Appellant was convicted by a jury on two informations charging petit larceny.1

This appeal raises the question as to whether a certain in-custody statement was admitted into evidence in violation of the Miranda rule.2

The trial judge granted defendant’s request for a Miranda hearing, at which the arresting officer, Estrada, testified that appellant was arrested at 10:30 p. m. and advised of his rights by reading to him from P.D. 47;3 that appellant was asked if he *554understood his rights; that he stated that he knew all about them; that nothing else transpired between the police and appellant prior to the interrogation; and that twenty-minutes after the arrest, while Estrada was filling out a lineup sheet at the precinct, he asked appellant, among other things, whether he had pulled the “Murphy” game4 recently. Appellant said that he had and listed three dates prior to his arrest that he had done so, one of those dates being the same date as the incident involved in the instant case.

The trial judge held that Miranda had been complied with, and Estrada was permitted to testify before the jury, over the objection of defense counsel, in regard to appellant’s statement admitting that he had pulled a “Murphy” game on the night of the alleged offense.

The Court stated in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625:

The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. (Emphasis supplied.)

At 475, at 1625 of 86 S.Ct., supra, the Court stated:

* * * [A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. * * *

“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.)5

It is noted in Estrada’s P.D. 47 form,6 which was read to the defendant, there was no statement to the effect that anything said might be used against him in court.7

On the point of waiver, the Government failed to prove at the Miranda hearing that appellant had been offered counsel and had rejected the offer prior to making his in-custody statement to the police.8 Under the circumstances of this case, appellant’s statement that he knew about his rights was *555insufficient to constitute a waiver of his right to counsel.

Since the record is clear that there was no waiver of the right to counsel, it was prejudicial error to admit into evidence appellant’s statement that he had pulled the “Murphy” game.

We do not find it necessary to reach the other points raised by counsel.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

(dissenting) :

I think the record discloses that after a full Miranda hearing the trial court concluded that appellant was advised of his right to counsel and knowingly and intelligently waived that right. In my opinion this was a factual conclusion supported by the testimony and should not be disturbed on appeal.