The saga of this appeal begins in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia where appellant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit rape.1 After trial by jury he was convicted of both counts. On appeal, those convictions were reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in an opinion which reads, in its entirety, as follows:

PER CURIAM: Appellant was convicted of two counts of assault with in*382tent to commit rape. 22 D.C.Code § 501 (Supp. V 1972). Chapter 28, Title 22, District of Columbia Code reads :

CHAPTER 28. — RAPE

§ 22-2801. DEFINITION AND PENALTY.

Whoever has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will or whoever carnally knows and abuses a female child under sixteen years of age, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

The victims in the two counts with which appellant was charged were females over 16 years of age. Instead of charging under the first part of 22 D.C. Code § 2801 (Supp. V 1972): “Whoever has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will,” the counts in the indictment against appellant charged under the second part relating to carnally knowing and abusing a female child.1 Thus the counts of the indictments are brought under the wrong part of the statute. Since there is no crime of assault with intent to carnally know and abuse a female 16 years of age or older, appellant’s conviction must be

Reversed.

Appellant was subsequently reindicted in the Superior Court for the same offenses.2 He then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a second trial would violate his Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy. The motion was denied by the trial judge after a hearing. Appellant thereupon waived his right to a jury trial, and both parties stipulated that the sole evidence presented to the court at the second trial would be the transcript of the first trial which had been held by the District Court. On defense counsel’s representation that the evidence contained in the transcript was sufficient to sustain a conviction, the trial court found appellant guilty of the crimes charged. From that judgment this appeal followed, the double jeopardy issue being the sole point raised for our consideration.

The general principles which must govern the disposition of this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant concedes that, as a general rule, one who secures on appeal reversal of his conviction is subject to retrial. We do not understand the government, on the other hand, to disagree with appellant’s contention that a judgment of acquittal, whether entered by trial or appellate court, bars retrial for the same offense. Where the parties join issue is on the interpretation to be given the action taken by the United States Court of Appeals in its opinion, quoted above, reversing appellant’s District Court conviction.

Appellant argues that the court there held that the indictment charged assault with intent to commit carnal knowl*383edge and the government had failed to prove that offense, since one of its elements is that the victim be under 16 years of age.3 Under this theory, the effect of the decision, according to appellant, was to acquit him of all charges. The government, on the other hand, contends that the Circuit Court’s holding was that the indictment failed properly to charge any offense, so that appellant is subject to retrial under the established principle that reversal of a conviction on the ground that the indictment was defective does not raise the bar of double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution. United States v. Thomas, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 444 F.2d 919 (1971); United States v. Panzavecchia, 446 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966, 92 S.Ct. 343, 30 L.Ed.2d 286 (1971); Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971).4

Given the somewhat unusual facts of this case, we are persuaded that the Constitution does not prohibit appellant’s retrial. The Circuit Court’s opinion could have avoided the problem presented by in-eluding specific directions on remand. Lacking that guidance, our task is to discern the basis of the court’s holding. We read the opinion to hold that the government failed properly to charge the offense of which appellant was convicted. It is clear that the government attempted to charge assault with intent to commit forcible rape, that appellant was convicted of that offense, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for that offense.5 Accordingly, we are of opinion that the Circuit Court held the indictment deficient for failure properly to state the offense charged. In such a case the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar reindictment and retrial, at least so long as the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense sought to be charged. United States v. Thomas, supra; United States v. Panzavecchia, supra; Goff v. United States, supra.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.6

So ordered.