United States v. The Laurada
United States v. The Laurada
Opinion of the Court
In this case a libel of information was filed on behalf of the United States against the American steamship Laurada, her tackle, apparel and furniture, praying that the same be condemned and declared forfeited for an alleged 'Violation of section 5283 of the Revised Statutes, containing certain provisions of the neutrality laws'of the United States. - That section is as follows:
“Sec. 5283. Every person who, within the limits of the United States, fits out and arms, or attempts to fit out and arm, or procures to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly is concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any vessel with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service at any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise or*761 commit hostilities against tlio subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, or who issues or delivers a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United Htates, for any vessel, to the intent that she may be so employed, shall be doomed guilty of a liigli misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years. And every such vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all materials, arms, ammunition, and stores, which may have been procured for the building and equipping thereof, shall bo forfeited; one half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the United States.”
The libel as amended contains sixteen counts, which it is unnecessary here to recite. It is enough to say that, collectively, they are sufficiently comprehensivo to allow the government to take advantage of all evidencie adduced in the case tending to show a violation of the (section in question.
The Laurada, being a vessel of about 900 tons burden, cleared from the port of Baltimore for Philadelphia, February 26, 1897, ostensibly for the purpose of having her boiler repaired in the la tier city. Samuel Hughes was master and in command of her when she left Baltimore and continued master and in command of her until after her return from Cuba. On or shortly before the day of her departure from Baltimore she received certain stores, consisting of provisions and ship-chandlery and 200 tons of coal. No other coal was supplied to her until she ueturned from Cuba. There is no evidence that the Laurada at the time she left Baltimore carried any armament or apjiliances suitable for hostile naval operations or any other arms or munitions of war. Nor does it appear that there was then any feature either in her construction or equipment suggestive of a purpose; that she should engage in hostilities of any kind. On the contrary, she was a merchant vessel specially adapted for the transportation of fruit. She was an old steamer. Her boiler was weak and out of repair, and her steam valves were so adjusted as not to allow her to carry more than 60 pounds pressure. At this pressure her speed was from six to seven knots an hour. After leaving Baltimore the Laurada proceeded to the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay and thence; pursued a generally northerly course until she reached a point on the high seas some three or four miles off Cape; Henlopen. She arrived at*this point either late at night or early in the morning. Here, about four o’clock in the morning, the Laurada was met by a tug boat with two life boats and three surf boats. The tug came alongside and the five boats were hoisted on hoard of the Laurada and thereupon Hughes ordered the crew to make haste as it would soon be daylight and “we want to get out of here before we are seen.” The Laurada then proceeded to a point on the high seas several miles off Barnegat, where she met a l.ug and the American schooner Donna M. Briggs about three or four o’clock in the afternoon. The schooner was laden with a large quantity of arms, ammunition and munitions of of war, including, among other things, from eight to twelve cannon. No signals were exchanged between the Laurada and the tug or schooner. The Laurada lowered a life boat, which brought General Soloff from the tug to the steamer. On the following day Captain O’Brien came aboard the Laurada from the schooner. Both itoloff and O’Brien remained on the Laurada until she reached Cuba. It ap
Several witnesses, who, since the Laurada arrived at Wilmington, •went on board of her, testified on behalf of the claimant that they did not observe any tracks, carriages or appliances on her for the use or carriage of guns. This testimony, with the exception of that of Chesbrough, is wholly inconclusive. Chesbrough testified that he was a naval architect, and that a few days before the giving of his testimony he examined the Laurada for the purpose of ascertaining whether she showed any evidence of having or Inning had any appliances for the carriage or use of guns; that on careful examination he failed to discover any such evidence; that no guns of effective size could harm been mounted on the deck of the Laurada for use without fastenings; that such fastenings would have left marks upon the deck; and that he did not find any such marks. The claimant did not produce as a witness anyone who accompanied the Laurada on the trip in question, although it appears that two of her crew were present at the taking of evidence in this case. 1 attach hut little importance to the testimony of Chesbrough so far as his opinion is based upon his failure to find marks of the mounting or fastening of guns on the deck of the steamer. That she was provided wiili planks is beyond doubt. She made use of them in landing men and munitions of Avar in Banes Bay. If grins were mounted on the Laurada, it is not unlikely that such use was made of those planks as to avoid leaving any evidence on the deck of such mounting. Hanson, Hurley and Land, all of them members of the crew of the Laurada, testified positively that at least two cannon were mounted while the Laurada lay at the small key or island near Banes Bay. They could not: have been mistaken on this point. They either deliberately swore falsely
