Dade County appeals a partial summary declaratory judgment wherein the trial court found that Dade County bears a legal and financial duty to provide post-emergency care to indigent residents of Dade County and to accept promptly from American Hospital such patients once their emergency medical condition has been stabilized.1 *233We have jurisdiction, see Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), and affirm.

Article XIII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution of the State of Florida provides that “[t]he respective counties of the State shall provide in the manner prescribed by law, for those of the inhabitants who by reason of age, infirmity or misfortune, may have claims upon the aid and sympathy of society ... ,” see also Cleary v. Dade County, 160 Fla. 892, 897, 37 So.2d 248, 251 (1948) (Article XIII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution gives Dade County “both the authority and the duty to care for the indigent, sick and poor in all of Dade County .... ”), and this constitutional requirement remains in full effect, albeit at a statutory level, by operation of article XII, section 10 of the 1968 Constitution of the State of Florida.2 Section 154.302, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to place the ultimate financial obligation for the medical treatment of indigents on the county in which the indigent resides, for all those costs not fully reimbursed by other governmental programs or third-party payors.” See § 155.16, Fla. Stat. (1981).

Affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing

Appellants’ motion for rehearing is denied.

dissenting.

Judge Schwartz’s dissenting opinion quite clearly demonstrates that the legal duty of the County to provide and pay for medical care for its indigent residents is nowhere to be found in any statute or other writing referred to in the majority opinion. Since that is the case, I suspect that the unstated premise of the majority’s holding is that no legislation imposing this duty is required, either because the duty was recognized at common law or, if not, because the duty should be recognized by us, the court. The premise is wrong.

Under the common law, no body politic is legally obligated to provide for its indigents; any obligation to so provide must come from legislation. Mandan Deaconess Hospital v. Sioux County, 63 N.D. 538, 248 N.W. 924 (1933); St. Luke’s Hospital Ass’n v. Grand Forks County, 8 N.D. 241, 77 N.W. 598 (1898); Roane v. Hutchinson County, 40 S.D. 297, 167 N.W. 168 (1918); Hamlin County v. Clark County, 1 S.D. 131, 45 N.W. 329 (1890); Patrick v. Town of Baldwin, 109 Wis. 342, 85 N.W. 274 (1901). See Carthaus v. County of Ozaukee, 236 Wis. 438, 295 N.W. 678 (1941) (liability of towns to support poor persons is founded upon and limited by statute, and it is not to be enlarged or modified by any supposed moral obligation); Willacy County v. Valley Baptist Hospital, 29 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930) (same). Thus,

“while there is a strong moral obligation resting upon organized society to relieve all poor persons in its midst standing in need thereof, there is no legal obligation to do so in the absence of a statute creating it, and ... the courts cannot go further than the legislative will has been expressed. To what extent, under what circumstances, at what place and by what agencies poor persons shall be relieved at the expense of the public, are all purely legislative questions.” Patrick v. Town of Baldwin, 85 N.W. at 276.

The majority holding that the expense of post-emergency care to indigent residents must be borne by the public through the County, no matter how well intended, is, in my view, impermissible judicial legislation.

I would reverse the judgment below and direct the entry of judgment in favor of the County.

On Motion for Rehearing En Banc

Motion for rehearing en banc was granted to consider the possible conflict between the panel decision and the prior decision of this court in Dade County v. Hospital Affiliates International, Inc., 378 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (see n. 5 at 46). Fla.R. App.P. 9.331(a), (c). After argument, we find no conflict and therefore deny the motion for rehearing en banc.

Because we deem it to be of great public importance, Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:

Does a county bear a legal and financial duty to provide post-emergency medical care to indigent residents of the county? SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (dissenting).

In my judgment, the panel’s sweeping conclusion that every Florida county — presumably including those which do not maintain hospitals or other medical facilities — is responsible for the hospital expenses of its indigent residents is directly contrary to a prior decision of this court, and, more important, is totally unjustified by the statutory provisions cited by the panel or by any other enactment of the legislature.

In Dade County v. Hospital Affiliates International, Inc., 378 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), we squarely held that because “otherwise indigent” patients were not county prisoners at the time of their treatment, there was no basis for holding Dade County liable for their hospital expenses. At 378 So.2d 46, n. 5, the court specifically rejected the contention that, as a matter of “public policy,” we should extend the coun*234ty’s responsibility “beyond that imposed by Sec. 951.23 [relating to county prisoners].” I do not believe that the present decision can be reconciled with that one.

