UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHSEN IBRAHIM,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-02915 (TNM)

MARCO A. RUBIO,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

For nearly four decades, Mohsen Ibrahim worked as a security officer at the U.S.

Embassy in Cairo. His tenure ended on a sour note. On his account, Ibrahim faced

discrimination from his superiors. When he reported that discrimination, he set off a cascade of

disciplinary actions that culminated in his firing. Ibrahim brings three claims under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and one claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

The Secretary of State moves to dismiss. The Court grants that motion as to Ibrahim’s Title VII

hostile work environment claim, but it declines to dismiss the rest.

I.

Mohsen Ibrahim is a U.S. citizen of Egyptian origin. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 2. He is 65

years old. Id. ¶ 47. For 38 of those years, he worked for the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, most

recently as an Operations Supervisor within the Local Guard Force (“LGF”). Id. ¶ 10.

According to his Complaint, Ibrahim “received positive performance evaluations” throughout his

service. Id. ¶ 11. That all changed in the fall of 2018, when Ibrahim allegedly “faced

discriminatory behavior by Agent Alex Brinker and Deputy LGF Commander Fathy Abdel-

Aziz,” id. ¶ 12, including “[v]erbal attacks and confrontations,” id. ¶ 31. Ibrahim flagged this conduct to a superior and contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor. Id.

¶ 13. His concerns were not only about race and national origin discrimination but also about

“age discrimination in the selection process for the LGF Deputy position,” for which he was

“passed over . . . in favor of a less experienced, younger candidate.” Id. ¶ 14.

In Ibrahim’s telling, his discrimination complaints triggered a bevy of adverse actions.

Weeks after his report, Ibrahim “was abruptly moved from his longstanding workstation of 38

years without valid justification.” Id. ¶ 15. After Ibrahim “opposed the relocation and continued

to protest the discrimination,” he “was notified of a five-day suspension, effective immediately,

based on alleged insubordination and misconduct.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16. The Embassy also told him

that his suspension made him ineligible for the Guard Force Commander position to which he

had applied. Id. ¶ 19.

Following Ibrahim’s unsuccessful appeal of his suspension, the Embassy began to

investigate his conduct stretching back to 2016. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. The person overseeing that

investigation was Agent Brinker—the same official whom Ibrahim had accused of

discrimination. Id. ¶ 22. Brinker suspended Ibrahim’s security certification due to the “pending

investigation.” Id. ¶ 24. Ibrahim insists that this was mere pretext, especially because the

investigation had supposedly ended the month before. Id. A few days after losing his security

certification, Ibrahim was placed on indefinite administrative leave and denied access to the

workplace. Id. ¶ 25.

Then matters took a final turn for the worse. Almost one month into his administrative

leave, Ibrahim “received a notice of intent to terminate his employment, citing the pretextual

findings of the biased investigation.” Id. ¶ 26. In the period that followed, Ibrahim alleges that

the Embassy denied him any opportunity to respond, departing from its own written employment

2 policies. Id. ¶ 28. Various Embassy employees urged Ibrahim to resign, but he refused. Id.

¶ 29. Two months after the notice of intent, the Embassy fired him. Id. ¶ 30.

These events are the fodder for Ibrahim’s lawsuit. 1 He asserts three claims under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., including one for race and

national origin discrimination (or disparate treatment), one for unlawful retaliation, and one for a

hostile work environment. Compl. at 6–7. Ibrahim also seeks relief on one count of age

discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),

et seq. Compl. at 7. The Secretary moves to dismiss, and that motion is ripe. Mot. to Dismiss,

ECF No. 11; Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 12; Reply, ECF No. 14.

II.

In considering the Secretary’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

determine whether the Complaint “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (cleaned up); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

Complaint must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. The Court must “treat the complaint’s

factual allegations as true and must grant the plaintiff[] the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged.” L. Xia v. Tillerson,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned

up). But the Court need not credit “legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”

Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994).

Evaluating a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is a “context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Robinson v.

1 Ibrahim also filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which investigated the allegations and rendered a final decision that Ibrahim does not further specify. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.

3 Howard Univ., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Iqbal,

), aff’d

sub nom. Robinson v. Wutoh,

(D.C. Cir. 2019).

III.

