We reluctantly hold that a de facto marriage relationship, however strong,1 is not a “marriage” and does not constitute a “remarriage” within the meaning of a separation agreement that provides that an ex-husband will support an ex-wife until the death or “remarriage” of the ex-wife. We do not reach this decision because we think the result is fair or just but only because citizens have the right to contract on such terms as they may choose and because, as a matter of law, the words “marriage” and “remarriage” must be held to refer to the state or condition of being lawfully married, that is, a de jure marriage, as distinguished from a de facto marriage. See Schneider v. Schneider, 467 So.2d 465 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); DePoorter v. DePoorter, 509 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So.2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1976).

The trial judge did not err in setting a reasonable attorney’s fee in an amount that was less than the amount the ex-wife actually paid her attorney.

AFFIRMED.