Nor do the provisions invoked in the panel opinion indicate that Hospital Affiliates was incorrectly decided. It seems clear, for example, that article XIII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution, which in essence became an ordinary statute by virtue of article XII, section 10, Florida Constitution (1968), see Kirk v. Brantley, 228 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1969); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1969), was repealed by numerous subsequent reviser’s bills, none of which preserved it as a part of the Florida statutes. Sec. 11.2422, Fla. Stat. (1981); Shuman v. State, 358 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1978).

Even if this is not the case and article XIII, section 3 remains extant, it nonetheless may not be given the effect ascribed to it by the court. The section states only that the counties shall act “in the manner prescribed by law;” it is thus not self-executing and requires specific supporting and enforcing legislation. Lewis v. Florida State Board of Health, 143 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied, 149 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1963); Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill.2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973). When Cleary v. Dade County, 160 Fla. 892, 37 So.2d 248 (1948), cited by the court, was decided, such a statute indeed existed as section 125.01(4), Florida Statutes, which provided that one of the duties of the Board of County Commissioners was “[t]o have care and provide for the poor and indigent people of the county.” On this basis, the Supreme Court held in Cleary:

[The county] has both the authority and the duty to care for the indigent, sick and poor in all of Dade County by virtue of the statute above referred to and by the provisions of Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. ...

37 So.2d at 251. But section 125.01(4) was deleted in 1959 and replaced by what is now section 125.01, Florida Statutes (1981). This section grants counties powers, but imposes no duties. Insofar as is here relevant, the statute provides:

125.01 Powers and duties.—

(1) The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, this power shall include, but shall not be restricted to, the power to:

⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜: ⅝:

(e) Provide hospitals, ambulance service, and health and welfare programs.

The significance of the distinction was made clear by the Supreme Court itself in Cleary in dealing with the status of the City of Miami at that time:

This section of the charter empowers or authorizes the City “to provide for the care, support and maintenance * * * of sick, aged, insane or indigent persons” and does not expressly make same an obligation or duty of the City.

37 So.2d at 251. The present state of the statutory law with respect to Dade County — and every other — is identical. Even assuming their viability, there is no enabling legislation enforcing the precatory provisions of article XIII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution, and thus no basis for imposing such a duty on the County.

The other statutes upon which the panel relies may be briefly disposed of. The expression of intent recited in section 154.-302, Florida Statutes (1981) must be read in the context of the entire chapter, which deals only with the responsibility, under certain limited circumstances, of the county of an indigent’s residence for medical care rendered in another county. See, St. Mary’s Hospital v. Okeechobee County Board of County Commissioners, 442 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983);1 Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics of University of Florida v. Council of City of Jackson*235ville, 398 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Lewis, 399 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The quotation at p. 233 thus expresses the legislative policy only that, in that situation, the county where the indigent lives should bear the financial burden. It has nothing whatever to do with a supposed obligation by all counties to care for all of their resident indigents.

Finally, section 155.16, Florida Statutes (1981) is part of Chapter 155, which does not deal with county hospitals in general, or public health trust hospitals like Dade County’s (which are governed by Chapter 154) in particular, at all. See 1973 Op.Att’y Gen. Fla. 073-41 (November 26, 1973).2 And section 155.03 in any case expressly provides that “nothing herein shall require the board of county commissioners to expend any funds of the county in the maintenance of such hospital or the administration of such trust.”

Beyond all this, it is simply incomprehensible that the legislature could have disposed of the immensely complex political, societal, technical and financial problems and interrelationships involved in the provision of health care to the indigent by placing the entire burden of doing so upon our counties in two or three lines of off-handedly-considered legislation.3 The result of the majority’s having concluded otherwise will be, I suppose, to require the courts to undertake what are the quintessential^ legislative, executive and administrative tasks of writing the contents and supporting regulations of the Little Medicaid Bill judicially enacted by the Third District Court of Appeal.4 We do not have and should not have arrogated to ourselves the power to do any such thing. I would va*236cate the panel opinion and reverse the order below.5