It was urged in argument on behalf of the claimant that the trip of the Laurada was of a purely commercial nature, and that, while she might have been captured or destroyed by Spanish cruisers, there was no infraction of our neutrality laws. The evidence, however, leaves no doubt that she was provided by Hughes, not to be engaged in merely a commercial venture, but to convey, from the point on the high seas off Barnegat, where she met the schooner and the lighter,' either to the vicinity of San Salvador -where she waited for. the expected steamer, or to Cuba, a military expedition or enterprise from the United States against the Spanish government in Cuba. In U. S. v. Murphy, 84 Fed. 609, this court, speaking of what would constitute a military enterprise, used the following language, equally applicable to a military expedition:
“Where a number of men, whether few or many, combine and band themselves together, and thereby organize themselves into a body, within the limits of the United States, with a common intent or purpose on their part at the time to proceed in a body to foreign territory, there to engage in carrying on armed hostilities, either by themselves or in co-operation with other forces, against the territory or dominions of any foreign power with which the United States is at peace, and with such intent or purpose proceed from the limits of the United States on their way to such territory, either provided with arms or implements of war, or intending and expecting and with preparation to secure them during transit, or before reaching the scene of hostilities, in such case all the essential elements of a military enterprise exist. It is not necessary that the men shall be drilled or uniformed or prepared for efficient service, nor that they shall have been organized, according to the tactics, as infantry, artillery or cavalry. It is sufficient that the military enterprise shall be begun or set on foot, within the United States; and it is not necessary that the organization of the body as a military enterprise should be completed or perfected within the United States. Nor is it necessary that all of the persons composing the military enterprise should be brought in personal contact with each other within the limits of the United States; nor that they should all leave those limits at the same point. It is sufficient that by previous arrangement or agreement, whether by conver*767 sation, correspondence or otherwise, they become combined and organized for the purposes mentioned, and that by concerted action, though proceeding from different portions of this country, they meet at a designated point either on the high seas or within the limits ol' the United States. Under such circumstances a military enterprise to be carried on from the United States exists within the meaning of the law. * * * The fact that the cargo of arms and munitions of war on the Uaurada was in excess of the amount 1hat could bo used in warlike operations by the men who were transferred to the Uaurada off Barnegat is not of itself inconsistent with the existence of a military enterprise on the Uaurada.”
The evidence excludes the idea that Roloff and the other men who were taken on board of the Laurada off Barnegat were either merely stevedores or passengers bent on pleasure or business of a peaceful nature; or that they were unassociated individuals who, without preconcert or combination among themselves, sought transportation with the sole intention of enlisting in Cuba iu the cause of the Cuban insurgents. They proceeded from ibe United States, and went aboard of the Laurada by preconcert and in a body. Arms, ammunition and munitions of war were iu tlieir possession and subject to their control and use. They broke open boxes and armed and uniformed themselves. They drilled. They declared their intention to fight the Spaniards in Cuba. When Hughes,off San Salvador, after waiting over a week for an expected steamer, proposed that they should go on an expedition, which was in fact an expedition to Cuba, they neither expressed surprise nor asked for any explanation of the purpose of the expedition, but instantly signified their willingness to go. One of (heir number, having repented, of his determination, went on board the Donna M. Briggs intending to return north, but was forced to proceed with the expedition. Hughes, in view of his subsequent conduct, must have been aware of the character of the expediiion before he left Baltimore. He provided the Laurada and coaled and provisioned her for the transportation of men and munitions of war at least to Ban Salvador, on their way to Cuba. There can be no reasonable doubt that (he men taken on the Laurada off Barnegat were a military expedition or enterprise against Spanish dominion in Cuba. Providing transportation for a military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the United States is providing the means for it, within (he meaning of section 5286 of the Revised Statutes. Wiborg v. U. S., 163 U. S. 632, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127, 1197.
