Lewis v. Superlodge Motel

United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Lewis v. Superlodge Motel

Trial Court Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE ROBERT CHARLES LEWIS, : Plaintiff, :

v. : Civil Action No. 23-874-CFC SUPERLODGE MOTEL, et al., : Defendant. :

Robert Charles Lewis, Pittsgrove, New Jersey. Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April4f 2024 Wilmington, Delaware

“ULAG CONNOLLY, Chief Judge: Plaintiff Robert Charles Lewis appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4) The Court proceeds to screen the Complaint (D.I. 2) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who was residing in Delaware when he filed this action,' names as the sole Defendant the Superlodge Motel, located in Delaware. Plaintiff alleges that an employee charged him for a weeklong stay in a handicap accessible room, and then assigned him to a regular room, which he could not enter on account of his disability. He seeks $10 million in damages. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Bail v. Famiglio,

726 F.3d 448, 452

(3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 229

(3d Cir. 2008).

' Plaintiff is currently in a rehabilitation facility in New Jersey.

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Weitzel,

957 F.3d. 366, 374

(3d Cir. 2020). Rather, a claim is deemed frivolous only where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.’” Jd. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough,

184 F.3d 236, 240

(3d Cir. 1999). A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662

(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544

(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that

a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby,

574 U.S. 10

, 12 (2014) (per curiam). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See

id. at 11

. A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify

allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

809 F.3d 780, 787

(3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id.

Il. DISCUSSION This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. There is not federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiff brings no federal claims, see

28 U.S.C. § 1331

and there is not diversity of citizenship jurisdiction because both Plaintiff and Defendant are Delaware citizens, see

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(a). Accordingly, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice. This Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

Reference

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