Ibrahim advances three Title VII claims—disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile

work environment—as well as one ADEA claim. The Court dismisses the hostile work

environment claim. The rest of them survive. The Court first addresses the three Title VII

claims and then turns to ADEA.

A.

Start with disparate treatment. Title VII bars federal agencies from discriminating in

employment on various bases. The statute dictates that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting

employees . . . in [federal] agencies . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Although this

provision’s language differs from the one governing private employers, cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a), the D.C. Circuit has long “held that the two contain identical prohibitions.” Czekalski v.

Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). 2

“[T]he two essential elements of a [Title VII] discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex,

2 In his reply brief, the Secretary argues that the standard for the federal sector should be different. After all, “[t]he non-federal provision of Title VII . . . uses different language from the provision . . . applicable to the federal government.” Reply at 5. For support, the Secretary cites Babb v. Wilkie,

(2020), where the Supreme Court held that ADEA’s federal sector provision imposes “a stricter standard” than its private sector counterpart because “ADEA’s private- and public-sector provisions are couched in very different terms.”

at 410–11 (cleaned up). The proposed takeaway: Under the Secretary’s reading of Title VII, “being moved from a workstation” is not a “personnel action[]” that infringes the federal sector provision. See Reply at 7. Whatever the merit of the Secretary’s late-breaking legal argument, it would make no difference here as Ibrahim’s relocation is only one of several more adverse employment actions that he alleges. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–30.

4 [or] national origin . . . .” Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)

(Kavanaugh, J.); see also, e.g., Stevenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (“To state a plausible claim of disparate treatment, Plaintiff had to allege facts

reflecting that (1) she suffered an adverse action (2) because of her race.”). This “pleading

burden is not great, and courts in this Circuit have consistently recognized the ease with which a

plaintiff claiming employment discrimination can survive a motion to dismiss.” Fennell v.

AARP,

(D.D.C. 2011) (cleaned up).

At this early stage, Ibrahim’s disparate treatment claim carries that burden—though

barely. He alleges that he had capably served the Embassy for almost four decades when he

“faced discriminatory behavior by Agent Alex Brinker and Deputy LGF Commander Fathy

Abdel-Aziz.” Compl. ¶ 12. That behavior supposedly included “[v]erbal attacks and

confrontations.” Id. ¶ 31. Ibrahim reported these incidents to a superior. Id. ¶ 13. This, Ibrahim

asserts, launched a string of “retaliatory actions”—including his removal from his longtime

workstation, his suspension, an investigation led by the person whom he accused of

discrimination, the revocation of his security certification and resulting administrative leave, and

finally his termination. Id. ¶¶ 15–30. At various points in this disciplinary spiral, Ibrahim

asserts that the agency deviated from its own written policies, for example by denying him “an

opportunity to respond to the proposed termination.” Id. ¶ 28; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (“Mr.

Ibrahim was placed on administrative leave for a longer duration than permitted by the Local

Employment Staff (LES) handbook.”).

Ibrahim’s Complaint is sparse on detail. The underlying events are open to dueling

accounts. Some of his allegations are little more than legal conclusions, which alone are

insufficient. But those issues can be addressed at summary judgment. See Fennell,

2d at 128–29. For now, Ibrahim’s claim scrapes by. See, e.g., Stevenson,

(concluding that plaintiff “sufficiently allege[d] a claim of race-based discrimination, albeit

barely, because she identifie[d] the adverse employment actions purportedly taken against her—

demotion and constructive discharge—and when they occurred”); Fennell, 770 F. Supp. 2d at

127–29 (holding that plaintiff “satisfied his pleading burden” for race and sex discrimination

where he alleged “that his job performance throughout his career was impeccable” and that he

was terminated based on false allegations); Jackson v. Gallaudet Univ.,

, 5–6

(D.D.C. 2016) (ruling that claim of national origin discrimination survived dismissal where

plaintiff alleged that “the very supervisor who made numerous anti-Jamaican remarks . . . had

significant influence on the decision to terminate her employment” (cleaned up)).

B.

Turn now to retaliation. Title VII also forbids employers from discriminating against

their employees for “oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by” Title

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The D.C. Circuit has applied this anti-retaliation rule to federal

employers. See Cruz v. McAleenan,

, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 2019). To establish

unlawful retaliation in this circuit, Ibrahim must show (1) that he opposed a practice he

reasonably thought violated Title VII; (2) that the Embassy took adverse action against him; and

(3) that the Embassy acted because of Ibrahim’s opposition to the practice. See McGrath v.

Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2012); accord, e.g., Moore-Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Navy,

, 124–25 (D.D.C. 2023). This claim “faces a relatively low hurdle at

the motion to dismiss stage.” Jones v. Bernanke,

(D.D.C. 2010)

(collecting cases).

6 Like the disparate treatment claim, Ibrahim’s retaliation claim clears the hurdle. He

pleads that he reported Agent Brinker’s and Commander Abdel-Aziz’s “discriminatory

behavior” to his superior and that he “later initiated informal EEO counseling.” Compl. ¶¶ 12–

13; see, e.g., Norris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2018)

(“Informally complaining to an employer about discrimination is covered as a protected activity

under Title VII . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting discrimination because an employee

“has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”). According to Ibrahim, this provoked an

escalating set of “retaliatory actions.” Compl. ¶ 15. “[W]eeks after his complaint,” Ibrahim

“was abruptly moved from his longstanding workstation of 38 years.” Id. “[S]hortly after [he]

opposed the relocation and continued to protest the discrimination in an email,” a superior

“recommended [his] suspension for alleged insubordination.” Id. And things only worsened

from there: The suspension morphed into indefinite administrative leave and ultimately

termination. Id. ¶¶ 25–30.

In this posture, Ibrahim has done enough. His Complaint supports a “plausible

inference” that “his protected activity was a but-for cause” of the “adverse action” that followed.

See Ho v. Garland,

(D.C. Cir. 2024); see also

(stating that “[a] plaintiff

can sometimes plead causation by relying solely on the fact that an adverse action shortly

followed the plaintiff’s protected activity” (collecting cases)). To be sure, the Secretary “might

very well rebut [Ibrahim’s] claim on summary judgment.” See

. “But that is for

discovery to uncover.”

Here, the Court finds “that the facts pled in this [C]omplaint, taken in

totality, have nudged [Ibrahim’s] claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See

(cleaned up).

7 C.

The same cannot be said for Ibrahim’s hostile work environment claim. To withstand

dismissal, Ibrahim must plausibly show that the Embassy subjected him to “discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

[his] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

(1993) (cleaned up). “The Supreme Court has made it clear that ‘conduct must be

extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment’”—and that

“‘isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to’” a hostile work environment.

George v. Leavitt,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

(1998)). After all, “[d]iscrete acts constituting discrimination or retaliation

claims . . . are different in kind from a hostile work environment claim that must be based on

severe and pervasive discriminatory intimidation or insult.” Lester v. Natsios,

(D.D.C. 2003); see also Foxworth v. McDonough,

, 11 (D.D.C. 2024)

(noting that “courts in this jurisdiction frown on plaintiffs bootstrapping discrete claims of

discrimination and retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim”).

Faced with this tall order, Ibrahim offers very little. His allegations of a hostile work

environment consist of four bullets in his Complaint—which point to (1) “[m]anagement

soliciting adverse information about him from subordinates”; (2) “[v]erbal attacks and

confrontations instigated by supervisors”; (3) “[a]ctions taken to tarnish his professional

reputation and undermine his authority”; and (4) “[o]stracism and exclusion from meetings and

communications essential to his role.” Compl. ¶ 31.

This claim has two fatal defects. First, Ibrahim’s allegations are too barebones even at

the dismissal stage. Ibrahim never specifies the “adverse information,” explains what happened

8 in the “verbal attacks,” or otherwise describes the “ostracism” he faced. Cf. Bynum v. District of

Columbia,

, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that plaintiff adequately pled a

hostile work environment where she detailed defendant’s offensive comments and the severe

mental impact they had). That leaves him only with conclusory assertions, which do not make

out a plausible hostile work environment claim even at this juncture. See, e.g., Stevenson,

(dismissing hostile work environment claim where plaintiff made the “largely

conclusory” allegation “that she was forced to endure an atmosphere filled with constant threats

of termination and demeaning conduct” (cleaned up)); see also Baloch,

(“several verbal clashes with [a] supervisor” did not create a hostile work environment); George,

407 F.3d at 416–17 (concluding that plaintiff did not establish hostile work environment claim

where she alleged “confrontations with her co-workers and . . . that she was thrice told to ‘go

back where she came from’”).