But this libel has been filed under section 5283. Did Hughes, within the meaning of this section, within the limits of the United States flt out and arm, or attempt to fit out and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or was lie, within the limits of the United States, knowingly concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of the Laurada, with intent that she should be employed in the service of the Cuban insurgents, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects or property of ihe King of Spain? If so, the Laurada, lira- tackle, apparel and furniture, became liable to forfeiture. If not, whaiever other of-fence Hughes may have committed against the neutrality laws, there can be no decree of condemnation under this libel. It is not necessary to a forfeiture that the furnishing, fitting out or arming of a vessel for the prohibited purpose should be completed within the limits of the United States. It is sufficient that, by prearrangement within
“It has been conclusively determined that It is not necessary that the vessel be armed or manned for the purpose of committing hostilities before leaving the United States, if it is the intention that she should be so fitted subsequently.”
In The Carondelet the court said:
“When the arming is on the high seas, through another vessel, proof that both were dispatched from our ports as parts of a concerted scheme made here, is justly held proof of ‘an attempt, within the limits of our jurisdiction, to fit out and arm’ the vessel with intent to commit hostilities, and hence within the statute.”
If the men and munitions of war had been taken on board of the Laurada at Baltimore, and if she had there taken the schooner in tow, instead of at the point off Barnegat, the legal aspect of the case would in nowise be changed.
In order that the Laurada may be declared forfeited, it is necessary that Hughes should have had “within the limits of the United States” the intent that she should be employed in the service of the Cuban insurgents “to cruise or commit hostilities” against the subjects or property of the King of Spain. If such intent was not formed within those limits, but only beyond them, there was no offence under the section, and there can be no forfeiture. The intent which is denounced by the section is one which is fixed, absolute and unconditional. In U. S. v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445, the court, having under consideration section 3 of the act of April 20, 1818, which is substantially the same as section 5283, said:
“The offence consists principally in tbe intention with which the preparations were made. These preparations, according to the very terms of the act, must be made within the limits of the United States; and it is equally necessary that the intention with respect to the employment of the vessel should be formed before she leaves the United States. And this must be a fixed intention; not conditional or contingent, depending on some future arrangements.”
Much stress was laid during the argument on behalf of the government on the proposition that the Laurada, being an American vessel, was to be considered within the limits of the United States, although on the high seas; and that, if Hughes, while on that vessel, either off San Salvador or at any other point on her way to Cuba, was knowingly concerned in furnishing, fitting out or arming her with the intent on his part, first formed at that time, that she should commit hostilities against the subjects or property of the King of Spain, such intent was in a legal sense formed within the limits of the United States, and the Laurada thereby became liable to forfeiture. Assent cannot be given to this proposition. While the United States possesses and exercises jurisdiction over many matters transpiring on American vessels on the high seas, including certain of-fences committed on them, such vessels are clearly not within the
Section 5283, in its application to the libel, requires that the Laurada should, before leaving the waters of the United States, have been intended to “be employed in the service” of the Cuban insurgents, to “cruise or comxnit hostilities” against the subjects or property of the King of Spain. Either an intent that she should so cruise or an intent that she should so commit hostilities is requisite for her condemnation. There is no evidence of any intent formed in the United States that she should cruise. Indeed the circumstances disclosed repel the idea. Was she or not intended to commit hostilities? It is not the purpose of the neutrality laws in any manner to check or interfere with the commercial activities of citizens of the United States or of others residing in the Unit (id States and interested in commercial transactions. Mere commercial ventures in contraband of war are not prohibited by those laws. In The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, the court said:
“There is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit; and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty o£ confiscation.”
