Bellinger v. Taylor
Opinion of the Court
This is an action brought for a partition of certain farm premises situated in the county of Saratoga, State of Hew York. The amended complaint is in the usual form in partition. The defendant legatees and the defendant executors have answered separately. Each demands a dismissal of the complaint with costs. Defendant Hovey •has not answered.
The case comes before the court upon stipulated facts, among which are the following: That, from September, I860, to the time of the death of Caroline Bellinger, in 1895, the plaintiff, Peter Bellinger, and 'Caroline Bellinger were each seized in fee simple of an undivided one-half of the premises described in the complaint; that Caroline Bellinger died in 1895, leaving a last will and testament which has been duly .admitted to probate in Saratoga county, and letters testamentary were issued to "William R. "Waterbury and Charles G. Slade, who qualified and are still acting as such executors; that, on the 12th day of January, 1898, a decree was duly made by the surrogate of Saratoga county in the settlement of the accounts of the executors, which was duly entered, February 18, 1898; that the defendants Mary W. Taylor, William R. Waterbury, Horma Rose Waterbury and Howard Ernest "Waterbury are the residuary legatees named in said will; that the .defendant Louisa Waterbury is the wife of William R. Waterbury,. the defendant Esther Waterbury is the wife of Howard Ernest Waterbury, an-d Edward Hovey is a tenant working said farm; that the parties own'
The plaintiff and the defendants, except Hovey, were parties to the judicial settlement of the accounts in which the will was construed. There has been no appeal from the decree of the surrogate. It is not questioned here and remains as a binding determination between the parties. Under the will there was an equitable conversion of the real estate and a power of sale to give deeds and conveyances was given to the executors. The power of sale, however, was not to be exercised until the death of the life tenant, the plaintiff. This is made evident by two provisions of the decree above quoted, (1) in which a life estate in the real property is
The defendant legatees move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they are not necessary or proper parties to the action. The defendant legatees are not devisees of any interest in the real estate; they take no interest therein and they are not necessary or proper parties defendant in the action. Delafield v. Barlow, 107 N. Y. 535; Salisbury v. Slade, 160 id. 278. The complaint, therefore, must be dismissed as against these defendants, with costs against the plaintiff.
The defendant executors ask a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action against the defendant executors, said executors not being, tenants in common or joint tenants with the plaintiff, with right of actual or constructive possession. In section 1532 of the Code we find the provision setting forth when an action for partition may be brought, and it is necessary that there should be two or more persons who hold and are in possession of real property as joint tenants or as tenants in common, in which either of them 'has an estate of inheritance for life or for years. Side v. Brennerman, 7 App. Div. 276. “To maintain an action for partition of lands, the plaintiff must at the time of the commencement of the action have an actual or constructive possession in common with the defendants of the. lands.” Florence v. Hopkins, 46 N. Y. 184. There is no valid trust created in this will. The executors -have a general power in trust to sell the land, but have not title in said real estate. Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 435, 436; Salisbury v. Slade, 160 id. 290. They have no possession, -actual or constructive, of the premises, and are not tenants in common with the plaintiff. For all of the purposes under the will, the one-half of the real estate, of which Caroline Bellinger died seized, is to be treated as personal property. The will has been construed to mean ■that a sale shall not take place until the death of the plaintiff, he having the life use of the real estate. He has not
Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431, is a case in which it is stated in the head-note that there was an equitable conversion of the real estate but no trust, the executors having a power of sale; and it was held that the will gave the executors no title to the real estate or right to receive the rents and profits. In the opinion, on page 436, the court said: “ But by the seventh clause a sale was directed to be made immediately after the death of the mother. This direction was absolute, and performance of the duty would have been enforced in equity. The execution of "the power was not made dependent upon any contingency or the exercise of any discretion by the donee. Hence, by the power, the land was equitably converted into money from the time the sale was directed to be made and will be so regarded thereafter in equity for all purposes. This is upon the principle that equity regards as done what ought to be done.”
Defendant Hovey is not a tenant in common with plaintiff. The complaint, therefore, must be dismissed as against the executors, with costs against the plaintiff.
Findings and decision may be prepared accordingly.
Judgment accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.