delivered the opinion of the court:

This cause comes before us on appeal from the decree of Justice Wylie, holding the special term.

The facts in the case are substantially as follows:

On the 10th of April, 1874, the plaintiff (complainant) filed a bill in equity, alleging that, about the 15th of July, 1873, he agreed to purchase certain real property from the defendant in-squ'are 4 of the city of Washington, for the exact sum of $20,000, the property being encumbered at the time of purchase by a debt of $8,000, and no more; that the payments were to be $2,000 in cash, $10,000 on the 1st day of January, 1874, $8,000 to discharge a mortgage on the premises held by one Henry North; but that after the purchase he found the claim of North to be more than $8,000 by reason of interest having accumulated therein to the aggregate amount of $1,300; the prayer of the bill is that the said sum of $1,300 be deducted from the amount yet remaining unpaid on complainant’s note given to the defendant, and for an injunction preventing the negotiation of said note, and for a decree’ for $1,300 in case the note had already been negotiated.

*7On tlie 25th of May, 1874, the defendant filed his answer admitting that the purchase was as alleged in complainant’s bill, but he denies that the purchase-money price was limited to the precise sum of §20,000, or that the property was encumbered by any amount particularly limited to §8,000, and no more.

W. denies, however, that there was any mistake whatever in the premises as to complainant’s liability on the North notes he owes; that the agent, Wilson, who negotiated the purchase of this property, knew, and was expressly informed, when the deeds were prepared, that those notes bore interest.

The bill in this case seems to have been drawn with something like a double aspect. First, that the papers as executed, made between the parties at the time, did not truly express the parol agreement made between the parties at the time of the then execution ; or, second, that the papers actually executed, if properly construed, only required the complainant to pay the precise sum of §20,000, the purchase-price expressed iu the deed, as the consideration for the conveyance. It was ihe latter point, doubtless, upon which the justice proceeded in entering the decree which is appealed from to this court. That decree in substance orders that the interest which had accrued on the North notes at the time of the purchase of this property, or rather at the time of the execution of the deed of conveyance, be deducted from the purchase-price of the property, so that in any event Sawyer, the complainant, would not be obliged to pay more than $20,000 for the property, hut upon whichever ground this decree was placed, I think it was erroneous. In reference to the first ground, it will he observed that there is no averment in the bill of any trick, fraud, or contrivance by reason of which Sawyer, complainant, was induced to execute under his hand and seal the pax>ers introduced iu evidence in this note, much less is there any proof in support of such averment had it been made. No principle of law, iu courts of equity as well as in courts of common law, is better settled than that all negotiations by parol, prior to the execution of a written contract, are merged in such contract, and most especially in a contract under seal, and that a party will be estopped from *8proving such was not the contract between the parties, unless the party alleges that his signature was procured by fraud, imposition, or other dishonest practices. To allow a deed or other instrument, evidenced in the most solemn manner any written agreement can be, to be set aside and overthrown by the loose recollection of a treacherous memory of conversations that preceded the execution of it, would subvert a well-established principle of law, and render such parol testimony of equal force with the most solemn written document. But if we turn to the testimony in this case, I think it is equally clear that the deed of conveyance was executed in precise accordance with the parol terms of negotiation which preceded it.

It is true that the witness makes an ex-parte affidavit to be used on motion for an injunction in this case, which, if considered in and of itself alone, would tend to show that the terms of sale were only $20,000, and that nothing was said upon the subject of back interest on the North notes. This ex-parte affidavit, by a stipulation of counsel, was made a part of the evidence in the case. But Wilson was called before the examiner and subjected to the test of a cross-examination 5 on that examination he says that, after he, Wilson, had told Sawyer the property in question was cheap, Wilson was told to call'on Weaver and ascertain upon what terms the latter would sell the property. Wilson sees Weaver in pursuance of* this agreement, and, as he testifies, Weaver told him that there were eight notes, payable annually, bearing seven per cent, interest; that if Mr. Sawyer would give him $12,000 and talce care of the North notes he could have the building, and the $12,000 he could pay to suit himself; that he reported this conversation to Mr. Sawyer; “Mr. Sawyer then told me to let Mr. Weaver have the papers drawn up, and he would pay him $2,000 in cash, and the balance in two payments of $5,000 each, three and six months, with interest, at the rate of the North notes.” This testimony, together with the ex-parte affidavit of Wilson before alluded to, and the amount of the consideration named in the deed, $20,000, is all the legal testimony on the trial of the cause tending to show what was the consideration agreed to be paid prior to the execution of the deed. The consideration expressed in a *9deed is but slight evidence of the true consideration. The consideration of a deed should be expressed to be such as will support a deed of bargain and sale, and for that purpose $5 is as good as $50,000; both are open in courts of law, as well as in equity, to explanation or even contradiction. Samuel Phillips, the attorney and counsel, who was employed to draw up the deed of conveyance from Weaver to Sawyer, testifies that Wilson, acting on behalf of Sawyer in negotiating the purchase of this property, was, with Weaver, present at his office when the deed was drawn, and that the subject of interest on the North notes was particularly mentioned, as it was the express understanding between Wilson and Weaver that the said Sawyer was to assume the payment of the interest as well as the principal, and to hold the said Weaver harmless from all obligation on said notes. How exactly, this testimony corresponds with that of Wilson, and with the covenant in the deed executed by Sawyer, it would seem to be needless to inquire.

