IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE RACQUEL LEWIS, : Plaintiff Vv. Civil Action No. 23-1276-RGA AT&T CORPORATE,

Defendant.

Racquel Lewis, Wilmington, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

May 10, 2024 Wilmington, Delaware

Kohat Lede — Plaintiff Racquel Lewis appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.|. 5). She commenced this action on November 8, 2023. (D.I. 3). Pending is a motion to seal. (D.|. 1). The Court proceeds to screen the Complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(B). BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that Defendant AT&T has been intercepting, surveilling, and otherwise tampering with her phone calls and wordpress website account. She also appears to allege that Defendant “synced” her account to social media. (D.I. 3-2). She states that she is bringing a wide range of civil and criminal claims. She requests $30 million in damages. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of

(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio,

(3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also

(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

(3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007).

A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Wetzel,

(3d Cir. 2020). Rather, a claim is deemed frivolous only where it relies on an “indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” /d. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough,

(3d Cir. 1999). A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby,

, 12 (2014) (per curiam). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See

at 4 1. A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

(3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show’ that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. /qba/,

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

DISCUSSION Plaintiffs Complaint, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her, barely states anything that could be considered a factual allegation. Such facts as are stated do not begin to describe any plausible cause of action against AT&T. In other words, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any of the legal theories she raised, and there is no plausible manner in which she could state a claim based on her allegations. Amendment is therefore almost certainly futile. Nevertheless, | will permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if she does so within twenty-one days of today. Plaintiff's motion to seal will be denied. There is a "strong presumption of openness [which] does not permit the routine closing of judicial records to the public." Miller v. Indiana Hosp.,

, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff has not met the “heavy burden" of showing that "disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury” to her, Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen,

(3d Cir. 1984), or that closure is "essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest," Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty.,

(1982). CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(ii). An appropriate Order will be entered.