IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

TAMIKA SHINTEL ANDERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 24-617 (MN) ) MERIDIAN BANK, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tamika Shintel Anderson, Wilmington, Delaware – Pro Se Plaintiff

May 12, 2025 Wilmington, Delaware ere REIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff Tamika Shintel Anderson, of Wilmington, Delaware, initiated this civil action pro se by filing a form Complaint (Pro Se), alleging breach of contract by Defendant Meridian Bank. (D.I. 2). Plaintiffhas been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4). The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(b). I, BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of screening the Complaint. See Shorter v. United States,

, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). Apart from bracketed text, the allegations below are as they appear in the Complaint. On July 31, 2020[, Plaintiff] signed a mortgage [p]ackage consisting of a promissory note and security [i]nstrument[,] herein called a mortgage[,] with [Defendant. Defendant] sold the package to PennyMac [in] April [of] 2021[.] PennyMac [is the] servicer of the aforementioned mortgage that [Plaintiff] is named as the mortgagor and [also] as the borrower [for,] that MERS is named as the mortgagee [for, and] that stipulate[s that] the [b]orrower is lawfully seized of [sic] the estate[. This] mean|[s] the property commonly known as 103 S. Harrison St[.] 1s unencumbered except for encumbrances of record (Agent Case number 071-1976594-703[), and] prior to [Plaintiff] signing said mortgage[,] there were only two extant encumbrances of record on the property[,] 103 S. Harrison St[.] [Defendant] was discharged and recorded as such on July 31, 2020[,] with Angel M. Rivera[,] instrument number 20021107- 0107944[.] There was no signature with [Defendant] or MERSJ, and] there is no int[e]rest or [r]ight with PennyMac. The power was [Plaintiffs] signature[. Defendant] implied that it was the source of the funding for the transaction associated with this mortgage package. [Defendant] failed to inform [Plaintiff] that the transactions [were] coming from the power of [Plaintiffs] signature[,] not [Defendant]. (D.I. 2 at 5). These are the only allegations in the Complaint. The Complaint alleges no injuries and seeks no relief. (See

).

II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of

(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio,

(3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also

(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

(3d Cir. 2008). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleading is liberally construed, and the complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007). A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Wetzel,

, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Rather, a claim is deemed frivolous only where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.’”

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough,

(3d Cir. 1999). A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby,

, 12 (2014) (per curiam). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See

. A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well- pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

(3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal,

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

III. DISCUSSION Even when liberally construing Plaintiff’s pleading and reviewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to her, the Complaint must be dismissed as frivolous, pursuant to 28 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), because it relies on indisputably meritless legal theories. See Dooley, 957 F.3d. at 374. The Complaint is also deficient pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, as it does not state a claim for relief, but amendment is futile because the legal basis of the pleading

is without merit. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(i). Amendment is futile. An appropriate Order will be entered.