UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAIDER HASHIMMAHDI ALHADDAD,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25 - 2278 (LLA) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Haider Hashimmahdi Alhaddad, a citizen of Iraq, commenced this action to

compel Defendants—the United States Department of Homeland Security, Secretary of Homeland

Security Kristi Noem, the United States Department of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), USCIS Director Joseph Edlow,

Attorney General Pamela Bondi, and the Los Angeles Asylum Office—to adjudicate his asylum

application. ECF No. 1. Defendants have moved to transfer this action to the Southern District of

California and to extend the time to respond to the complaint until thirty days after the action is

docketed there. ECF No. 8, at 1. Mr. Alhaddad consents to the motion. Id. For the reasons

explained below, the court will grant Defendants’ motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court takes the allegations in Mr. Alhaddad’s complaint as true for the purposes of

deciding the pending motion. Louis v. Hagel,

(D.D.C. 2016). The

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) allows “[a]ny” noncitizen “physically present in the

United States” to apply for asylum if he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” in his home country because of his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.”

(a)(42)(A), 1158(a)(1), 1158(b)(1)(A). A noncitizen who

seeks to apply for asylum must submit an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of

Removal, to the USCIS.

(a)(1) (2025); see U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,

Obtaining Asylum in the United States. 1 As relevant here, “in the absence of exceptional

circumstances, the initial interview or hearing on the asylum application shall commence not later

than 45 days after the date an application is filed,” and the “final administrative

adjudication . . . shall be completed within 180 days after the date an application is filed.”

(d)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii).

Mr. Alhaddad is a native and citizen of Iraq who resides in El Cajon, California. ECF

No. 1 ¶¶ 10-11. In July 2016, he filed an application for asylum and for withholding of removal.

. Mr. Alhaddad has neither received an interview nor a final decision on his application.

. Rather, his application has remained pending with the USCIS’s Los Angeles Asylum

Office since the date of filing.

. In June and August 2024, he sent inquiry letters to

the Los Angeles Asylum Office regarding his application.

; see ECF No. 1-1, at 11-15.

The Asylum Office responded to the first letter, noting that it had updated his attorney information

in the USCIS system but failing to address to his request for an interview. ECF No. 1-1, at 13.

The Asylum Office did not respond to the second letter. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23-24.

Mr. Alhaddad filed this action in July 2025, seeking a writ of mandamus directing

Defendants to schedule him for an asylum interview. ECF No. 1. In December 2025, Defendants

1 Available at https://perma.cc/5CGR-RB9Z.

2 filed a motion to transfer this case to the Southern District of California. ECF No. 8. Mr. Alhaddad

does not oppose the motion.

.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under

(a), a court may transfer a case from one proper venue to another

appropriate venue if it serves “the convenience of parties and witnesses” and is “in the interest of

justice.” 2 This is an “individualized, case-by-case consideration,” comprised of two steps. Stewart

Org. v. Ricoh Corp.,

(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack,

(1964)). First, the transferor court must determine that the action “[could] have been brought” in

the transferee district or that the parties consent to litigating there.

(a). Second,

the court must decide whether “considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in

favor of transfer to that district.” Blackhawk Consulting, LLC v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,

(D.D.C. 2013). In making this determination, the court “weigh[s] several

private- and public-interest factors.”

. The private-interest factors include: “(1) the

plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s preferred forum; (3) the location where the claim

arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) ease of

access to sources of proof.”

. The public-interest factors include: “(1) the transferee’s

familiarity with the governing law; (2) the relative congestion of the courts of the transferor and

potential transferee; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home.”

(quoting

2 In contrast,

(a) governs transfer or dismissal when the initial venue is improper. See Liu v. Mayorkas,

, 3-5 (D.D.C. 2024). Here, venue is proper in this district under

(e)(1)(A) because several Defendants reside in the District of Columbia. See Lamont v. Haig,

, 1128 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“What controls is the official residence of the federal defendant where the official duties are performed and not the personal residence of an individual who is a defendant.”); ECF No. 1, at 1.

