitive because of the nomenclature, as other courts have held,

an ALJ’s finding of “a moderate limitation [in a particular area of functioning] is not inconsistent

with a finding that an individual can engage in frequent, but not constant activity” in that area.

May v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-1347,

, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2019)

(quoting Jennifer Lee W. v. Berryhill, 18-CV-64,

, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. March 18,

2019)); accord Simmons v. Saul, No. 18-cv-1293,

, at *17 (D.D.C. Sep. 30,

2019), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2019); see also

Wightman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-6295,

, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 26,

2019) (“[T]he ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s moderate limitation in social interaction permits him

to tolerate ‘frequent’ contact with supervisors, coworkers and the public was not erroneous.”);

Smith v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-305,

, at *6 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2017) (“By limiting

Mr. Smith to frequent interaction, as opposed to constant interaction, the ALJ accounted for Dr.

Suyeishi’s moderate limitation in this regard”); Treadwell v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-370,

, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2014) (“The ALJ assigned each of these opinions ‘some

weight’ and restricted Claimant to only frequent contact with the public as a result of his

consideration.). That is because “frequently” is defined by SSA regulations to mean “occurring

from one-third to two-thirds of the time.” SSR 83-10,

, at *5–6. And restricting

a claimant to exposure to the condition only one- to two-thirds of the time is an appreciable

38 limitation—a reduction in exposure of 33% to 66% compared to a non-limited individual—which

is sufficient to account for a “fair” limitation. 20 C.F.R. §. 404, subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00(F)(2).

Accordingly, restricting Plaintiff to frequent social interaction adequately accounted for her

moderate limitation in this area.

Moreover, like in Simmons, the ALJ here adequately explained why Plaintiff could have

frequent interactions with the others despite her moderate limitations in the area of social

interaction.

, at *16–17. In Simmons, the ALJ specifically assessed the

plaintiff’s allegations for consistency with the evidence, noting that he “shops in stores, handles

his own money, and is active in his church community,” leading to the conclusion that he “had no

problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others.”

. Similarly here, the

ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s testimony that she “had no problems getting along with other people,”

that her “activities of daily living were also generally good,” and that she regularly requested that

another person accompany her “on public transportation to go shopping due to her anxiety.” ECF

No. 7-2 at 32. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s RFC properly assessed her ability

to interact with others.

* * * In sum, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discounting of

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity and persistence of her symptoms, the ALJ’s rejection

of the limitations recommended by Dr. Carlson and Nurse Ware, and the ALJ’s incorporation of

limitations based on Plaintiff’s limitations in three of the four areas of mental functioning. But the

Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to properly account for her moderate CPP limitation

when determining her RFC. Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands for the ALJ to re-

determine Plaintiff’s RFC, taking proper account of her moderate CPP limitation.

39 IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will enter a separate Order that Plaintiff’s motion

for judgment of reversal, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED to the extent it requests remand to the

Commissioner for further administrative proceedings, Defendant’s motion for judgment of

affirmance, ECF No. 15, is DENIED, and this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of

(g).

2025.12.22 11:06:50 -05'00' Date: December 22, 2025 ____________________________________ G. MICHAEL HARVEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

40