State v. McKnight

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. Nos. 2206012342 A&B ) MILIK MCKNIGHT, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER This 25th day of June 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Milik McKnight’s Motion for Correction of Sentence, 1 and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that: 1. Defendant Milik McKnight (“McKnight”) was convicted after a bifurcated trial in this Court of Attempted Murder First Degree, Conspiracy First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”), and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. The verdicts on all but the PFBPP and PABPP charges were returned by the jury in the “A” case.2 The Court found him guilty of PFBPP and PABPP in the “B” case after he waived his right to a jury trial on those charges. 3 He was sentenced to a total of 23 years of

D.I. 49 (ID No. 2206012342A); D.I. 28 (ID No. 2206012342B) Subsequent references are to ID No. 2206012342A.

D.I. 23.

Id. unsuspended Level V time followed by decreasing levels of supervision.4 In particular, he received an enhanced, unsuspended sentence of five years at Level V on the PFBPP charge. 5 2. He now moves for correction of sentence alleging that the enhanced sentence on the PFBPP charge violated the dictates of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v. United States.6 In particular he contends that because a sentencing judge “can do no more than stay consistent with the Sixth Amendment than determine the crime with what elements a defendant has been convicted,” he was entitled to have a jury determine the factors that enhanced his sentence on the PFBPP charge.7 3. The PFBPP count of the Indictment charged McKnight with possession of a firearm “after having been convicted of Robbery 1st Degree, a felony or crime of violence, in case number 1411008862 in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County on or about August 4, 2015.” 8 Pursuant to 11 Del. C.

§ 1448(e)(1)(b) any person convicted of a violent felony within the previous 10 years shall receive a minimum sentence of five years at Level V.9 Robbery First Degree is a violent felony. 10

D.I. 25. Id. 602 U.S. 821 (2024).

D.I. 49.

Indictment, Count IV, D.I. 2.

11 Del. C. 1448(e)(1)(b).

11 Del. C. 4201(c).

4. Pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(a), the Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 11 A sentence is illegal if it violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize. 12 The Court may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided for the reduction of sentence which is 90 days of the imposition of sentence. 13 5. Here, the Court need not determine whether the motion more properly is one to correct an illegal sentence, and thus cognizable, or a time barred motion to correct a sentence illegally imposed. Nor, need the Court consider whether Erlinger may be retroactively applied to McKnight’s case. The Court need only consult the trial record to determine McKnight is not entitled to relief under either interpretation of the motion.

6. Erlinger provides that ‘“[a] fact that increases” a defendant’s exposure to punishment, whether by triggering a higher maximum or minimum sentence, must be “submitted to a jury” and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.”’14

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).

Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) and (b).

Erlinger 602 U.S. at 833 (quoting Alleyne v United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111-113).

7. Here, McKnight’s sentence on the PFBPP charge was enhanced because he was convicted of a violent felony within the previous 10 years as alleged in the Indictment. 15 McKnight contends that Erlinger and its predecessors require the fact-finder at trial to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was convicted of Robbery First Degree within 10 years of the current PFBPP charge in order for the enhancement provision of 11 Del. C. § 1458(e)(1)(b) to apply. Unfortunately for McKnight, for purposes of this motion, he apparently forgot the fact-finder on the PFBPP charge was the Court, since he waived his right to a jury trial. 16 The Court made just those findings of fact necessary to enhance his sentence at trial when it found him guilty of the PFBPP charge.

THEREFORE, Defendant Milik McKnight’s Motion to Correct Sentence is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.

oc: Prothonotary cc: Office of Conflicts Counsel Jillian Bender, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General Stephen McCloskey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General Milik McKnight (SBI# 00583978) Investigative Services Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(b).

D.I. 51.