Florida District Courts of Appeal, 1990

Friedman v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.

Friedman v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.
Florida District Courts of Appeal · Decided July 11, 1990 · Anstead, Dell, Letts
563 So. 2d 833; 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4964; 1990 WL 95368 (Southern Reporter, Second Series)

Friedman v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.

Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LETTS, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion. DELL, J., dissents with opinion.

Concurring Opinion

ANSTEAD, Judge,

concurring specially.

This case is not unlike that of Ferreira v. P.C.H. Inc., 774 P.2d 1041 (Nev. 1989). I join in the affirmance here for the same reasons articulated by the Nevada court:

The rental agreement provided in bold capital letters that only persons listed on the contract were authorized to drive the vehicle. The only person authorized to drive the vehicle was Lorie. It is undisputed that Carlo’s brother-in-law, Anthony Tyler drove the car. Further, Lorie never alleged that she did not give Carlo or Tyler permission to drive the car. Therefore, whether Lorie gave the keys to Carlo or Tyler, she breached the contract.
Lorie claims, nevertheless, that she purchased collision insurance from Rent-a-vette and is therefore not liable for the damages that resulted from the accident. The protection Lorie purchased is labeled in the contract “collision/theft damage waiver.” Paragraph 4(3) of the contract provides in all capital letters that “collision damage waiver is not insurance.” Paragraph 4 also provides in all capital letters that the collision damage waiver does not apply if the renter allows an unauthorized driver to drive the automobile. Because an unauthorized driver was driving the automobile at the time of the accident, the collision damage waiver provision of the contract does not absolve Lorie of liability. We conclude', therefore that Rent-a-vette was entitled as a matter of law to judgment against Lorie, and we affirm the district court’s judgment in this respect.

Dissenting Opinion

DELL, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I believe the trial court erred as a matter of law when it entered a summary final judgment on liability in favor of appellee, Alamo Rent-A-Car. Briefly, appellant, age eighteen, rented an automobile from appellee. Appellant *834purchased, as part of her lease, a collision damage waiver. The parties stipulated that, while operating the automobile appellant became seriously ill and asked her companion, also age eighteen, to drive the vehicle. An accident occurred, through no fault of appellant’s companion, when another vehicle ran a stop sign and collided with the rental vehicle. Appellee claimed that appellant breached the lease agreement by allowing an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle.

I would reverse the summary judgment. First, the breach, if any, was a technical breach and not a material breach of the contract. See Burger King Corporation v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Callins v. Abbatecola, 412 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Second, the contract limitation concerning unauthorized drivers, as applied, constituted an unconscionable restriction to the collision damage waiver. See Davis v. M.L.G. Corporation, 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).

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