Cannon v. Hudson
Opinion of the Court
The bill of complaint in this cause presents these facts:
That one Manean Gum on the 10th day of April, 1865, recovered a judgment in the Superior Court of Sussex County against Bobert Hudson for the sum of $147.27, with interest thereon from the 13th day of March, 1865; that said Gum on the 13th day of March, 1866, recovered another judgment against said Bobert Hudson for the sum of $121.50, on which judgment was indorsed a credit of $100; that two of complainants, Elisha W. Cannon and George W. Cannon, as assignees of Lemuel Derickson, recovered a judgment in said Superior Court to the October Term, 1867, against said Bobert Hudson, for $146, with interest from May 24,1866; on which judgment sundry credits were indorsed; that at the times of entering said three judgments the said Bobert Hudson was seised and possessed in fee simple of one tract of land situate
“ That if said proceeds of sale of said tract of 50 acres of land be applied to said three older judgments, the said proceeds of sale of said 50 acres of land will pay off said three-first judgments, and a part of said judgment Mo. 327 to-October Terna, 186S, of said superior court, of said H. W. Long, assignee as aforesaid, and will leave said judgment of' said Elisha W. Cannon and George W. Cannon, of $132, Mo. 189 to October Term, 1871, as wholly due and unpaid, which is not a lien on said tract of 100 acres of land ; and that said Elisha W. Cannon and George W. Cannon are in danger of losing their said last-named judgment; although if said three first judgment creditors be compelled to proceed against said tract of 100 acres of land, the same will sell for enough to pay their said three older judgments. That the whole of the-personal estate of said Robert Hudson aforesaid has been sold, and $603.30 thereof applied to judgment of said Henry W. Long, assignee as aforesaid; and no part of said personal estate has been applied towards the said three older judgments,, aforesaid, nor to the said younger judgment of said E. W. and George W. Cannon; and the only hope of said H. W.
After the above statement of facts, the complainants pray an injunction to restrain the sheriff from paying over the proceeds of sale of said tract of 50 acres of land to said three older judgments, until the two younger judgments aforesaid are paid, and that the balance, if any, of said sale of said tract of 50 acres, be paid to the said three older judgments; and also that the said Seth Hudson be decreed to pay the balance due on said three older judgments after the payment of any balance, if any, out of sales of said tract of 50 acres; and that said complainants, said Elisha W. Cannon and George W. Cannon, assignees, may be allowed to proceed against the said tract of 100 acres of land.
It is unnecessary to refer at large to the answer. The record evidence mentioned in the complainants’ bill is therein substantially admitted. It is, however, stated that Bobert Hudson purchased the 50-acre tract of land of John T. Long on the day before he, the said Bobert, sold the 100-acre tract to his father, Seth Hudson; and that the consideration price for the said 100-acre tract was the sum of $1,200, $800 of which was paid by the father to the son in cash, and the balance of $400 was secured by judgment note, with warrant of attorney for the confession of judgment; and upon which judgment was confessed on the 2d day of March, 1869.
This cause has been heard on the bill, answer, and exhibits. Ho testimony of witnesses was taken. Although the recital of the provisions of the bill has been tedious and uninteresting, it seemed to be necessary in order to arrive, if possible,, at a proper understanding of the complainants’ real or anticipated wrongs oi’ grounds of complaint.
The first inquiry necessarily is :• Have the complainants presented such a statement of facts to this court as to warrant its equitable interposition? — does their statement of facts come within; the range of equitable jurisdiction ? The complainants seemed to think so; for in their bill its draughtsman
If this be the theory upon which the bill was framed, the doctrine has been wholly misconceived, and is wholly inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. The general principle in respect to the marshaling of assets, as it is called, is that if one party has a lien on or interests in two funds for a debt, and another party has a lien on or interest in one only of the funds for another debt, the latter has a right in equity to compel the former to resort to the other fund, in the first instance, for satisfaction, if that course is necessary for the ■-satisfaction of the claims of both parties, whenever it will not trench upon the rights or operate to the prejudice of the party entitled to the double fund.
But the courts of equity will thus administer relief to parties in cases of double funds which are subject to the same debt, and will, in. favor of sureties, marshal the securities for their benefit-; yet this will be so done only in cases where no injustice is done to the common debtor, for then other equities may intervene. And the interposition always supposes that the parties seeking aid are creditors of the same common debtor; for, if they are not, they are not entitled to have the funds marshaled in order to have a larger dividend out of one fund for those who can claim only against that.
These are familiar. principles recognized in Story and all text-writers on the subject.
“ I admit” (says Chancellor Kent in the case of Cheesbrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 412), “ as a principle of equity, that if a creditor has a lien on two different parcels of land, and another creditor has a lien of a younger date on one of those parcels only, and the prior creditor elects to take his whole demand out of the land on which the junior creditor has the lien, the latter will be entitled either to have the prior creditor thrown upon the other fund, or to have the prior lien assigned to him, and to receive all the aid it can afford him. This is a rule founded in natural justice, and I believe it is recognized in every cultivated system of jurisprudence.”
The bill is dismissed, and the costs in the cause ordered to be paid by the complainants within three months, or attachment.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.