Davidson v. Kalmbacher
Opinion of the Court
If the averments of the fifth defense are true, they present a valid defense of imputed contributory negligence. 7-8 Huddy Automobile Law, 9th Ed., 353. See also Campbell v. Walker, 2 Boyce 41, 49, 78 A. 605; Igle v. People’s Railway Co., 5 Boyce 376, 93 A. 666. It cannot be held, therefore, that they are “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or frivolous”. If the averments are so “ambiguous, uncertain and indefinite” that plaintiffs cannot reasonably be required to fram'e a responsive pleading (and this seems doubtful), the proper motion is not one to strike under Rule 12 (f) but for a more definite statement under Rule 12 (e). The motion to strike must be denied.
What the plaintiffs admittedly seek to accomplish by the motion for summary judgment as to the fifth defense is to eliminate from the trial of the case the question of joint enterprise or joint control. Without that, Gibstein’s negligence, if any, is not imputed to Davidson. See authorities cited supra; also Island Express Inc. v. Frederick, 5 W. W. Harr. 569, 171 A. 181. However, even if the issue of joint enterprise be eliminated from the case at this stage, plaintiffs would not be entitled to a judgment for all or part of their claim. They would still have to prove all the necessary elements of a negligence action to the satisfaction of a jury in order to obtain any judgment.
In some circumstances, the Court may under Rule 56 (d) enter an order which would eliminate the necessity of proving uncontroverted facts. “The procedure authorized in that
The motion for summary judgment must be denied. Plaintiffs may, of course, still proceed as indicated. An order to this effect will be entered.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.