The departure sentence in this case is reversed because: (1) the facts that were sufficient to violate the defendant’s probation are not sufficient to constitute a clear and convincing reason for imposition of the departure sentence in this case, Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1989); Branton v. State, 548 So.2d 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); and (2) defendant’s pattern of committing new crimes does not meet the standard for departure based on temporal proximity of offenses set out in State v. Jones, 530 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1988).

REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

In my opinion the “temporal proximity” of the crimes for which appellant was sentenced to the crimes for which he was already on probation was such that a departure sentence is justified under State v. Jones, 530 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1988).

*793Appellant was put on probation on February 16, 1988 and then committed the two substantive drug offenses for which he was sentenced here on February 25, 1988 and March 13, 1988. The departure sentence was designed for this defendant.