I conclude, therefore, that the learned justice did not pass this decree on the ground that any such fraud or mistake nad been practiced or made as would justify a court of equity in setting aside an agreement under seal. Onthesecondground, the simple question is as to the true intent and meaning of the papers executed by the respective parties.

The deed of conveyance of this property executed by Weaver and wife to the complainant Sawyer contains, among other things, this recital, “ it being understood that Harvey North holds eight promissory notes of said Oastleman and Weaver, each for the sum of one thousand dollars, secured by a deed of trust on said property, recorded in liber 640, folio 474, and the said party of the second part hereby assumes the payment of the same as part of the consideration of this deed, and will hold the said Weaver harmless from all obligations thereon.”

If the language of this covenant, as interpreted by the absurd rule of the common law long since exploded, that requires the words of a deed to be interpreted most strongly against the grantor, be applied in this case, I still think this covenant bound Sawyer to pay and satisfy the notes held by North, together with all interest that had accrued, or might thereafter accrue, thereon. How else could he save Weaver *10harmless from the consequences of having signed these notes. At the time of the execution of the deed of conveyance of this property to Sawyer, the latter executes what is usually termed a deed of trust to secure deferred payments, which contains-the following recital or covenant. “And whereas thereis now an indebtedness on such property of eight promissory notes of S. D. Castlemau and Weaver, each for one thousand dollars, with interest, as will appear by deed recorded in liber No. 643, folio 474, and part of the consideration of this sale is that the said Sawyer shall assume such indebtedness, and pay the same, and hold the said, Weaver harmless therefromP

I think it quite unnecessary to apply the same rule of construction before alluded to to interpret an instrument of this kind. On tbe other hand, the plain and obvious meaning of the language to an ordinary understanding is that there was an incumbrance on the property conveyed of eight promissory notes for one thousand dollars each, with interest, and reference is made to the book and page where this incumbrance is recorded; thus we see that by the deed of conveyance of “Weaver to Sawyer, and also in the mortgage or deed of trust given by Sawyer to Weaver to secure deferred payments of the purchase-price of the property, there is a covenant on the part of Sawyer to pay the North notes and save Weaver harmless from having signed the same. How, I again repeat, could Sawyer save Weaver harmless from the consequence of signing the North notes, if he did not pay the interest which had accrued as well as to accrue? Weaver was as legally bound to pay the back interest on the North notes as he was to pay the principal.

The decree in this case should be reversed, the bill dismissed, and the complainant pay the costs of this suit.

delivered the following dissenting opinion:

On the 15th of July, 1873, the complainant bought from the defendant a lot of ground, for which he agreed to pay $10,000; $8,000 in cash, down, $1,000 on the 1st of January, 1874, and assume the payment of a mortgage-lien on the property, the principal of which was $8,000.

*11I think there can be no doubt that these were the terms agreed upon between the parties, previous to the execution of the deed,

A deed of trust was given by the purchaser to secure the deferred payments, and the mortgage-debt subject to which the property was sold.

At the time of the transaction there were arrears of overdue interest upon the incumbrance amounting to the sum of $1,300, not known to the purchaser, and this is the subject of the present controversy.