Second, Ibrahim’s hostile work environment claim largely repackages his disparate

treatment and retaliation claims. His allegations that “[m]anagement solicit[ed] adverse

information about him” and that it took “[a]ctions . . . to tarnish his professional reputation,”

Compl. ¶ 31, rehash his assertion that the Embassy retaliated against him by launching a

“pretextual investigation into [his] conduct,” id. ¶ 21. And his gesture toward “[v]erbal attacks

and confrontations,” id. ¶ 31, overlaps with the “discriminatory behavior” that informs his

disparate treatment claim, see id. ¶¶ 12–13. The problem with this attempt to recycle disparate

treatment and retaliation into a hostile work environment is that courts have consistently rejected

that very move. See, e.g., Lester, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 30–33 (dismissing plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim premised on three allegedly discriminatory incidents and emphasizing that “it

is not at all clear that mere reference to alleged disparate acts of discrimination against plaintiff

9 can ever be transformed, without more, into a hostile work environment claim”); Smith v.

Jackson,

(D.D.C. 2008) (ruling that plaintiff could not “simply

regurgitate his disparate treatment claims in an effort to flesh out a hostile work environment

claim”); Keeley v. Small,

(D.D.C. 2005) (“The remainder of plaintiff’s

alleged ‘hostile’ events are the very employment actions he claims are retaliatory; he cannot so

easily bootstrap alleged retaliatory incidents into a broader hostile work environment claim.”).

Allowing Ibrahim’s claim to proceed would dilute the governing standard for hostile work

environment claims. See George,

. The Court rejects Ibrahim’s bid to do so.

Because Ibrahim fails to plead a hostile work environment, the Court dismisses his claim.

D.

Move finally from Title VII to ADEA. That statute dictates (with some exceptions) that

“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees . . . who are at least 40 years of age . . . in [federal]

agencies . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).

This provision “hold[s] the Federal Government to a stricter standard than private employers or

state and local governments.” Babb v. Wilkie,

(2020); cf.

(a)(1) (making it unlawful for private employers to “discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual’s age”);

(b) (extending this prohibition to state and local

governments). “[U]nder § 633a(a), a personnel action must be made ‘untainted’ by

discrimination based on age . . . .” Babb,

. That “include[s] most employment-

related decisions, such as appointment, promotion, work assignment, compensation, and

performance reviews.”

(citing

(a)(2)(A)). In other words, “[i]f age

10 discrimination plays any part in the way [the federal employer’s] decision is made,” then the

plaintiff has a viable ADEA claim. See

.

Ibrahim states a plausible ADEA claim. He is 65 years old. Compl. ¶ 47. Throughout

his 38 years at the Embassy, he supposedly “received positive performance evaluations and was

recognized for his dedication and service.”

. Still, he alleges, the Embassy denied him a

promotion to LGF Deputy, “passing over [him] in favor of a less experienced, younger

candidate.”

. After Ibrahim communicated his concerns about age discrimination both to

his Embassy superior and an EEO counselor, the Embassy instigated the (by now well-known)

disciplinary process that ended in his firing.

¶¶ 15–30.

As with his surviving Title VII claims, Ibrahim’s Complaint is stingy on detail. More

will be needed to withstand summary judgment. At this point, though, Ibrahim’s allegation that

the Embassy passed him over for a younger candidate makes it plausible that “age discrimination

play[ed] a[] part” in the Embassy’s decision not to promote and later discipline and terminate

him. See Babb,

; see also, e.g., Washington v. D.C. Hous. Auth.,

, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that ADEA claim overcame dismissal where plaintiff

“claim[ed] to have been ‘eminently qualified’ for his position,” alleged that “his position was

abolished,” and asserted that younger employees “were treated more favorably than he was”);

Montgomery v. Omnisec Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc.,

, 183–84 (D.D.C. 2013)

(denying motion to dismiss ADEA claim where plaintiff “stated that she endured younger

officers being treated better and given better . . . assignments, even though she had seniority and

more experience than them” (cleaned up)).

11 * * *

In sum, Ibrahim fails to state a hostile work environment claim, but his other claims

survive for now.

IV.

For the reasons explained above, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s [11] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

Title VII hostile work environment claim, and that claim is accordingly DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s [11] Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to all other claims.

2025.12.23 13:49:02 -05'00' Dated: December 23, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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