3 Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

(D.D.C. 2006)). “If the balance of private and

public interests favor[s] a transfer of venue, then a court may order a transfer.”

(quoting Sheffer

v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2012)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Transfer

Mr. Alhaddad consents to Defendants’ motion to transfer. ECF No. 1, at 8. Nevertheless,

the court will consider the facts and determine whether transferring this case to the Southern

District of California is in the interest of justice. Stewart Org.,

(“Section 1404(a)

is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to

an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” (quoting Van Dusen,

)).

First, the court concludes that the action could have been brought in the transferee district.

Venue is proper in suits against officers or agencies of the United States “in any judicial district in

which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.”

(e)(1). Here, the plaintiff resides in the Southern District of California. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2; see

ECF No. 8, at 1-2. The action accordingly could have been brought in that district under

(e)(1)(C). 3

3 In any event, because Mr. Alhaddad has consented to the transfer of this case to the Southern District of California, that venue is appropriate under Section 1404’s provision that “a district court may transfer any civil action . . . to any district . . . to which all parties have consented.”

(a).

4 Next, the court concludes that both the private- and public-interest factors weigh in favor

of transferring this case to the Southern District of California. The court begins with the private

interest factors. First, as to Mr. Alhaddad’s choice of forum, while Mr. Alhaddad initially brought

his case in this district, he has since consented to Defendants’ request to transfer the case to the

Southern District of California. ECF No. 8, at 1. The first factor thus favors a transfer. Second,

as evidenced by their motion to transfer, Defendants prefer the Southern District of California.

That is also Mr. Alhaddad’s home district, and “[t]ransfer is favored when defendants’ preferred

forum is also the plaintiff’s home forum.” Wolfram Alpha LLC v. Cuccinelli,

,

332 (D.D.C. 2020).

The third private-interest factor—where the claim arose—is neutral. “[I]n APA cases like

this one, the underlying claim typically arises ‘where the decisionmaking process occurred.’”

McAfee, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 19-CV-2981,

, at *1

(D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2019) (quoting Gyau v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-407,

, at *2

(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018)). Mr. Alhaddad alleges that his application is pending with the Los

Angeles Asylum Office, which is in neither the District of Columbia nor the Southern District of

California.

Finally, the remaining private-interest factors favor a transfer. Mr. Alhaddad “cannot

reasonably claim to be inconvenienced by litigating in [his] home forum.” Wolfram Alpha LLC,

490 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (alteration in original) (quoting Aishat v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2018)). And he “will likely be the key witness and rely on personal

records to develop his claim, making his home district a better venue.” Liu v. Mayorkas,

, 6 (D.D.C. 2024).

5 The public-interest factors likewise weigh in favor of a transfer or are neutral. First, courts

in both districts are competent to deal with issues of federal immigration law. See Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n v. Harvey,

(D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that where “both courts are

competent to interpret the federal statutes involved[,] . . . there is no reason to transfer or not

transfer based on this factor”). Next, there can be no dispute that each district faces congested

dockets, making this factor neutral. Third, “[b]ecause any potential impacts are to be felt locally,

the controversy is truly local to” Mr. Alhaddad’s home district of the Southern District of

California. Pres. Soc’y of Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

(D.D.C. 2012).

After balancing the relevant factors as set forth above, the court concludes that transfer to

the Southern District of California promotes the convenience of the parties and witnesses and is in

the interest of justice. See

(a). The court will therefore transfer this action to the

Southern District of California.

B. Motion to Extend Time to Respond

In general, “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for

good cause, extend the time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Upon transfer, this matter will be handled

by an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of California, who will require time to

familiarize himself with the case. Mr. Alhaddad does not oppose the requested extension. ECF

No. 8, at 5. The court will thus extend the time for Defendants to respond to the complaint to thirty

days after the action is docketed in the Southern District of California.

6 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ Consent Motion to Transfer

and Extend. ECF No. 8. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: December 23, 2025

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