Greyhound Corp. v. Clark
Greyhound Corp. v. Clark
Opinion of the Court
Upon review and due consideration of the briefs and record herein we are of the opinion that the trial court’s order granting plaintiff-appellee’s motion for new trial has not been shown by defendant-appellant to be inconsistent with the pronouncements in Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959).
To the extent that any portion of the order granting new trial was based upon the court’s reasoning regarding the applicability of section 92.33, Florida Statutes (1975), such portion may be deemed to be surplusage. In connection with the new trial we hold that section 92.33 is inapplicable to a tape-recorded statement of an injured party.
AFFIRMED, as modified.
. 92.33 Written statement concerning injury to person or property; admission as evidence
Every person who shall take a written statement by any injured person with respect to any
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I believe the trial court abused his discretion in ordering a new trial. There was no error in the admission of evidence concerning a tape-recorded statement of the appel-lee, Joyce A. Clark, and an examination of the record does not support the finding that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The verdict and judgment should be reinstated.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.