In The Carondelet, 37 Fed. 799, the court said:
“Commercial transactions by neutral nations in contraband of war, according to the long-established doctrine of this country, it must be remembered, are as legitimate and free as traffic in any other description of merchandise, subject only to the risk of capture by the belligerents. A vessel, by merely engaging in bona fide contraband trade, does not violate the statute, or our neutral obligations, even if the trade be in armed vessels.”
Nor is it an offence under the neutrality laws to transport unassociated persons from the United States to a foreign country, although they have a known intent to enlist in foreign armies, or to transport such persons, so intending to enlist, and munitions of war, in the same ship. Wiborg v. U. S., 163 U. S. 632, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127, 1197.
In these and other instances serious embarrassment may result to a friendly power, engaged in hostilities, by reason of the men, munitions, arms and engines of war furnished to its enemies from this country. But such traffic and transportation, though liable io interruption through capture by the friendly power for its own protection, involve no breach of a real neutrality on our part, and are permitted by onr laws out of consideration for the commercial prosperity of the people. The purpose of the neutrality laws is, however, to prohibit acts and preparations on the soil or waters of the United States, not originating from a due regard for commercial interests,
The term “hostilities” is certainly not expressly limited in its scope by the section to strictly maritime warfare, and may include all hostilities for which a vessel is adapted. A vessel, whether ‘armed or unarmed, is in and by itself a harmless thing. It is the use for which she is intended or to which she is put that determines whether she is an instrument of hostility. It can be of but little importance whether, on the one hand, she carries guns suitable for naval engagements or the bombardment of fortresses, or, on the other, has her crew firmed with rifles.and ammunition to effect a hostile and violent landing of a military expedition. In either case human agency converts the otherwise harmless thing into an engine of war. In U. S. v. The Mary N. Hogan, 18 Fed. 529, the court said:
“Several examinations by experts on behalf of the government previous to the seizure’ failed to discover any repairs or preparations indicating any intended service in military or naval operations. No arms, ammunition, or other warlike appliances were on board. From the evidence it clearly appears that though the Hogan was wholly unadapted to effective naval operations against any considerable organized opposition, she could be of the greatest service°to the insurgents by her light draught and considerable speed in landing or taking off men at unprotected points on the coast of Hayti by watching her opportunities of running in and out, as well as in offensive demonstrations against defenseless parts of the island, with little to fear from the slight naval resources*771 of the lawful government. * * * The evidence shows, therefore, a hostile expedition organized and dispatched from our ports in separate parts, to be united a.t a common rendezvous on the high seas, and to proceed thence to Hayti, in completion of the original hostile purpose with which the different parts were dispatched from our shores. Such an expedition is as much within the prohibition of section 5283 of the Revised Statutes as if all its parts were united and complete upon one single vessel at the moment of its departure.”
In The City of Mexico, 28 Fed. 148, the court said:
“Whatever may have been the intention of the legislators regarding the particular class of hostilities they desired to prevent, — all we have to decide from is the language with which they have clothed their ideas, and this is broad enough to include all classes of hostilities. It has been ably argued that unless the vessel is so armed that she herself can be the offending party or thing, or, in other words, carries such an armament as can throw projectiles from her port, or is equipped as a man-of-war or armed vessel, the statute will not apply. The terms ‘peaceful’ and ‘warlike,’ ‘friendly’ and ‘hostile,’ are thoroughly recognized; and the line so plainly marked between what should he the course and conduct of a vessel engaged in a, peaceful commercial venture, and one fitted, prepared, and intended for hostilities, is so distinct and well defined as to permit no mistake, nor require a reference to a judicial decision. A peaceful act, a peaceful voyage, cannot he a hostile one; nor can acts looking towards war or enmity escape from the general term ‘hostilities.’ * * * But when it is intended that a. vessel shall herself be part and portion of a hostile expedition; that she shall carry troops, not for the purpose of making quiet and unopposed landing, and leaving them to take the risk of war subsequently, but making for them, or with them, if found necessary, a forcible and hostile landing; standing ready to put them on shore, or receive them on board defeated; to convey and furnish them with arms, ammunition, and stores; to act as a base of supplies and operations, ready to assist in committing any hostile acts that can be completed by armed men, she sharing all chances of success or defeat, and under the direct orders and control of the commander of a hostile expedition, — it cannot be admitted that her acts would he anything but hostilities. A vessel is a passive instrument, and is hut made the means of success; and it matters hut little, in the effect of her hostilities, whether she throw shot and shell from her ports, or dispatch boat-loads of armed men from her gangways.”
