The state appeals from orders which respectively suppressed, on Miranda grounds, statements made by the defendant when he was being transported to the police station from the place of arrest and granted the defendant’s Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss charges of possession and trafficking in methaqualone.

Although the arresting officer was the only witness at the hearing, his testimony was in internal self-conflict both as to whether Gutierrez had waived his Miranda rights and whether the admissions now in question were volunteered by the defendant or were the product of subsequent interrogation by the police. Since we cannot interfere with the trial court’s resolution of these conflicts and its implied factual finding that the statements were unauthorizedly secured, e.g., McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1978), the order of suppression is affirmed.

The “(c)(4)” dismissal, however, cannot stand. Even without the suppressed admissions, the defendant’s unsuppressed pre-arrest statement that he was the owner of the tote bag in which the quaaludes were *63found1 was alone sufficient to require denial of the sworn motion to dismiss. E.g., State v. Holder, 400 So.2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

(concurring).

I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court. I would add, however, with respect to our reversal of the order granting the motion to dismiss that the trial judge plainly agreed with our analysis here, stated so on the record, and apparently granted the subject motion, after earlier denying it, as an appellate accommodation to the parties so that both the Miranda and sworn motion issues could be taken up in a single state appeal. Our reversal of the order granting the defense motion to dismiss, then, only vindicates the trial court’s true evaluation of this issue.