The deed of trust contains the following recital, declaring the intention and object of the parties, and.which the defendant insists obliges the complainant not only to pay the principal of the incumbrance with interest from the date of the sale, but also all the previously-accumulated and overdue interest:

“And whereas there is now an indebtedness on said property of eight promissory notes of S. D. Oastleman and said Weaver, each for $1,000, with interest, as will appear by deed recorded in liber No. 604, folio 474 5 and part of the consideration of this sale is that the said Sawyer should assume said indebtedness, and pay the same, and hold the said Weaver harmless therefrom ; and whereas the said parties of the first part are desirous to secure the full and punctual l>ayment of said notes, and all interest, costs, and expenses that may accrue thereon, according to the true intent and meaning of the same.”

It appears to me that this recital, fairly construed, shows that no interest upon the ineumbrauce in question was to be assumed by the purchaser, except such as should afterward accumulate; for it declares the object to be “the full and punctual payment of said notes, and all interest, costs, and expenses that may accrue ” (not that have accrued) “ thereon, according to the true intent. and meaning of the same.”.

The recital also declares:

“And whereas there is now an indebtedness on said property of eight promissory notes of S. D. Oastleman, each for $1,060, with interest.”

The indebtedness here mentioned, it seems to me, is to be understood as meaning a debt of $8,000, bearing interest, and *12the interest to be assumed by the purchaser, as afterward more clearly defined in the same sentence, was the interest which “may accrue,” and therefore only future interest.

I submit that this interpretation is not overstrained, but is that which is most equitable, and certainly most consistent with all the evidence we have as to the intention of the parties.

I think, also, that the question has been, in principle, determined this way by the decision made by Lord Hardwicke, in Roberts vs. Kuffin, 2 Atk., 112, cited with approbation in Roper on Leg., 288. Owen Roberts made his will to the following effect: I give to my son, Thomas Roberts, £200, secured by a mortgage on the estate of Mr. Marriot, and all the messuages, lands, and tenements, for securing the same.

The question in the case was whether the legatee took merely the £200, or that sum with interest. The Lord Chancellor said:

“This entitles the devisee to the principal only of the mortgage, and not to the interest from the time of the execution ef the will, nor from the death of the testator, or any other time whatever. If a man gives £200, due upon a bond by his will, this does not carry interest incurred in the life-time of the testator.”

In the present instance, the deed of trust was given to secure an “indebtedness” of “eight promissory notes of $1,000 each,” “with interest;” in other words, a debt of $8,000 with interest, and that interest such only as “ may accrue.” I cannot see how such language can be made to cover arrears of interest as to which the purchaser was undoubtedly ignorant at the time of executing the deed of trust.

But the counsel of defendant also argued, in support of his position, from the following other terms of the deed of trust: “In case of default or failure in payment of said debts due as aforesaid to the said Weaver or the said Harvey North, or any part thereof, or of any proper costs or charges thereon, or which may accrue thereon, the trustee should make sale of the property on the terras prescribed by the deed; and,' after paying the expenses of the sale and trust, shall pay, in the first place, whatever of said debts, interest, costs, and expenses may be due and unpaid at the time of such sale; secondly, to pay whatever of said debts, interest, costs, and *13expenses may then remain unpaid, although the same may not then have become due and payable.”

Undoubtedly, all the unpaid interest upon the debt was to be paid from the proceeds of the sale; but these provisions of the deed shed no light whatever upon the question under consideration.

If it be settled that the object of this deed of trust was not such as to secure the payment of the overdue and unpaid interest in question, then in case of a sale, under its provisions, it must be conceded that no part of the proceeds could be properly so applied. For, as was said by Lord Hardwicke in the case already referred to, u when there is a devise, in express words, the construction in this court is, that subsequent general words shall not extend it further than the natural meaning of the preceding ones will do.”

It seems to me, therefore, that on the very face of this deed the claimant is entitled to the relief he asks. Dehors the deed, I think the evidence in the cause is still more convincing, but I do not care, in a dissenting opinion such as this, to go over that ground, as the opinion of the court determines that the parties are bound in this case by their solemn deed, and I am willing to take position upon the ground it has selected.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that the present issue is between Sawyer and Weaver only as to the construction of their contract as between themselves.

The question would be widely different, as between Sawyer and the party entitled to the first incumbrance, if a sale were to be made under it. No contract entered into between Sawyer and Weaver could impair that security to the full extent of all the debt and interest from the beginning.