Sheckells v. Sheckells
Sheckells v. Sheckells
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
If the recital in the decree that the cause was submitted upon supplemental bill and the answers thereto which deny the material allegations of the bill be strictly construed, it would seem that no other decree than that dismissing the bill could have been rendered.
“When the material allegations of a petition are all denied in the answer to it, and a hearing is sought by the petitioner upon the petition and answer, it must be a very unusual case where the court will do otherwise -than dismiss the petition. A dismissal is what is required by the fundamental rules of equity procedure.” Bohrer v. Otterback, 2 App. D. C. 78, 79; see also Arnold v. Garter, 19 App. D. C. 259, 264.
In view of the facts that there was a replication to the answers, that a statement of evidence has been certified to, and that it does not appear affirmatively that the cause was set down for hearing, by the plaintiff, upon the bill and answers, the recital will not be strictly construed.
It remains then to consider the pleadings and evidence which have been recited. As the sworn answers are responsive to the allegations of the bill, they are evidence for the defendants, and as evidence will prevail unless overcome by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and clear corroborating circumstances. McCartney v. Fletcher, 10 App. D. C. 572, 599.
The wife’s signature to the deed was necessary to bar any dower interest that she might have; but was not necessary to the assignment of the interest in the personal estate. The latter instrument preceded by two days the execution of the deed by the wife. We see no reason to doubt that it was actually executed on the date it bears. As the property was in the actual possession of the transferee, it was not important to the interest' of anyone that it he recorded as a transfer of property.
It -was properly presented to the probate court in support of the account of the administratrix, whose rights to retain and have credit for the shares of the signers of the same depended upon it. This account on file as an exhibit to the answers of the original bill showed the retention by the administratrix, as assignee, of the distributive shares of all the next of kin save one, who was an infant. It was not attacked by amendment to the original bill. For this reason little or no importance is to be given to the abstract of evidence on the former hearing. The hill of sale, or evidence relating thereto, was not relevant to the issues then on hearing.
Counsel for defendants gave notice of his reservation of the right to offer the instrument in evidence before the conclusion of the hearing. It was not offered, presumably, because of its irrelevancy.
The testimony on the former hearing used in this hearing
The fact raises, then, no more than a suspicion that defendant, in recognizing his moral obligation to carry out his deceased father’s wishes, was really actuated by the desire to put the property beyond the reach of his wife in a possible future proceeding for alimony. Suspicion, however, is not proof.
The evidence relied on was not sufficient to overcome the specific denials of the answers • and the equity court committed no error in dismissing the supplemental bill.
The decree is affirmed without the award of costs.
Affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- SHECKELLS v. SHECKELLS
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Equity; Pleading; Appeal and Error; Verified Pleadings; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Divorce; Fraudulent Conveyance; Dower; Alimony. 1. Where the material allegations of a bill of complaint are denied in the answer, and the hearing is sought by a complainant upon the bill and answer, it must be a very unusual case where the court will do otherwise than dismiss the bill in accordance with the fundamental rules of equity procedure. (Following Bohrer v. Otterback, 2 App. D. C. 78, and citing Arnold v. Carter, 19 App. D. C. 259.) 2. A recital in a decree, that the cause was submitted upon supplemental bill and answers thereto which deny the material allegations of the bill, will not be strictly construed on appeal to this court, so as to warrant a dismissal of the bill, where there was a replication to the answers, and a statement of the evidence upon the hearing upon the original bill has been certified to, and it does not appear affirmatively that the cause was set down for hearing by the plaintiff upon the bill and answers. 3. Sworn answers responsive to the allegations of a bill in equity are evidence for the defendant, and as such will prevail unless overcome by the testimony of two witnesses, or the testimony of one witness coupled with clear corroborating circumstances. (Following McCartney v. Fletcher, 10 App. D. C. 573.) 4. A wife who, incidentally to her suit for divorce, attacks as fraudulent against her the husband’s execution of a bill of sale of his interest in his deceased father’s personal estate, has the burden of proving a fraudulent intent, where the bill of sale was dated, and for anything that appears was executed, a year before the bringing of the suit for divorce, and the husband executed the same, in common with his sisters, for the purpose of carrying out the father’s wishes expressed in an intended testamentary paper which, for want of proper execution and attestation, did not have the force of a will. 5. A husband’s deed of his interest in his deceased father’s real estate must be signed by the wife in order to bar her dower, but her signature is not necessary to his assignment of his interest in 'the personal estate. 6. The fact that a husband’s transfer of his rights in his deceased father’s personal estate has not been recorded is not, where the transferee was in actual possession of the property, important in a suit by the wife, incidentally to her suit for divorce, to have the same set aside upon the ground that it was executed pending the suit for divorce aim dated back. 7. An abstract of the evidence which includes testimony of the husband that he remembered signing only deeds of real estate, taken on a hearing of a wife’s bill to obtain a divorce and to set aside, as in fraud of her rights, the husband’s conveyance to his mother of his interest in his deceased father’s real estate, is of little importance on the hearing of a supplemental bill filed by the wife to set aside a bill of sale by the husband to his mother of his interest in the decedent’s personal estate, upon the ground that it was executed pending the divorce suit and dated back, where the approved account of the administratrix, the mother, which was filed as an exhibit to the answer to the original bill, and which showed her retention as assignee of the husband’s distributive share, and which • was supported by the bill of sale,—was not attacked by amendment to the original bill, since in such circumstances, the bill of sale or tho evidence relating thereto was not relevant to the issues involved in the original hearing. 8. The evidential force of specific denials in sworn answers, that a husband, in assigning personal property to his mother, was actuated by •a desire to render the same unavailable in possible future proceedings for alimony, as alleged in the wife’s supplemental bill to set the same aside as having been made and dated back pending her original bill filed to obtain a divorce, which has been granted, and to set aside a deed of real estate from the husband to his mother,—is not overcome by the facts that, on the hearing of the original bill, the husband’s counsel reserved the right to offer the assignment in evidence, but failed to do so, and evidence that for a year or more before the assignment quarrels had occurred between the husband and wife, where two days after the assignment the wife voluntarily joined in the deed of real estate, and it appears that both the deed and the assignment were made to respect the father’s wishes as expressed in an intended testamentary instrument not legally executed and attested.