Arbolay v. Vettori

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE ANGEL LUIS ARBOLAY, : Plaintiff, : v. : Civ. No. 19-976-LPS SPO BRYAN VETTORI et al., Defendants. : Angel Luis Arbolay, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION February 19, 2020 Wilmington, Delaware U.S. District Judge: INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Angel Luis Arbolay (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution in Wilmington, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’ (D.I. 3) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed 7 forma pauperis. (D.1.5) The Court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(a).

II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that on August 15, 2019, unnamed law enforcement personnel and probation officers performed an illegal entry and search where Plaintiff was located. (D.I. 3 at 6) Plaintiff alleges that he was tackled, slammed, kicked several times, and thrown against a toilet by Defendant State Police Officer Brian Vettori (“Vettori”) and sustained injuries. (Id at 6) He was detained and then taken to Delaware State Police barracks, where he was processed. (Id.) Later, he was taken to the hospital for treatment. ([d.) Plaintiff alleges that false accounts of the events and false reports were generated to cover up the actions of the officers on the scene. (/d.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.

WI. LEGAL STANDARDS A federal court may properly dismiss an action sva sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ba// ». Famigho, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (én "When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal nght, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds prv se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neiteke v. Wilkams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Be// Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Wilkams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Jobnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 10.

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, ate not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give tise to an entitlement to relief. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. IV. DISCUSSION The Complaint names as a defendant Detective Patrick McAndrew (“McAndrew”). The Complaint, however, contains no allegations directed towards McAndrew.

A defendant in a civil rights action “cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he [] neither participated in nor approved,” personal involvement in the alleged wrong is required. Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Pole County v. Dodson, 454 USS. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that liability in § 1983 action must be based on personal involvement, not tespondeat superior). Such involvement may be “shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho ». Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 Gd Cir. 2005).

As pled, the Complaint fails to state a facially-plausible claim against McAndrew. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Therefore, he will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)@ and § 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with his claim against Vettori.

IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) dismiss Patrick McAndrew pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)@ and § 1915A(b)(1), as the claims against him are frivolous; and (2) allow Plaintiff to proceed with his claims against Bryan Vettori.

An appropriate order will be entered.