There was some evidence, however, in both of these cases tending to show not only that the vessel was to be employed in the service of the insurgents, but an intended armament of the vessel. No case has been cited, nor am I aware of any case, which directly supports or refutes the proposition, that, if Hughes provided, coaled and provisioned the Laurada in Baltimore with intent then and there that she should transport a military expedition from the United States, in aid of the Cuban insurgents, to Cuba and there effect the landing of that expedition with arms and munitions of war, he, within the meaning of the section, knowingly was concerned in the furnishing of that vessel with intent that she should be employed in the service of the insurgents to commit hostilities against the subjects or property of the King of Spain. The decision of this case does not require the determination of that point. A forfeiture cannot be declared unless Hughes, while within the limits of the United States, intended that the Laurada should commit hostilities against such subjects or property. If it be assumed that the landing by the Laurada of the expedition on the shore of Cuba might have constituted hostilities within the meaning of the statute, it was necessary that the furnishing of that vessel should have been with the intent, within the limits
It was urged on the part of the government that even if the original design was that the Laurada should transfer the military expedition, together with the munitions of war to the expected steamer at or near San Salvador, and not go to Cuba, there was a scheme or plan, prearranged within the limits of the United States, under which the Laurada and the other steamer were to meet and co-operate in carrying out the unlawful purpose of landing the expedition in Cuba, that the Laurada furnished a link in the chain of criminality, and that, therefore, she offended in the same manner as if she had been originally intended to effect the landing in Cuba. I have given much consideration to this, point, but am unable to adopt that view. The Laurada is guilty, if at all, only in so far as the intention of Hughes, formed, in this country, with respect to her use, made her guilty; and she could not be guilty unless she was intended as the instrument to commit hostilities. The transportation of the military expedition over a part of its way to Cuba did not constitute hostilities, although Hughes might have been punished under section 5286 for providing means for such an expedition. If the expected steamer had appeared pursuant to prearrangement made in this country and had taken the military expedition from the Laurada off San Salvador to Cuba, then if either vessel was guilty, it would have been that steamer and not the Laurada. In the case of The Carondelet, above referred to, the libel was filed against that vessel, under section 5283, alleging that she had been fitted out and armed, and laden with cannon, arms and munitions of war, with intent to enter into the service of “certain rebels in insurrection against the organized and recognized government of the republic of Hayti, and to commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, and property of that republic.” It was claimed on the part of the government that “either on the high seas or at Sarnana. the arms are to be transferred to the steamer Madrid, now fitting up for warlike uses at this port, and nearly ready to sail; that the Madrid, thus armed, is to join Hippolyte’s forces; and that the Carondelet is a mere tender to this enter
“If there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the Madrid is not designed to go to Samana, to be delivered there in completion of a contract of sale to the Dominican republic, but to go direct to Hippolyte, taking her armarhent, by a preconcerted arrangement, from the Carondelet on the high seas, in that case, whether the Carondelet could or could not be refused a clearance under section 5290, the Madrid, according to the cases of The Meteor [17 Fed. Cas. 178] and The Mary N. Hogan, 18 Fed. 538, might be seized and forfeited under section 5283; but not the Carondelet; for the latter, upon the facts assumed, would not be designed ‘to cruise or commit hostilities’ against anyone, but only to complete the arming of the Madrid, which is not a ground for forfeiting the Carondelet. She. might be captured by the belligerents, but would not come within our statute.”
I am forced to the conclusion that the proceedings against the Laurada cannot be sustained; and the libel is therefore dismissed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- THE LAURADA. UNITED STATES v. THE LAURADA
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published